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[2004] VSCA 44
Court of Appeal (Vic)
2004-04-02
VINCENT, J.A., SMITH and COLDREY, A.JJ.A.
Original judgment source is linked above.
[ 2004] VSCA 44
Criminal Law - Conviction - Sexual offences committed by applicant against niece when she was aged between 11 and 14 years - Whether verdicts were inconsistent giving rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice - Proper approach to be adopted by an appellate court considering a case of claimed inconsistency: McKenzie v. The Queen (1996) 190 C.L.R. 348 - No suggestion that jury not fully and properly instructed by trial judge in relation to relevant facts and law - Verdicts not inconsistent - Longman warning given - Application dismissed.
"The verdicts returned by the jury upon the applicant's presentment are inconsistent, resulting in verdicts of guilt and convictions which were unsafe and unsatisfactory, thereby giving rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice."
"...this was a case in which the jury's assessment of the complainant's veracity and credibility was vital.
...
where a jury has convicted an accused upon the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant in relation to some, but not all, counts in a presentment relating to a series of alleged sexual offences, this casts doubt upon the jury's verdicts of guilty, which may constitute inconsistent verdicts. In cases of `oath against oath' (as in this case), the rejection of the complainant's evidence in relation to the counts upon which a verdict of not guilty was returned casts doubt upon the acceptance of the complainant's evidence beyond reasonable doubt on remaining counts. The verdicts returned in this case represent such an affront to logic and commonsense."
"... the inconsistency arises in the jury verdicts upon different counts of the originating process in a criminal trial, the test is one of logic and reasonableness. A judgment of Devlin J in R v Stone ... is often cited as expressing the test ... : `He [the applicant] must satisfy the court that the two verdicts cannot stand together, meaning thereby that no reasonable jury who had applied their mind properly to the facts in the case could have arrived at the conclusion, and once one assumes that they are an unreasonable jury, or they could not have reasonably come to the conclusion, then the convictions cannot stand.' Nevertheless, the respect for the function which the law assigns to juries (and the general satisfaction with their performance) have led courts to express repeatedly, in the context both of criminal and civil trials, reluctance to accept a submission that verdicts are inconsistent in the relevant sense .... Thus, if there is a proper way by which the appellate court may reconcile the verdicts, allowing it to conclude that the jury performed their functions as required, that conclusion will generally be accepted .... If there is some evidence to support the verdict said to be inconsistent, it is not the role of the appellate court, upon this ground, to substitute its opinion of the facts for one which was open to the jury .... In a criminal appeal, the view may be taken that the jury simply followed the judge's instruction to consider separately the case presented by the prosecution in respect of each count and to apply to each count the requirement that all of the ingredients must be proved beyond reasonable doubt .... Alternatively, the appellate court may conclude that the jury took a `merciful' view of the facts upon one count: a function which has always been open to, and often exercised by, juries ...
...
... a residue of cases will remain where the different verdicts returned by the jury represent, on the public record, an affront to logic and commonsense which is unacceptable and strongly suggests a compromise of the performance of the jury's duty .... More commonly, it may suggest confusion in the minds of the jury or a misunderstanding of their function, uncertainty about the legal differentiation between the offences or lack of clarity in the judicial instruction on the applicable law .... It is only where the inconsistency rises to the point that the appellate court considers that intervention is necessarily required to prevent a possible injustice that the relevant conviction will be set aside .... It is impossible to state hard and fast rules. `It all depends upon the facts of the case'" (Citations omitted.)
"Since the ultimate question concerns the reasonableness of the jury's decision, the significance of verdicts of not guilty on some counts in an indictment must necessarily be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Furthermore, it must be considered in the context of the system within which juries function, and of their role in that system. ... In the case of sexual offences, of which there may be no objective evidence, some, or all, of the members of a jury may require some supporting evidence before they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the word of a complainant. This may not be unreasonable. It does not necessarily involve a rejection of the complainant's evidence. A juror might consider it more probable than not that a complainant is telling the truth but require something additional before reaching a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. The criminal trial procedure is designed to reinforce, in jurors, a sense of the seriousness of their task, and of the heavy burden of proof undertaken by the prosecution. A verdict of not guilty does not necessarily imply that a complainant has been disbelieved, or a want of confidence in the complainant. It may simply reflect a cautious approach to the discharge of a heavy responsibility. In addition to want of supporting evidence, other factors that might cause a jury to draw back from reaching a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt in relation to some aspects of a complainant's evidence might be that the complainant has shown some uncertainty as to matters of detail, or has been shown to have a faulty recollection of some matters, or has been shown otherwise to be more reliable about some parts of his or her evidence than about others. Thirdly, there is the consideration stated by King CJ in R v Kirkman and referred to in later cases: it may appear to a jury, that, although a number of offences have been alleged, justice is met by convicting an accused of some only. And there may be an interaction between this consideration and the two matters earlier discussed."
Count 1 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 25th day of December 1979 and the 31st day of January 1980 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 6 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 18th day of May 1980 and the 31st day of December 1980 on an occasion other than that referred to in Count 4 committed an act of gross indecency in the presence of L a person under the age of sixteen years.
Count 7 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 18th day of May 1980 and the 31st day of December 1980 on an occasion other than those referred to in Counts 3 and 5 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 11 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 1st day of September 1980 and the 28th day of February 1981 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 12 - That BT at Ashwood in the said State between the 18th day of February 1981 and the 28th day of February 1981 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 13 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 18th day of February 1981 and the 28th day of February 1981 on an occasion other than that referred to in Count 11 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 14 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 18th day of February 1981 and the 28th day of February 1981 on an occasion other than those referred to in Counts 11 and 13 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 15 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 18th day of February 1981 and the 28th day of February 1981 committed an act of gross indecency in the presence of L a person under the age of sixteen years.
Count 16 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 2nd day of March 1981 and the 31st day of December 1982 indecently assaulted L
Count 17 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 2nd day of March 1981 and the 31st day of December 1982 raped L by introducing his penis into her vagina without her consent.
Count 3 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 18th day of May 1980 and the 31st day of December 1980 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 4 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 18th day of May 1980 and the 31st day of December 1980 committed an act of gross indecency in the presence of L a person under the age of sixteen years.
Count 5 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State between the 18th day of May 1980 and the 31st day of December 1980 on an occasion other than that referred to in Count 3 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
"It's probably appropriate that I should tell you at this stage that as a result of some legal submissions that have been made I will be directing you, when you come to consider your verdict, that on counts 3, 4 and 5 I'll be directing you to return findings of not guilty in respect of those 3, 4 and 5 counts. I'll explain it in detail later on, but the chief reason is that the Crown must establish that those particular offences occurred within the time said that they occurred in the presentment. And you'll recall that there was concession or agreement made as to when the `Prisoner' episode was screened. And on my close reading of the transcript counts 4 and 5 are linked to count 3, and she said so, and it takes those there (sic) counts out of the time frame which ends in December of 1980."[4]
"As I indicated to you, this morning, I will direct you, as a matter of law - and I just invite you to make a note on your charge sheets, if you would - in the right-hand column, I think, is the best to do it - that on counts 3, 4 and 5, I direct you, as a matter of law, that you must return findings of not guilty. Briefly, the reason for that is this; that it is conceded - and properly so - by the Crown, that the episode of `Prisoner', whether it be the Frank, or the Jock episode, occurred some time after December of 1980, which is the cut-off date; and it is the obligation of the Crown to satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt that the event that they are charging the accused with occurred within that date. It is simply a matter of fairness. You are entitled to know, if you are accused, what the particular matter is we are talking about. Because the Crown focused, or the complainant [L] focused, on that addition (sic) of `Prisoner' - or whichever one it was - it is conceded by both parties that there was a confusion in [L's] mind as to whether she was marrying the two episodes into one; but in any event, it was either '82 or '85; and that when she gave evidence - and I need not take you to it, but I have had reference to the transcript - it was clear that, in respect of counts 4 and 5, she was asked whether those counts occurred shortly after, or several weeks after, count 3; and she said they did. So it is all fixed. So the time telescoped, as it were. For that reason, I have directed you to find the accused man not guilty of counts 3, 4 and 5."[5]
Count 2 - That BT at Mount Waverley in the said State on the 17th day of May 1980 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 8 - That BT at Wantirna in the said State between the 18th day of May 1980 and the 31st day of December 1980 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
Count 9 - That BT at Wantirna in the said State between the 18th day of May 1980 and the 31st day of December 1980 on an occasion other than that referred to in Count 8 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of sixteen years.
"Counts 8 and 9, which are the drive-in counts - I use the expression `drive-in' because it is said in the counts that it occurred at Wantirna and [the complainant] said the Wantirna Drive-in. There was other evidence from [the accused] and [G], and I think [K], who said that they had been to the Clayton - and I think in the case of [G] - the Oakleigh Drive-in. Now the purpose of the prosecution in setting out these dates and setting out the place is to specify the event that is being focused upon that is the subject of a count. In other words, if an assault is committed in this building, it is complete even if the person is mistaken and it happened next door, or in this room next door is a better example. But you will bear in mind that [the complainant] said it was at the Wantirna Drive-in that it occurred. If you reach the conclusion that she is mistaken about that, but she is talking about the film `Ten', that seems to be pretty clear; and witnesses were asked specifically about that event, it really would not matter much where it was shown, if you were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the matters which are the subject of counts 8 and 9 occurred at a drive-in theatre, and during the course of such a film. That is the purpose of giving dates and places. Thus, as I say, if you were to conclude that [the complainant] is wrong about Wantirna, that it was somewhere else, but you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the elements of the offence, then it would be open to you to return a verdict of guilty in respect of that count, counts 8 and 9."[6]
Count 10 - That BT at Melbourne in the said State between the 1st day of September 1980 and the 28th day of February 1981 unlawfully and indecently assaulted L a girl under the age of 16 years.
"Now in this case, as I have said, you determine the question of the guilt or otherwise of the accused on the evidence before you. As has been pointed out, largely, this case is one in which the complainant has given sworn evidence before you as to certain things that she said the accused effected upon her. These matters, the accused man says, simply did not occur. Save for the episode which [the complainant] described in the swimming pool when she said that she was under the water and she bit the accused's penis, and you will remember the evidence - that [K] was in close proximity, under the water or whatever - there was no other witness who saw or heard any of these matters which [the complainant] alleges, so that you have [the complainant's] account and you have the accused's account. What I am about to tell you is very important. It is not a question of choice between two different accounts. Do not fall into that trap, tempting as it may appear, because it is not the law. The critical question in this case for your answer is this: are you satisfied of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? Has the prosecution satisfied you beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused? That onus is not satisfied by your selection or preference for one version over another. In this case, the Crown proffer [the complainant] to you as a witness upon whose evidence they rely to establish the guilt of the accused. Obviously, an acceptance of her evidence is not dependent upon a rejection of the accused's evidence, because it is her evidence that the Crown relies upon. I repeat, the law places no obligation upon the accused to satisfy you that his evidence is truthful. It is for the Crown to prove the guilt of the accused. There may be elements in the accused's evidence which support the Crown case, but it is not his obligation to disprove the Crown case. You must be satisfied on all of the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, of each of the elements of these offences."[7]
I also observe that these instructions were reinforced by the provision of an appropriate Longman[8] instruction in relation to which no complaint has been made before us. Nor has it been contended that there was insufficient evidence to support any of the verdicts of guilty returned against the applicant.
the jury to acquit on these counts was based upon the concession by the Crown that the offences could not have been committed within the period designated in the presentment. Of course, it did not follow that L had to be disbelieved as to the occurrence of the incidents at all, or even that serious doubts had to arise at this level. The jury may, consistent with this position, have concluded that similar difficulties existed in relation to each of the four counts where verdicts of not guilty were returned. I have earlier drawn attention to the judge's redirection on counts 8 and 9 which pointed to this possibility. They may have formed the view that with the effluxion of time, some confusion may have developed in the complainant's mind as to when and under what circumstances the particular incidents occurred or at least have not been prepared to find beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant's recall of the specific incidents was accurate. There is certainly nothing in the evidence or in the verdicts themselves which is capable of supporting the contention that the verdicts of guilty represent an affront to logic and common sense or that the jury did more than honour their obligation to consider each count separately in the light of the obligation resting upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the applicant on the particular count beyond reasonable doubt before a verdict could be returned against him.
[1] MacKenzie v. The Queen (1996) 190 C.L.R. 348 at 366-368 as per Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby, JJ.
[2] MFA v. R. [2002] HCA 53; (2002) 193 A.L.R. 184 at 192.
[3] The jury had a view of the premises.
R
B T [2004] VSCA 44