1. As at the relevant date of 1 January 2015, the V-G's capital valuation of the Land was $450,000.00 (the "valuation"). By letter received by the V-G on 30 July 2015 the Applicant objected to the valuation pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Act. On 11 September 2015 the V-G disallowed the objection pursuant to Section 25(1) of the Act. As mentioned above, on 16 September 2015 the Applicant lodged an application for review of the decision of the V-G upon his objection to the Tribunal pursuant to Section 25C(1) of the Act. The Applicant asserts before the Tribunal that the value of the Land should be varied to $435,000.00.

1. I received at the hearing of this matter two bundles of documents titled "Section 35 Statement and Documents" and "Supplementary Statement in Support of Section 35 statement" from the V-G, a written statement of the Applicant containing valuation information concerning the Land and other land asserted to be relevant and photographs of the Land, and a copy of the Certificate of Title of the Land.

Nature of the review to be undertaken by the Tribunal

1. Section 25C(3)(c) and (d) of the Act provide that the nature of the review to be undertaken by the Tribunal of the valuation in dispute is to be as follows:

"(c) a review under this section will be taken to come within SACAT's review jurisdiction but, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, SACAT will consider the matter de novo (adopting such processes and procedures, and considering and receiving such evidence or material, as it thinks fit for the purposes of the proceedings); and

(d) without limitation, a variation made by SACAT on the review of a valuation may consist of an increase or decrease in the valuation."

1. The words "review jurisdiction" in Section 25C(3)(c) of the Act relate directly to Section 34(1) of the SACAT Act and the nature of the review is also informed by the provisions contained in Section 34 SACAT Act, sub-sections (3) - (7) of which provide as follows:

"(3) Subject to subsections (4), (5) and (6), the Tribunal will, in exercising its review jurisdiction, examine the decision of the decision-maker by way of rehearing.

(4) On a rehearing, the Tribunal must reach the correct or preferable decision but in doing so must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision-maker.

(a) an examination of the evidence or material before the decision-maker (unless any such evidence or material is to be excluded under another provision of this Act or under any other law); and

(b) a consideration of any further evidence or material that the Tribunal decides, in the circumstances of the particular case, to admit for the purposes of rehearing the matter.

(6) In exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal is to deal with a matter in accordance with this Act and the relevant Act.

(7) Furthermore, the relevant Act may modify the operation of this Act in relation to a matter that comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction."

1. Section 25C(3) of the Act are clearly provisions of a "relevant Act" for the purposes of Section 34(7) of the SACAT Act, and modifies the operation of Section 34 in respect to the nature of a valuation review before the Tribunal. In determining the nature of the review, and the practice and procedures of the Tribunal upon a valuation review, the relevant statutory provisions set out above are to be read together, and account taken of Section 25C of the Act and Sections 34 and 37 of the SACAT Act.

1. Prior to its amendment on 29 March 2015, Section 25C(1) of the Act formerly provided a right of "appeal" to the Land and Valuation Division of the Supreme Court, with Section 25C(3) formerly providing that on such appeal the Court "may confirm, increase or decrease the valuation to which the appeal relates".[1] The nature of the "appeal" pursuant to the former Section 25C(1) was however to be undertaken as an appeal de novo.[2] The nature of this appeal de novo was described by Bleby J in SkyCity Adelaide Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2009] SASC 289; (2009) 168 LGERA 332 as follows at [7]:

"It was common ground that the appeal is a hearing de novo in which the Court is to make its own determination after hearing the evidence. However, in order to succeed on an appeal it is insufficient merely to lead evidence of a different value without being able to point so some error in the valuation the subject of the appeal."

1. In Ardoch Pty Ltd v Valuer-General (No 2) [2006] SASC 217; (2006) 148 LGERA 408, Debelle J had earlier stated at [24] that a valuation appeal was "an appeal de novo" and at [33]:

"[T]he court will not interfere with a valuation unless the appellant demonstrates that the valuer whose assessment is subject to appeal has made some error of law; has acted on a wrong principle of valuation; has misapprehended, misused or excluded relevant material, in other words, has failed to have had regard to relevant factors or has had regard to irrelevant factors; has misapplied principle or has in some other way erred in discharging the task of a valuer. The court will also interfere where the valuation is manifestly excessive or manifestly low ... an incorrect analysis of comparable sales or a failure to mention relevant comparable sales are instances are instances of misuse or exclusion of relevant material. To put the matter shortly, the court will not interfere if the difference between the Valuer-General's valuation and that of the appellant is essentially a difference of opinion. It will interfere only if the appellant demonstrates error of the kind just mentioned."[3]

1. The V-G submits to the Tribunal that the operation of the review jurisdiction of the Tribunal effectively replicates the previous jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, upon a review of a valuation to the Tribunal, the Applicant bears the burden of demonstrating the valuation was erroneous, by establishing the valuer made some error of law, acted upon a wrong principle of valuation, misapprehended, misused or excluded relevant material, misapplied principle or otherwise in some way erred in discharging the task of a valuer, or has arrived at a value that is manifestly excessive or manifestly low. This is a formulation of principle essentially adopted from the detailed analysis of Debelle J provided in Ardoch at [21] - [34], and in particular, at [33]. I do not accept however that the de novo review the Tribunal is to undertake is restrained in the manner the V-G submits.

1. The statements of principle expressed in Ardoch at [33] and SkyCity at [7] - whilst undoubtedly correct in respect to the former Section 25C of the Act - were made before the 29 March 2015 amendments of the Act and the enactment of the SACAT Act. The fundamental change in jurisdiction from an appeal to the Supreme Court to now an application for review to the Tribunal is significant. The Tribunal is expressly directed to reach the "correct or preferable decision"[4] upon a valuation review, and in doing so is also to apply the objectives, principles and philosophy set out in Sections 8(1) and 39(1) of the SACAT Act, and Rule 3 of the SACAT Rules. This is a significantly different statutory regime to that which applied pursuant to the former Section 25C(1) and (3) of the Act upon an appeal against a valuation to the Supreme Court. Further, there is a significant difference in the wording of the former Section 25C(3)(a), and the current Section 25C(3)(c) of the Act,[5] with the addition of the words "without limitation" in the current Section 25C(3)(c) constituting a material change to the nature of the review to be undertaken by the Tribunal in respect to the valuation under consideration.

1. Taking account of all of these matters, I am of the view that a review of a valuation by the Tribunal involves a hearing de novo in respect to the valuation under consideration.[6] In undertaking this de novo hearing, the Tribunal may adopt such processes and procedures as it thinks fit,[7] is to act with as little formality as possible, informing itself as it thinks fit,[8] considering and receiving such evidence or material as it thinks fit for the purposes of the review,[9] and is to give appropriate weight to the original decision of the V-G under review.[10] The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence,[11] and is to make its own determination after hearing and evaluating the evidence or material put forward by the parties.[12] In doing so, the Tribunal may without limitation increase or decrease the valuation under review.[13] There is no presumption in favour of the valuation of the V-G the subject of the review. The V-G as the respondent to the review is not to be regarded as having any advantage upon the review beyond such force as it can derive from the material upon which it relies.[14] Ultimately, it is for the Tribunal to reach the preferable decision in respect to the valuation the subject of the review,[15] and the Tribunal may then either affirm or vary the valuation, and make any further consequential order it considers appropriate.[16]

1. I have carefully considered all of the material produced to the Tribunal by the parties in this matter, and their helpful submissions. I am not satisfied that the capital value attributed by the V-G to the Land is incorrect. I prefer the material put forward to the Tribunal by the V-G in respect to comparable sales to that of the Applicant. Comparable sales analysis is a matter of specialised expertise. As was stated in Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] HCA 8; (2003) 212 CLR 111 by the High Court[17] at [17] the method of selecting comparable sales:

"is to seek out relatively contemporaneous sales of comparable properties between parties at arm's length, unaffected by special circumstances, such as, for example, a strong desire by a purchaser to buy an adjourning property, and to use those sales as a yard stick for the valuation of the relevant land."

1. An exercise in expert valuation skill and expertise is however required. As stated in Brenwarra v Commissioner of Highways [No 1] (1973) 32 LGRA 170 at 179 - 180 by Wells J:

"It is general valuation practice for sales characterised as comparable sales to be used as bases for the valuation of lands said to be similar. But allowances must always be made before such sales can be so used. No two parcels of land are identical in all respects: the sale price of any given piece of land is not necessarily the price at which it ought to have been sold, or ... its true value. Before using any allegedly comparable sale ... the valuer must consider whether, having regard to the circumstances ... appertaining to the parcel of land in question, and to the transaction of sale, there are sufficient similarities to the circumstances appertaining to the subject land and to the notional sale presupposed by the test formulated in Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia ... to warrant a court's reasoning from the sale price paid under the allegedly comparable sale, with or without other evidence, to a value for the subject land. Adjustments must, of course, be made every time reasoning of that kind is undertaken. For example ... it may be necessary to consider such matters as topography, location, size, shape, slope, view, land use (actual and potential), scope for, and difficulties of, development, services and amenities; and in relation to the transaction of sale, the valuer must weigh such things as the character, business and relationships of the parties, their motives, the terms and conditions in their contract of sale, and any other special considerations that induced or may have induced them to conclude the contract at the selling price agreed, as well as the dates when the contract of sale and the transfer were concluded or effected. ... there is no hard and fast rule by the application of which a valuer may ... draw the line that clearly separates the sales that are comparable from those that are not. It is, in my view, all a matter of degree: some adjustment is always necessary; too much adjustment will render it unsafe to use a sale, subject to such a degree of adjustment, for the purpose of the reasoning process in the comparable sales method. Just where the line is to be drawn is, it seems to me, the very sort of question that is fit for the expert valuer to determine ... The valuer must use his skill to winnow out the element of comparability if it is there, and use it with discretion."

1. I am satisfied that the V-G valuation of the Land in the amount of $450,000.00 as at 1 January 2015 is correct.

[2] SkyCity Adelaide Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2009] SASC 289; (2009) 168 LGERA 332 at [7] and Ardoch Pty Ltd v Valuer-General (No 2) [2006] SASC 217; (2006) 148 LGERA 408 at [24]

[3] Adopted and endorsed by Bleby J in SkyCity at [7]

[4] Section 34(4) of the SACAT Act and Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286 at [140] - [141]

[5] Section 25C(3)(c) of the Act provides:

"without limitation ... SACAT on the review of a valuation may ... increase or decrease ... the valuation" (emphasis added)

[14] Farrow v South Australian Planning Commission (1988) 66 LGRA 92 at 95

[17] McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Cullinan JJ