State of New South Wales (NSW Police Force) (M1-W5358/25)

State of New South Wales (NSW Police Force) (M2-W5358/25)

WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; appeal by psychologically injured claimant from 8% whole person impairment (WPI) assessment; whether additional report from psychologist fresh evidence; whether error made in class 2 rating for social and recreational activities; whether error made in class 1 rating for travel; whether claimant's truthfulness and honesty relevant to assessment; in view of unanimous opinion of 22% by experts on each side of the record, the Medical Assessor's (MA) reasons were inadequate; Held - fresh evidence rejected; claimant incorrect to assert that 'going out' was an essential part of social and recreational activities; Diaz v Sydney International Container Terminals Pty Ltd applied; travel rating increased to class 2 as evidence accepted by MA limited to familiar travel; self-report in truthful manner not determinative, psychiatric impairment rating scale authorities referred to; reasons adequate; Campbelltown City Council v Vegan, Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Limited v Kocak, and El Masri v Woolworths Ltd considered; Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) revoked; new MAC for 9% issued.

1. On 25 July 2025 Sarah Quinn, the appellant, lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision. The medical dispute was assessed by Dr Surabhi Verma, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 11 July 2025.
2. On 20 August 2025 State of New South Wales (NSW Police Force), the appellant employer, also lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision. The medical dispute was assessed by Dr Surabhi Verma, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 11 July 2025.
3. These reasons concern Ms Quinn's appeal, M1-5358/25. We shall issue separate short minutes in the employer's appeal, M2- W5358/25.
4. The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):
   • availability of additional relevant information (being additional information that was not available to, and that could not reasonably have been obtained by, the appellant before the medical assessment appealed against);
   • the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and
   • the MAC contains a demonstrable error.
5. The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the ground(s) of appeal on which the appeal is made.
6. Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.
7. The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed

1 March 2021 (the Guides) and the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th ed (AMA 5). "WPI" is reference to whole person impairment. "Baseline WPI" is a reference to the total WPI assessed before deduction or modification pursuant to the relevant legislative authority.

1. On 5 June 2025 this matter was referred for an assessment of WPI caused by a psychiatric and psychological disorder that occurred on 10 March 2023.
2. Ms Quinn was a sergeant with the NSW Police Force, having commenced working there in 1996. She ceased work in March 2023. She worked with frontline general policing for about 28 years and was exposed to the traumatic and horrific episodes to which first responders are required to attend. They were set out in some detail by the Medical Assessor.
3. In 2015 post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms began to be experienced and she was referred to a psychologist after contacting her general practitioner (GP).
4. She was also commenced on Sertraline. As she was promoted, Ms Quinn was able to choose where she wanted to work and she consciously decided to stay off the road and worked as a Custody Manager which did not prevent her mental health gradually declining as one of her colleagues committed suicide, and another in 2022 attempted suicide.
5. The Medical Assessor diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol use disorder.
6. The Medical Assessor found 8% WPI**.**

1. The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.
2. As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the worker to undergo a further medical examination as the panel has determined that no error was made by the Medical Assessor, save as to the travel category in the Psychiatric Impairment Rating Scale (PIRS). That error related to the appropriate rating for Ms Quinn's past travel, and a re-examination would not have assisted the panel's deliberations.

"(3) Evidence that is fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received in relation to the medical assessment appealed against may not be given on an appeal by a party to the appeal unless the evidence was not available to the party before that medical assessment and could not reasonably have been obtained by the party before that medical assessment."

1. In her appeal Ms Quinn sought to have admitted as fresh evidence a report of Ms Lisa Wilson a registered psychologist and WorkCover Provider dated 21 July 2025.[1]

1. The heading of her report was "Challenge to the 8% whole-person impairment rating documented for Ms Sarah Louise Quinn by Dr Surabhi Verma on 11 July 2025".
2. Ms Wilson considered that the Medical Assessor had "significantly understated, minimised and overlooked the severity and magnitude of Ms Quinn's psychological injury, which is in direct contrast to the two previous assessments indicating 22% impairment".
3. Ms Wilson criticised the rating given by the Medical Assessor for travel, advising that Ms Quinn suffered various symptoms whilst driving or being a passenger in a motor vehicle, as a result of the experiences that Ms Quinn had encountered as a police officer. Ms Wilson referred to "our psychological sessions," without indicating when they had occurred. The medical certificates issued by Dr John Holt, Ms Quinn's GP, indicated that Ms Wilson had been her psychologist for a considerable period of time. One certificate indicated that Ms Wilson was the psychologist when the certificate dated 22 March 2023 was issued.[2]
4. Ms Wilson referred to the March 2025 report by Dr Yadav and reproduced some of that report. She also referred to a report by Dr Kuljic from August 2023. Ms Wilson criticised the finding by the Medical Assessor that she had been able to attend weddings and parties, albeit occasionally. Ms Wilson also gave her opinion regarding the Medical Assessor's use of italics.
5. Ms Wilson made some comments about the rating given to the social and recreational activities category. She referred to a 2021 report by a Dr Holt and the 2023 report by Dr Yadav. She considered that the sudden and unexpected death of colleagues, which dated back to 2021 needed to be re-addressed.
6. Under a heading "additional evidence that could be considered," Ms Wilson thought that all the reports had overlooked sleep disturbance.

1. We were not addressed by the appellant as to just how this evidence qualified for admission under the provisions of s 328 (3) of the 1998 Act. Ms Wilson's report was replete with references to evidence that was available before the medical assessment, and that on its face could reasonably have been obtained prior to the medical assessment. Regrettably, it does not appear that Ms Quinn was aware of the practice and procedure of the jurisdiction.
2. Sara Quinn (the respondent) did not consent to the admission of this evidence.

1. Ms Wilson's report, as evidenced by her preamble, was obtained for the purpose of challenging the contents of the MAC, in ignorance of the relevant legislative requirements. It is rejected.

1. The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.

1. The parts of the medical certificate given by the Medical Assessor that are relevant to the appeal are set out, where relevant, in the body of this decision.

1. Both parties made written submissions which have been considered below by the Appeal Panel.

1. The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.
2. In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons. Where there are disputes of fact it may be necessary to refer to evidence or other material on which findings are based, but the extent to which this is necessary will vary from case to case. Where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary to explain why one conclusion is preferred. On the other hand, the reasons need not be extensive or provide a detailed explanation of the criteria applied by the medical professionals in reaching a professional judgement.

1. At [10c] the Medical Assessor discussed the opinions of other medical experts. She noted the opinion by Dr Yadav on 17 March 2025. In doing so she noted that he had calculated 22% and she said:

"Kindly note that my calculation differs in the area of social and recreational activities and travel. Kindly refer to my PIRS rating scale for the differences."

1. She referred to the medico-legal report by Dr Rastogi, noting also that Dr Rastogi had calculated the impairment at 22%. As to that opinion, the Medical Assessor said:

"Kindly note that Ms Quinn reported to me during the assessment that she socializes with her neighbour on every Friday when the neighbour comes up and they socialize over coffee and wine. Her best friend also visits her at least once every month. She has been able to attend weddings and parties albeit occasionally. With regards to the category travel she has been able to go for long drives on her own to visit her younger sister and has been able to travel to Bali with her husband at least on a yearly basis since 2020."

1. The Medical Assessor had considered those activities earlier in her MAC under the heading "Social Activities/ADL". She repeated those comments in her Table 11.8 PIRS rating form.
2. As to social and recreational activities she said:[3]

"Ms Quinn previously enjoyed playing netball, gardening and she has stopped playing netball because of the ongoing physical pain and has stopped engaging in gardening as well. She does not socialise with her friends and lacks enthusiasm and interest to leave the house. She has been able to attend important events like her sister's wedding and going out for races. She has attended a fundraiser for a friend who had bowel cancer. Her best friend comes over at least once a month. Her neighbour pops over on Friday afternoon and they catch up over coffee and wine. Her dad too comes and socialises and stays with her at times."

1. Regarding the travel category, the Medical Assessor said:

Ms Quinn leaves her home when she needs something from the grocery store. She visits her sisters. Her elder sister lives in Sutherland Shire which is a 40-minute drive which she is able to drive on her own. She is able to drive to visit her younger sister who lives in Nerong which is a three-hour trip. She has visited her at least five times. Out of these five times she was able to drive there at least twice on her own.

She has gone to Bali on multiple times and in the last five years she has gone there at least five to six times. She reported that she used to go to Bali quite frequently even before the injuries which she has continued doing.

She said that they usually spend two to three weeks in Bali, and they 'swim and watch Netflix'."

Ms Quinn's presentation was consistent with the history given during clinical interview, documentation received, and mental status examination. There was no evidence of any exaggeration or malingering."

1. We read Ms Quinn's submissions with some interest. Rather than address the PIRS categories, Ms Quinn approached the submissions from the point of view of the expert witnesses.
2. It was firstly argued that the Medical Assessor had given inadequate reasons for disagreeing with the medico-legal experts on each side of the record. Emphasis was laid on the unanimous assessment of 22% WPI, and we were referred to content of both reports. These were contrasted with the findings of the Medical Assessor.
3. The Medical Assessor had accordingly given inadequate reasoning, Ms Quinn submitted.
4. We were referred to the often-cited passage regarding the path of reason from the plurality of the High Court in Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Limited v Kocak [2013] HCA 43 at [48] and [55]. We were also referred to "Lederer"[4] but that was a case concerned with the legislation relevant to the Motor Accident Compensation Act 1999, and of little relevance. Ms Quinn seems to have relied on it for the uncontroversial proposition that a Medical Assessor is required to respond to a substantial and clearly articulated argument.
5. Secondly, error was said to have occurred in particular by the failure by the Medical Assessor to apply a class 3 rating in the social and recreational activities category.
6. Ms Quinn argued that on an alternative interpretation of the facts, it was possible to argue that indeed a class 3 rating would have been appropriate. It was important, she argued, that the descriptors for this class required the action of "going out." The Medical Assessor had limited Ms Quinn's relevant activities to those within her home, and had fallen into error,
7. We were referred to supportive findings in the opinions of Dr Rastogi and Dr Yaduv. Reference was also made to a Medical Appeal Panel decision of Oraha v Settlement Services International [2024] NSWPICMP 171.
8. The third ground related to the PIRS category of travel.
9. We were referred to the history that the Medical Assessor took and again it was argued that another interpretation of the facts might have resulted in a higher rating.
10. Ms Quinn relied on the evidence which "makes significant references" to Ms Quinn's excessive anxiety.
11. We note that considerable emphasis was laid by Ms Quinn on her subjective reactions to having to drive and travel more generally.

1. The respondent submitted that Ms Quinn's appeal was misconceived. An appellant was required to establish error, and none had been shown. The Medical Assessor had provided a detailed analysis of all the material before her and commented on aspects of the medical evidence that she agreed and disagreed with. Thus, no error had been made because she adequately disclosed her path of reasoning.
2. The respondent submitted that the appellant's challenge to the ratings for both social and recreational activities and travel must fail. We were referred to the authority we have discussed below in that regard. (It was also submitted that the rating for the category of concentration, persistence and pace should be confirmed, but no appeal was made against that rating).

1. The PIRS is established as the rating system for assessing psychiatric/psychological impairment, by virtue of Chapter 11 of the Guides. Chapter 11 sets out six categories of behaviour to be considered, each being divided into five classes, ranging in seriousness from 1 to 5. Class 1 relates to a situation where there is no psychological deficit, or a minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population. Class 5 pertains to a person who is totally impaired.
2. Chapter 11.12[5] provides:

"Impairment in each area is rated using class descriptors. Classes range from 1 to 5, in accordance with severity. The standard form must be used when scoring the PIRS. The examples of activities are examples only. The assessing psychiatrist should take account of the person's cultural background. Consider activities that are usual for the person's age, sex and cultural norms."

1. The Medical Assessor is required to classify each category, and to apply the resulting scores as set out in Chapter 11.[6]
2. The assessment of psychiatric disorder has been considered in a number of cases. In Ferguson v State of New South Wales[7] Campbell J was concerned the case where the Medical Appeal Panel had revoked the MAC on the basis that the finding by the Approved Medical Assessor (AMS) had been glaringly improbable. His Honour found that the Panel had fallen into jurisdictional error. He said at [23]:

"By reference to NSW Police Force v Daniel Wark [2012] NSWWCCMA 36, the Appeal Panel directed itself that in questions of classification under the PIRS:

'... the pre-eminence of the clinical observations cannot be underrated. The judgment as to the significance or otherwise of the matters raised in the consultation is very much a matter for assessment by the clinician with the responsibility of conducting his/her enquiries with the applicant face to face'.

1. The Appeal Panel accepted that intervention was only justified: if the categorisation was glaringly improbable; if it could be demonstrated that the AMS was unaware of significant factual matters; if a clear misunderstanding could be demonstrated; or if an unsupportable reasoning process could be made out. I understood that all of these matters were regarded by the Appeal Panel as interpretations of the statutory grounds of applying incorrect criteria or demonstrable error. One takes from this that the Appeal Panel understood that more than a mere difference of opinion on a subject about which reasonable minds may differ is required to establish error in the statutory sense.
2. The Appeal Panel also, with respect, correctly recorded that in accordance with Chapter 11.12 of the Guides 'the assessment is to be made upon the behavioural consequences of psychiatric disorder, and that each category within the PIRS evaluates a particular area of functional impairment': Appeal Panel reasons at [37]. The descriptors, or examples, describing each class of impairment in the various categories are 'examples only': see Jenkins v Ambulance Service of New South Wales[8]. The Appeal Panel said 'they provide a guide which can be consulted as a general indicator of the level of behaviour that might generally be expected': Appeal Panel reasons at [37]."
3. In Glenn William Parker v Select Civil Pty Ltd,[9] another case regarding assessment of psychiatric disorder, Harrison AsJ cited [23] of Ferguson with approval at [65]. Her Honour said at [66]:

"In relation to Classes of PIRS there has to be more than a difference of opinion on a subject about which reasonable minds may differ to establish error in the statutory sense. (Ferguson [24])....."

"It was a matter for the clinical judgment of the AMS to determine whether the impairment with respect to employability was at the moderate level, as he did, or at some other level. But, in seeking judicial review, a mere disagreement about the level of impairment is not sufficient to demonstrate error of a kind susceptible to judicial review."

1. The descriptors for the PIRS category of social and recreational activities are to be found in Table 11.2 of the Guides:

"Class 1 - No deficit, or minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population: regularly participates in social activities that are age, sex and culturally appropriate. May belong to clubs or associations and is actively involved with these.

Class 2 - Mild impairment: occasionally goes out to such events eg without

needing a support person, but does not become actively involved (eg dancing,

Class 3 - Moderate impairment: rarely goes out to such events, and most when prompted by family or close friend. Will not go out without a support person. Not actively involved, remains quiet and withdrawn".

1. As noted above, the reasons given by the Medical Assessor for his class 2 rating were:

"Ms Quinn previously enjoyed playing netball, gardening and she has stopped playing netball because of the ongoing physical pain and has stopped engaging in gardening as well. She does not socialise with her friends and lacks enthusiasm and interest to leave the house. She has been able to attend important events like her sister's wedding and going out for races. She has attended a fundraiser for a friend who had bowel cancer. Her best friend comes over at least once a month. Her neighbour pops over on Friday afternoon and they catch up over coffee and wine. Her dad too comes and socialises and stays with her at times."

1. The alternative interpretation of the facts was said to be available on the basis that Ms Quinn had been found to have been "clear" and "co-operative." She had been found not be exaggerating or malingering in her presentation to both medico-legal experts and the Medical Assessor, nor had she been feigning her symptoms. She had been spontaneous and engaging. Thus, it was argued, Ms Quinn had presented truthfully and honestly to all medical specialists and the difference is assessments between the unanimous rating by the medico-legal experts of 22% and 8% found by the Medical Assessor demonstrated error by her failure to adequately explain why she differed.
2. It is trite to say, in the light of the above authority, that the assessment of a claimant is not based on whether he/she presents honestly and truthfully. It is assessed on the behavioural consequences of a person's psychiatric disorder insofar as they affect the six categories laid out in the PIRS. Many people presenting for assessment are honest and truthful, if not the majority of them, and it would defeat the purpose of the scheme if, as submitted by Ms Quinn, a psychiatrist acting as a Medical Assessor were restricted only to the self-report of the claimant in his evaluation.
3. Ms Quinn argued that in view of the agreement by the medico-legal experts, the reasons given by the Medical Assessor were inadequate in that they "disregarded the worker's complaints and history" when the medico-legal experts had not.
4. However, Ms Quinn's submission overlooked the standard of reasons required by a Medical Assessor, as we have already alluded to in our reference to Vegan in our preamble. In Vegan, Handley J (McColl JA agreeing) said:

"121 Where it is necessary for the Panel to make findings of primary fact, in order to reach a particular conclusion as to the existence, nature and extent of any physical impairment, it may be expected that the findings of material facts will be set out in its reasons. Where facts are in dispute, it may be necessary to refer to evidence or other material on which findings are based, but the extent to which this is necessary will vary from case to case. More importantly, where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary for the Panel to give some explanation of its preference for one conclusion over another. That aspect may have particular significance in circumstances where the medical members of a Panel have made their own assessment of the applicant's condition and have come to a different conclusion from that reached by other medical practitioners, as set out in reports provided to the Panel.

1. On the other hand, to fulfil a minimum legal standard, the reasons need not be extensive or provide detailed explanation of the criteria applied by medical specialists in reaching a professional judgment: (authority omitted). At least, that will be so where the medical science is not controversial: if it is, a more expansive explanation may be required."
2. Of relevance in this regard also is the dicta of the plurality in Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak[10] at [47]:

"The function of a Medical Panel is to form and to give its own opinion on the medical question referred for its opinion. In performing that function, the Medical Panel is doubtless obliged to observe procedural fairness, so as to give an opportunity for parties to the underlying question or matter who will be affected by the opinion to supply the Medical Panel with material which may be relevant to the formulation of the opinion and to make submissions to the Medical Panel on the basis of that material. The material supplied may include the opinions of other medical practitioners, and submissions to the Medical Panel may seek to persuade the Medical Panel to adopt reasoning or conclusions expressed in those opinions. The Medical Panel may choose in a particular case to place weight on a medical opinion supplied to it in forming and giving its own opinion. It goes too far, however, to conceive of the function of the Panel as being either to decide a dispute or to make up its mind by reference to competing contentions or competing medical opinions. The function of a Medical Panel is neither arbitral nor adjudicative: it is neither to choose between competing arguments, nor to opine on the correctness of other opinions on that medical question. The function is in every case to form and to give its own opinion on the medical question referred to it by applying its own medical experience and its own medical expertise."

1. The corollary to this function was also discussed in [48]:

"The reasons that s 68(2) of the Act obliged the Medical Panel to set out in a statement of reasons to accompany the certificate as to its opinion were the reasons which led the Medical Panel to form the opinion that the Medical Panel was required to form for itself on the medical question referred for its opinion. What is to be set out in the statement of reasons is the actual path of reasoning by which the Medical Panel arrived at the opinion the Medical Panel actually formed for itself."

1. In El Masri v Woolworths Ltd [2014] NSW SC 134 Campbell J said at [50] that:

"The statement of reasons must explain that actual path of reasoning in sufficient detail to enable a court to see whether the opinion does or does not involve any error of law."

1. In the present case the facts are not in dispute, and the medical science is not controversial. The Medical Assessor was applying the criteria - or more precisely, the descriptors - in reaching a professional judgment so that, as stated in Vegan, her reasons did not need to be extensive or provide the detailed explanation sought by Ms Quinn. The Medical Assessor was not required to adjudicate about other opinions and her duty to provide her actual path of reasoning relates to her clinical opinion as to the medical question referred to her. It is in that context that the duty to provide reasons needs to be considered.
2. We have reproduced the Medical Assessor's consideration at [10c] of the reports of Dr Rastogi and Dr Yadav. She was aware of their content and went to some lengths to explain why she differed, saying in the case of the respondent's Dr Yadav:

"Kindly note that my calculation differs in the area of social and recreational activities and travel. Kindly refer to my PIRS rating scale for the differences."

"Kindly note that Ms Quinn reported to me during the assessment that she socialises with her neighbour on every Friday when the neighbour comes up and they socialise over coffee and wine. Her best friend also visits her at least once every month. She has been able to attend weddings and parties albeit occasionally...."

1. Ms Quinn's submission that the Medical Assessor had failed to "engage with and evaluate" those reports, or indeed that the Medical Assessor had failed to give adequate reasons must accordingly be rejected.
2. The next issue Ms Quinn raised was that the Medical Assessor had fallen into error in evaluating the activities she described as being relevant to the category. This was said to be because most of those activities were held at Ms Quinn's home, and accordingly could not comply with the descriptors in the assessed class 2 rating, as they specifically referred to the act of "going out" without a support person. Ms Quinn relied on the precedent of Oraha, which we have already distinguished on the basis referred to above, but which is also distinguishable because it is not correct in this jurisdiction to say, as was apparently found in that decision, that activities within the home were not relevant. Subsequent authority has held that such activities are indeed relevant.[11]
3. We are satisfied that Ms Quinn's having regular visitors for social purposes - her best friend, her neighbour and her father - is activity that is age, sex and culturally appropriate. In her report of 27 June 2024, Dr Rastogi did not include Ms Quinn's activities at home in the class 3 rating assessed, and it may be that Ms Quinn's activities have become more prevalent since the date of Dr Rastogi's report.[12] Dr Yadav, in his report of 17 March 2025 also did not note the home activities.[13]
4. In the final analysis, the Medical Assessor through her clinical evaluation on a face-to-face basis, enjoyed a pre-eminent position to enable her to assess this category. Whilst other minds may differ, the submissions do not demonstrate error on her behalf.
5. The remaining issue concerned the class 1 rating given for the travel category. The descriptors are set out in Table 11.3 of the Guides:

"Class 1 No deficit, or minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population: Can travel to new environments without supervision.

Class 2 Mild impairment: can travel without support person, but only in a familiar area such as local shops, visiting a neighbour.

Class 3 Moderate impairment: cannot travel away from own residence without support person. Problems may be due to excessive anxiety or cognitive impairment."

1. The Medical Assessor said in her Table 11.8 Rating Form:

"Ms Quinn leaves her home when she needs something from the grocery store. She visits her sisters. Her elder sister lives in Sutherland Shire which is a 40-minute drive which she is able to drive on her own. She is able to drive to visit her younger sister who lives in Nerong which is a three-hour trip. She has visited her at least five times. Out of these five times she was able to drive there at least twice on her own.

She has gone to Bali on multiple times and in the last five years she has gone there at least five to six times. She reported that she used to go to Bali quite frequently even before the injuries which she has continued doing. She said that they usually spend two to three weeks in Bali, and they _'_swim and watch Netflix'."

1. The relevance of Ms Quinn's activities in Bali is somewhat difficult to perceive, however the regular visits there may have been a factor that influenced the class 1 rating. Ms Quinn accurately summarised the evidence in [46] of her submissions:

"Report of Dr Rastogi: 'She will drive only short distances if needed, has lost confidence and her concentration is impaired. She drives to her appointments only. She gets triggered on the road and by noises' [page 24 of ARD], and 'Moderate impairment as she is anxious and ... is very hesitant driving to places. She is easily triggered.' [page 30 of ARD]

Report of Dr Yaduv: 'She has daily flashbacks effecting her functioning including driving and now she only drives to familiar places', 'Intrusive memories and flashbacks of traumatic work incidents are a constant presence in Mrs Quinn's life, triggered by both specific reminders, such as driving ...', 'She requires her husband to drive her to unfamiliar places' and 'She gets triggered when driving alone.' [page 6 of Reply to ARD]."

1. Ms Quinn argued for a class 3 rating but, again, the Medical Assessor was in the best position to assess her ability in this category as she presented on the day of the assessment. The Medical Assessor's description, however, of Ms Quinn's driving experience - that she was able to drive to familiar destinations some distance away - did not fit easily into the class 1 rating. That history was not consistent with a person who is able to drive to new environments without supervision; it was rather restricted to travel to familiar places - namely, her sisters in Sutherland Shire and Nerong. Ms Quinn's regular visits to Bali had also become a familiar journey to her. Thus a class 1 rating was not applicable.
2. Ms Quinn's capacity to travel, however, was also not compatible with a class 3 rating. Ms Quinn is able to travel without a support person and the distances she has been able to travel - both by car and by aeroplane - do not support a finding that excessive anxiety or cognitive impairment is problematic. That she might have had some anxiety whilst so travelling is not relevant to the assessment. The PIRS (with the exception of class 3 in this category) is concerned only whether a person with a psychological disorder can carry out the requirements of the six categories, and to what extent, as suggested by the descriptors.
3. The class 1 ruling will be revoked.
4. The appropriate rating is class 2. Ms Quinn can travel without a support person in familiar areas, albeit that they are considerably more involved than the example of a trip to the shops.
5. The corrected calculations are as follows:

Deduction for pre-existing impairment= 0%. Addition for treatment effect = 0%

1. For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on 11 July 2025 should be revoked, and a new MAC should be issued. The new certificate is attached to this statement of reasons.

This Certificate is issued pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998.

The Appeal Panel revokes the Medical Assessment Certificate of Medical Assessor Dr Surabhi Verma and issues this new Medical Assessment Certificate as to the matters set out in the Table below:

Chapter, page and paragraph number in NSW workers compensation guidelines

Chapter, page, paragraph, figure and table numbers in AMA 5 Guides

Proportion of permanent impairment due to pre-existing injury, abnormality or condition

Sub-total/s % WPI (after any deductions in column 6)

Total % WPI (the Combined Table values of all sub-totals)

[4] Presumably Lederer v Insurance Australia Limited trading as NRMA Insurance [2022] NSWSC 322.

[6] See 11.15-11.21 at Guides page 65 and Table 11.7 at Guides page 66.

[7] [2017] NSWSC 887.

[8] [2015] NSWSC 633.

[9] [2018] NSWSC 140.

[10] [2013] HCA 43 - the reference to a "Medical Panel" is also applicable to a Medical Assessor: Western Sydney Local Health District v Chan [2015] NSWSC 1968 at [13].

[11] See discussion in Diaz v Sydney International Container Terminals Pty Ltd [2024] NSWPICMP 437 from 110.