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[2004] VSC 394
Supreme Court of Victoria
2004-10-13
ASHLEY J
Original judgment source is linked above.
"It doesn't matter. These are the records of the junket. After we play, I will give it back to you."[19]
On the second and third occasions, on his account, nothing was said.
* In January 2002 he arranged a junket to Jupiter's. The defendant arranged for others to participate. He, the plaintiff, received 1.6% commission on turnover. He paid 1.4% to the defendant. What the defendant paid out of that to other junket participants he did not know. On that trip he lent no money to the defendant.
* He had a method of gambling which he used at various casinos. It was written down on the reverse side of the document, Exhibit C. He could not remember when he wrote the method on that document. At the time when he wrote it he and the defendant were still good friends, sometimes the defendant asked his opinion, so sometimes he wrote the figures on the paper. The document seemed to show that it was written at Star City Casino. He and the defendant had been there once, he thought it was in March 2002. They had gambled on that trip, and played golf.
* The April trip was arranged a few days prior to departure for the Gold Coast. The defendant said he had a few friends who wished to gamble. That was two or three days before they lunched together on 22 April. It was on 22 April that he sent Miss Chen to collect the air tickets.[25]
* On the morning of 23 April the defendant asked him for a loan of $200,000 in chips. He expected a request for a loan. The defendant had mentioned it before they left Melbourne, at Crown Casino. He had said that he would pay the loan back immediately if he won. If he lost, he would pay the plaintiff back from the proceeds of sale of his property. He said the same things on the morning of 23 April. The defendant, I interpolate, had sold a property in Doncaster in January 2002. Settlement, it seems, took place in about the second week of May.
* He, the plaintiff agreed to make the loan. He believed the defendant to be a man of means, and to him - that is, the plaintiff - $400,000 was a very small amount.[26] He gave the defendant a chip for $200,000. His wife prepared a voucher recording the loan. The defendant signed it. The defendant made other requests for loans - on 24 April and 27 April - on each occasion a loan was made, and a voucher was prepared and signed. On the third occasion he told the defendant that he would make him no more loans.
* When they gambled on 23 April, and thereafter, he and the defendant did not necessarily bet the same way. He did not know what the defendant liked to bet.
* At one stage Mr Ly arrived. He thought it was on about 24 or 25 April. Mr Ly gambled, but the plaintiff could not say where he got the chips to do so. He could not recall if Mr Ly was still at Jupiter's on the day that his party left.
* He, the plaintiff, gambled each day on the trip. When he gambled, the defendant gambled at the same table.
* On 29 April he got his wife to write out the $66,000 cheque in the circumstances described in [50].
* That day the defendant was paid commission, calculated from Miss Chen's records, on the same basis as commission had been calculated on the January junket. He did not recall if he was present when the defendant signed the commission paid records.
* Subsequent to 29 April, he made various unsuccessful requests to the defendant for repayment of the loans. The defendant reassured him that he would effect repayment; but he did not do so.
* In June 2002 he came to Melbourne. He brought with him the three vouchers. The defendant came to see him at Crown. The defendant asked him for the vouchers. He said that with the vouchers he could go to the bank and buy the plaintiff a bank cheque. They went to a bank. He gave the defendant the vouchers. That was either in his room, or in the car. The defendant put them in an inside pocket. At the bank, the defendant spoke to a bank officer. He, the plaintiff, did not see whether the defendant took the vouchers out of his pocket. Subsequent to the conversation with the bank officer the defendant told him that the money was not in place yet, it would be a few more days before the plaintiff could get his money. He, the plaintiff, demanded the vouchers back, more than once. The defendant variously told him to take it easy, and that he did not know where he had put them and that they would talk about it later.[27] He, the plaintiff, just kept quiet, he could not do anything.[28]
* It was subsequent to his return to Singapore that he took steps to stop payment of the $66,000 cheque.
* Denied that he had asked the defendant to organise participants for the January junket; and said that it was the defendant who had proposed the junket, and organised the participants.
* Said that on the trip to Star City they "tried to find those people who wished to go up to gamble"[29] - that is, participants in the January junket.
* Denied that before they went to Star City he contacted the defendant and tried to persuade the defendant to work for him using his system.
* Denied asking the defendant to go to Star City to watch how he played his system.
* Said that it was possible that he paid the defendant's expenses for the Star City trip "because he had to, you know, find the customers".[30]
* Said that in March 2002 he did not ask the defendant to organise a group to go to Jupiter's. It was the reverse.
* Denied that in March 2002 he asked the defendant and Stephen Tung to gamble for him. Why, he asked, would he request others to gamble for him?
* Said that there was a lunch on 22 April, attended by he and his wife, the defendant and his wife, and Miss Chen.
* Denied that on the day of the lunch the defendant gave him a paper bag containing $100,000 cash.
* Said that the defendant was not his authorised representative as at 22 April. Rather, application was made by the defendant during the trip to become a registered junket operator.
* Gave evidence that sometimes, not always, he used the method of gambling depicted by Exhibit C. He could not remember whether he used it at Star City in February-March 2002 or at Jupiter's in April that year.
* Gave evidence of attending a lunch on 21 April with the defendant and "quite a fat man" whose name he did not know - Tung or Dung - later "fat Tung". That day, he said not say to Tung that the latter could join him and gamble for him at Jupiter's.
* Agreed that Miss Chen, at his direction, had put the Chinese character for "loan" beside notations of three chip exchanges totalling $400,000; and said that this was done after the "fake vouchers" were sent to the defendant.
* Denied that at the end of gambling on 23 April the defendant had handed over to him all the chips - junket and winning - which he then held.
* Denied that on 27 April he had instructed the defendant not to bet at the seventh hand; and that he then bet and won.
* Denied that when Mr Ly arrived the defendant had said that he did not want to play for him, but wanted to play with Mr Ly.
* Denied that when Mr Ly arrived the defendant had returned all the chips which he then had, and that he thereafter gave the defendant a $100,000 chip.
* Denied that on 29 April his wife and the defendant's wife went off to settle the accounts, whilst he, the defendant and Mr Ly went up to the VIP room.
* Denied that the defendant had asked him for the vouchers, that he went to his room and got them, and that he then gave them to the defendant in the presence of the defendant's wife and Mr Ly.
* Denied that the defendant had on various occasions after 29 April asked him when he could bank the $66,000 cheque.
* Gave uncertain answers as to the occasions on which and frequency with which he had attempted to contact the defendant on his mobile or home phone subsequent to his, the plaintiff's, June 2002 trip to Melbourne.
* Denied that the fake vouchers had been created after he learned that the defendant had gone to the police about the $66,000 cheque, though agreeing that at some stage he did learn that the defendant had gone to the police.
* It was not put to the plaintiff that having someone bet for him with his money had the advantage that he could tell the other person not to bet in particular circumstances, or to bet on the opposing hand.
* It was put to the plaintiff that on a single occasion, on 27 April, he had told the defendant not to bet on a hand. Compare the later evidence of the defendant as to the frequency and the dates of any such occasions, and the evidence of Mrs Chan about those matters.
* It was not put to the plaintiff that on any occasion he had taken chips from the defendant's pile in order to place his own bet.
* It was not put to the plaintiff that the defendant had given him score cards.
* The plaintiff admitted asking Miss Chen, later in the piece, to write the Chinese character for "loan" beside three entries totalling $400,000 on the rolling record which she kept in respect of the defendant. That record did not show chips advanced as distinct from chips exchanged. The entries were, accordingly, a nonsense. It can be said that the fact that the plaintiff directed Miss Chen to make such entries showed his willingness to fabricate documents; and the fact that she made the entries shows her readiness to do what he told her. On the other hand, the "evidence" created by the notations was in substance compatible with the import of the three original vouchers.
* Cross-examination of the plaintiff first opened up the issue as to when the three vouchers were given by the plaintiff to the defendant. Each of the defendant, his wife and Mr Ly gave evidence, contrary to the evidence of the plaintiff, that he gave the vouchers to the defendant, after request, on the morning of 29 April. Of this controversy, more later.
* Cross-examination of the plaintiff first made mention of the circumstance that the defendant went to the police. The plaintiff was cross-examined to suggest that he made up the story of the loans and created the fake vouchers after and because he became aware that the defendant had gone to the police about the $66,000 cheque.[31] The defendant gave conflicting evidence as to when and why he went to the police. But even if the defendant did go to the police before he received the fake vouchers, there is a difficulty in saying that it caused the plaintiff to invent the loans; for the original vouchers had been written months before that.
"It doesn't matter, you can go. I'll teach you the system. I will pay for your expenses".[39]
The plaintiff asked him to continue to attempt to get others to go.
"I will give her money to check in herself."[40]
"...approximately some time between 12 or thereafter I departed from my home with my wife. My wife prepared $100,000 cash, went to casino, gave it to Mr Quek, arrive at the place in the casino where the cars were parked. Mr Quek got into my car, say 'Going to Richmond together to have lunch'."[41]
"All the time Mr Quek ask me to be his employee."[42]
Throughout the period they were there, he thought he was using the chips to help the plaintiff play the system.
"At the beginning because I was not very familiarised, it was Mr Quek instruct me how to play, then I play."[43]
It was after he began to play that he was handed the first voucher to sign.
"I'm returning back to you. This is your money."[48]
* He knew, he said, that the plaintiff had many methods of gambling; but the plaintiff only taught him one of them; and the plaintiff always played that one method when at Jupiter's in January 2002, at Star City in February-March 2002, and at Jupiter's in April 2002.[50]
* The particular method, on his account, was very complicated. He could not express it orally. The main difficulty was in a formula whether to play banker or player on a particular hand (the plaintiff said that the system, the existence of which he acknowledged, had no such formula). Yet although the method was very complicated, the plaintiff left him to gamble alone, using the plaintiff's money, on the late evening of 24 April, and at times on 25 and 26 April.
* The plaintiff, he said, had given him pieces of paper showing when he should bet on the banker's or the player's hand on particular occasions. Such pieces of paper, which he had retained but which he neither discovered nor produced at trial, could only be used in connection with one stack (shoe) of cards. The plaintiff, I note, was not cross-examined to suggest that he had created any such documents, or that he had given the same to the defendant.
* On his account, the plaintiff went to the trouble, in connection with an internal transaction, of having the vouchers prepared. Yet no count was made of chips which he claimed that he returned to the plaintiff when gambling ended on 23 April,[51] nor of chips which he claimed that he returned to the plaintiff after Mr Ly's arrival on 27 April. What could be the purpose of the plaintiff having a one-sided record, assuming that there could have been any sense in him asking the defendant to sign receipts for chips given to the defendant for gambling on the plaintiff's behalf?
* According to his evidence, although the plaintiff took back the chips which he had after gambling ended on 23 April, yet on 24, 25 and 26 April he retained the chips which he held at the end of gambling - even though Miss Chen, the plaintiff's authorised representative, was on hand.
* He gave evidence that he held chips to a value exceeding $100,000 on the morning of 27 April. He only needed chips amounting to, say, $50,000 for gambling by the plaintiff's method. Yet on his account the plaintiff gave him a further $100,000 chip that morning.
* According to his evidence, he won overall on 27 April in the period before Mr Ly arrived. He had more than $200,000 in chips when Mr Ly arrived. Yet he did not give the plaintiff the excess of chip value beyond $100,000 - that is, retaining in chips the equivalent of the cash which on his account he had given to the plaintiff on 21 April - but rather gave all the chips back and then received a $100,000 chip (or chips to that value) from the plaintiff.
* He said that he agreed with the plaintiff that he would go to the Gold Coast about two-three days before they left on 22 April. Compare his evidence in chief; and compare also the evidence of Mrs Chan - to the latter of which I will refer later in these Reasons. Note also conflict in his evidence whether his agreement to go to Jupiter's to gamble for the plaintiff was conveyed at a lunch on 21 April, or was conveyed a day earlier.[52] Note again his evidence that the pertinent agreement was reached at a lunch in Richmond on 21 April attended by the plaintiff, himself and Mr Tung; and his evidence that an answer to interrogatory, in which he deposed to the lunch taking place on 22 April, was incorrect. Note also paragraph 17 of the amended defence and counterclaim, the burden of which is that the pertinent conversation occurred on 22 April.
* According to his evidence, the plaintiff gave an explanation why he wanted the defendant to gamble for him. It would increase the number of losing hands that could be played before the up-front money which the plaintiff had deposited with the Casino (in the form of a cheque) would be exhausted. The more hands that could be played, the greater the prospect that the odds of having winning sequences would prevail.[53]
Pausing for a moment, I consider it very unlikely that the plaintiff would have given such an explanation, which was in my opinion unsound. In order to see why that is so it is necessary to understand a little about the particular method of betting. As explained in viva voce evidence, and as depicted in columns 2 and 3 of exhibit C, the betting sequence was quite simple. Taking as a starting point a bet of one amount or another, in the event of a losing hand bet next an amount equal to double the amount lost plus the starting bet. Follow that sequence for a maximum of eight consecutive losing bets. Then revert to the starting bet. In the event of a winning bet at any time in the sequence, revert to the starting bet.
The theory underpinning the sequence of bets was said to be this: if one winning hand occurred in the sequence, the gambler would win overall a modest amount; and the infrequency with which there was likely to be a sequence of eight consecutive losing bets was such that the more frequent sequences in which there was likely to be a winning bet would secure an overall profit.
Now the starting bet in one sequence shown in the exhibit was $100, and the last bet was $25,500. If there were eight consecutive losing bets, the overall loss would be $50,200. The starting bet in another sequence was $700, and the last bet $178,500. If there were eight consecutive losing bets, the overall loss would be $351,400. In the event, if the up-front money was $1M, there could be about 20 consecutive sequences of eight losing bets starting at $100 before the $1M was exhausted; but if the starting bet was $700 the $1M would be exhausted in less than three consecutive losing sequences of eight bets.
Aside altogether from the improbability of there being 24 losing hands in a row, and the improbability of an uncommon frequency of sequences of eight consecutive losing bets (for such an event was said by the defendant to be very infrequent), there was no advantage such as the defendant claimed in the plaintiff recruiting another person to play for him. If that person began with a starting bet of $100, and the plaintiff began with a starting bet of $700, and if there was a catastrophic sequence of losing bets, then the up-front money would be exhausted more speedily than if the plaintiff was betting alone. At least that would be so if the plaintiff and defendant were playing at the same table. Indeed, the defendant seemed to acknowledge that the value of having multiple players was that they could play at different tables and so spread the risk.[54] But on no view did the plaintiff and defendant play at separate tables in April 2002 in the period when, as the defendant alleged, they were playing by the plaintiff's method.
* There was, he said, another virtue in the plaintiff engaging him to bet using the plaintiff's money and system. Because of the relative frequency of winning sequences by contrast with losing sequences, a gambler was likely to achieve an overall modest win. More numerous small wins were, on that assumption, likely to be achieved if more than one person used the plaintiff's system and started with a $100 bet.
To my mind that explanation why the plaintiff should have recruited him to bet with the plaintiff's money was unsound; and the plaintiff was unlikely to have recruited the defendant for such a reason. The betting sequence was essentially very simple. Whatever the amount of the starting bet, in the event of a losing bet double the bet and add the amount of starting bet; and so continue for a maximum of eight consecutive losing bets. Exhibit C, columns two and three, shows starting bets of $100 and $700. But there was nothing to stop the plaintiff having a starting bet of, say, $200 or $300. The sequence could be constructed very simply. Why would the plaintiff pay a man with an imperfect knowledge of the system a wage calculated as if it was commission, his airfare, and accommodation (as the defendant alleged was the case) to gamble using a $100 starting bet if the plaintiff could replicate the defendant's bet and his own (for on the defendant's evidence the plaintiff sometimes began with a $100 bet) by a starting bet of $200?
* There was, he gave evidence, another advantage again in the plaintiff engaging him to bet with the plaintiff's money using the plaintiff's system. The plaintiff could instruct him not to bet on a particular occasion. The plaintiff had so instructed him. In cross-examination he referred to one such occasion - on 23 April.[55] On that occasion the plaintiff's starting bet had been $700, and his starting bet $100. There had been seven consecutive losing bets. The plaintiff told him not to bet on the eighth hand and he did not do so. The plaintiff bet, and won. Then they reverted to the starting bets.[56]
As I understand it, the alleged advantage of the plaintiff being able to instruct the defendant not to play was that the plaintiff could play the eighth hand for a large amount; whereas, if the defendant also played that hand according to the system, the table limit would be exceeded. Putting to one side the plaintiff's denial that any such incident occurred, putting to one side the defendant's conflicting evidence as to the number of occasions on which he was told not to play, putting to one side also the defendant's evidence that their starting bets on the occasion on 24 April of which he gave evidence in chief were $100, and putting aside again the defendant's uncertain evidence about the amount of the table limit, the alleged advantage was no advantage at all. If the table limit was $200,000 and the plaintiff's starting bet was $700, after seven consecutive losing bets his overall loss would be $172,900. His eighth bet would be $178,500. If the bet won then his overall win (it would be a little smaller if he bet the banker's hand) would be $5,600. If the defendant's starting bet was $100, his accumulated losses after seven hands would be $24,700. If he was forbidden to bet on the eighth hand, the plaintiff could be certain of losing overall, even if his eighth bet won - that is, a $5,600 win less $24,700 losses equals a loss of $19,100. If the table limit was $200,000, it would make no sense for the plaintiff not to instruct the defendant to bet the difference between his bet and the limit - that is, $21,500.
* There was, he said, a still further advantage for the plaintiff in his employing persons to bet on his behalf. Because the table limit is set at a differential between bets on the player's and banker's hands, in given circumstances the plaintiff could instruct an employee to bet on the other hand, thereby keeping his, the plaintiff's, bet within the table limit.
Not only did the plaintiff not instruct the defendant to act in such a way whilst at Jupiter's in April 2002, I very much doubt the existence of the alleged advantage in such a case. The same result would seem to be achieved by instructing a second player to bet to, but not beyond, the table limit, betting on the same hand as the plaintiff. But I take this matter no further.
* At times on 24 April, he said, the plaintiff played different hands to the hands which he played in accordance with the plaintiff's system.
The defendant, having given this evidence, was confronted by the problem that this meant that the plaintiff must surely have lost on every such hand. For winning bets on the player hand are paid at even money, and winning bets on the banker's hand are played at even money less 5%. The defendant then said that he had misunderstood what he had been asked. What he had meant was that he and the plaintiff had bet different amounts. An examination of the transcript does not suggest the reliability of that explanation.[57]
* He had won overall, he said, whilst betting on 24 April. But he had no more in chip value at the end of the day than when he began. That was because the plaintiff had taken chips of large value from his pile, and had placed a losing bet of $125,000. The entire $125,000 bet had been made with chips from his, the defendant's pile.[58]
That account was improbable for a number of reasons. If true, it would tend to show that the chips which the defendant had were the plaintiff's chips. Yet the plaintiff was not cross-examined to suggest that such an incident had occurred; whilst the defendant said nothing about it in evidence in chief. Again, the account emerged in cross-examination by way of explaining why, after a winning day, the defendant had no greater value in chips than when he began. But his explanation created more problems than it solved. For the defendant agreed that he needed at least $50,000 to play the plaintiff's system; and he played on 24 April after the plaintiff ceased gambling, and on occasions on 25 and 26 April. It followed from his account that he must have had something over $175,000 in his pile before the plaintiff abstracted chips amounting to $125,000 in value. His description of the rate at which the plaintiff's system generated winnings could not explain how he could have increased his chip holding from $100,000 to $175,000 or more by the time that the plaintiff acted in the manner alleged. Further again, the defendant gave evidence that the $125,000 bet was the eighth bet, and that he was told not to play. $125,000 is not a bet fitting any sequence in exhibit C, a problem which the defendant sought to avoid by later suggesting that the bet may have been $125,000 of his chips plus other chips from the plaintiff's pile. Moreover, this was perhaps a third occasion when, according to the defendant, the plaintiff told him not to bet. Yet nothing was said about that matter until nearly the end of cross-examination on the topic.[59]
* On 25 April he was occupied, he said, in the preparation of an application to become a junket operator. The plaintiff's wife filled it in the forms for him. He gambled after that.
Pausing for a moment, the only real significance of that evidence was that the defendant gave internally inconsistent accounts of when it was that he awoke that day, when the form-filling was undertaken and completed; and that the defendant's account, as to timing, considerably contrasted with the evidence given by his wife.
Of somewhat greater moment was the defendant's vagueness whether the plaintiff gambled with him at all on 25 and 26 April, his evidence that on those days that the plaintiff "looked for him" whilst he was playing, and his evidence that when he finished gambling on those days he did not go looking for the plaintiff.[60] It would be strange, if the plaintiff had retrieved chips from the defendant on 23 April, and if he was present when the defendant ceased gambling on 25 or 26 April, that the retrieval would not have been replicated.
* It was his evidence that after gambling on 25 and 26 April he gave records of his bets to the plaintiff. They showed, hand by hand, whether he had played banker or player, and whether he had won or lost on the hand.
Pausing for a moment, the import of this evidence was that the defendant had reported his betting on 25 and 26 April - that is, as would enable the plaintiff to check whether the defendant had followed his system. Whilst a scorecard which the defendant completed on a sample basis[61] does not suggest that a complete picture was thereby conveyed - particularly as to bet size - the more important consideration is that if he had given the plaintiff scorecards it could be seen to be some corroboration of his general account. But that matter was not the subject of cross-examination of the plaintiff; and, indeed, it only emerged in the course of the defendant's cross-examination. I very much doubt the reliability of that evidence, even though it was later supported, and, indeed, improved upon, by evidence given by Mrs Chan.
s She decided that she was going to Jupiter's about 10 days before leaving on 22 April. Her husband had then decided that he was going. He had told her that he was going to help the plaintiff play his system. She also wanted to learn that system.
s On 23 April she did not hear her husband ask for a loan from the plaintiff. She heard everything that he said to the plaintiff the whole time they were at Jupiter's, but she could not recall very clearly now (what was said). She saw the three vouchers, but did not see Mrs Quek writing on any of them, or where they came from.
s She went to learn the plaintiff's system, but despite sitting at the gaming table for many hours whilst the plaintiff and her husband was playing, and despite being a long-time baccarat player herself, she learned nothing about the system. Indeed, on her admission, she did not try to learn it.[63]
s On 23 April there was no occasion when her husband and the plaintiff played different hands; and on that day there was no occasion on which the plaintiff bet but her husband did not.
s The defendant won on 23 April. But then she agreed that over a long period of gambling her husband had many winning and many losing hands, and that the only basis upon which she had said he won was that he had told her that the plaintiff had told him (they) were winning.[64]
s Not only were chips handed to the plaintiff at the end of play on 23 April, the defendant gave the plaintiff a record of his playing - that is, a scorecard.
s Vouchers which the defendant was asked to sign were not loan vouchers. A propos 24 April, there was this question and answer:
"... Mr Quek's wife handed across a voucher, didn't she? - Not the loan voucher."[65]
s On 24 April, "in the middle of gambling", after dinner, the plaintiff asked the defendant not to bet. He, the plaintiff, then played a large winning bet. Then the plaintiff and the defendant both stopped gambling for a time.
s The chips which she put in her handbag at the end of play on 24 April remained in her handbag, did not come out, for two days. It took more than one day to complete the defendant's application for a junket licence. But then the witness said that her husband gambled on the evening of 25 April, that Mr Quek had asked him to do so, saying that he was not going to gamble. As to when Mr Quek said those things, the witness gave conflicting evidence. She said also that her husband, but not the plaintiff, gambled on the night of 26 April. Her explanation why she had said in evidence in chief that there was no gambling on 25 or 26 April was that she had meant that she had retained the chips.[66] But then she said that maybe she had made a mistake.[67]
s The defendant gave scorecards to the plaintiff on 25, 26 and 27 April - that is, in addition to the scorecard which he gave to the plaintiff on the evening of 23 April. On one occasion, at least, the cards had been in her handbag.
s As to 27 April, her husband began the day with more than $100,000 worth of chips. The plaintiff gave him a chip for $100,000. She could not recall whether that happened after play had been going for a while.
s The $20,000 which Miss Chen gave her on 29 April had been described by Miss Chen as commission on the $100,000 gambling money - that is, the $100,000 in chips said to have been given by the plaintiff to the defendant after Mr Ly's arrival - plus the value of winning chips handed back that day. She recalled that her husband had come over and signed the commission paid records.
s Miss Chen told her that she had lost $30,000. She agreed that Miss Chen had no way of knowing how the $100,000 said to have been given to the defendant after Mr Ly's arrival had been split up between she, her husband and Mr Ly. Then she said that she told Miss Chen that her husband had given her $40,000 in chips. But her evidence was far from consistent upon the matter.[68]
* Agreed that at the end of the January 2002 junket it was the defendant who gave him commission.
* Agreed that he and the defendant should be termed good friends, and said at casinos they had loaned each other money.
* Said that on no previous occasion had there been an arrangement with the defendant whereby they played in partnership, but entirely with the defendant's money; but said that such arrangements are not uncommon.
* Gave uncertain evidence whether, on his arrival, the plaintiff, the defendant and their wives were or were not gambling; and as to what they did in the immediate aftermath of his arrival.
* Gave a series of answers about the circumstances of his April 2002 trip to Jupiter's which were inconsistent with things recorded in a police statement which he had made, through an interpreter, in December 2002.[69]
* Gave a confused account why it was that he remembered that he travelled to Jupiter's on 27 April.
* Asserted that the plaintiff had definitely gambled at the same table as he and the defendant.
* Said that at the end of gambling on 28 April he and the defendant, having started gambling on 27 April with $100,000 in chips, had won a few thousand and had not more than, or more than (he did not know), $100,000 in chips.
* Gave evidence that, although there was nothing special about settling at the end of a junket, he could remember where people were sitting or standing, who was involved in settling, that there was mention of a cheque, and that paperwork was given by the plaintiff to the defendant.
"This bag is money, it's Mr Chan's wife to go to Gold Coast for check-in money."[71]
"because the table is just a square table and you put a plastic bag, you feel obstruction."[75]
In dimensions, it was about half the size of an A4 sheet. He did not know what was inside it. He gave no evidence of the plaintiff saying anything to him about what was in the bag. Cross-examined, he said that the bag belonged to the plaintiff. Mr Tung did not give evidence which showed how it was that made it an obstruction.
* It seems improbable that Mr and Mrs Chan, having an account at Crown casino, would keep large amounts of cash derived from their activities at the casino at home. At least one reason given by Mrs Chan why they kept large amounts at home made no sense.
* There was contradictory evidence whether the defendant and his wife had a safe in their present home, that being where they were living in April 2002. If they did not, as Mrs Chan said was the case, it seems the more improbable that they would keep large amounts of cash in a variety of hiding places in a home which had no security systems.
* The evidence of the defendant and his wife was inconsistent as to when it was that they decided to go to Jupiter's. On the defendant's account, there was no reason why Mrs Chan should have packed a paper bag with $100,000 cash a week before their departure.
* Even if Mrs Chan did have some idea that she and her husband would be going to Jupiter's in the future, on her account she did not know that the plaintiff was in Melbourne until a few days before 22 April, and did not know that she and her husband were leaving on 22 April until the evening of 21 April. Why then would she pack $100,000 in cash a week before 21 April?
* In any event, why would Mrs Chan pack $100,000 in cash into a paper bag, taking the money from a safe place, behind lock and key, and putting it into a wardrobe, this creating a risk such that she felt she could not leave the house, at a time when she did not know that the plaintiff was in Melbourne, let alone the departure date?
* On the final version of the defendant's evidence, he and his wife drove to the casino on 21 April to give the plaintiff the cash. But according to his wife they set off intending both to have lunch with the plaintiff at the Richmond restaurant and to give him the cash.
* Assuming that the purpose of the journey was as last stated by the defendant, why wait in the car for the plaintiff to come? Would it not be logical to give the money to Mr Quek in the casino, so that he could put it in a safe place?
* Assuming that the purpose of the journey as stated by Mrs Chan was accurate, was there not the more reason to see that the cash was safely stored before embarking upon a trip to the Richmond restaurant?
* The size of the package as described by Mrs Chan, and the size of the package which Mr Tung said that he saw, were greatly disparate.
* Mr Tung gave no evidence of the plaintiff saying to him what the defendant attributed. Absent such a remark, and if the package was of the size described by Mr Tung, is it not improbable that he would remember the presence of a relatively small object on a table in a restaurant at a meal that was inconsequential save that the plaintiff had bought, as it was said, several bottles of expensive wine?
"'junket agreement' means an agreement entered into by a casino operator, with the approval of the Minister under s. 84, with another person (the 'promoter') under which -
(a) the promoter arranges for a group of persons to visit the casino to participate in gaming; and
(b) the casino operator pays the promoter a commission based on -
(i) the amount the persons gamble at the casino; or
(ii) the revenue of the casino derived from the persons."
"A casino operator shall not and an agent or employee of a casino operator shall not, in connection with any gambling - . . . (b) make a loan to any person; . . .
"Agency is a word used in the law to connote an authority or capacity in one person to create legal relations between a person occupying the position of principal and third parties,"
nonetheless "agent" is a word often used in the business world to describe a person who does not fit the legal conception.
"An auctioneer who is employed to sell... is acting as an agent; and if you take the remuneration of the agent to be what is generally meant by the word 'commission', everything you pay him for his services in the course of his agency comes within the expression of the word 'commission'."[82]
"Commission is prima facie the payment made to an agent for agency work, usually according to a scale - it may be an ad valorem scale, but not necessarily an ad valorem scale. It is... the most general word that can be used to describe the remuneration paid to an agent for an agency work other than a salary."[83]
The burden of counsel's submission was that the fact that the statute refers to an agreement by which the promoter will receive something described as a commission
"indicates the existence of the relationship of principal and agent in some sense..."[84]
[1] April 2002 at Jupiter's Casino was one instance; see exhibit H.
[3] During the April 2002 visit to Jupiter's, chip exchanges amounted to $3.9 M. See exhibit 3.
[11] See exhibit K, fee charged 3 July referable to cheque 000363.
[12] I do not mean that he posted it. On the evidence, his wife did so.
[22] T 77. Compare statement of claim, para 10.
[25] Evidently Miss Chen did collect the tickets that day. See the receipts, exhibit 5.
[32] And, in Miss Chen's case, an earlier affidavit.
[44] See, example, T 579, referring to 24 April.
[50] Although he gave some conflicting evidence in connection with the April 2002 trip.
[51] He vaguely suggested that some count may have been made. It was essentially by way of afterthought.
[55] In his evidence in chief he had identified two such occasions.
[62] I include in these events, in case it be thought uncertain, the alleged chip returns; of which, in the case of 27 April, more later.
[69] Thus, in the statement, that he had first met the plaintiff on the (April) visit to Jupiter's, that the trip took place in "around March/April", that his trip to Jupiter's was not pre-arranged, that he travelled with his friend Ming from Sydney, and that he was at Jupiter's for one day and two nights.
[78] The date is uncertain, the plaintiff's passport appears to show that he was in Australia between 6 and 9 September, and that he arrived back in this country on 14 September.
[79] [1958] HCA 16; (1958) 100 CLR 644 at 652.
[86] As to which see paragraph [ 55 ].
Quek
Chan [2004] VSC 394
(1958) 100 CLR 644