R v Beale

Introduction

1. Ian Gregory Beale stands to be sentenced after pleading guilty to three offences involving child abuse material. The offences to which Mr Beale has pleaded guilty are: (a) Count 1: using a carriage service to access child abuse material, contrary to s 474.22(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth); (b) Count 2: using a carriage service to access child abuse material, transmit child abuse material and cause child abuse material to be transmitted, contrary to s 474.22(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth); and (c) Count 3: using a carriage service to possess child abuse material, contrary to s 474.22A(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth).

2. The sentencing task is governed by Pt IB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The overriding principle is that the court is required to impose a sentence of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence: s 16A(1) in Pt IB. Section 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 provides a non-exhaustive list of mandatory considerations to be taken into account for that purpose, to the extent that they are relevant and known to the court.

The nature of child abuse material offences

3. The first is the nature and circumstances of the offence. It is trite that, when considering the nature of an offence, a sentencing judge must pay careful attention to the maximum penalty, for the reasons explained in Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [31]: first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick.

4. Each offence here carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 15 years. That is higher than the maximum penalty for the Territory offence of sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 54(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), which is 12 years. A maximum penalty of 15 years serves as a direction to the court that these kinds of offences are to be regarded as being very serious. Other offences in the Criminal Code (Cth) carrying the same maximum penalty include kidnapping a UN or associated person (s 71.9), numerous offences connected with terrorism such as recklessly providing or receiving training in connection with a terrorist act or recklessly directing the activities of a terrorist organisation (ss 101.2(2) and 102.2(2)), robbery (s 132.2(1)), numerous war crimes (e.g. ss 268.29, 268.36, 268.51, 268.54) , procuring a child to engage in sexual activity outside Australia (s 272.14), grooming a child for sexual activity outside Australia (s 272.15) and pre-trafficking marketable quantities of controlled precursors (s 306.3). These offences have in common the capacity to cause significant trauma and lasting harm, in some cases potentially to many people.

5. The seriousness of offences involving obtaining and sharing child abuse material using a carriage service is sometimes sought to be minimised as being far removed from the conduct of those who create such material, as if the interposition of an electronic device with internet connection in a Western society home somehow softens the inherent violence of the acts filmed. While the creation of child abuse material is undoubtedly more serious than its consumption, it does not follow that offending of the kind found here is of a different nature altogether. In truth, downloading and sharing child abuse material is no less serious than pulling up a chair and watching the abuse live. The difference is that the keyboard audience does not have to leave the safety of their home and is often less detectable. Downloading and sharing child abuse material is recognised to be harmful because the appetite for participation in this sordid market is what sustains it: DPP v D’Alessandro [2010] VSCA 60; 26 VR 477 at [21] Harper JA (with Redlich JA and Williams AJA agreeing). The demand for child abuse material creates the occasion for adults across the world to rape and torture young children, film those acts and distribute their obscene images and videos for the enjoyment of their depraved audience.

6. It has accordingly been recognised that, without derogating from the principle of individualised justice, child abuse material offences will ordinarily require the imposition of an immediate term of imprisonment: R v De Leeuw [2015] NSWCCA 183 at [72] (Johnson J, with whom Ward JA and Garling J agreed at [1] and [188]). The Court in that case at [70]-[72] set out a series of principles and propositions that have been recognised to apply to sentencing for offences involving child abuse material, importantly including that general deterrence and denunciation are the paramount sentencing considerations and that limited weight will be given to an offender’s prior good character.

Circumstances of the present offences

7. Central to the determination of an appropriate sentence is the assessment of the objective seriousness of the particular offences in this case. That assessment may be articulated by positioning each offence on a hypothetical range, but that is not essential. The critical task is to identify the features of the offending that inform the assessment.

8. The circumstances of the present offences are set out in a statement of agreed facts. That statement includes descriptions of a sample of the child abuse material files found on various devices in the possession of the offender. The statement of facts also has three schedules setting out online conversations in which the offender participated, which form part of the basis for count 2. The prosecution did not tender any of the actual files the subject of the offences (as to the need for judicial officers to view such material in order to obtain a full appreciation of its nature, see R v Porte [2015] NSWCCA 174; 252 A Crim R 294 at [76] (Johnson J, with whom Leeming JA and Beech-Jones J agreed); and see R v Hutchinson [2018] NSWCCA 152 at [90] (Button J) but cf Hutchinson at [47]- [50] (R A Hulme J).

9. The descriptions of the files are plainly relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offences. That material is so abhorrent that I was initially minded not to include any detail of it in this judgment. However, during the process of writing, I have come to the conclusion that some description of the material the offender accessed is necessary to explain why I regard his offending to be so serious and his complete lack of remorse (addressed below) so troubling. I will preface each paragraph containing detail of that kind with an individual content warning.

10. In assessing the objective seriousness of the offences, I have had regard to the decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Hutchinson at [45], where R A Hulme J (with whom Meagher JA and Button J agreed) helpfully collected a list of factors that may bear upon such an assessment, drawing and expanding upon a similar list in the earlier decision of the Court in Minehan v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 140; 201 A Crim R 243. I will address those factors, to the extent that they are relevant here, in the discussion that follows.

Count 1: Using a carriage service to access child abuse material

11. Count 1 is based on the offender’s conduct between 14 May 2020 and 18 June 2020. The end date for that offence was chosen because it punctuates the most recent amendments to the Crimes Act 1914. The result is that different provisions apply to count 1 on the one hand and counts 2 and 3 on the other hand.

12. Over the period of the dates for count 1, the offender accessed 23 child abuse material files which were stored on his Samsung Galaxy S5 mobile phone. The files depicted real children and at least eight separate children, their ages ranging between six to 12 months old and 15 years old. These same files are included in the charge of possession (count 3) and are described below in my explanation of that count. Count 2: Using a carriage service to access child abuse material, transmit child abuse material and cause child abuse material to be transmitted

13. Count 2 is a rolled-up charge based on the offender’s conduct over a four-year period, between 26 September 2020 and 15 October 2024. Over this period, the offender accessed 107 child abuse material files, including both videos and images, on three different devices. These files are also included in the charge of possession (count 3) and are described below in my explanation of that count.

14. During the same period, the offender also engaged in online conversations with three different users. During those conversations, he both transmitted child abuse material and caused child abuse material to be transmitted to himself. In two of those online conversations, he pretended he was an adult woman interested in sexual engagement with children. There is an aspect of manipulation in that pretence which aggravates the seriousness of the offence.

15. Content warning: this paragraph gives detail of some of the child abuse material transmitted or caused to be transmitted by the offender. In an online conversation with User A, who told the offender they were 15 years old, the offender sent text-based child abuse material and received child abuse material in the form of images from User A. The offender’s messages included graphic descriptions of the sexual activities in which he would like to engage with User A, whom he believed to be a 15-year old girl, and her sister, who User A described as being “almost 11”. While I have not included those exchanges in this judgment, I have of course read them. They are thoroughly disgusting. I say that, not to be emotive, but to give an indication of the gravity of the offending. In an online conversation with User B, the offender sent text-based child abuse material and child abuse material files. He also caused User B to send him child abuse material files, including images and text-based child abuse material, in return. In an online conversation with User C, the offender transmitted text-based child abuse material.

16. The child abuse material accessed on the three devices depicts real children, their ages ranging from four to 10 years old. As with count 1, this material is also highly depraved. The prosecution submitted, and I accept, that count 2 is the most serious of the three offences.

17. The fault element for obtaining material via a carriage service is recklessness. However, the offender’s participation in the online conversations reveals a clear intention to send and receive child abuse material. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended to send and receive that material.

18. As submitted on behalf of the offender, I cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that User A was in fact a 15-year-old female child, as represented by that user in the conversation. It follows that the offending is less serious than if that fact were established. However, it is implicit in the offender’s agreement with the statement of facts that he believed User A to be a 15-year-old female child. That is a relevant factor pointing in the opposite direction.

19. The offender further submitted that it is relevant that there were gaps in time between the different acts on which count 2 is based (for example, a six-month gap during which it is not alleged there was any offending). The offender submitted that these gaps in time make the offending less serious than offending where material was accessed or transmitted consistently, for example daily over an extended period.

20. The submission raises an interesting question. It is not uncommon to hear evidence in these kinds of cases that the offending is explained by a mental condition or the offender having themself been a victim of sexual abuse in their childhood, causing the offender to access child abuse material compulsively and to have little control over their compulsive conduct. On one view, the gaps indicate that this offender did have the capacity to stop accessing child abuse material and repeatedly chose to re-engage with it. On that analysis, the offending might be more serious than, for example, the conduct of an offender driven by a compulsion beyond their control. As this point was not considered at the hearing, in fairness to the offender, I must put it to one side. However, I am not persuaded that the fact that there are gaps in the offending makes it less serious.

Count 3: Possession of child abuse material

21. Count 3 is a charge of possession based on all the material police found when they executed a search warrant on 12 November 2024. Five electronic devices and storage devices containing child abuse material were seized. The items seized were: (a) Samsung Galaxy S5 containing eight videos and 306 images of child abuse material; (b) Samsung Galaxy S8 containing 15 videos and 26 images of child abuse material; (c) Samsung Galaxy S9 containing eight videos and four images of child abuse material; (d) HP Tower Computer containing 91 child abuse material files; and (e) SanDisk USB flash drive containing 11 child abuse material image files.

22. The total number of files containing child abuse material was 469 files. As already noted, there is some duplication between that material and the material relied upon for counts 1 and 2. The material depicted numerous real children, their ages ranging from an infant as young as six to 12 months old to girls aged 15 years old. The nature of the material is highly depraved.

23. Content warning: this paragraph gives detail of some of the child abuse material accessed by the offender. For example, the material on the Samsung Galaxy S5 includes an image of a naked infant female child aged approximately one to three years old having her vagina penetrated by an adult penis; an image of a naked adult performing oral sex on a naked female baby aged approximately six to 12 months old and an image of a prepubescent female child aged approximately three to five years old performing oral sex on an adult penis. These are not animated images. These horrific offences were actually committed against real children and captured in images. This is the nature of the material the offender accessed and retained.

24. Content warning: this paragraph gives detail of some of the child abuse material accessed by the offender. The material on the Samsung Galaxy S8 includes videos of prepubescent females of various ages (six to eight years old, eight to 10 years old and “prepubescent”) being vaginally raped by an adult man’s penis. In one video, a female aged approximately six to eight years old is naked except for “a bondage-style cuff set” with her ankles cuffed to her wrist and neck. She is being vaginally raped by an adult man’s penis.

25. Content warning: this paragraph gives detail of some of the child abuse material accessed by the offender. The material on the Samsung Galaxy S9 includes similarly depraved material including a video that runs for over four minutes depicting a prepubescent female aged four to five years old performing oral sex on an adult penis then being digitally penetrated while he masturbates over her face and ejaculates into her mouth. Similarly depraved material was found on the other two devices, notably including a file on the USB flash drive depicting a female child aged three or four years old having her anus penetrated by an adult man’s penis.

26. At the sentence hearing, the prosecution noted that there is a level of duplication between the material contained on the USB flash drive and the material contained on the phones. The exact proportion of overlap is not known.

27. The relevant fault element for possession is intention. Accordingly, the offender by his plea admits that he intended to possess the child abuse material. Consideration of Hutchinson factors

28. Content warning: this paragraph gives detail of some of the child abuse material accessed by the offender. The most significant factors pointing to these being relatively serious offences of their kind are the fact that actual children were used in the creation of the child abuse material (not including the text-based material); the fact that the files depict children of a broad range of ages including infants and very young children; and the gravity of the sexual activity portrayed, which includes acts as serious as anal penetration of a child aged three or four years old and acts of cruelty such as the vaginal rape of a female child aged approximately six to eight years old while her ankles were cuffed to her wrist and neck. Although the descriptions included in the agreed statement of facts make no explicit reference to physical harm, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that some of the acts depicted must have caused significant physical pain, for example, penile-anal penetration of a three- or four-year-old. Some of the material included children involved in sexual acts with other children and adults which would no doubt result in lasting trauma throughout their lives.

29. I must accept, as submitted by the offender, that the number of files possessed, being 469, was relatively small compared with some cases that come before the court. However, the number is not so small as to place the offences at the lowest end of the range. Hypothetically, an offence in the least serious end of the range might be, for example, possession of a single file containing an animated image of a child rather than an actual child. The present offences are significantly more serious than that. Numerous actual children were actually raped. The offender accessed videos and images of that material over a number of years.

30. The number of different children depicted is not known. The prosecution noted, based on the descriptions provided in the statement of agreed facts, that eight separate children are shown. However, those descriptions were put forward as a sample. It beggars belief that, over the whole 469 files, there were only eight separate victims (if so few victims were pictured so many times, there would be seriousness of a different dimension). I note that, in Hutchinson at [37], the Court recorded that “experienced counsel then appearing for the respondent acknowledged that, unless there was some repetition, given there were 509 files in total there were more than likely 509 victims.” While the number here is unknown, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was significantly more than eight. Furthermore, while I accept that I am required to consider the number of files and the number of different children as relevant considerations in this assessment, there is a certain callousness in treating 469 depictions of child abuse as being significantly less serious than, say, the 32,656 images, videos and documents classified as child abuse material found in the case of De Leeuw. Every file that depicts the sexual abuse of a child as a form of entertainment fit for consumption on the internet is a wicked kind of depravity. It is repugnant to be required to compare the seriousness of possessing “only” 469 such files with the seriousness of possessing 32,656 files. Yet that is the task.

31. One of the factors identified in Hutchinson at [45] is “the proximity of the offender’s activities to those responsible for bringing the material into existence.” It is important to understand how that factor is to be taken into account. In Minehan at [84], the Court cited the guideline judgment of the English Court of Appeal in R v Oliver, Hartrey and Baldwin [2003] 1 Cr App R 28 where the Court said at [11], “the seriousness of an individual offence increases with the offender’s proximity to, and responsibility for, the original abuse”. That is not to say that being distanced from the creator of the material equates to being at the lowest end of the range. Creation of child abuse material is a separate offence. Proximity to the creator would be an aggravating factor, but the absence of that factor is not mitigating.

32. There is no evidence of any payment having been made to access the material. However, the offender did exchange material during the online chats. That is regarded as being akin to selling it. In the guideline judgment in R v Oliver, Hartrey and Baldwin, the Court of Appeal said at [11]: “swapping of images can properly be regarded as a commercial activity, albeit without financial gain, because it fuels demand for such material”. The fact that there is no evidence that the offender sold files at any point is not a mitigating factor; it reflects the absence of an aggravating factor.

33. In the absence of any suggestion of any other purpose for accessing child abuse material, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender did so for his own sexual gratification.

34. I accept, as submitted on behalf of the offender, that the present offending “was not a sophisticated instance of this type of offending”. The offender did not use a VPN to disguise his identity, engage in any elaborate planning or participate in a network of users outside of his one-on-one messaging. Again, this reflects the absence of an aggravating factor. It does not mitigate the offending. His offending remains inherently serious.

35. Count 1 is the least serious of the three offences having regard to the period of offending and the number of files accessed. However, having regard to the depravity of the material, the fact that real children were involved and the fact that material was accessed over a period rather than on one or two occasions, it cannot be regarded as an offence at the low end of the scale.

36. Count 2 is the most serious of the three offences. It is a rolled-up charge involving different kinds of offending, each inherently serious. The period of offending was lengthy. The level of depravity of the material is high and real children were involved.

Circumstances of the victim

37. Sections 16A(2)(d) and (e) of the Crimes Act 1914 require me to have regard to the personal circumstances of any victim of the offence and any injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence. Although the victims of these offences have evidently not been identified, the offences are not victimless: R v Porte at [68]. In Kannis v The Queen [2020] NSWCCA 79 at [126], the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held: … Courts have recognised that the implicit, persuasive presumption that a child has suffered harm as a result of prohibited sexual activity applies no less to cybersex offences than it does to (in person) sexual offences committed against young persons. Circumstances of the offender

38. I am required to consider the offender’s personal circumstances including his character, antecedents, age, means and physical or mental condition: s 16A(2)(m) Crimes Act 1914. According to the pre-sentence report, the offender was born in New South Wales and had two siblings. He is now 67 years old. He told the author of the pre-sentence report that his parents were uncaring and unsupportive and that his sister played the role of his “pseudo mother”. He said his father engaged in physical punishment and described his mother as “mentally manipulative”. The offender’s sister, who was his biggest support, died with dementia in 2025. This had a profound impact on the offender. However, I note that his offending started before then.

39. The offender reported two significant relationships. He was married to his first wife for 14 years and they have two sons together. He told the author of the pre-sentence report that he has a good relationship with his sons and is in regular contact with his first wife.

40. The offender remarried in 2019. That relationship continues. However, the offender stated that he felt socially isolated after the deaths of several friends over the past 15 years and that he has used online services, such as Adult Friend Finder, to build connections with other people.

41. The offender suffers from chronic arthritis and has a history of engagement with mental health intervention for depression, grief and family counselling.

42. The offender has no prior criminal record. The public interest in deterring offences of this kind is such that little weight can be given to the offender’s prior good character: DPP v Smith [2010] VSCA 215 at [23].

43. I am required to consider the probable effect of the sentence on the offender’s family or dependents: s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914. Counsel for the offender submitted that a sentence of imprisonment would have a negative impact on the offender’s current wife. She moved to Australia from China in the late 2010s and speaks limited English. It was submitted that she would have limited community ties due to her limited English. However, there was no evidence to support that submission, and I am not persuaded that it is a matter I can infer. Happily, Australia is robustly multicultural. As at the 2021 Census, almost a third of the population of the Australian Capital Territory were born overseas, predominantly in Asia and Europe, with India, England and China featuring as the top three countries of origin outside of Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2021) ‘Table 7. Country of birth of person by state and territory of usual residence – 2016 and 2021’, Census of Population and Housing: Snapshot of Australia data summary. I quote this statistic only to demonstrate why the submission was not one that could be accepted without evidence.

Contrition

44. I am required to have regard to the degree to which the offender has shown contrition for the offences: s 16A(2)(f) of the Crimes Act 1914. I am not persuaded that he has shown any contrition whatsoever.

45. During the execution of the search warrant, the offender told police what, having regard to his subsequent pleas of guilty, must have been a lie, namely, that he had been hacked some years ago and had been unable to access some of his accounts since that incident. He denied ever “getting into” child abuse material, instead claiming he ended up in a “situation where [he] was the recipient of them”.

46. The offender also denied any knowledge of the Kik account used for the communications the subject of count 2. He claimed that Kik was already installed on the Samsung Galaxy S9 when he purchased it. When questioned further about why the account had the same password as his other accounts, he stated “I’m guessing – sorry, it can only be a guess – is that, um, someone has set it up, knowing my standard password and whatever else. That’s all I can think of.” He denied ever requesting child abuse material or possessing child abuse material on the Samsung Galaxy S9. Those denials are contradicted by the agreed facts underpinning his guilty pleas.

47. The offender is not the only person ever to deny an offence when first confronted by police. What is more troubling is that he appears to have maintained the lie, even after pleading guilty to the offences. He told the author of the pre-sentence report the child abuse material found in his possession was unsolicited, stating “I can’t answer why it led to that.” He said he “didn’t think to call police as [he] wasn’t aware of the process”. He denied using the material for sexual gratification. He recognised that there were numerous victims associated with his offending but “indicated some of the photos were quite old”, as if that ameliorates the impact on the victims, knowing that their images continue to be circulated among paedophiles years after the assaults that created those images. The enduring harm of offending of this kind was recognised in R v Porte at [69], where Johnson J cited the following remarks of Professor Kate Warner in “Sentencing for Child Pornography” (2010) 84 ALJ 384 at 385 (references omitted): The damage done to the children so abused can be, and undoubtedly often is, profound. In addition to the physical and psychological harm from the abuse itself, the New South Wales Sentencing Council has explained that harm may also result from the knowledge, as they grow older, that the material may remain in circulation, heightening the shame and distress associated with being exploited when young and vulnerable.

48. Counsel for the offender submitted the offender understood that the child abuse material “would have significant adverse effects on the children involved” and was “remorseful for his contribution to these effects by contributing to demand for the material.” But there is nothing in the material before the court to confirm that the offender truly has any real understanding of the consequences of his actions. As the author of the pre-sentence report put it, the offender’s insight into his offending “remains incomplete.”

Assistance in the administration of justice and to law enforcement authorities

49. I am required to consider the degree to which the offender has cooperated with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of the offence: s 16A(2)(h) of the Crimes Act 1914. During the execution of the search warrant, the offender provided passwords and passcodes that assisted them to obtain access to various devices and accounts, which undoubtedly assisted police in the investigation of the offences. Some credit must be given on that account. However, at the same time, he told police that his accounts had been hacked, suggesting that another person was responsible for the existence of the child abuse material on his devices. As already explained, that was plainly a lie. He is not to be punished for lying to police, but the lie undermines the benefit of the assistance to some extent. I propose to make some small reduction for assistance by allowing a generous reduction for the pleas of guilty.

Deterrence

50. I am required by s 16A(2)(j)-(ja) of the Crimes Act 1914 to consider the deterrent effect of the sentence on the offender and on other persons, reflecting the sentencing objectives of specific and general deterrence. Regarding specific deterrence, it is notable that the offender only ceased offending following his arrest for the present offending. The Crown has also pointed to the offender’s lack of contrition and insight into his offending as demonstrating a heightened need for specific deterrence.

51. In DPP v D’Alessandro at [21] Harper JA (with Redlich JA and Williams AJA agreeing) held that “the prevalence and ready availability of pornographic material involving children, particularly on the internet, demands that general deterrence be a paramount consideration.” This was cited with approval by Johnson JA in R v Porte at [60] (Leeming JA and Beech-Jones J agreeing) and the primacy of general deterrence as a sentencing consideration for offending child pornography is well accepted: see Mertell v The King [2022] ACTCA 69 at [29]; R v De Leeuw at [72]. This consideration requires sentencing judges to signal to the community that offences of this kind will be dealt with sternly.

Amendments to the Crimes Act 1914

52. As already noted, the Crimes Act 1914 was amended between the period of offending for count 1 and that for counts 2 and 3.

Guilty pleas

53. Until June 2020, a mandatory consideration under s 16A(2)(g) of the Crimes Act 1914 was, “if the person has pleaded guilty to the charge in respect of the offence – that fact”. This was the provision in force at the time the offence in count 1 was committed. Before the decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Xiao v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 4; 96 NSWLR 1 (a case in which I sat as one of the bench of five), s 16A(2)(g) had been understood to have an implied limitation which precluded a sentencing judge from taking into account “the utilitarian value of the plea, as distinct from whether it demonstrates a subjective willingness on the part of the offender to facilitate the course of justice”: Xiao at [226]. In Xiao, the Court held at [278] that, in sentencing proceedings governed by s 16A, the judge is entitled to take the utilitarian value of a plea into account in sentencing.

54. The section was subsequently amended to expand upon the unhelpful direction to have regard to “that fact” by including explicit reference to the timing of the plea and “the degree to which that fact and the timing of the plea resulted in any benefit to the community, or any victim of, or witness to, the offence”. Those are the matters that had previously been understood in the jurisprudence (in New South Wales at least) to be comprehended within the term “utilitarian value”.

55. The offender pleaded guilty on 30 June 2026 after a criminal case conference had been conducted earlier in the month. In Blundell v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 34, the Court of Appeal stated at [14] that “as a general proposition it should be expected that [the discount] will be at least 15%” where it follows a criminal case conference. The basis for this was, in part, to ensure “that persons coming to a Criminal Case Conference do so with confidence that pleas of guilty will attract more than a minimum discount.” There is significant utilitarian value in a guilty plea in matters such as this. It is appropriate to assume that the jury would have had to review child abuse material, which may have caused them significant psychological distress. The value of the plea is tempered by the fact that there was a strong crown case. Conversely, as already noted, I also have regard to the fact that the offender assisted police by providing his passcodes. Taking into account both the guilty pleas and that assistance, I propose to reduce the sentences by a total of roughly 20%.

56. Counsel for the offender submitted that I should also take the guilty pleas into account when considering the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation on the basis that it reflects acceptance and acknowledgement. For the reasons already explained, I am not persuaded that the offender has engaged with the gravity of his offences in any meaningful way. As submitted by the prosecution, his statements to police and more recently to the author of the pre-sentence report reveal that he has no contrition.

Prospects of Rehabilitation

57. Section 16A(2)(n) of the Crimes Act 1914 requires me to consider the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation. Due to the nature of the offending, I am also required by s 16A(2AAA) to have regard to the objective of rehabilitating the offender when sentencing for counts 2 and 3, including considering whether it is appropriate to impose any conditions about rehabilitation or treatment options or to include sufficient time for the offender to undertake a rehabilitation program. I note that s 16A(2AAA) was not in force at the time of the offending for count 1, although the overarching sentencing purpose of rehabilitation still applies.

58. The explanatory memorandum for the introduction of s 16A(2AAA) noted that typically “a non-parole period of 18 months to two years is necessary for offenders to complete a sex offender rehabilitation program while in prison.” The provision accordingly contemplates that, where there is evidence as to the availability of appropriate rehabilitative programs, the court should take that evidence into account in determining the appropriate sentence so as to give effect to the purpose of rehabilitation. However, there was no evidence in the present case as to any rehabilitation programs available at the Alexander Maconochie Centre (AMC). The explanatory memorandum indicates that courts are not required “to conduct independent enquiries into rehabilitation options for a particular offender.” However, in the absence of any such information, it is difficult for the court to give effect to s 16A(2AAA).

59. The offender submitted that he has positive prospects of rehabilitation evidenced by his lack of criminal record, the support of his wife, his financial stability and the fact that he has had a period on bail with no further offences. I accept that the offender has those protective factors. However, his attitude towards the offences points clearly to the need for specific deterrence. Even after pleading guilty, he has continued to minimise his role and failed to provide any plausible explanation for his possession of child abuse material.

60. The offender also relied on a finding in the intensive correction order assessment report that he has a “low risk of reoffending”. The basis for that opinion is not articulated in the report. It is the experience of the court that, particularly in the case of child abuse material offences, offenders who refuse to acknowledge or engage with the underlying causes for their offending are not at a low risk of reoffending. In the absence of any such engagement, I do not accept that the offender has a “positive prospect of rehabilitation”, as submitted on his behalf.

Current sentencing practice

61. Although “current sentencing practice” is not specified as a sentencing consideration in Pt IB of the Crimes Act 1914, the High Court has held that the obligation of a judge to take current sentencing practices into account when sentencing an offender for a federal offence arises as a matter of common law, the requirement here being to “have regard to current sentencing practices throughout the Commonwealth”: R v Pham [2015] HCA 39; 256 CLR 550 at [23]. A federal offender is not entitled to expect to be sentenced in accordance with current sentencing practices in the geographical jurisdiction in which he is sentenced, “as opposed to the relevant range of sentences established across all States and Territories”: Pham at [17]-[18].

62. The Crown identified the following as comparable cases: Burton v The Queen [2020] NSWCCA 127, Lazarus v The King [2023] NSWCCA 214, Cairncross v The King [2025] VSCA 117 and Woods v The King [2023] NSWCCA 37. It was submitted that the present offending is more serious than in Burton and Woods but in some regards slightly less serious than the offending in Cairncross and Lazarus.

63. The decision in Burton is, with respect, not a helpful comparator. The child pornography material was written material with no real children involved and the child abuse material consisted of only four images. The offending was significantly less serious than in the present case.

64. The decision in Woods also involved significantly less serious offending. The offender in that case was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment and released immediately on recognizance for one count of soliciting child abuse material. A schedule offence of using a carriage service to groom a person under 16 years was also taken into account. The offending related to the offender’s actions over a single approximately 24-hour period where he communicated with a police officer who had assumed the online identity of a 14-year-old girl. The offender suffered from an intellectual disability, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and Tourette’s syndrome and was found to have expressed remorse and be taking genuine steps towards addressing his offending. The Court found the offender had reduced moral culpability due to his cognitive impairment and mental conditions and, in turn, the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation were given less weight. The offending in the present case is clearly more serious and the offender does not have the same mitigating factors.

65. The offending in Cairncross was quite different to the present case and comparison is difficult (the online conversations were more serious, but the child abuse material possessed was less serious). Even if it is accepted that it was overall a more serious case than the present case, the offender in Cairncross had a significantly stronger subjective case. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of three years and ten months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and three months for five counts of causing child pornography/child abuse material to be transmitted to himself, three counts of using a carriage service to solicit child abuse material, two counts of using a carriage service to procure a person under 16 for sexual activity and one count of possessing child abuse material. The offending occurred between January 2018 and August 2022, a period of just over four and a half years. The offender encouraged children aged between 14 and 17 years old to create child abuse material and send it to him, including by providing money as an incentive. The offending also included two counts that arose out of the offender’s actions following the execution of a search warrant, demonstrating a continuation of offending despite being aware of the police investigation. The possession of child abuse material charge related to 208 unique files the offender possessed. Notably, the sentencing judge found that the offender’s age, being in his early 20s for the majority of the offending and 26 at the time of sentencing, “meant he was better equipped to change”, with a lesser sentence imposed on account of this. The sentencing judge also found the offender had shown genuine remorse and noted that he had voluntarily commenced specialist sex offender treatment.

66. In Lazarus, the offender was sentenced to a total effective sentence of six years and six months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three years and nine months for four counts of using a carriage service to transmit indecent communication to a person under 16 years of age, one count of possessing child abuse material, four counts of causing child pornography to be transmitted, three counts of accessing child pornography and one count of procuring a person under 16. The schedule offences of two counts of transmitting indecent material to a person under 16 was also taken into account at sentence. Over an eight-year period, the offender engaged in online conversations with multiple victims under the age of 16 years old or who the offender believed to be under 16 years of age. The offender sent victims indecent material and caused victims to send him child abuse material of themselves. The offender had led one of the victims to believe that he was a school teacher she knew and, while asking her to send sexually explicit material of herself, had told the victim that he loved her. The victim believed she was in a relationship with her teacher. The offender engaged in an “extended period of predatory and persistent criminal behaviour”, having actively sought out young girls to communicate with. The count of possession related to 282 child abuse files found on various hard drives. Taken as a whole, the offending in Lazarus has features that are objectively more serious than the present case due to the offender’s direct contact with victims, his posing as another person to gain a victim’s trust and the greater period of time that he sustained contact with his victims. However, there was a significantly stronger subjective case in Lazarus including that: (a) the offender demonstrated remorse and insight into the consequences of his offending; (b) the conditions of custodial imprisonment were more onerous during the COVID-19 pandemic; and (c) the offender suffered from dysthymia and there was an ongoing need for psychological intervention.

67. All of the decisions relied upon by the offender were decisions from the Territory. Of those, the only decision I need to consider is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Mertell (the offender otherwise identified first instance decisions in which the facts were quite different).

68. The facts in Mertell were quite similar to the facts in the present case. The offender was sentenced for nine separate offences relating to accessing or possessing child abuse material, each carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment. Over a period of six months, the offender possessed 513 child abuse material files on seven devices, including 56 duplicate files. He also used a carriage service to access 71 child abuse material files. There was significant duplication in the charging.

69. The Court of Appeal noted that the task for the sentencing judge was complicated by the charges selected: at [20]. The sentencing judge wholly accumulated the sentences for five counts, an approach the prosecution conceded on appeal entailed error. The greatest single sentence imposed was nine months.

70. The total sentence imposed at first instance was imprisonment for six years and three months with a non-parole period of two years and four months. In resentencing the offender, the Court said at [33]: We were mindful that the greatest sentence imposed by the primary judge was nine months imprisonment, and therefore did not impose sentences above that figure. It should not be taken that longer sentences were not more appropriate.

71. In light of those remarks, the comparative value of the decision is minimal.

72. The offender in Mertell was a similar age to Mr Beale and also had no criminal history. However, he had medical conditions that engaged the principles in R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 and he had voluntarily sought treatment. The offender in the present case does not have those mitigating factors.

Form of sentence

73. Imprisonment is a sentence of last resort: s 17A of the Crimes Act 1914. Both parties accepted that this threshold has been crossed in the present case. I agree. However, parties put competing submissions as to the appropriate structure of the sentences, including how any sentence of imprisonment should be served.

74. Counsel for the offender submitted that the appropriate sentence would be a term of imprisonment for three years to be served by way of intensive correction in the community, as allowed under s 20AB of the Crimes Act 1914. The offender has been found suitable for an intensive correction order. There is no requirement to find exceptional circumstances before making such an order: R v Perry [2026] ACTSC 63 at [56]; Henderson v The King [2024] ACTCA 3 at [31]-[32]. However, it remains necessary to impose a sentence of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offences: s 16A(1) of the Crimes Act 1914.

75. Counsel for the offender submitted that an ICO would be appropriate because it would provide community-based rehabilitation that would assist the offender “to address his grief, depression and feelings of loneliness that contributed to the offending behaviour.” I have no confidence that, if permitted to serve his sentence in the community, the offender would take any steps to address those issues. As already noted, he continues to minimise his offending and was unwilling or unable to address it in any meaningfully way. In any event, in light of the term of the sentences I propose, an ICO is not available.

76. The Crown submitted that the offending requires the imposition of a period of full-time imprisonment with a recognizance release order. The offender submitted that, if the Court were minded to take that course, the appropriate sentence would be one that saw the offender released on a recognizance release order after serving six months of the sentence. While I am grateful to Mr Lo Schaivo for being prepared to suggest a specific sentence, I have reached the conclusion that a term of imprisonment for only six months would be entirely inadequate in the present case.

77. A recognizance release order is only required to be made where the total sentence does not exceed three years: s 19AC of the Crimes Act 1914. I propose to impose sentences that will instead require me to fix a non-parole period. Although it follows that s 20(1)(b)(ii) will have no application here, it remains appropriate to have regard to the matters relied upon by the offender to establish “exceptional circumstances” for the purpose of that provision.

78. The offender relied on a combination of matters for that purpose, being his age, the loss he has experienced (both of family and friends), his limited social connections and the fact this would be his first time in custody. I have had regard to those considerations in fixing the non-parole period. However, they are not factors that can appropriately be given such weight as to prevail over the sentencing purposes of deterrence and denunciation. At the age of 67, the offender is by no means in the category of a frail, elderly man. Beyond a complaint of arthritis, there was no evidence of his suffering any physical disabilities due to his age. Loneliness and depression are sadly common and do not sit easily as an explanation for offences of this kind.

Concurrency

79. Section 19(5) of the Crimes Act 1914 creates a presumption that the sentences for counts 2 and 3 should be served consecutively. Section 19(6) displaces this requirement if I am satisfied that partial or complete concurrency would still result in sentences that are of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances.

80. Those provisions were introduced by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sexual Crimes Against Children and Community Protection Measures) Act 2020 (Cth). The explanatory memorandum for the amendments explained: The objective of the presumption is to act as a yardstick against which to examine a proposed sentence of an offender for multiple child sex offences to ensure that the effective sentence represents a tougher response to the objective seriousness of the sexual abuse of children.

81. In the present case, the Crown concedes that some concurrency between the three counts would be appropriate. I agree that there should be some concurrency as there is some overlap between the offences in that the child abuse material files the subject of counts 1 and 2 feature as part of count 3. However, it remains appropriate for there to be some accumulation to reflect the fact the different offences charged are directed at different vices: R v Porte at [157]; Mertell at [20].

82. As count 2 is the most serious offence, I will fix the sentence for that offence to start first. Giving due consideration to the maximum penalty of 15 years, my assessment of the seriousness of that offence, the absence of any significant mitigating factors and the offender’s failure to engage with the seriousness of his offending, a stern sentence is warranted. It is implicit in the Crown’s submission concerning a recognizance release order that the Crown considered an aggregate sentence of less than three years would be adequate. For the reasons addressed at length in this judgment, I disagree.

83. For ease of computation of the reduction of 20% for the plea I have rounded down to give sentences expressed in months, not weeks. The starting point for each offence and the reduction for the plea of guilty is, for count 2, a starting point of four years reduced by 20% and rounded down to give three years and two months; for count 1, a starting point of 18 months, reduced by 20% and rounded down to give 14 months, and for count 3, a starting point of two years reduced by 20% and rounded down to give 19 months.

84. The total sentence will be a term of imprisonment for four years. The sentence for count 1 will be accumulated on the sentence for count 2 by six months. My reason for structuring the sentences in that way is to avoid excessive punishment for the same course of conduct but also to reflect the separate periods of offending. The sentence for count 3 will be accumulated on the sentence for count 2 by four months. The element of concurrency reflects the degree of duplication between the material accessed and the material possessed. The element of accumulation reflects the proposition that the offence of possession of child abuse material is a different kind of offending from accessing child abuse material. I have had regard to the principle of totality but also to the terms of s 19(5) of the Crimes Act 1914 in respect of counts 2 and 3. I am satisfied that the structure of the sentences I propose reflects the totality of the offender’s offending and, notwithstanding the degree of concurrency allowed, will still result in sentences that are of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances.

85. As the aggregate of the sentences exceeds three years, I am required to fix a non-parole period: s 19AB(1) of the Crimes Act 1914. The non-parole period will be three years.

Orders

86. Ian Gregory Beale, please stand: (1) For the offence in count 2 of using a carriage service to access child abuse material, transmit child abuse material and cause child abuse material to be transmitted (CC2025/1926), you are convicted. For that offence, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for three years and two months commencing on 21 October 2026 and expiring on 20 December 2029. (2) For the offence in count 1 of using a carriage service to access child abuse material (CC2025/5242), you are convicted. For that offence, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for 14 months commencing on 21 April 2029 and expiring on 20 June 2030. (3) For the offence in count 3 of possessing child abuse material (CC2024/11333), you are convicted. For that offence, I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for 19 months commencing on 21 March 2029 and expiring on 20 October 2030. (4) I fix a non-parole period of three years commencing on 21 October 2026 and ending on 20 October 2029.

I certify that the preceding eighty-six [86] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Chief Justice McCallum. Associate: Date: