//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2026] NSWSC 964
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-08-11
Muston J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: R v Aller (No 3) [2026] NSWSC 964
Hearing dates: 5 August 2026
Date of orders: 11 August 2026
Decision date: 11 August 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law - Criminal
Before: Muston J
Decision: (1) Michael Aller is convicted of the manslaughter of Amy Aiton.
(2) For that offence, you are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 years, which commenced on 1 September 2012 and expired on 31 August 2024.
(3) I am required by s 25C(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), to inform you of the existence of that Act and the fact that it has potential application to you. I direct your lawyers to provide you with advice as to the practical and possible consequences (if any) of that fact.
Catchwords: CRIME — manslaughter — offender unfit to be tried and found at a special hearing to have committed the offence of manslaughter — offender subsequently became fit to be tried — plea of guilty to manslaughter owing to substantial impairment
SENTENCING — violent offending — substantial impairment — Bugmy factors — victim impact statements — remorse — prospects of rehabilitation — where previous non-compliance with release conditions affected by external stressors — ceiling principle not applied
Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 23, 24
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 21, 22 (repealed), 30, 44, 45
Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) ss 53, 68
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) ss 23
Cases Cited: Attorney General for New South Wales v Aller (Final) [2024] NSWSC 33
Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 751; [2013] HCA 37
Camilleri v R (2023) 308 A Crim R 52; [2023] NSWCCA 106
DG v R [2025] NSWCCA 137
DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
Henderson v R (2016) 256 A Crim R 519; [2016] NSWCCA 8
Magro v R [2020] NSWCCA 25
McL v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 452; [2000] HCA 46
Munda v State of Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38
Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273
R v Aller [2014] NSWSC 360
R v Aller [2015] NSWSC 178
R v Aller (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 402
R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935
R v Oinonen [1999] NSWCCA 310
R v Thompson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; [2000] NSWCCA 309
R v Williams [2005] NSWCCA 99
Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162
Category: Sentence
Parties: Rex (Crown)
Michael Aller (Offender)
Representation: Counsel:
B Allison (Crown)
S Fraser SC (Offender)
Solicitors:
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (NSW) (Crown)
Legal Aid Commission of NSW (Offender)
File Number(s): 2012/240127
Amy Aiton was a much-loved daughter and niece to her mother Debbie Roberts and her aunt, Melissa Grace; in fact, their similar age meant that the latter thought of her more as a sister than a niece. In deference to the way in which she has been described by them in their victim impact statements, and without intending any disrespect, I will refer to Ms Aiton as Amy.
In 2004, Amy was involved in a terrible car accident. It left her with serious injuries, including an acquired brain injury. This, in turn, led to her suffering several strokes and paralysis to the left side of her body. She lost a significant part of the use of her left arm. She also suffered injuries to her knees and walked with a limp.
Through the advocacy and support of her loved ones — and her own perseverance — Amy had overcome much of this hardship and enjoyed living an independent life.
In 2009, she had purchased and moved into a townhouse in Narara, NSW. She was forming new relationships and was drawn to helping others who were struggling in various ways.
In the words of Amy’s mother, “she would open her home and her life to people in need.” On 31 July 2012, that life was taken suddenly in an act of terrible violence perpetrated upon her by Michael Aller.
The victim impact statements prepared by Amy’s mother and aunt make very clear that Amy was loved and that her life was precious. Each has described the many ways in which their respective lives have been affected by her death. I accept that both have suffered a tremendous loss. Their sense of grief is clearly permanent and their suffering has been exacerbated by the prolonged nature of these proceedings.
I thank them both for sharing with the Court something of the lasting impact that Amy’s death has had upon them and their wider family. The Court extends its sympathies to all who knew and loved Amy.
Mr Aller has pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of Amy. He accepts that he would be guilty of murder but for the defence of “substantial impairment because of mental health impairment or cognitive impairment” afforded to him by s 23A Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).
He must now be sentenced for the manslaughter of Amy.
Following her accident, Amy suffered depression and developed a dependence on cannabis. She had been attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings and was introduced to Mr Aller by a fellow attendee, who had met him while participating in a rehabilitation program at the Lake Macquarie Recovery Centre.
In October 2011, Mr Aller had himself entered that program for alcohol rehabilitation. He participated in the program until 6 June 2012. Shortly before he was due to graduate from the program, he told the co-ordinator "I've had enough, I'm out of here, I'm not going to get any more from being here".
A few days later, Mr Aller was introduced to Amy. In the face of his own challenges, she offered him kindness. They began an intimate relationship and Mr Aller moved into the Narara townhouse. At around this time, Amy told her mother that Mr Aller was just staying there until he found a place of his own.
Mr Aller has told police that in the weeks that followed, he and Amy argued about her cannabis use, its effect on her, and the amount of money spent on it. However, he also acknowledged that his drinking had recommenced on the day he left the rehabilitation program. He said that he then stopped drinking for about a month but recommenced shortly before 31 July 2012.
On the morning of 31 July 2012, Mr Aller left the Narara townhouse to buy milk and cigarettes, obtain cash from an ATM, and buy some cannabis. While out, he also purchased a six pack of bourbon and coke from a liquor store. Before returning to the townhouse, he visited a hotel and had two schooners of beer. He also drank two cans of bourbon and coke in a public toilet.
Upon his return to the townhouse, Mr Aller entered Amy’s bedroom. Amy was also in the bedroom, sitting on the bed. Mr Aller continued to drink cans of bourbon and coke. He subsequently told police that he "was drinking [the cans] very quickly" and that he began arguing with Amy. To adopt his words, that argument came “out of the blue" and "got way out of control". This is a profound understatement.
There was a small knife on the bedside table. Mr Aller told police that during their argument, Amy noticed him glance at the knife and said, "go on, fucking do it, you either do it or I'm going to fucking do it to you". Mr Aller told police that at this moment he “snapped”. Mr Aller accepts that he grabbed the knife and repeatedly stabbed Amy while she was on the bed.
A post-mortem examination of Amy’s body disclosed at least 54 individual stab wounds; 1 to the left forehead region, 25 to the front anterior torso, 6 to the back, 8 to the left arm, 2 to the left hand, 7 to the right arm and 5 to the right hand. Multiple stab wound injuries had penetrated her heart and lungs. There were so many knife wounds that individual wound tracks could not be followed.
The pathologist who conducted the examination of Amy’s body concluded that the attack perpetrated by Mr Aller was of a very violent nature, possibly occurring over several minutes, and that severe force would have been required to inflict some of the injuries. Mr Aller accepted that his actions may aptly be described as “a sustained and ferocious attack”.
Defensive injuries on Amy’s arms and hands led the pathologist to conclude that she was conscious during the attack and had tried to defend herself.
Following the attack, Mr Aller placed the bloodstained knife into a knife block in the kitchen. He changed his clothes and drove to Gosford in Amy’s car. He then travelled by train to Sydney, where he spent the night drinking at a hotel in the CBD.
At around 9:45am the following morning, Mr Aller used a payphone to call his mother. He said to her: "could you ring the police to come to the unit as I have just stabbed Amy to death." He then hung up the phone.
His mother called 000 and asked the police to send a car to the Narara townhouse. She told them that her son had just told her that he had stabbed someone to death at that location.
At about 10:00am on the same morning, police attended the Narara townhouse, where they found Amy’s body; lying on her bed facedown, covered with a blanket. A crime scene was established. Police located the bloodstained knife in the kitchen and found a jumper and a pair of jeans, both bloodstained, which Mr Aller had been wearing the previous day.
At around lunchtime on the same day, Mr Aller again called his mother. On this occasion, the phone was answered by his step-brother. In the conversation that followed, Mr Aller said, "I killed her, I killed her and people are after me. I don't know what to do." His step-brother urged him to surrender himself to the police.
Around 20 minutes later, Mr Aller made final call to his mother. The call was again answered by his step-brother. During this call, Mr Aller said "I am going to give myself up."
At around 2:00pm that day, Mr Aller approached a uniformed police officer at Central Railway Station and said: "I need to speak with someone, I am wanted for the murder of my girlfriend."
He was arrested and cautioned before being taken to Surry Hills Police Station and entered into custody. At this time, police noticed what appeared to be blood on Mr Aller’s socks, which were seized for forensic examination.
Whilst in custody, Mr Aller was offered the opportunity to participate in an electronically recorded interview with police, and he said "yeah I want to tell you everything". He was expressly told that he did not have to say anything if he did not want to, to which he replied "no I want to tell you everything; I did it so yeah let's do it".
He immediately made a full and frank confession to police and was charged with Amy’s murder.
Since that time, this matter has had an unusually long procedural history.
On 3 July 2013, Mr Aller expressed his willingness to plead guilty to manslaughter if the charge of murder was withdrawn. The Crown declined to take that course.
On 27 March 2014, Mr Aller was found by Garling J to be unfit to be tried: R v Aller [2014] NSWSC 360.
On 24 February 2015, a special hearing pursuant to s 19 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW) was conducted before Hidden J. His Honour was satisfied that Mr Aller had killed Amy while he was substantially impaired by an abnormality of the mind, arising from an underlying condition, and that the impairment was so substantial as to warrant his liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter, given the marked effect of his condition upon his capacity for self-control and its bearing upon his culpability: R v Aller [2015] NSWSC 178 at [65]. Mr Aller was found not guilty of murder but, on the limited material available to his Honour, was found to have committed the offence of manslaughter: R v Aller [2015] NSWSC 178 at [66].
On 10 April 2015, acting pursuant to s 23(1)(b) of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW), his Honour imposed a limiting term of 11 years and 6 months, commencing on 1 August 2012 and expiring on 31 January 2024: R v Aller (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 402.
On 2 February 2024, Mr Aller’s status as a forensic patient was extended by Button J until 1 February 2026: Attorney General for New South Wales v Aller (Final) [2024] NSWSC 33.
On 9 September 2025, the Mental Health Review Tribunal found that Mr Aller was fit to be tried: Mental Health Review Tribunal Reasons for Decision F2113. And, on 12 December 2025, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions informed the Court that criminal proceedings were to be pursued against him with respect to the offence of manslaughter, pursuant to s 53(2) of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW), relying on s 68(3) of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act.
Consistent with the position he had adopted some 12 years earlier, Mr Aller offered a plea of guilty to that charge at the first available opportunity following the re-commencement of the proceedings.
The maximum penalty for manslaughter is imprisonment for 25 years: s 24 of the Crimes Act. There is no applicable standard non-parole period. That maximum penalty is an important statutory yardstick that must be borne in mind when assessing the appropriate sentence to impose. However, the maximum penalty is, itself, rarely imposed. It is reserved for the very worst offences and for the worst offenders.
It has frequently been observed that manslaughter arises in a wide variety of circumstances. Sentences imposed range from the imposition of non-custodial penalties through to very long prison terms. Given the factually varied nature of the offence, recourse to “comparable” cases for the purpose of seeking to identify where particular offending is to be placed on a hypothetical range of manslaughters is of limited utility and should be avoided: Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273 at [33].
On the Prosecutor’s application, I have taken into account the grief and hardship recorded in the victim impact statements prepared by each of Amy’s mother and aunt. I consider it appropriate to have regard to this as “an aspect of the harm done to the community”: s 30E(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW); Sumpton v R [2016] NSWCCA 162**.**
However, all human life is sacred, and every crime of manslaughter involves the taking of a life. That inevitably leaves behind a family, friends and the long shadow of their indescribable grief. In having regard to the victim impact statements, I have not overlooked the fact that this unfortunate reality is already recognised in the maximum penalty provided for the offence to which Mr Aller has pleaded guilty.
The Crown submitted, and Mr Aller has accepted, that this was a very serious example of manslaughter. I have independently reached the same view.
The offence involved an act of extreme violence and the taking of a life. However, as each of these may be regarded as elements of the offence itself, I have not treated either as an aggravating factor: s 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act*; R v Williams* [2005] NSWCCA 99 at [37]-[38].
In reaching my conclusion as to the objective seriousness of the offence, I have had regard to the fact that it involved the use of a weapon and was perpetrated against Amy in her home; where she was entitled to feel and be safe. The injuries sustained in her earlier car accident left Amy in a position where she was — to Mr Aller’s knowledge — vulnerable and, in a physical sense, quite defenceless. Finally, at the time he committed the offence, Mr Aller was on bail for offences relating to a different domestic partner. Each of these matters should be treated as aggravating factors: ss 21A(2)(c), (eb), (j), and (l) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
My assessment of the objective seriousness recognises that — despite its ferocity — the offence was spontaneous. It was not part of a planned or organised criminal activity: s 21A(3)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
I have alluded to Mr Aller’s early reference to words spoken by Amy immediately preceding his use of the knife to stab her. As the Crown has observed, the description he has provided of that argument in the years following his arrest has varied in material respects. On any view, his response to whatever might have been said or done by Amy in that moment was grossly disproportionate. He accepts this and does not seek to rely on his early account as anything other than a small feature of the context surrounding the offence. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not accept that any aspect of the argument which precipitated the offence involved provocation by Amy which could properly be regarded as a mitigating factor. She was a wholly blameless victim of the offence.
Considerations arising out of Mr Aller’s mental health featured prominently in the parties’ respective submissions and require careful consideration.
Since being arrested in August 2012, Mr Aller has been assessed and treated by a great number of mental health professionals. Views expressed by them over this time as to which of a variety of well recognised mental health disorders he suffers from have varied; at least in some respects.
The most recent diagnosis available to me was that provided by Dr Natasha Rae in a report prepared in mid-2025 for the purposes of a hearing before the Mental Health Review Tribunal. In it, Dr Rae expressed a view that Mr Aller does not have a diagnosis of schizophrenia or bipolar affective disorder. She does attribute to him a diagnosis of mixed personality disorder with dependant, anxious, anti-social and borderline traits. She also confirms the diagnosis of alcohol dependence disorder, methamphetamine use disorder, and cannabis use disorder — in remission.
Whatever nomenclature might be applied to Mr Aller’s diagnosis, Hidden J was persuaded that his psychiatric illness was the operative factor in the otherwise largely inexplicable loss of self-control which precipitated the offence. The Crown did not cavil with this proposition but submitted that it should not lead to a reduction in his moral culpability beyond that which is inherent in the partial defence of substantial impairment.
In my view, the role played by Mr Aller’s mental health in the commission of the offence does operate to reduce his moral culpability in a way which is not wholly captured by the partial defence: Camilleri v R (2023) 308 A Crim R 52; [2023] NSWCCA 106 at [142] and [203]. I consider it appropriate to take this into account when assessing the appropriate sentence to impose.
I also consider that the involvement of Mr Aller’s mental illness in his offending means that he is a less suitable vehicle for general deterrence than might otherwise have been the case: DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 at [177].
Rehabilitation is an important purpose of sentencing. The long history of this matter means that my assessment of Mr Aller’s potential for rehabilitation is no longer predictive. My view that he has good prospects of rehabilitation is, in this case, largely informed by the significant progress he has made in this regard whilst detained as a forensic patient and during his staged return to the community: Henderson v R (2016) 256 A Crim R 519; [2016] NSWCCA 8 at [84]-[85].
Mr Aller has demonstrated genuine insight into his behaviour. His treating clinicians and the Mental Health Review Tribunal have carefully managed his transition back into the community. With the exception of two instances to which I will return, he has been compliant with the conditions imposed upon him during that transition. He has not reoffended; although I accept that this fact must be viewed in the context of his detention throughout the overwhelming majority of this period.
Dr Rae notes that Mr Aller has generally complied with the conditions of his release, including attending regular appointments with his community case manager, engaging with psychological therapy, and attending Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous groups in his local community. His urine drug screens and testing for alcohol have been consistently negative. He initially secured employment, adopted a pet and maintained his tenancy to a high standard.
The episodes of non-compliance with conditions of his release which have occurred must be approached with some caution. Each occurred at a time when he was exposed to significant stressors and his non-compliance must be viewed in the context of those stressors.
Publicity regarding the application made to extend his limiting term in late 2023, was followed by a sustained social media campaign. Mr Aller lost his employment. He was targeted with verbal threats, vandalism of his property and threats to the agency managing his tenancy. He became socially isolated and disengaged from his community mental health team. He relapsed into substance abuse.
While I accept the Crown’s submission that some level of ostracization is a natural consequence of the offending and a stressor that Mr Aller must be able to manage, he was exposed to much more than that.
As described in the evidence, the acts of vigilantism perpetrated by members of his community were in many respects unlawful and, in every respect, misguided. The destabilising effect of those actions created a risk to the community which may not otherwise have arisen.
After receiving further treatment for his mental health in an acute setting, Mr Aller returned to the community and has — with the assistance of the supports available to him — remained compliant with the conditions of his release.
If anything, Mr Aller’s resilience to these acts of vigilantism highlights the progress he has made in addressing his mental health challenges.
Mr Aller was born in Surry Hills and was initially raised in Waterloo. His father left his mother shortly after learning that she had fallen pregnant.
During Mr Aller’s early childhood, his father would visit infrequently. These visits were characterised by drunkenness and violence toward Mr Aller’s mother.
When Mr Aller was aged 6, his mother re-partnered. That relationship was also marred by alcohol abuse and domestic violence perpetrated against both Mr Aller and his mother. The relationship also brought with it two half siblings who were considerably older than Mr Aller. He has told his treating clinicians that he was sexually abused by his older step-brother during that period.
Against this background, Mr Aller was himself drawn to substance abuse at a young age. He commenced drinking alcohol at the age of 16 and, by 18, was drinking on a daily basis. At his worst, he would drink up to two bottles of spirits in a day. He was drinking heavily at the time of his offending. I have already referred to the fact that his treating clinicians have diagnosed him as suffering from alcohol dependence disorder, methamphetamine use disorder, and cannabis use disorder; all of which are said to be in remission.
I accept that Mr Aller’s history of social deprivation and his early exposure to alcohol and violence provides some explanation for his criminal history and the unfortunate path that led him to commit the offence for which he is now being sentenced.
It is now well accepted that these matters are relevant to a proper assessment of an appropriate and just sentence: Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 751; [2013] HCA 37 at [43] and Munda v State of Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 at [53]. Proof of a “causal connection” between that history and the offending need not be shown in order for me to take it into account in assessing Mr Aller’s moral culpability: DG v R [2025] NSWCCA 137 at [159]. I accept that this history means that his moral culpability is somewhat diminished.
However, I have not taken into account Mr Aller’s self-induced intoxication at the time of the offence as a mitigating feature: s 21A(5AA) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
As these proceedings were commenced before 30 April 2018, the prescribed sentencing discounts for guilty pleas to indictable offences contained in Div 1 of Pt 3 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act are not applicable. Rather, the former s 22 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, must be applied. Pursuant to that provision, I am required to take into account the fact of Mr Aller’s guilty plea, its timing and circumstances.
The principles to be applied when assessing the discount to be given in respect of a plea of guilty under s 22 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act are well settled: Magro v R [2020] NSWCCA 25 at [46]-[51].
A discount is allowed solely to reflect the utilitarian value of the plea in expediting and reducing the cost of the criminal law: R v Thompson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; [2000] NSWCCA 309 at [114]-[126]; R v Sharma (2002) NSWLR 300; [2002] NSWCCA 142 at [67]. The utilitarian value of a plea should generally be assessed in the range of 10-25 percent as a discount on sentence. The primary consideration when determining where in that range a case should fall, is the timing of the plea: R v Thompson; R v Houlton at [154].
Importantly, for the purposes of Mr Aller’s case, these principles apply equally where there has been an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty which matches the crime for which a person is ultimately convicted: R v Oinonen [1999] NSWCCA 310 at [15].
As I have already noted, Mr Aller offered to plead guilty to a charge of manslaughter soon after he was charged. The significant utilitarian value of that plea was not realised due to it having been rejected by the Crown and then overtaken by the fact that Mr Aller became unfit to be tried. These matters lay beyond his control.
Upon the re-commencement of the proceedings, his offer of a plea was renewed at the first available opportunity. Having regard to his long history of mental illness, during which time he could not have pleaded guilty, even the renewal of that plea when the proceedings were recommenced might arguably be said to have equated to a plea made at the earliest reasonable opportunity.
In the circumstances, I consider it appropriate that Mr Aller receive the full discount of 25% for his early offer of a plea of guilty to the crime for which he has been convicted.
Mr Aller submitted that any sentence I impose should not exceed the limiting term fixed by Hidden J. In doing so, he relied on the “ceiling principle” and pointed to the significant overlap in the facts considered by his Honour and those which now confront me.
I accept that there is a substantial overlap in the facts; although there are material differences. Some — such as the progress made in his rehabilitation and the view I have reached in relation to his plea — favour Mr Aller. Others, including the emphasis on his mixed personality disorder in his more recent psychiatric diagnoses and the fact that he may not have been in the prodrome phase of schizophrenia at the time of his offence point the other way: DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa at [177].
This is not an appropriate occasion for a lengthy discursus on the ceiling principle. However, I consider the two policy considerations said by Street CJ in R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 to underpin the principle to have limited application in the current circumstances. This is not a case where Mr Aller was confronted with the risk of a heavier sentence as a consequence of having shown error in an earlier trial. Nor could it be thought by Mr Aller (or any member of the community) that the imposition of a higher sentence than that reflected in the earlier limiting term imports any element of retribution as a consequence of a successful appeal.
In any event — and recognising that his Honour was considering very similar facts to those before me — I consider the 14-year notional sentence posited by Hidden J when fixing the limiting term to have been inadequate: McL v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 452; [2000] HCA 46 at [72].
Taking into account all of the considerations I have identified, I believe the seriousness of the offence warrants a significantly higher sentence. Although, as I have already noted, I also consider it appropriate to apply a larger discount on account of Mr Aller’s early offer of a guilty plea than the 15% applied by Hidden J. While this may ultimately result in me imposing a sentence which is not significantly different to the limiting term specified by Hidden J, that is merely the product of my having independently exercised the sentencing discretion, as is required.
As I have already noted, Mr Aller was arrested on 1 August 2012. He was refused bail on that day. Following his arrest, Mr Aller was:
Held in custody between 1 August 2012 and 22 November 2016.
Detained as a forensic patient between 23 November 2016 and 17 December 2025.
Although the conditions of his detention were progressively relaxed as he approached the end of his detention as a forensic patient — so as to carefully manage and facilitate his safe reintegration into the community — Mr Aller has spent a total of 13 years, 4 months and 17 days either in custody or subject to severe restraints upon his liberty. I am required by s 68 of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act to have regard to all of that time when imposing a sentence in this matter. To do so, it is open to me to order that any such sentence commence on 1 August 2012 or some date thereafter.
Between 4 September 2012 and 4 December 2012, Mr Aller was also subject to a sentence of imprisonment for an earlier offence committed against a different domestic partner on 3 September 2011. From 4 September 2012, he was serving a term of imprisonment of 7 days for having contravened an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order relating to that domestic partner, that offence having been committed on 4 September 2011.
The Crown submits that any sentence in this matter should involve a degree of accumulation in so far as it interacts with these other two sentences.
Recognising that the criminality involved in the present offence overwhelms that of the earlier offences — the sentence I will shortly impose will commence on 1 September 2012. There is an element of arbitrariness in this, but I have selected that date to ensure that there is some period of separate custody for the offences committed against the other domestic partner, while giving effect to the principle of totality and taking into account the fact that all three offences occurred at a similar time in Mr Aller’s life and while he was labouring under the same episode of profound mental instability.
I am comfortably satisfied that no penalty other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate.
As will be apparent from what I have said already, the interplay of considerations bearing upon the sentencing discretion in the unusual circumstances of this case, are complex and sometimes point in different directions. Synthesising those competing considerations, I have concluded that an appropriate starting point is a total sentence of 16 years.
Allowing a discount of 25% for Mr Aller’s plea of guilty, the total sentence will be 12 years.
I appreciate that this sentence is a poor reflection of the profound loss suffered by Amy’s friends and loved ones. No sentence of imprisonment could ever adequately capture that loss. However, it is the sentence produced by my assessment of the competing considerations I am required by law to have regard to.
Neither party suggested that there are any special circumstances which would warrant a departure from the ratio contemplated by s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. However, as the term of the sentence to be imposed has now expired, there is no longer any utility in me setting a non-parole period. For that reason — and in the somewhat unique circumstances of this matter — I consider this to be an appropriate case to decline to set a non-parole period under s 45(1)(c) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act.
I make the following orders:
Michael Aller, you have been convicted of the manslaughter of Amy Aiton.
For that offence, you are sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 years, which commenced on 1 September 2012 and expired on 31 August 2024.
I am required by s 25C(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), to inform you of the existence of that Act and the fact that it has potential application to you. I direct your lawyers to provide you with advice as to the practical and possible consequences (if any) of that fact.
**********
R
Aller (No 3)
[2013] HCA 37
(2013) 249 CLR 751
(2010) 79 NSWLR 1
(2000) 203 CLR 452
(2013) 249 CLR 600
(2000) 49 NSWLR 383