R v Abbas

Decision date: 07 May 2025

Jurisdiction: Criminal

Before: Newlinds SC DCJ

Decision: Aggregate term of imprisonment of three (3) years.
The Offender should be released on a Recognizance, pursuant to s 20(1)(b)(i), after the Offender serves a period of eleven (11) months and twenty-five (25) days from now in custody, so that the total time she will have spent in custody is one (1) year.

Catchwords: CRIME — Fraud — Victim a Commonwealth entity – Crime of submitting false claims to the NDIA purporting to be legitimate claims under NDIS – Total attempted financial gain of $214,973.93 – Total lost to Commonwealth of approximately $30,000 – Objective seriousness of crimes of fraud against the Commonwealth – Strong subjective case

Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A, s 20AB
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 135.1(1)

Cases Cited: Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288
Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105
Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) v Rowson [2007] VSCA 176
DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1
Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47
McGregor v R [2024] NSWCCA 200.
Parente v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 633
R v Abboud [2005] NSWCCA 251
R v Holdsworth [1993] QCA 242
R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566
R v Rice (2004) 150 A Crim R 37
Scook v R [2008] WASCA 114
Totaan v R [2022] NSWCCA 75
Veen v The Queen (No 2) (2001) 206 CLR 267
Xiao v R [2018] NSWCCA 4
R v Annecchini (unreported), NSWCCA, 24 April 1996
Ryan v R [2024] VSCA 74

Category: Sentence

Parties: Gada Abdelwahab Abbas (Offender)
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (“CDPP”) (Crown)

Representation: Counsel:
A Karim (Offender)
B Stevens (Crown)
Solicitors:
Sydney Criminal Law Specialists (Offender)
CDPP (Crown)

File Number(s): 2021/259156

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

The Facts

1. Between 25 February 2019 and 25 February 2020, in relation to eight separate National Disability Insurance Scheme (“NDIS”) participants, the Offender submitted a total of 50 false payment requests to the National Disability Insurance Agency (“NDIA”) deliberately claiming payment for services knowing they were never provided.

2. The total value of the false invoices and thus the total benefit the Offender dishonestly intended to obtain was $214,973.93.

3. The false claims were able to be submitted by the Offender because of her control of two companies, which she had registered as NDIS providers with the NDIA.

4. Seven of the NDIS participants had engaged the Offender through one of those companies as a provider for particular services approved on their NDIS plans. The eighth participant had no connection or relationship at all with the Offender or any company under her control.

5. The total lost to the Commonwealth until today that would have otherwise been available for the benefit of participants in the NDIS scheme was disputed. It is said by the Crown to be $53,011.68 and was, until this morning, accepted by the Offender to be about $30,000. This morning the Offender has accepted the amount is $53,011.68 in that she has consented to a reparation order in that amount. I shall proceed on that basis. Although, I do not consider the difference between $30,000 and $53,000 to make any difference to the ultimate sentence. This morning, the Offender paid an amount of $26,000 in part payment of reparation, which sum has been raised by the Offender’s family.

6. The Offender was apprehended and charged with offences under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)**. She was arrested on 9 April 2024 and spent 5 days in custody, before being released on bail. She pleaded not guilty and was committed for trial in the Downing Centre Local Court on 8 November 2022.

7. On 24 October 2024, the indictment having been amended, the Offender entered pleas of guilty to two counts.

8. The Offender, who has an otherwise unblemished criminal history and a moderately strong subjective case, now comes before me for sentencing in relation to those two counts, which, on any view of the agreed facts, are objectively serious.

The offences

| Count | Offence | Description | Maximum Penalty | | 1 | 1 x s 135.1(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) | Between about 25 February 2019 and about 25 February 2020, at Liverpool in the State of New South Wales and elsewhere, did submit to the National Disability Insurance Agency claims for services that were not provided to Aisha Hamoud, Omar Abdulrahman, Wolfgang Stuhr, Sonia Taha, Nawal Al-Zuhairi, Afnan Sufyan, Aram Noori with the intention of dishonestly obtaining a gain from another person, namely the National Disability Insurance Agency, which is a Commonwealth entity. | Imprisonment for 10 years and/or 600 penalty units (being $126,000) | | 2 | 1 x s 135.1(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) | Between about 3 December 2019 and about 22 December 2019, at Liverpool in the State of New South Wales and elsewhere, did submit to the National Disability Insurance Agency claims for services that were not provided to Naeema Dean with the intention of dishonestly obtaining a gain from another person, namely the National Disability Insurance Agency, which is a Commonwealth entity. | Imprisonment for 10 years and/or 600 penalty units (being $126,000) |

Delay in sentencing

9. The delay between the pleas of guilty on 24 October 2024 and the sentencing hearing before me which took place on 2 May 2025 is explicable by time spent wherein the Crown and the Offender sought to agree on facts which, whilst I do not know the detail, appears to have been a complex and slightly fraught process.

Principles of Commonwealth sentencing

10. Ultimately, the Court must impose a sentence “that is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence” (s 16A(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)). Section 16A(2) requires the Court to take into account the non-exhaustive list of factors in that subsection. A Court may only impose a sentence of imprisonment for a federal offence if, having considered all other available sentences, it is satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate (s 17A(1)). An aggregate sentence is available for Commonwealth offences: McGregor v R [2024] NSWCCA 200.

Relevant sentencing factors – s 16A(2)

Nature and circumstances of the offending (s 16A(2)(a))

11. Many of the principles that apply to State fraud offences are equally applicable to Commonwealth offences: see DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1 at [297]; Scook v R [2008] WASCA 114 at [16]. For example, the scale and complexity of the offence, the level of sophistication and planning involved, the way in which and time over which the fraud was pursued and implemented, the offender's role and any detailed knowledge of the relevant system defrauded, general deterrence, the possibility of detection and the amount defrauded are relevant to sentencing for Commonwealth fraud: Dickson v R [2016] NSWCCA 105 at [166]-[167].

12. As to the objective seriousness of the offending, the parties have agreed to a comprehensive set of facts, which I have summarised.

13. The Crown contends that the offending was designed to manipulate the NDIA payment system over a period of 12 months, which design involved a degree of planning and thought. The Offender’s purpose was to put herself in a better position financially, largely by setting off debts owed back to the Commonwealth by previously cancelled gains. A total of approximately $53,000 was ultimately retained, which amount has been lost to the Commonwealth, until this morning when $26,000 was paid, leaving an amount lost of about $27,000.

14. On behalf of the Offender, it is submitted that the offending, whilst not at the lower end of objective gravity, is appreciably below mid-range.

15. The Offender makes the following points in support of this submission. First, whilst conceding that the total intended gain was $214,973.95, the Offender’s submission is the actual financial loss is around $30,000. Whilst significant, this is well below the higher range of Commonwealth fraud cases involving millions of dollars. Second, whilst conceding that the offending occurred over a 12-month period, the submission is made that the offending was not a protracted multi-year offending period typical of higher objective serious type cases. Third, the Offender’s motive did not stem from pure greed or calculated exploitation but rather is in part the product of the Offender’s diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and major depressive disorder, which significantly impaired her judgement and decision-making capacity. Fourth, the degree of planning and sophistication was not great. Fifth, whilst accepting that there was a breach of trust involved, the breach is characterised on behalf the Offender as “opportunistic," rather than a deliberate calculated abuse of a high trust fiduciary role. Sixth, whilst accepting that the offending did undermine confidence in the NDIS system generally, no individual victim was deprived of any critical support service because of the offending.

16. Dealing with each of those submissions. First, whilst there are no doubt many cases of fraud on the Commonwealth where the amount actually lost is greater than $30,000 and the amount of intended gain exceeds $214,973 and whilst both amounts are, in the context of the Commonwealth of Australia's budget, de minimis, the fact is they are both significant amounts of money which were intended to be, and in part were, successfully taken, not just from the Commonwealth's overall budget, but out of the money allocated by the Commonwealth to the NDIS scheme. I do not consider much weight can be placed on the fact that the amount of money in question could have been larger. In any event, I do not consider the amount of money involved as anything other than significant. The charges directly relate to the intent and not the consequences. The intent was to obtain a gain of more than $200,000. That is significant. Second, the simple fact is the offending happened over a period of approximately 12 months by fifty, separate individual fraudulent activities. They were each planned and deliberate. Again, it could have been over a longer period of time, but I do not accept the submission that the offending can properly be described as “opportunistic." Third, as far as motive is concerned, the Offender was motivated by a desire for financial gain. I accept that her decision-making process was impaired because of her mental health issues, but the fact is she wanted that financial gain and acted dishonestly so as to get it. Fourth, I do not accept that the degree of planning and sophistication was at the lowest level, there was actually quite a large degree of sophistication and planning involved. It is true that the offending could have been more sophisticated, but it still involved thought and planning. Fifth, I consider that the offending involved a serious breach of trust, not just between the Offender and the Commonwealth of Australia, but also between the Offender and those intended to be the beneficiaries of the NDIS scheme. It is not a breach of trust in the sense that equity would recognise, but nonetheless, the Offender was put into a position which enabled her to commit the offences because people within the system decided that she was an appropriate person to trust. She dishonestly took advantage of that trust. Sixth, the concession on behalf of the Offender that the offending undermined confidence in the NDIS system generally is well-made. However, the submission that no individual victim can be identified, being a person who did not receive money from the NDIS scheme which they might have otherwise received, whilst true, is in my opinion, beside the point. The fact is an amount of in excess of $30,000 was removed from the system, which money would have otherwise been available to help vulnerable people with disabilities in great need. Whilst I cannot identify a particular victim, it is clear that there has been, and were intended to be, actual victims.

17. Financial offences against the Commonwealth are not victimless crimes. Courts have long recognised that fraud has many harmful, but often hidden, social consequences and the offending is such that it impacts the entire community. The offences before me are analogous to offences that undermine the confidence in the efficacy and integrity of the social security system, which have long attracted stern penalties: R v Annecchini (unreported), NSWCCA, 24 April 1996 (“Annecchini”); and R v Holdsworth, [1993] QCA 242 (“Holdsworth”).

18. As is inevitable with social security systems, the NDIS is a system based in large part on trust and good faith, which is open to abuse. Claims for payment under the NDIS are necessarily self-reported by the provider and generally accepted and proceeded in good faith without the provider being required to produce supporting documentation. The alternative of introducing threshold compliance checks into the system would be expensive and burdensome, and would likely delay many legitimate payments, thereby potentially giving rise to hardship for those in need of services under the NDIS.

19. Moreover, I have before me a victim impact statement from a mother of a 11-year-old child who suffers considerable disability who has said, not unsurprisingly:

“having an NDIS provider steal from… plan has made me so paranoid that I now feel I cannot trust providers at all… I have lost trust in all providers… I am now self-managing my daughter's plan. This has been extra work and stress for me but I feel I have to do it myself to keep her money safe…”

20. Such a reaction is perfectly understandable. It is to be expected that someone in the position of the mother of a severely disabled child would feel that way and accordingly, beside any financial victims, there are other victims of the crime.

21. I conclude that the objective seriousness of the offending is significant. If I had to place it on a scale, I would say it is well and truly in the mid-range, and probably a bit higher than the middle.

Whether the offence forms part of a course of conduct – s 16A(2)(c)

22. It is properly conceded that the offending extended beyond limited or isolated conduct, occurring over a substantial period of approximately 12 months.

Any injury, loss, or damage resulting from the offences – s 16A(2)(e)

23. I have already dealt with this when dealing with the objective seriousness of the offending.

24. There has been loss and damage to the money available to the NDIS scheme inflicted and there has been other non-financial loss and damage caused. It would be quite wrong to consider this to be some sort of victimless crime.

General deterrence and punishment – s 16A(2)(ja)

25. The Offender accepts that general deterrence must have a significant part to play in this sentencing exercise, although general deterrence is not the primary or pre-eminent sentencing consideration: Totaan v R [2022] NSWCCA 75 at [81]–[83], [90]-[91]; Parente v R (2017) 96 NSWLR 633.

26. Nonetheless, without suggesting there is some sort of hierarchy in the various factors to be taken into account when determining an appropriate sentence, the NDIS scheme is a substantial, benevolent government project designed to assist those in society in particular need of help. It involves the government interfacing with numerous private providers. It is the type of government system which is particularly susceptible to fraud of the nature perpetrated by the Offender.

27. The weight to be given to general deterrence in these types of cases has been repeatedly emphasised by the courts: see for example Annecchini at p 6, per Gleeson CJ; Holdsworth at [7], per Pincus JA and Thomas J; and Ryan v R [2024] VSCA 74 at p 10, per McLeish JA. All of those cases were dealing with crimes which I consider analogous to the matters before me, and in each, the importance of general deterrence as a factor to be weighed in the sentencing exercise was emphasised.

28. I consider that the weight to be given to general deterrence is significant. A clear message needs to be sent by the Courts to any person considering defrauding the NDIS system, that if apprehended and convicted, they can expect to be met with stern punishment.

The Offender’s subjective case

29. The Offender puts forward in support of a submission that her subjective case is strong – her contrition, her plea of guilty, the limited need in the circumstances for specific deterrence because of her mental health issues, which are said to reduce her moral culpability, her character, antecedents, age, means, physical and mental condition, and her prospects of rehabilitation.

30. Dealing with each of those separately.

Contrition – s 16A(2)(f); and Plea of Guilty – s 16A(2)(g)

31. The Offender has pleaded guilty. A guilty plea can be demonstrative of contrition: Filippou v The Queen (2015) 256 CLR 47 at [66]. This is over and above the utilitarian value of a plea: Xiao v R [2018] NSWCCA 4 at [281].

32. The Offender has also put before me a comprehensive report of Mr Attai, psychologist, of “Mindstrong – Psychology and Consulting,” where substantial statements of contrition by the Offender are recorded.

33. However, there are a series of disturbing observations in the Sentencing Assessment Report (“SAR”) which are inconsistent with any real contrition, remorse, or insight. The Offender seems to have blamed her husband and employees and, at one point, seems to have suggested that the claims were legitimate.

34. The Offender tendered a letter to the Court from her dated 28 April 2025 expressing regret and remorse and promising not to reoffend. Again, it contained some confusing statements which seem to suggest that the Offender was seeking to deflect responsibility for, what she admits to be her criminal activity, onto one or more of her employees and a failure by her to have in place a system. These are similar to the statements in the SAR. Mr Karim of counsel, who appeared for the Offender, made it clear that she was not seeking in any way to depart from her plea, but I am left with a feeling of disquiet when I come to consider the important questions of contrition, remorse, and insight.

35. The Offender has not committed any further offences since February 2020, having spent a considerable time in the community under strict bail conditions, which conduct is consistent with some remorse and contrition.

36. The Crown reminds me that contrition is better shown by acts and should be established by proper evidence (Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288 at [38]) and that caution needs to be exercised when evidence is adduced as to contrition via statements to third parties (Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) v Rowson [2007] VSCA 176 at [24]).

37. After the sentencing hearing on 2 May 2025, this morning, I was advised that the Offender's family has been able to secure the sum of $26,000, which she has paid by cheque to the Commonwealth in part reparation for the loss she has caused. The Crown fairly concedes that payment of the sum may be taken into account as indicative of the Offender’s contrition and remorse, and I have done so, although it must be emphasised that the source of the money is the Offender's family, who for reasons I will explain have their own significant reasons for the sentence to be lenient.

38. With some considerable hesitation, and really because of the Offender’s otherwise good character and acceptance of the Treatment Plan recommended for her mental health issues and the payment this morning of $26,000, I approach the matter on the basis of some quite low-level contrition and remorse on the part of the Offender.

39. In addition, and in any event, the Offender is entitled to a utilitarian discount for the plea of guilty for the facilitation of the course of justice. Under the State legislation she would be entitled to 10% to 15%. I consider it appropriate to afford her an arithmetical discount of 10% for the purpose of s 16A(2)(g).

Character, antecedents, age, means and physical or mental condition – s 16A(2)(m)

40. The Offender is 48 years old with no criminal history.

41. That prior good character is such that it must materially moderate any punishment imposed: Veen v The Queen (No 2) (2001) 206 CLR 267 (“Veen”) at [275].

Mental condition

42. A psychological report of Hamad Attai, tendered by the Offender, dated 27 April 2025, states that the Offender suffers from PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder with anxious distress, both severe in nature. I accept these conditions were present at the time of the offending and are the context in which the offending occurred. The report states that the Offender’s judgment was significantly impaired due to overwhelming psychological distress arising from multiple factors, including the breakdown of her marriage in 2019, serious difficulties faced by her daughter in her marriage, prolonged separation from her children in Australia, and her entrapment in Sudan during a period of escalating civil unrest.

43. This indicates that the Offender lacked adequate coping mechanisms at the time, resorting to withdrawal, isolation, and maladaptive behaviours to manage her deteriorating mental state.

44. Importantly, the psychologist concludes that with continued psychological intervention, the likelihood of reoffending is significantly reduced. The Offender has engaged positively with treatment, resumed full-time employment, and has committed to an ongoing plan of therapy involving Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, Acceptance, and Commitment Therapy, and other relapse prevention strategies. The report supports a conclusion that her mental health disorders contributed to the offending and that her prospects for rehabilitation are good.

45. I accept that the Offender suffers, and at the time of the offending was suffering, from significant mental health issues, which, in part, combined with her unfortunate family situation, provides some, but by no means all, of the explanation for her offending. The significant and less attractive other part of the explanation is she decided to take money that she was not entitled to for her own benefit.

Rehabilitation – s 16A(2)(n)

46. I consider the Offenders prospects of rehabilitation are quite good because of the contrition she has demonstrated, slight as it may be, her commitment to undertake the treatment plan recommended to her by her psychologist, the fact she has strong family support, including her children and extended family, and the fact that she has stable accommodation and a job.

Specific deterrence – s 16A(2)(j)

47. Specific or personal deterrence is particularly applicable where an offender has a prior criminal record which manifests a continuing attitude of disobedience, such that more weight should be given to retribution, personal deterrence or protection of the community: Veen at 477; R v Rice (2004) 150 A Crim R 37 at [26]; R v Abboud [2005] NSWCCA 251 at [33]; R v McNaughton (2006) 66 NSWLR 566 at [54].

48. The Offender's lack of criminal history at the time of the offending does not reveal any pattern of persistent lawlessness or disregard for legal obligations. However, against that, the offending itself does demonstrate a year-long pattern of criminality, thus ruling out any finding that the offending was a one-off aberration.

49. In these circumstances, the need for specific deterrence here, whilst relevant, carries less weight. It is also relevant that the Offender has already served a period of five days in custody and has gone through this sentencing exercise, which no doubt has been very unpleasant and distressing and stands as a tangible personal deterrent against future offending.

Hardship on family – s 16A(2)(p)

50. The Offender has six adult children and elderly parents who have chronic illness, who live overseas, and rely on her for daily contact. Her eldest son has serious mental health illness and needs the Offender and her younger son who has just turned 18, is struggling to deal with the circumstances his mother finds herself in.

51. There is no doubt that a consequence of any period of imprisonment on the Offender will be significantly detrimental, perhaps even devastating, to her family’s life, and I do take that into account in her favour. However, another way of looking at it is such consequences are the inevitable result of the Offender's own illegal conduct.

The parties’ competing submissions

52. On behalf of the Crown, it is submitted that, having regard to the objective seriousness of the offending, the period of time over which it occurred and the need for general deterrence and denunciation, the only appropriate sentence is a term of immediate imprisonment.

53. The Crown emphasises that offences involving defrauding the Commonwealth of significant amounts of money generally attract a custodial sentence: Holdsworth at [7].

54. The Crown has identified no appellate consideration of sentences for frauds against the NDIA. The Crown provided me with a schedule of first instance outcomes relating to fraud offences, specifically against the NDIA, and other appellate level decisions relating to analogous crimes, being crimes against various aspects of the Commonwealth Social Security System. I have taken those outcomes into account, whilst acknowledging that the charges are often very different, and the factual settings vary widely.

55. On behalf of the Offender, whilst acknowledging that the only appropriate sentence is one of imprisonment, by the root of s 20AB, it is submitted that sentence should be served wholly in the community, by way of an Intensive Corrections Order.

Discussion

56. I start by acknowledging the strength of the Offender's subjective case. She is a 48-year-old woman with no criminal convictions. The offending, whilst systematic over a period of a year, does appear to have been generally out of character and, at least in part, the product of her mental health issues. Notwithstanding the lack of any significant contrition, remorse, or insight, I consider her prospects of rehabilitation and not offending again to be reasonably good to the point where I think it is unlikely that she will reoffend.

57. Nonetheless the offences themselves are serious, carrying maximum penalties of 10 years imprisonment. The offending was deliberate, sustained, planned, and ultimately, the intention, which was partially successful, was to effectively steal money of the Commonwealth's out of the budget of money allocated towards the NDIS scheme for the Offender’s own benefit. This was done by a cynical breach of the trust that the NDIS system had placed in the Offender. I am not satisfied that the Offender has shown anything more than minimal contrition, remorse, and insight.

58. For the NDIS scheme and other like Commonwealth projects to survive, fraud, when identified, must be actively discouraged by the Courts by imposing sentences that send a clear message that such crimes will attract significant penalties, and the risk of those penalties outweigh any perceived access to easy money. I do not consider that the Offender is a particularly good candidate for that message to be sent and I have taken that into account. However, I have concluded that the only appropriate sentence is one of imprisonment.

Resolution

59. For Count 1, I consider an appropriate starting point is three (3) years and four (4) months imprisonment, less 10% for the utilitarian value of the guilty plea, which leads to three (3) years, with some rounding in the Offender’s favour and for Count 2, fourteen (14) months imprisonment, less 10% for the value of the guilty plea, which leads to one (1) year, with some rounding in the Offender’s favour. As the offending covers exactly the same course of conduct and there is no distinguishing factors differentiating Count 1 from Count 2, I consider it appropriate that those sentences be served concurrently, so as to conclude that an appropriate aggregate term of imprisonment is three (3) years. It should be backdated by five (5) days to take account of the time already served.

How should that term be served?

60. The next question is how much, if any, of that term of imprisonment should be served in full-time custody.

61. I have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the Offender and acknowledge the strength of her subjective case. Nonetheless, I am not satisfied that the Offender should serve the whole of the sentence in the community. I have decided that the appropriate mechanism so as to encourage and facilitate as much as possible her rehabilitation and reduce the prospects of her reoffending, whilst at the same time sending an appropriate message of general deterrence, is that the Offender should serve a total of one (1) year in custody, including the five (5) days already served, after which she should serve the balance of the term on a recognizance pursuant to s 20(1)(b)(i) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).

62. The conditions of the recognizance will be that the Offender be of good behaviour, be subject to the supervision of a probation officer appointed in accordance with the order and obey all reasonable directions of that probation officer.

63. In addition, the Offender will be required to comply with the Treatment Plan recommended by Mr Attai at page 9 of his Report of 15 March 2025.

Conclusion

64. The indicative sentences which I consider appropriate, after a 10% reduction for the guilty pleas, are:

65. Count 1 – Three (3) years.

66. Count 2 – One (1) year.

67. Taking into account the principles of totality, I consider an appropriate aggregate term of imprisonment to be three (3) years.

68. That term will be backdated to take account of the five (5) days already served.

69. The Offender should be released on a Recognizance, pursuant to s 20(1)(b)(i), after the Offender serves a period of eleven (11) months and twenty-five (25) days from now in custody, so that the total time she will have spent in custody is one (1) year.

Orders

68. My orders are:

69. In respect of Counts One and Two and after deducting 10% for the pleas of guilty, the Offender is sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of three (3) years to commence on 2 May 2025 and expire 1 May 2028.

70. The Offender is to be released on 1 May 2026, upon her entering a recognizance pursuant to s 20(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) herself in the sum of $100, without security, for a period of two (2) years. That recognizance is to be conditioned that the Offender will:

(a) Be of good behaviour; (b) Be subject to the supervision of a probation officer appointed in accordance with the order; (c) Obey all reasonable directions of the probation officer; and (d) Follow and attend the Treatment Plan recommended by Mr Attai at page 9 of his Report of 15 March 2025 or as amended from time to time in writing by Mr Attai.

3. It is the Court’s intention that the Offender be released on the recognizance release order on 1 May 2026.
4. Pursuant to s 21B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), the Offender pay reparation to the Commonwealth in the sum of $51,733.
5. I note that the Offender intends to pay an amount of $26,000 of that amount to the Commonwealth today, and subject to that cheque clearing, the above amount should be set off by $26,000.

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