austlii:qld/QCATA/2026/28
General information, not legal advice.
QCATA
2026-02-02
Original judgment source is linked above.
This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)
[1] This appeal is one of many, each of which arise from decisions[1] made in the minor civil disputes jurisdiction of the Tribunal involving the applicant, Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd ("QVCC"), and various members of the Vedic community who are respondents to the other appeals. Each of the respondents claimed a refund of money paid for a share in QVCC pursuant to a written "Share Agreement" which share was never issued to them. The respondents contend that pursuant to the Share Agreement with QVCC[2] they were entitled to terminate the Share Agreement and be refunded the money paid for the share. In each of the proceedings QVCC has been represented by Sukram Pal Singh and Dr Sukhvir Singh.
[2] In this case, and some others, claims were made for the repayment of loan monies paid to QVCC for a period of two years pursuant to a separate written Loan Agreement.
[3] Although the circumstances of each of the respondent requesting a refund of the money paid under the Share Agreement or Loan Agreement vary somewhat, and the various defences raised, the fundamental issue in each of the minor civil dispute proceedings, and the appeals, is whether the Share Agreement and/or Loan Agreement was enforceable and the refund was payable. Unusually in this hearing the Tribunal was constituted by a panel of two adjudicators who published joint reasons. They heard each of the primary applications and found that the Share Agreement was enforceable and each of the applicants were entitled to a refund of money paid pursuant to it. Similarly, with the Loan Agreements.
[4] The hearing the subject of this appeal was the first of the hearings conducted in consecutive days from 22 November 2022 to 24 November 2022 and another heard on 19 October 2023. This is important because insofar as there may have been any doubt on the part of QVCC as to the issues in dispute and documents relied upon, all of this was made clear in the first hearing. The only caveat to this is that some documents relied on in each case by the various claimants, were personal to them. An example is the letter of demand.
[5] In each of the appeals filed,[3] the grounds of appeal are the same. Those grounds will be addressed in this appeal but will be applicable to the other appeals and where necessary repeated in the reasons. However, where necessary the submissions relevant to the particular appeal will be considered.
[6] Therefore, these reasons should be regarded as the lead reasons in these appeals. In particular the background facts are the same and need not be repeated in each separate appeal reasons. Also, they are not controversial. It is also not disputed that each of the claimants did pay the money claimed either to QVCC or the Vedic community[4] organisation Arya Pratinidhi Sabha of Queensland ("APSQ") who then paid it to QVCC.
[7] For context, it is necessary to record the brief factual background that gave rise to the dispute between the respondents and QVCC in the first place.
[8] QVCC is a propriety limited company. It embarked on a project to build a community hall for the members of the Vedic community at a site in Willawong, Brisbane.
[9] The project was financed by loans from the Bank of Queensland. After the project commenced, directors of QVCC realised that there would be a shortfall in funding and decided to raise extra money from members of the Vedic community by the issuing of shares in the company. To achieve this outcome, a Share Agreement was prepared, variously dated, setting out the terms upon which a share or shares could be acquired by a member of the community. For clarity it is necessary to set out the terms of the agreement. Firstly it is headed "Share Agreement". It then goes onto provide:
Dated this 10 Day of November 2014
This agreement is between QUEENSLAND VEDIC CULTURAL CENTRE Pty Ltd (QVCC) ABN 27 600 279; its Directors: Mr Jitendra Deo; Mr Dick Sen; Dr Sukhvir Singh; Mr Sunil Dutt and ARYA PRATINIDHI SABHA OF QUEENSLAND (APSQ)
And
Rajnish Padarath[5]
[10] Following the identification of the parties to the agreement, there are some relevant recitals to explain the purpose of the share agreement and it included the following:
[11] The Share Agreement then went to set out the Terms of Agreement. Relevantly they included:
[12] Pursuant to this Share Agreement the respondent signed it and paid $3,000.00 to the QVCC or APSQ for three shares, this is not disputed.[6] The Share Agreement was not signed by a representative of QVCC, but it accepted and retained the $3,000.00. The respondent also made payments towards the repayment of the bank loan, but does not seek recovery of this amount.
[13] As the Bank of Queensland would not authorise the issuing of further shares at that time, no share was ever issued to the respondent, again not disputed. He decided to exercise his rights under clauses 6 and 7 of the Share Agreement to terminate and seek a refund. On 28 February 2020 he made written demand for the return of his $3,000.00 (the cost of three (3) shares).[7] The QVCC refused to refund the money. Initially, it alleged the deposit into the bank account was a donation and argued in the alternative that the agreement was not enforceable.
[14] The Loan Agreement is an uncomplicated document of only six paragraphs. The borrower is identified as the QVCC and the lender is the respondent, and the deceased, Ram Padarath. The loan is to be paid to the borrower with no interest payable. The loan "shall be paid to the lender by 2 years time [sic] from the date the full amount of is transferred into the borrowers account".
[15] To recover his contribution, the respondent commenced a proceeding in the minor civil disputes jurisdiction of the Tribunal in reliance on the Share Agreement. There was a hearing on 31 May 2023 and the Tribunal found in favour of the respondent on the basis of the clear terms of the Share Agreement about termination. It ordered the Company pay the respondent the sum of $1,123.20 (which included the filing fee).
[16] In written reasons dated 31 May 2023 the Tribunal addressed various defences raised by QVCC to the claim.[8] Firstly, the question of jurisdiction. The Tribunal held it had jurisdiction under the definition of "minor civil dispute" in schedule 3 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ("QCAT Act"). This was affirmed by me in Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd v Deo [2024] QCATA 101 ("Deo Appeal").
[17] Secondly, the Share Agreement was not a valid agreement because it was not signed by all parties. The Tribunal found that the absence of a signature by an officer of QVCC was not fatal. It referred to the various ways an agreement can be entered into, oral, partly oral or partly written or wholly written. That is not a novel concept. The written offer did not include an "entire agreement clause" which is common if the document is to contain the whole of the agreement between the parties.
[18] Therefore, the representation by Mr Jitendra Deo that he, as a director of
QVCC, had the ostensible authority to make the offer in accordance with the Share Agreement and it was accepted by the respondent signing it and depositing the $3,000.00 into the QVCC account. This is also consistent with what the Appeal Tribunal said in the Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd v Lal [2022] QCATA 50 ("QVCC v Lal") at [19]-[20]. The Tribunal below referred to and followed this appeal decision by Member Gordon, even though he found the agreement was oral, the terms were contained in the written Share Agreement subsequently executed.
[19] Thirdly, whether the money paid was a donation. The Tribunal found as a fact it was not. In any event this is now not raised in the grounds of appeal or submissions.
[20] This minor civil dispute application[9] was first listed for hearing on 19 October 2021. That hearing was adjourned because the appeal in QVCC v Lal was pending determination. Because the very same issues arose in that matter, the learned adjudicator considered it best, for consistency, to await the result of that appeal before proceeding with this matter. A decision in QVCC v Lal appeal was delivered on 19 April 2022.
[21] I digress here to note that there was reference in the transcript of the first hearing on 19 October 2021 to the evidence of Jitendra Deo,[10] a director of QVCC, being relevant as to his authority to bind the applicant to the various agreements. This discussion is relevant to one of the grounds of appeal in which the applicant submits it was taken by surprise when Mr Deo was called to give evidence at the final hearing of this matter on 22 November 2022. In those circumstances, Mr Deo's involvement in this case, and others, should not have come to any surprise by the applicant. Mr Deo was heavily involved in the cultural centre project, and it is conceded he drove the project and undertook a lot of the work in its construction.
[22] Ultimately the Tribunal delivered comprehensive reasons on 31 May 2024 ordering that the applicant pay to the first respondent, Rajnish Padarath, the sum of $8,345.50, $3,000.00 for the purchase of shares and $5,000.00 pursuant to the Loan Agreement. The applicant was also ordered to pay $5,000.00 to the Estate of Ram Padarath pursuant to the Loan Agreement.[11] From this decision the applicant filed the application for leave to appeal or appeal.
[23] Because this is an appeal from a decision in the minor civil disputes jurisdiction leave to appeal is required under s 142(3)(a)(i) of the QCAT Act. Leave to appeal (or permission) will usually only be granted where there is a reasonable argument the decision was attended by error, or that an appeal is necessary to correct any substantial injustice caused by the error.[12] It is not a rehearing of the proceeding below.
[24] As Judicial Member McGill SC said in Allen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission:[13]
As a general proposition, when leave to appeal to the Appeal Tribunal is required, it will be granted only where there is a reasonable argument that the decision was attended by error and an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice caused by that error, or where the appeal raises a question of general importance upon which further argument and a decision of the Appeal Tribunal would be to the public advantage. An Appeal Tribunal would not usually disturb findings of fact on appeal if the evidence is capable of supporting the finding, and it is not contrary to compelling interferences. If leave to appeal is granted, the appeal is by way of rehearing so far as it is against a decision on a question of fact, or of mixed fact and law: the QCAT Act s 147. Otherwise it is an appeal which will only correct an error of law: the QCAT Act s 146.
[25] The grounds of appeal are set out in Part C of the application. In summary they are:
(a) That the respondent had not provided the applicant with a statement of documents in support of his application contrary to the directions of the tribunal. Also, he had not given notice of any witnesses to be called, in particular Mr Deo.
(b) Despite the objection of the applicant at the hearing the adjudicator/s permitted the respondent to tender the documents referred to as exhibit 1-5 (letter of demand; receipt for deposit paid; share agreement, emails and company searches).
(c) A denial of natural justice by permitting the respondent's father Jitendra Deo to give evidence and tender documents.
(d) The adjudicator admitted documents which had been held to be inadmissible by other adjudicators deciding the same issues.
(e) Failing to follow the decisions of three other adjudicators in similar matters where the claims were dismissed and thereby "violated the objective of consistency claimed to be achieved by the tribunal".
(f) The Loan Agreement does not meet the criteria of a valid agreement and therefore there is an error of law.
[26] There is another ground of appeal concerning the application of s 217 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) but that issue is not in contention by reason of separate decision as to its applicability to the dispute.[14]
[27] Before dealing with the grounds of appeal, I have had the opportunity to read the reasons in the earlier decision of QVCC v Lal, surprisingly not referred to by the applicant in its submissions. Importantly Sukarm Pal Singh represented QVCC in that initial hearing of that matter. Therefore, appearing as representative of the applicant at the primary hearing he was aware of all issues that might be agitated in defending this claim, both under the Share Agreement and the Loan Agreement. That appeal, as seen above, involves the very same issues as in this case. That is the surrender of the share and a claim for a refund of the cost pursuant to clause 7. Also, a refund of the loan money pursuant to the Loan Agreement. By reason of the QVCC v Lal Appeal and the issues in dispute the QVCC Sukarm Pal Singh was informed of the existence of the documents relied upon by the respondent in this matter. He was also aware of Mr Jitendra Deo's involvement as a director of QVCC and the validity of those agreements, all relevant to ground 1.
[28] In addition to the grounds of appeal, the applicant filed further submissions as directed on 19 January 2024. These submissions are a critique of the reasons for decision by the Tribunal below to support the grounds of appeal. In particular with fact finding and procedural fairness issues. These which will be addressed by reference to the grounds of appeal.
[29] The complaint in ground 1 is that in terms of fairness, the respondent contends by the respondent not giving it (or Mr Singh) the documents relied upon filed on 15 July 2021 until the hearing, contrary to the Tribunal's direction, the respondent was at a disadvantage.[15] That complaint is inconsistent with how the hearing progressed which was in an orderly way. It is best to refer to the transcript to summarise and appreciate how this occurred.
[30] At the commencement of the hearing, the respondent gave the adjudicators a concise overview of the basis of his claim.[16] In essence it is as described above by reference to the documents supporting the claims under both the Share and Loan Agreements.
[31] When the respondent finished, Mr Sukarm Singh on behalf of the applicant, gave an overview of the history of raising money and the involvement of Mr Jintendra Deo, as a director of QVCC and APSQ. The overview was more in the nature of a question and answer process so the adjudicators could get a complete understanding of the history and the relationship between the parties.
[32] Mr Singh outlined how Mr Deo, in his view, instigated and urged the various purchasers of shares and lenders to take action to recover the money paid. He conceded that all of the money was ultimately paid to QVCC to construct the building.[17] In his view, and that of QVCC, all money paid was by way of donation.[18] He said there was confusion because some of the contributors were content to not claim because they were donations. He said that:[19]
Close to 200 people have contributed to this project. There's only five or seven or eight people those [sic] were claiming.
[33] The exchange between the adjudicators and Mr Singh went on for some time. There was reference to other members of the QVCC and supporters. However, nowhere during this exchange was there any complaint by Mr Singh about non-compliance with directions or the late provision of documents.
[34] After this there was a further exchange between the adjudicators and the respondent about the documentary evidence, including financial reports of QVCC he intended to rely on. Also that he had Mr Deo there to call as a witness. At 10:41am Mr Deo was sworn in. The respondent led him through some of his evidence. He was also questioned by the adjudicators, again to get clarification of some of his evidence about the raising of money for the project. He gave evidence about how the dispute between QVCC and some of the contributors developed, which only had marginal relevance to the issues in dispute. His evidence and responses to questions by the adjudicators and the respondent continued without interruption for about 25 minutes.
[35] Mr Singh was then given an opportunity to ask questions. He did so, during which time the adjudicators also asked questions for clarification. After about five minutes Mr Singh was asked if he had further questions. It was only here that Mr Singh raised what might, being generous, be regarded as an objection to the evidence of Mr Deo. He addressed the adjudicators and said:[20]
We were not aware or made aware that he will [sic] be coming as a witness and we have not brought some of those documents [sic] which would have given, you know, contradiction to whatever he has said but anyway, we have put the questions, he has only tried to explain that he was doing everything himself. He - he was the only person who did everything.
[36] Mr Singh sought to ask some further questions about stolen shares. However, that was not relevant to the issues.
[37] A further independent witness was called, Mr Hari Chand. Mr Singh conducted a brief questioning of the witness but again no complaint was made about lack of notice.
[38] After this, the parties made some further submissions. Mr Singh reiterated the position of the applicant in that:[21]
(a) All contributions were donations;
(b) The Loan Agreements and Share Agreements are not properly documented because they are not signed by any other director except Mr Jitendra Deo and are unenforceable.
(c) All expenses are paid through contributions by members of QVCC or QPSQ.
[39] It is evident from the transcript of the proceeding that Mr Singh was content to proceed on all the material that was put before the Tribunal. The only time any objection was raised, if it can be classified as an objection, is that referred to in [35] above. Even then having raised a question about documents, he then resiles from it by being content with the questions put.
[40] In light of this, Mr Singh's intimate knowledge of the history of the development of the site for the benefit of the APSQ community, the financing of the project through loans and share purchases; the initial hearing in QVCC v Lal and the appeal reasons in that case; the timing of when he became aware of the agreements in relation to Supreme Court proceedings;[22] it is very difficult to conclude QVCC has been denied procedural fairness by being given documents before the hearing, and he calling of Mr Deo.
[41] Had Mr Singh objected,[23] and demonstrated how QVCC would be prejudiced by the documents and Mr Deo's evidence, it is evident from the careful way the hearing was conducted, the Tribunal would have considered the objection and whether to adjourn the matter. Both experienced adjudicators conducting the hearing would have been alive to the procedural fairness requirements to ensure there was a fair hearing. Particularly given it was a seriously contested hearing with the others following. However, there was just nothing in the exchange between the adjudicators and Mr Singh to flag a concern about fairness or the need for an adjournment. This is specifically commented on in [23] of the reasons. On this basis ground 1 fails.
[42] Under this ground the applicant contends specifically that:
When the witness Mr Jitendra Deo referred to certain documents the Respondend [sic] submitted that no such document was provided to the respondent. The respondent objected to the Adjudicator admitting these documents for consideration, but the Respondent's objection was overruled by the Adjudicator. The adjudicator asked the Respondent to review these documents in 5 minutes and present its defence.
[43] Again, there is just nothing in the transcript to support his contention of an objection to evidence. There was no objection, complaint or misunderstanding voiced by Mr Singh about the conduct of the hearing. In addition, it is plain from reading the transcript that the adjudicators gave both parties every opportunity to put forward their positions and concerns. In fact, there is even an expression of sympathy for QVCC. This ground of appeal fails.
[44] This ground relates to the contention that the respondent advised the adjudicators that he would call his second witness Mr Rakesh Singh as his second witness over the objection of Mr Sukarm Singh. This is difficult to comprehend. Firstly, the second witness was Mr Chand. Mr Rakesh Singh was never called or sought to be called as a witness. Secondly, there is no objection raised to the calling of Mr Chand, assuming there is some confusion here. This ground of appeal fails.
[45] The objection is that Mr Deo referred to "self-prepared papers" not signed by anyone. Mr Singh contends these were fabricated. No objection was raised during the hearing. The documents did not influence the adjudicators findings of ostensible authority by reason of his position with QVCC. They discussed this in detail in their reasons [68]-[77]. It was open to them to come to this conclusion and there is no reason to interfere with that decision. This ground of appeal fails.
[46] The applicant contends that the adjudicators relied on documents that were declared by other adjudicators as legally unenforceable. There are no details of these cases. No submission was put to the adjudicators about other cases. However in the reasons for the decision the Tribunal did refer to two earlier decisions[24] Singh v Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd[25] and Prasad v Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre[26] both of which were distinguishable on their facts. The only relevant reported case is that of QVCC v Lal which is consistent with the adjudicators' decision here. This ground of appeal fails.
[47] As already noted in [25] above this ground was dealt with in a separate decision.
[48] This is a challenge to the finding that the Loan Agreement was a legally enforcement instrument because "it does not meet the criteria of a valid agreement" The contention simply is that this was an error of law. The adjudicators relied on evidence of Mr Deo's open discussions with the members of QVCC to clothe him with authority. At [74] the reasons noted:
[74] The positions held by Mr. Deo in QCVV, without more, did not cloak him with authority to bind the company. However, as the evidence shows, the means of raising funds to service the bank loan to acquire the Willawong property by the sale of shares in QCVV with monthly contributions and the construction of the community centre by interest free loans for two years were discussed and agreed at meetings of the executive committee and board of directors of QCVV. The invitation to subscribe for shares and lend monies were sent to all members including directors. The monies raised and the need for further monies, once again, were addressed and agreed at meetings of the executive committee and the board of directors and sought in further emails sent to members, including the directors. The monies collected by Mr Deo were used for the purposes stated. Ultimately, the transactions were documented in the share and loan agreements and reported in the financial statements of the company
[75] The constitution of the QVCC is not in evidence in this proceeding but is in evidence in Pal v Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd & Anor. QVCC did not suggest there is a limit on the powers of directors, whether in the constitution or by resolution of the directors.
[76] The authority given to Mr Deo was to perfect arrangement discussed and agreed by the executive committee and board of directors. He did so openly and the manner agreed by the directors.
[77] It follows, the Tribunal finds, that Mr Deo had the express actual authority of the board of directors of QVCC to raise monies as he did for the purposes stated and to enter the share and loan agreements. Alternatively, directors as a board, stood by whilst Mr Deo entered into agreements and the consequences it created, by implication, actual authority to enter the agreements
[49] There is no basis demonstrated to disturb these findings of fact. The conclusions reached were open on the evidence and therefore this ground of appeal fails.
[50] This ground contends that the adjudicators failed to have regard to the documents submitted by the applicant at the hearing. There is no specificity as to the documents referred to but more of a generalisation. However, it is evident from the reasons that consideration was given to all of the evidence filed by both parties for the Tribunal to reach its decision. The summary of findings at [85] is entirely consistent with the evidence, in particular the written agreements entered into.
[51] Most of the contentious issues raised in the submissions are dealt with in the discussion about the grounds of appeal above. In particular, the procedural fairness issues and the late production of documents and the failure to comply with directions.
[52] The submissions do raise another issue and that relates to the recipient of the money paid pursuant to the Share Agreement and the Loan Agreement. Accepting that the money was paid to APSQ as seems to be the case in some instances, Mr Singh agreed that ultimately the money was given to QVCC for the purpose of paying for the building project. At page 23 of the transcript:
Adjudicator: But the money was coming to you?[27]
Mr Singh: Money was coming to [indistinct] some were sending to APSQ, some to QVCC.
Adjudicator: And but we're common on this: all the money actually came to your company, didn't it eventually?
Mr Singh: Yes.
[53] Although APSQ and QVCC are two separate legal entities, the fact the money was paid to a third party (APSQ) pursuant to the agreement, does not alter the obligation of the contracting party to repay the money as promised in the agreement. Also, it is clear from the above that QVCC received the benefit of the money as intended under the agreements. The adjudicators did not treat both APSQ and QVCC as one organisation, however the evidence demonstrates they were both working to get this project completed. Also, by reference to those named in the agreement, APSQ would be liable to refund under the Share Agreement as a party to that agreement.
[54] In respect of the contention that the applicant was denied any opportunity to challenge Mr Deo, or the respondent about the evidence put on, again the transcript shows that this is not maintainable. Mr Singh was well aware of the issues in dispute, was given an opportunity to give evidence and cross-examine. There was a lengthy exchange between the adjudicators and Mr Singh during the hearing where he argued the case for the applicant. In fact the adjudicators ensured he had every opportunity to put the case for the applicant.
[55] The additional appeal submissions do not demonstrate any error of law or fact.
[56] Importantly, this application for leave to appeal is not a re-hearing of the original dispute. I adopt what tribunal member Dr Forbes said in the appeal decision of Ingall v Australian Postal Corporation (t/as Australia Post):[28]
An application for leave to appeal is not an opportunity to conduct a retrial. It is an inquiry to see whether any reasonably arguable error of law or 'glaringly improbable' error of fact, has resulted in serious injustice. This matter turns upon the primary tribunal's findings of fact; fact-finding is its prerogative, and findings of fact by a trial court are seldom disturbed on appeal. If there is evidence, or if there are available inferences which compete for the judge's acceptance, no error of law occurs simply because the judge prefers one version of evidence to another or one set of inferences to another. Reasonable minds may differ, but that is not a proper ground of appeal. It is not the function of a tribunal of appeal to substitute its own view for reasonable findings of a primary judge, even if disposed to do so.
[57] The result in this proceeding, and others, turn on the enforceability of a written agreement. Despite the evidence put on by the applicant, it was open for the primary Tribunal to find on the whole of the evidence that Mr Deo had authority to enter into the agreements on behalf of QVCC. The basis of that finding is articulated in the reasons. No basis has been established to allow me to overturn that finding.
[58] In the absence of any appellable error, leave to appeal is refused.
[1] Rajnish Padarath as trustee v QVCC Pty Ltd APL205-23 (MCDO60589-20); Pranesh Pal v QVCC APL206-23 (MCDO60617-20); Rakesh Padarath & Kamlesh Padarath v QVCC APL207-23 (MCD060610-20); Lalta Prasad v QVCC APL208-23 (MCD523-20) and Rekesh Sing v QVCC APL090-24 (MCDO937-22).
[2] A contested issue in the proceeding.
[4] I could see no explanation of "Vedic" but it seems they are followers of the Vedic Culture originating in the north west parts of India (Wikipedia).
[5] There is a separate agreement for each purchaser.
[6] Exhibit 2/5 of the respondent's documents filed in the minor civil dispute file. Noting the sum of $1,120.00 was paid to the QVCC account number ending in ...16.
[8] Deo v Singh & Anor [2023] QCAT 220, [7].
[10] I have read the transcript but there is no reference to Jitendra Deo but there is repeated reference to Ditendra Dal. I suspect the transcriber may have had difficulty with pronunciation and the reference is to Jitendra Dal. At page 11 of the transcript the adjudicator said to Mr Singh: I take it that your defence is founded on this notion that Ditendra Dal entered into these share agreements purportedly on behalf of the Verdic Cultural Centre, and you say he had no authority to do so?...Yes, that correct.
[11] It seems to be accepted that Rajnish Padarath is the executor of the Estate of his father Ram Padarath.
[12] Terera & Anor v Clifford [2017] QCA 181.
[13] [2023] QCATA 66, [2] (footnotes omitted).
[14] Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd v Deo [2024] QCATA 101.
[15] Applicant's appeal submissions filed 19 January 2024 [8]-[16].
[16] In referring to "his claim" I am also including the claim on behalf of the Estate as well to ensure there is no misunderstanding.
[23] Not necessarily using the formal "objection" but just raised some concerns.
[28] [2025] QCATA 85, [20] (footnotes omitted).
Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd
Padarath & Anor [2026] QCATA 28
Allen v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2023] QCATA 66
Ingall v Australian Postal Corporation (t/as Australia Post) [2025] QCATA 85
Prasad v Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre [2022] QCATA 174
Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd v Deo [2024] QCATA 101
Queensland Vedic Cultural Centre Pty Ltd v Lal [2022] QCATA 50
Terera & Anor v Clifford [2017] QCA 181