QRAD Pty Ltd v Philips Electronics Australia Limited [2026] QSC 5

[2] In the result, it is ordered that the plaintiff pay the first defendant's costs of the proceeding, including reserved costs, on the standard basis up to and including 8 November 2024 and on the indemnity basis thereafter.

[3] In compliance with directions made in relation to costs, Philips delivered an affidavit of Williams dated 9 December 2025 and written submissions of the same date. QRAD relied upon earlier delivered affidavits of Gregg dated 30 January 2025 and 14 February 2025, and written submissions dated 12 December 2025. Philips delivered written submissions in reply dated 18 December 2025.

[4] The competing positions in respect of costs can be summarised as follows.

[5] Philips seeks that QRAD pay its costs of the proceeding (including reserved costs), with such costs on an indemnity basis from either after 8 November 2024 (based on the rejection of a formal offer which Philips has beaten) or after 22 November 2024 (based on the rejection of a Calderbank offer which Philips has beaten).

[6] QRAD accepts that it ought pay Philips' costs of the proceeding but says that should only be on the standard basis. It says in respect of both offers that it was not unreasonable for the offers to be rejected by it at the times made and so an indemnity costs order is not appropriate.

[7] It is only necessary to consider the first, formal offer under the rules. There is no issue that the requirements of rule 361A(1) UCPR are met and so the default position is that QRAD is to pay Philips' costs on the indemnity basis from the date of the service of the offer unless another order (in this case, standard costs) is appropriate (rule 361A(2) UCPR).

[8] QRAD says standard costs is appropriate because at the time of the formal offer QRAD had an outstanding request made of Philips for data logs of the relevant MRI machine which QRAD's expert had advised would be of assistance to him. The data logs were not provided until after the offer had expired.

[9] Whilst in some cases the fact of outstanding disclosure at the time an offer is made might be a reason to conclude that rejection of the offer is not unreasonable,[1] that is not this case. Here, QRAD's case failed on the primary bases that the Court concluded that the duties QRAD alleged Philips owed it and were breached, were not in fact owed; and representations actually made by Philips were not misrepresentations. The data logs were of no direct relevance to the determination of the case. There is no reason in such circumstances to interfere with the usual operation of the rules.

[10] I find the requirements of rule 361A(1) UCPR satisfied and that no other order under rule 361A(2) UCPR is appropriate.

[11] Insofar as the costs of the proceeding involve costs of the counterclaim such that regard might be had by way of analogy to rule 360 UCPR, the same analysis justifies the same result in respect of the costs of the counterclaim, and so there is no reason to distinguish between the costs related to the claim and those related to the counterclaim.

[1] Delmenico v Brannelly [2008] QCA 74 at [64] (per Keane and Fraser JJA and Chesterman J).