Quadri v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2026] NSWCATAD 10;

(1) Should the Tribunal dispense with a hearing of the Respondent's costs application?

(2) Are there special circumstances to warrant an award of costs?

(3) If costs are warranted, should the Applicant pay a fixed sum amount?

Should the Tribunal dispense with a hearing of the costs application?

1. Section 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) provides that the Tribunal "may make an order dispensing with a hearing if it is satisfied that the issues for determination can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties by considering any written submissions or any other documents or material lodged with or provided to the Tribunal."
2. The Tribunal must not make an order dispensing with a hearing unless the Tribunal has first afforded the parties an opportunity to make submissions about the proposed order, and taken any such submissions into account (NCAT Act, s 50(3)).
3. The guiding principle for the NCAT Act and the procedural rules, in their application to proceedings in the Tribunal, is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings (NCAT Act, s 36(1)). The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the guiding principle when it interprets any provision of, or exercises any power given to it, by the NCAT Act or the procedure rules (NCAT Act, s 36(2)).
4. The parties were given an opportunity to make submissions concerning whether costs could be determined on the basis of the material filed and without any further hearing. Neither party objected to the Respondent's costs application being dealt with in this way. The Respondent consented to the application being determined without a hearing in accordance with s 50(2) of the NCAT Act. The Applicant did not file any submissions.
5. The Tribunal is satisfied that the costs application can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties by considering the written submissions and material before the Tribunal. The parties would incur unnecessary expense if required to attend a hearing to determine the costs application and there is a risk of non-attendance by the Applicant given the Applicant's failure to appear at the final hearing and file any material in response to the costs application. As there is no contested evidence, there is also no need for evidence to be tested at a hearing. Dispensing with a hearing in the circumstances is also consistent with the guiding principle to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.
6. The Tribunal is therefore of the view that it is appropriate to deal with the costs application by making an order under s 50(2) of the NCAT Act, dispensing with a hearing.

Are there special circumstances to warrant an award of costs?

1. The general rule is that each party is to pay their own costs. Section 60 of the NCAT Act gives the Tribunal the discretion to award costs only if the Tribunal is satisfied that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs.
2. Section 60(3) of the NCAT Act sets out a number of matters that the Tribunal may have regard to in determining whether there are such special circumstances. Section 60(3) does not require that all the provisions need to be enlivened to establish special circumstances: Joseph v Kiama Municipal Council (No 2) [2023] NSWCATAD 87, at [30]. A costs order, however, should not be made simply because one or more of the factors in s 60(3) are made out. Even if satisfied that there are special circumstances, the Tribunal must be further satisfied that they are circumstances warranting an award of costs: The Owners - Strata Plan No 63731 v B & G Trading Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] NSWCATAP 273, at [11]-[12].
3. The term "special circumstances" is not defined in the NCAT Act. This term has been interpreted to mean circumstances which are out of the ordinary, but need not be those which are exceptional or extraordinary: Edwards v Commissioner for Fair Trading, Department of Customer Service (Costs) [2019] NSWCATAP 249, at [9].
4. The onus is on the party seeking an order for costs to satisfy the Tribunal that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs in their favour: Styles v Wollondilly Shire Council [2017] NSWCATAP 108, at [5] under the heading "Costs".
5. It is accepted that where a party is unsuccessful in the party's application before the Tribunal, this alone will not amount to special circumstances in favour of the successful party: Youssef v NSW Legal Services Commissioner (Costs) [2020] NSWCATOD 115, at [107]. The discretion to award costs must be exercised by the Tribunal judicially having regard to the underlying principle that parties to proceedings in the Tribunal are ordinarily to bear their own costs. Each situation must, of course, be assessed on a case by case basis to see whether or not special circumstances exist so as to warrant the award of costs: e_Move Pty Ltd v Naomi Dickinson_ [2015] NSWCATAP 94, at [37] and [48].
6. An award of costs is intended to be compensatory and not punitive: Grasso v The Owners Strata Plan No. 52399 [2022] NSWCATAP 91, at [12].

1. On 4 March 2025, the Respondent revoked the Applicant's security licence under the SI Act. This decision was made because the Applicant had provided false information in relation to his residential address and length of residency in Australia. That false information was given in both his application for an ACT security licence and his subsequent application for a NSW security licence under the Mutual Recognition (New South Wales) Act 1992 (NSW).
2. On 16 March 2025, the Applicant filed an administrative review application, seeking a review of this revocation decision.
3. On 20 May 2025, a directions hearing was held, which both parties attended. Directions were made for the filing of material, and the proceedings were listed for an in-person hearing on 5 August 2025.
4. On 30 May 2025, in compliance with the directions, the Respondent filed and served documents pursuant to s 58 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW).
5. On 11 June 2025, the Respondent's solicitor emailed the Applicant, seeking further information in relation to his mobile phone service providers, mobile phone bills, banking institutions and bank account transactions statements. This is because the Applicant maintained that he resided in the ACT. The Applicant did not respond to this request or to subsequent correspondence and phone calls from the Respondent's solicitor.
6. On 27 June 2025, the Applicant filed and served written submissions and supporting documents.
7. On 30 June 2025, the Tribunal issued three summonses at the request of the Respondent, in circumstances where the Applicant had not provided information as requested by the Respondent on and after 11 June 2025.
8. On 7 July 2025, the Applicant rang the Respondent's solicitor and stated that he had been "bedridden" for ten days after being in hospital, which is why he was unable to respond to the correspondence. The Applicant requested an extension of time to provide further information and documents to the Respondent. The parties agreed to 13 July 2025 as the date by which the Applicant would respond.
9. The Applicant did not provide the requested information and documents to the Respondent by 13 July 2025. The Applicant did not respond to subsequent correspondence and phone calls from the Respondent's solicitor. On the evidence before the Tribunal, 7 July 2025 was the last date that the Applicant had any contact with the Respondent. Apart from this phone call, the Respondent's solicitor sent 11 emails and made five phone calls to the Applicant which remained unanswered.
10. On 24 July 2025 and 31 July 2025, the Respondent's solicitor attended the Return of Summons listing. The Applicant did not attend.
11. On 28 July 2025, due to the Applicant's failure to voluntarily provide the Respondent with documents that he held in his possession, the Tribunal issued two summonses at the request of the Respondent that required the Applicant to bring a copy of his passport, and other relevant documents, to the hearing on 5 August 2025 by 10:00am. There was also an existing Return of Summons listing for a summons issued on 30 June 2025 which had not been complied with.
12. On 29 July 2025, the Respondent filed and served written submissions, a statement, affidavit and the Respondent's evidence bundle.
13. On 29 July 2025 and 1 August 2025, the Respondent's solicitor emailed the Applicant, asking whether he required any of the Respondent's witnesses for cross-examination at the hearing on 5 August 2025. The Applicant did not respond to these emails.
14. On 5 August 2025, the Respondent's solicitor and Counsel (who had been briefed to appear for the hearing) attended the hearing. The Applicant did not attend the hearing and did not produce the records that he had been personally required to produce under the summonses issued by the Tribunal on 28 July 2025. The Applicant also did not attend or participate in the Return of Summons listing on 5 August 2025.
15. After the commencement of the hearing, the Tribunal made two phone calls to the Applicant and left voice messages requesting the Applicant to contact the Tribunal or the Respondent. The Tribunal adjourned twice during the hearing to allow time for the Applicant to attend or contact the Respondent or the Registry. During the adjournments, the Respondent's solicitor also searched the Tribunal Registry area, phoned the Applicant and sent an email to the Applicant.
16. Section 55(1)(c) of the NCAT Act allows the Tribunal to dismiss, at any stage any proceedings if the applicant has failed to appear in the proceedings. Due to the Applicant's failure to appear at the hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the proceedings pursuant to s 55(1)(c), save as to any costs application filed. The Respondent indicated an intention to file a costs application. Directions were made for the Respondent to file a costs application, evidence in support and indicate a position as to whether a hearing could be dispensed with. The Respondent complied with these directions.
17. After the filing of the costs application, the Applicant was directed to file and serve any evidence and submissions in response, and his position as to whether a hearing could be dispensed with, by 8 October 2025. The Applicant did not file any material in compliance with this direction or make any contact with the Tribunal.

(1) Failed to appear at the final hearing without notice to the Tribunal or the Respondent.

(2) Failed to appear at two Return of Summons listings of which he was on notice.

(3) Failed to communicate with the Respondent throughout the proceedings, except on 7 July 2025 as noted above.

(4) Failed to communicate with the Tribunal, including in response to the Tribunal's attempts to contact the Applicant during the hearing.

(5) Made no attempt to communicate to the Respondent or the Tribunal to advise that he no longer wished to proceed with his application.

(6) Failed to comply, without any explanation, to two summonses issued to him to produce documents.

(7) Apart from the material filed on 27 June 2025, otherwise did not comply with directions of the Tribunal.

1. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant's conduct falls within the following relevant considerations in s 60 of the NCAT Act:

(1) Conducting the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged the Respondent by failing to engage with the Respondent's solicitor over a long period of time, including not producing documents that the Applicant said he would, necessitating summonses being issued at short notice before the hearing (s 60(3)(a)).

(2) Prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings by not seeking to withdraw his application, after 7 July 2025 and before the hearing he did not attend on 5 August 2025 (s 60(3)(b)).

(3) Making an application that, although he was entitled to make, was not supported by relevant evidence including evidence that went to the main reason for the revocation of his licence - the provision of a false ACT address. While the Applicant's case had a tenable basis in law, it did not have a tenable basis on the facts, given the Applicant did not file any evidence to support his statement that he did reside in the ACT (s 60(3)(c)). Although the Applicant does not bear a legal onus of proof in his administrative review application, there is a practical onus on the Applicant if he raises a specific fact for consideration to prove the existence of that fact: Wilson v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force [2015] NSWCATAP 248, at [19].

(4) Refusing or failing to comply with the duty imposed on the Respondent by section 36(3) of the NCAT Act, to co-operate with the Tribunal to give effect to the guiding principle - to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings (s 60(3)(f)).

1. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Respondent has discharged the onus to establish that there are special circumstances warranting an award of costs. The Tribunal is satisfied that there are special circumstances because the Applicant's conduct falls within the matters to be considered in s 60(3) of the NCAT Act and his abandonment of the proceedings without any explanation was out of the ordinary and caused the Respondent to incur unnecessary costs.
2. Even though the Applicant was not warned by the Respondent prior to the hearing that a cost application would be made if he continued to fail to respond, it was, at all times, open to the Applicant to notify the Respondent and the Tribunal that he did not want to continue with his application. It is the Applicant's obligation to property and in a timely manner prosecute the proceedings that they have initiated or otherwise withdraw from those proceedings at the earliest opportunity. Failure to do so can point towards special circumstances warranting costs: 3 Bears Childcare Centre Pty Limited v Secretary, Department of Education; Hi 5 Childcare Centre Pty Limited v Secretary, Department of Education; Apple Bear Pty Limited v Secretary, Department of Education; GRR v Secretary, Department of Education (No 2) [2025] NSWCATAD 308, at [52].
3. A failure by one party to comply with the duty in s 36(3) of the NCAT Act by choosing not to attend a hearing and failing to respond to correspondence, leading to the other party incurring unnecessary costs, has been held by the Tribunal to constitute special circumstances warranting an award of costs: Invests Ahmadi Pty Ltd ATF Ahmadi Trust v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2019] NSWCATAD 189, at [34]-[35].
4. It follows that the Tribunal is of the view that these special circumstances warrant an award of costs in favour of the Respondent.

If costs are warranted, should the Applicant pay a fixed sum amount?

1. The Tribunal has power under s 60(4)(b) of the NCAT Act to determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid.
2. Costs are defined to include the costs of, or incidental to, proceedings in the Tribunal, and the costs of, or incidental to, the proceedings giving rise to the application and/or the application (NCAT Act, s 60(5)).
3. Given the terms of s 60(4) of the NCAT Act are similar to s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), the Appeal Panel in ZXJ v ZXK (No 2) [2023] NSWCATAP 76, at [13]-[15], decided to apply the principles relevant to the exercise of the discretion to fix costs under s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act, which were expressed in Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375, at [813]-[820]:

1. In the exercise of its discretion the court is not required to undertake a detailed examination of the kind that would be appropriate to taxation or a formal costs assessment: at [819]

2. The assessment of any lump sum to be awarded must represent a review of the successful party's costs by reference to the pleadings and complexity of the issues raised on the pleadings; the interlocutory processes; the preparation for final hearing and the final hearing: at [819]

3. The costs ordered should be based on an informed assessment of the actual costs having regard to the information before the court (for example, by relying on costs estimates or bills): at [820]

4. The approach taken to estimating the costs to be ordered must be logical, fair and reasonable. This may involve an impressionistic discount of the costs actually incurred or estimated in order to take into account the contingencies that would be relevant in any formal costs assessment: at [820]

5. The courts have typically applied a discount in assessing costs on a gross sum basis: at [814].

1. The power to make a fixed sum costs order should only be exercised when the Tribunal considers that it can do so fairly between the parties, and that includes sufficient confidence in arriving at an appropriate sum on the materials available: Hamod at [813].
2. It is also relevant that fixing costs will avoid the expense, delay and aggravation arising out of the process of assessing costs: Hamod, at [817].
3. A fixed costs order is appropriate where, amongst other things, the sum of costs incurred is relatively modest: 203 Castlereagh St Pty Limited v Skybloo Holdings Pty Limited [2017] NSWCATAP 29 at [40].

1. The Respondent claims around 70 percent of the costs actually incurred ($19,552.67 rather than to total costs of $27,932.39) in the proceedings. The Respondent states that the discount of 30 percent accounts for any discount that would have been applied in any formal costs assessment process.
2. In the alternative, the Respondent claims an amount of $4,723.59, which is the equivalent of 70 percent of costs incurred in preparing for and attending the final hearing, which were "thrown away" as a result of the Applicant's failure to attend the hearing (the total cost being $6,747.99). The concept of "costs thrown away" is best conceptualised as compensation for work already done but wasted as a result of the other party's error or failure: R v CS [2024] NSWDC 108, at [56].
3. The Respondent contends that while the Respondent ought to be entitled to recover costs from the outset of the proceedings, given the Applicant's unexplained abandonment of his application, at the very least, the Respondent ought to be entitled to recover costs associated with preparing for the hearing. The Respondent submits that the Applicant is solely to blame for those costs being wasted.
4. The Respondent has filed tax invoices which break down the legal costs for periods between 30 April 2025 to 28 May 2025, 29 May 2025 to 26 June 2025, 30 June to 30 July 2025, 25 July 2025 to 31 July 2025 (Counsel fees only), and 31 July 2025 to 7 August 2025.

1. Having regard to the principles in Hamod as set out above, and the evidence relied on by the Respondent, the Tribunal is satisfied that it is more efficient and in the interests of justice for the Tribunal to award costs in a fixed amount, having regard to the amount of the costs sought, the time and costs associated with any costs assessment process, and the Applicant's likely non-engagement in any assessment process.
2. As the Applicant had filed evidence in support of his application on 27 June 2025, after appearing at the directions hearing, the Tribunal is of the view that it is not appropriate to award costs against the Applicant from the outset of the proceedings.
3. It is evident, however, that the Applicant abandoned the proceedings by failing to attend the hearing and produce records required by the summons served on him. This caused the Respondent on incur unnecessary costs associated with preparing for the hearing.
4. The Tribunal is therefore of the view that it is appropriate to award costs in a fixed amount of $4,723.59 for costs thrown away due to the Applicant's failure to withdraw his application prior to the hearing date and his failure to attend the hearing without explanation.

(1) Pursuant to s 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), a hearing on the question of costs is dispensed with.

(2) The Applicant is to pay the Respondent's costs in the fixed sum of $4,723.59.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

14 January 2026 - Paragraph 4 - dollar amount corrected.