procedural. The miscellaneous matters application to dismiss or strike out proceeding OCL032-19 is refused. Any application for costs arising from this application is reserved to be dealt with at the...
Key principles
The Tribunal should exercise its summary dismissal power under s 47 QCAT Act with caution; summary dismissal is appropriate only in clear cases where there is a high degree of...
Where an unrepresented applicant files prolix or partially irrelevant material, the Tribunal must adopt a pragmatic, accessible approach rather than imposing technical pleading...
A proceeding should not be summarily dismissed under s 47 merely because the applicant is unlikely to succeed on factual issues; if a real question of fact exists that requires...
Remedies available under the Information Privacy Act s 178 are limited; orders sought beyond those available under s 178 (including substantial financial awards unsupported by...
Issues before the court
Whether the Tribunal should summarily dismiss or strike out the applicant's referral as frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or an abuse of process...
Plain English Summary
The Department applied to strike out or dismiss Dr Purje's privacy referral to QCAT. Member Kent reviewed extensive filings, found much of the applicant's material irrelevant but identified one potentially live issue: whether an email dated 8 August 2017 was inaccurate and, if inaccurate, whether that amounted to a breach of IPP 8 of the Information Privacy Act. Because that factual dispute required a hearing and the threshold for summary dismissal is high, the Tribunal refused to dismiss the referral and reserved costs until the substantive hearing (refusal to dismiss; matter to proceed) [72], [86]–[87].
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
Deep Dive
1,801 words · generated 23/07/2026
What happened
Dr Ragnar Purje lodged a privacy complaint with the Office of the Information Commissioner (Queensland) on 29 August 2018 alleging misuse/inaccuracy of personal information by the Department of Education and Training (the Department) (background, [3]–[6]). Mediation (9 January–15 April 2019) failed and the matter was referred to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) on 29 April 2019 ([4]–[6]). The central, disputed factual event is an email sent by Ms Wasson on 8 August 2017; the accuracy of that email is the nucleus of the applicant’s complaint that the Department may have breached Information Privacy Principle 8 (IPP 8) of the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) (the IPA) ([30], [56]–[57], [72]).
Whether the remedies sought by the applicant fall within the Tribunal's power under s 178 of the Information Privacy Act, and whether seeking...
Whether the applicant's failure to comply with Tribunal directions and to particularise his case caused unnecessary disadvantage under s 48(1) QCAT...
Cited legislation
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The Department filed a miscellaneous application to dismiss or strike out the QCAT referral (the interlocutory application relied on s 47 and s 48 of the QCAT Act), arguing the referral was frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or otherwise an abuse of process; that many remedies sought by the applicant were not open under s 178 IPA; and that the applicant's failure to comply with directions and to particularise his case had unnecessarily disadvantaged the respondent ([8]–[20], [58]–[64]). The Department relied on documentary material and submissions that asserted there was no reasonable prospect that the Tribunal would find an IPP 8 breach.
Member Kent determined the interlocutory application on the papers and refused to dismiss or strike out the referral. The member found that, despite substantial irrelevant material filed by the applicant, there was a single potentially live issue, the accuracy of the 8 August 2017 email and whether that could amount to an IPP 8 breach. Given the high threshold for summary dismissal and the need to allow the applicant a hearing on that factual question, summary dismissal was not appropriate. Costs were reserved to the substantive hearing (decision and orders, [72]–[73], [86]–[87]).
Why the court decided this way
The Tribunal applied well-established principles governing dismissal of proceedings at an interlocutory stage. The key legal theme is caution: dismissal under s 47 QCAT Act is a powerful summary remedy and should be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases where there is a high degree of certainty that the proceeding cannot succeed and there is no need for a hearing ([71], [84]). Member Kent relied on authorities emphasising that summary relief to end proceedings early should be granted only in clear cases, and that the Tribunal’s function must be exercised with care so that a litigant is not improperly deprived of a hearing ([71]–[72], quoting Gobus and other authorities).
Two further institutional considerations shaped the outcome. First, QCAT’s procedural regime is designed to be accessible, including to unrepresented litigants; it does not demand the technical precision of court pleadings, and the Tribunal will interpret and manage imperfect material reasonably and pragmatically ([71], [74]). Second, the Tribunal must identify whether an arguable case or a 'real question' exists; if it does, the matter should proceed to a hearing so contested facts can be fully explored ([77]–[79], discussion of Aigner, Murtagh, Felstead).
Here, after reviewing the lengthy material, Member Kent identified a single, concrete factual dispute (the 8 August 2017 email) that, if resolved for the applicant, could amount to an IPP 8 breach with potential remedies under s 178 IPA. That finding meant the high threshold for summary dismissal was not met and a hearing was warranted ([72], [86]–[87]). The member also flagged that many of the applicant's asserted remedies appeared to exceed the statutory limits of s 178 and/or were unsupported by evidence, but declined to resolve those issues summarily in the interlocutory application ([11]–[15], [59]–[64]).
Member Kent balanced the Department's legitimate complaints about the applicant's prolix, irrelevant filings and non-compliance with directions against the broader obligation to afford an unrepresented litigant a hearing on an arguable point. The result was refusal to dismiss, accompanied by a warning to the applicant to narrow his case and by a power-notice that the Tribunal can manage evidence and witnesses at hearing ([65]–[69], [88]–[90]).
Before and after state of the law
Before this decision, the applicable principles were long-established: summary dismissal or summary judgment devices require a high threshold; the courts adopt caution before depriving a party of a cause of action without hearing (General Steel; Dey; and QCAT authorities such as Gobus, Murtagh, Felstead, the judgment cites these authorities and applies their themes) ([71], [81]–[84]). QCAT's own jurisprudence has emphasised flexibility for self-represented litigants and pragmatic case management rather than rigid pleading standards ([71], [74]).
After this decision, the legal posture remains consistent with those pre-existing principles. Purje reinforces that QCAT will not summarily dismiss a referral merely because an applicant files prolix, partially irrelevant material, or seeks remedies beyond statutory limits, as long as there exists at least one viable legal question capable of resolving the dispute on its merits after full hearing. The decision reiterates the proper exercise of s 47 as a summary power of last resort and underscores the Tribunal's duty to ensure access and fairness to self-represented litigants ([72], [86]–[87]).
Thus, Purje aligns with the pre-existing line: summary dismissal is exceptional; identify real issues to be tried; if one exists, proceed to hearing; manage irrelevant material and protect procedural fairness at the hearing. It does not alter or expand the law but it clarifies application in cases with unrepresented applicants and voluminous irrelevant filings.
Key passages with plain-English translation
"Summary relief to end proceedings early should only be granted in clear cases." ([71])
Plain English: The Tribunal should not throw a case out unless it is obviously hopeless.
"There is only one incident that may possibly give rise to a breach ... the sending of the email of 8 August 2017 ... I find this question is most appropriately one for a tribunal member to determine after a hearing." ([72])
Plain English: After reviewing the papers, the Tribunal found one specific event that might show a privacy breach; that question requires a full hearing so facts and evidence can be properly tested.
"Perfection in pleading practice is not an end in itself." ([71], quoting Gobus)
Plain English: QCAT does not demand legal drafting like a court would, especially from people representing themselves. The Tribunal will look at what the material, overall, is trying to show.
"It is always a very serious step to deprive a party of a cause of action without a hearing on the merits, and 'extreme care' must be taken before doing so." ([91])
Plain English: Dismissing someone's case without letting them present their full evidence and arguments is a drastic action and should only happen rarely.
"I do not intend to deny Dr Purje a hearing because he does not know what is expected by the tribunal." ([88])
Plain English: The Tribunal will not penalise an unrepresented person by striking out their case where there is an arguable issue and confusion about procedure.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
This decision is directed at cases with the following profile:
An unrepresented applicant files a Tribunal referral and produces voluminous, partly irrelevant, or poorly particularised material; nevertheless, within that material, there is a discrete, potentially decisive factual dispute that could found a statutory breach (here, accuracy of a particular internal email and IPP 8 breach) ([65]–[72]).
The respondent applies under s 47 (and s 48) QCAT Act for dismissal as frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance or an abuse of process, pointing to procedural non-compliance and remedies that appear beyond statutory scope ([8]–[20], [58]–[64]).
The Tribunal must weigh accessibility for self-represented litigants and the need for procedural order against the respondent's legitimate difficulty in responding to poorly particularised claims ([71], [74]–[76], [88]).
In such patterns, Purje instructs that the Tribunal should identify whether any real question exists; if so, proceed to hearing rather than summarily dismiss, while reserving costs and employing case management to curtail irrelevant lines of evidence.
How later courts have treated it
This judgment itself relies on prior QCAT decisions (for example Gobus [2020] QCAT 134) and higher court authorities for the summary dismissal jurisprudence ([71], [81]–[84]). The Purje decision applies those principles to a factually difficult case involving an unrepresented litigant and privacy legislation.
The judgment does not record subsequent appellate or later-court treatment of Purje. To assess how later courts or tribunals have treated Purje would require a targeted citator search (e.g. via AustLII, JADE or commercial citators) to see whether Purje has been cited, followed, distinguished or criticised in later decisions. The present decision stands as a QCAT member’s application of established summary-dismissal and tribunal-access principles to IPA complaints; absent later citations, it remains persuasive within QCAT practice for similar interlocutory contexts.
Still-open questions
Purje leaves several practical and legal matters unresolved (intentionally reserved for the hearing):
Causation and quantification of economic loss. The Department argued the applicant could not causally connect the disputed email or IPP 8 conduct to the substantial economic and superannuation losses claimed; Member Kent did not determine causation and left this to the substantive hearing ([14], [62]–[63], [72]). How strictly the Tribunal will test causation and remoteness at hearing is open.
Scope and nature of remedies under s 178 IPA. Member Kent noted many remedies sought lie beyond s 178 or were unsupported; the exact remedies the Tribunal may, in the end, award (and their quantum under s 178(a)(iv)) will be determined on the evidence at hearing ([11]–[15], [59]–[63]).
The line between 'irrelevant' material and necessary contextual evidence. Purje recognises the reality of litigants placing personal history into filings, but how the Tribunal will manage the admission, exclusion and weight of such collateral material at hearing, especially where it touches core issues (e.g. motive, context), remains for case management at hearing ([65]–[69], [89]–[90]).
Practical case management steps to protect respondents from prejudice while preserving access for unrepresented applicants. Member Kent signalled the Tribunal can exercise its powers to limit evidence and cross-examination but did not specify the precise measures; the appropriate balance of fairness and efficiency in hearing conduct remains a live question ([89]–[90]).
The extent to which earlier findings in other jurisdictions influence the Tribunal’s assessment. Member Kent observed that findings in other jurisdictions are not determinative here ([76]); how the Tribunal will treat such collateral determinations at hearing in particular factual situations may require further judicial clarification.
In short, Purje is a careful application of the cautious summary-dismissal doctrine and the Tribunal’s duty of accessibility. It preserves a hearing where a viable factual dispute exists, while signalling strict management and statutory limits will constrain irrelevant or excessive claims at the substantive hearing. Practitioners should focus on narrowing issues, particularising evidence that speaks to IPP 8 accuracy and causation, and preparing to meet both case management scrutiny and statutory remedial limits.
[1] The issue I must decide is whether I grant or refuse a miscellaneous matters application to dismiss OCL032-19 made by the Department of Education and Training (the Education Department).
[2] In deciding this matter, I am not deciding the substantive issue that is the subject referral. I must decide whether the referral should be dismissed or struck out. Having said that, in determining that application, I need to decide if the referral is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived, lacking in substance or otherwise an abuse of process.[1] To do this I need to examine the submissions of the parties. This includes all the submissions made to date. This consideration is for the purposes of this application only and is in no way a substitute for a decision being made in any other aspect of OCL032-19.
[3]
[3] On 29 August 2018 Dr Purje (the respondent in this miscellaneous application but hereafter referred to as applicant due to being the applicant in the substantive matter) lodged with the Office of the Information Commissioner Queensland (the Office) a privacy complaint against the Education Department (the applicant in this miscellaneous matters application but hereafter referred to as the respondent due to being the respondent in the substantive matter) under the Information Privacy Act2009 (Qld) (IPA).
[4] On 9 January 2019 the Office accepted the complaint of Dr Purje on the basis that there was a possible argument for a breach of the IPA. The mediation discussions took place between 9 January and 15 April 2019 with the matter ultimately remaining unresolved.
[5] Section 175 of the IPA provides that if a privacy complaint lodged with the Office is not able to be resolved then the Office is required under the IPA to inform the parties that they have the option of referring the matter to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).
[6] As a consequence of this information being imparted to the parties a referral was received by QCAT on 29 April 2019.
[7] In this referral Dr Purje claims, inter alia, that he is the victim of inappropriate action towards him on the part of the Education Department and that this action amounts to a breach of the IPA.
[4]
The Education Department submissions - Miscellaneous Matters application
[5]
[8] The respondent Education Department made an application for miscellaneous matters. This application applied to dismiss or strike out proceeding OCL032-19. The respondent seeks the dismissal or striking out on the basis that Dr Purje's application it is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or is otherwise an abuse of process.[2]
[9] Submissions received from the Education Department (20 February 2020) referred to the characterisation of the respondent's behaviour in Dr Purje's application. The Education Department submitted that this behaviour did not amount to a breach of the IPA. It was their submission that it therefore followed that there is no reasonable prospect that the tribunal would find that the email, the behaviour in question, breached the respondent's obligations under the IPA Information Privacy Principle (IPP) 8.
[10] It was submitted that the information in the email was accurate and that the respondent had taken reasonable steps to ensure that it was accurate at the time the information was used. Further it was "doubtful" that the information contained in the document was under the respondent's control as required by IPP 8.
[6]
[11] The respondent submitted that only part of the relief sought by the applicant was available pursuant to section 178 of the IPA.
[12] The applicant sought relief as follows: of $190,000 in lieu of superannuation; the loss of wages for period of three years and seven months; a letter of apology and financial compensation of $500,000.
[13] The respondent pointed out that section 178(a)(iv) provides that the Tribunal could make an order that Dr Purje is entitled to a maximum amount of not more than $100,000.
[14] It was submitted that apart from an order for apology as provided by section 178(a) (iii) the applicant was seeking relief that was not available to him under the IPA. Additionally, the amounts claimed, presumably as compensation, were unsupported by evidence filed by the applicant. A further submission was there is no prospect that the applicant could establish on the balance of probabilities that such losses were suffered by him because of the act or practice complained of i.e. he could not blame a breach of the respondent's obligations under the IPA by use of his personal information in an email dated 8 August 2017 for any of the loss he claims he has suffered.
[15] The respondent submitted that even if the applicant could establish a breach of their obligations and the IPP 8 (which was denied by them) there is no prospect that the applicant could establish that the breach caused the economic losses suffered.
[7]
[16] A further limb to their submissions was that the referral should be dismissed or struck out pursuant to section 48(1)Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2009 (Qld) (the QCAT Act) due to the applicant conducting the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged the respondent. Examples of such disadvantage were cited as by failing to comply with tribunal directions and/or vexatiously conducting the proceedings.
[17] Additionally, it was alleged that the 77-page document filed by the applicant on 10 June 2019 did not address the directions issued. It was submitted that the document contains submissions and further allegations and rhetorical statements that may be largely irrelevant to any issue open to the tribunal. Also, the earlier 28-page document filed on 2 December 2019 did not address the relevant directions.
[18] The respondent stated that they were greatly disadvantaged because the applicant had not complied with the directions of the tribunal requiring him to particularise his case and identify the evidence he intended to rely upon.
[19] The respondent submitted that it could not comply with the tribunal's directions because it could not understand the case that it was to meet. It was submitted that the failure of the applicant to comply with the directions of the tribunal had caused ongoing cost to the respondent and a delay in the proceedings, causing additional disadvantage to the respondent.
[20] In summary they said the referral lacked reasonable grounds and the applicant had demonstrated disregard for the procedural directions of the tribunal.
[8]
Dr Purje's submissions - miscellaneous matters application
[9]
[21] Dr Purje filed material in the Tribunal on 24 February 2020. This document made allegations against the Education Department, including very serious allegations. Dr Purje in his submissions of 7 February 2020 makes allegations against the legal representatives of the respondent. In the absence of any justification for these allegations I find no basis for such allegations and find them to be inappropriate and baseless.
[10]
[22] The applicant referred to external events including the Australian Royal Commission into Banking without linking this in any way to his own application. He also attached the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service. Dr Purje's submissions relating to the inclusion of this material did not link the subject matter to his own circumstances. It was difficult to establish what Dr Purje saw as his claim and what remedies he submitted flowed from this claim. It was difficult to appreciate what evidence he would be relying upon to prove this claim.
[23] Due to an ongoing lack of clarity in the matter I issued directions on 15 April 2020. I directed that the parties file a joint agreed chronology of relevant dates and events relating to the dispute. The parties did not comply with this direction as neither party could agree to a chronology.
[24] Ultimately submissions in response to the directions of 15 April 2020 were received by the tribunal from both parties.
[25] The specific question that I am required to resolve is whether there should be a dismissal of Dr Purje's referral to the tribunal.
[11]
[26] Originally Dr Purje requested from the tribunal orders that quite arguably could not all be provided under the legislation. Dr Purje filed his response on 3 June 2020 to the detailed directions issued by the tribunal. He set out his own chronology, commencing with the statement "context is everything". Dr Purje outlined a series of no doubt distressing events that occurred to him commencing with the tragic death of a work colleague (in 2012). The applicant then proceeded to traverse material and information that had already been dealt with in previous submissions e.g. material about a Work Cover Queensland claim including medical history details. This material did not relate directly to the allegation that was made in relation to a possible breach of IPP 8.
[12]
Submissions in response to the tribunal directions of 15 April 2020
[13]
[27] In his response to whether it was common ground that he had provided his curriculum vitae on 18 November 2016 he started with the date (18 November 2016) he emailed his resume/ curriculum vitae to Ms McGuire. This was followed by a long recitation of what he saw as the history of his interactions with the Education Deportment dating from this time.
[28] In 2017 Dr Purje applied to be transferred to Doomadgee State School. At this time, he was no longer a teacher at Burrowes State School. He stated that the Education Department "had not chosen to return him to work until August 2016 and that took place at Beerwah State School". He remained at Beerwah State School till the end of 2016. He was informed at the end of 2016 that he would not be returning to that school. He said no return to work was put in place by the Education Department. He informed the Queensland Teachers Union that he wanted to be transferred to Doomadgee to be with his wife. There was communication between the Queensland Teachers Union and the Education Department. He was informed by the Queensland Teachers Union that his transfer to Doomadgee was in place. In April 2017 he joined his wife who was living in Doomadgee.
[29] Dr Purje submitted that he was not asked to provide a resume in his 2017 application and that Ms McGuire had already received his resume in 2016.
[14]
Provision of resume and the accuracy of the email 8 August 2017
[15]
[30] When asked whether there was a distinction between curriculum vitae and resume he stated that they were used for the same purpose. The second part of the direction that required submissions on was the accuracy of Ms Wasson's email of 8 August 2017. The submissions sought were on the point of whether the accuracy or otherwise was an essential issue in the application and if so does it involve a dispute as to whether previous submission of the curriculum vitae in 2016 was sufficient. Dr Purje's response was that Ms Wasson's email of 8 August 2017 was incorrect.
[31] He submitted that both Ms Wasson and Ms McGuire (Principal, Doomadgee State School) deliberately lied. He said the correct version of events was that when he arrived in Doomadgee in April 2017 he went to the supermarket, Ms McGuire was shopping at the same time, his wife introduced him, Ms McGuire responded with a cursory nod and then Ms McGuire and his wife were involved in small talk. He said that this was the only time he had met with Ms McGuire in 2017. Dr Purje did not clarify what he was trying to convey with this information or how it related to a possible breach of the IPA. He stated that was the only day he had met Ms McGuire in 2017.
[32] At the start of the new school year (2018) he said that he was met by the Deputy Principal, Ms Jackson. Ms Jackson presented him with a one-page sheet of paper and informed him that the sheet of paper was his teaching duties and times. He did not see Ms McGuire.
[33] The directions of 15 April 2020 required the parties to respond to whether Dr Purje was transferred to Doomadgee on 18 January 2018. The applicant responded that he was transferred to Doomadgee in April 2017. Based on other material filed in this proceeding this is the date of his residential transfer not his work commencement date.
[34] He started that Ms McGuire and Ms Wasson and senior members of "the Mary St Office of the Department" as well as the Queensland Teachers Union were aware of his arrival in Doomadgee. He said he was not offered work in Doomadgee when he arrived. He was in contact with the Queensland Teachers Union as the month went by. He was informed by the Queensland Teachers Union that they had no idea why he was not being placed at Doomadgee. He was informed by the Queensland Teachers Union that the Education Department administrators were saying that "he would never be employed by the Department".
[16]
[35] Dr Purje made several allegations about the Education Department. He said that they had not met their own code of conduct. He stated that what took place in 2017 (not specifically the email of 7 August 2017) had caused him financial stress . To alleviate this financial stress the Queensland Teachers Union provided him with a $5,000 loan. His submission was that the Queensland Teachers Union continue to engage with the Education Department to have him placed in Doomadgee in 2017 but that this did not occur in 2017.
[36] Dr Purje submitted that Ms Wasson, through the Queensland Teachers Union, directed him to attend a third medical appraisal. He did this under duress and protest. In December 2017 Dr Purje said that he received a generic email informing him that he had been placed as a teacher in Doomadgee and that he was to start in 2018.
[37] Direction 2 (g) of 15 April 2020 required submissions on the following: in the light of the successful application to transfer what remedies could be available to Dr Purje, for example, further than an apology or an order under section 178 (b) of the IPA.
[38] Dr Purje's submission in response to this this appears to be housed under heading of "remedies". He stated that "the (Education) Department were aware of the impact of their decisions and actions on his person, his professional standing and in his life". He submitted that this awareness was through Work Cover and the Queensland Government Code of Conduct and this awareness and knowledge of the impact of the decisions directed at him was supported by the email sent on 28 July 2017. This email was authored by Ms Samantha Byrne writing to Ms Wasson, with a carbon copy being sent to Ms Rena West. It was stated that this email included communication of decisions that were taking place and being made by Ms Paula McGuire.
[39] Dr Purje considered it inconceivable that as part of the communication process and information being openly shared that Ms Wasson and Ms McGuire were not aware or had not known or had not discussed the resume he had sent on 18 November 2016. He believed that information such as this "is shared and declared as policy and standard procedure". He submitted that this email of November 2016 informed Ms McGuire about his professional expertise and included his resume.
[40] In paragraphs nine and ten of his submissions Dr Purje said that his life matters. He submitted that the remedies he sought would never outweigh "the damage, humiliation and immense financial damage the Education and Training Department had deliberately inflicted upon (him)". Further "the remedies need to be openly and transparently reflecting this damage". He repeated "my life matters".
[17]
Education Department further submissions - miscellaneous matters application
[18]
[44] On 3 June 2020 the respondent's submissions in response to the directions of 15 April 2020 were received by the Tribunal. The respondent had submitted a chronology on 6 May 2020. In these submissions they stated that there "clearly remained many facts in issue in the proceedings". (emphasis added)
[45] The respondent submitted that it was established that the applicant provided a curriculum vitae to Ms McGuire by email on 16 November 2016.
[19]
[46] It was agreed that the applicant was employed by the respondent throughout 2017 but was absent on leave from his substantive positions at Landsborough State School then Beerwah State School and this was the case through terms one and two. The applicant applied to transfer to Doomadgee State School on 28 July 2017.
[47] They submitted that Dr Purje's 28 July 2017 application for transfer was submitted by email to the respondent's Director of Human Resources, Business Partner, partnering in the South East region. The respondent's contention is that the applicant did not attach his resume to the application of 28 July 2017 and he did not nominate referees and provide their contact details. They submit this is relevant in assessing whether a breach of the IPA has occurred.
[48] Ms Wasson's email of 8 August 2017 appears to be an issue for Dr Purje. The Education Department submitted that although Dr Purje had emailed a resume to Ms McGuire on 18 November 2016, he had not provided a resume with his application for transfer on 28 July 2017. The respondent submits that Ms Wasson's email was referring to the application of 28 July 2017. It therefore follows that if there was not a resume attached with the application on 28 July 2017, Ms Wasson was accurate when she wrote that " He has not provided a resume, refused to provide referees and directed the Principal not to contact his previous supervisors that there was no resume with his application".
[49] As Ms McGuire was an employee when Dr Purje sent her his resume (18 November 2016) the respondent accepted the statement made by Ms Wasson "that he had not provide the resume was strictly not was strictly inaccurate". However, there does not appear to be a dispute between the parties that the applicant had not provided a resume to the respondent with his application for transfer made on 28 July 2017. There is no dispute between the parties that the applicant did not provide referee details to the respondent at any time before Ms Wasson's email of 8 August 2017. Therefore, it is the respondent's submission that Ms Wasson's statement about the resume is not a central issue.
[20]
[50] The respondent submitted that the central issue in the application is whether or not the respondent breached IPP 8 of the IPA by failing to take all reasonable steps to ensure, that having regard to the purpose for which the information is proposed to be used, the information is accurate and completely up to date in that context. The respondent relied upon submissions made as part of an earlier response to the application (29 July 2019).
[51] In summary they state that they received the applicant's application for transfer to Doomadgee then various emails were exchanged internally. Within these emails it was identified that the applicant's transfer application had an omission of a resume and referees' details. They also noted the applicant's previous absence from work due to illness.
[52] During this time period Ms Byrnes had been liaising with Ms McGuire in relation to the applicant's transfer. Ms Byrnes would relay the information provided by Ms McGuire to Ms Wasson.
[53] Specific emails are referred to e.g. on 28 July 2017 Ms Byrnes emailed Ms Wasson additional information including that the Doomadgee State School Principal's "background checkes [sic] have proven unfavourable and she's determined Dr Purje would not be a not be a good fit for the Doomadgee community".
[54] In an email dated 28 July 2017 from Ms Byrne to Ms Wasson she wrote:
[21]
Please note: In addition to information previously provided this application has been approved by the substantive region with no resume uploaded, no supporting documents for compassionate transfer and no referees indicated. There is great concern that the applicants applying for positions in remote locations are expected to provide less information than those applying for positions in major centres, when in fact it should be the opposite considering the context they will be required to teach in.
[22]
[55] On 3 August 2017 Ms Wasson received an email from Ms Byrne which stated that the application of Dr Purje was missing a resume, referee details and support documents. This email also included that the application had been supported by the South East region as pressing personal circumstances. This was due to the information received about the applicant's circumstances (it named separation from spouse) then the application was in the category of compassionate transfer. As no supporting documents had been uploaded to indicate the transfer should be on grounds of exceptional hardship and given the grounds for pressing personal circumstances "the guidelines clearly state the application is to be considered as part of the usual transfer process therefore our region is not required to consider it the applicant for transfer prior to commencement of the new school year".
[56] Another email referred Ms Wasson's of 8 August 2017. This email was sent to Ms Hastie-Burrows and copied in Ms Byrne and Ms Payne. This email is in largely similar terms to the "disputed" email. The "disputed" email is Ms Wasson's email of 8 August 2017. On 8 August 2017 Ms Wasson attempted to recall an email she had sent as she sought to add some additional wording. Then on 8 August 2017 Ms Wasson sent the "disputed" email as extracted in the submissions before the tribunal. The "disputed" email was a slightly revised version of the email sent earlier.
[57] It was submitted by the respondent that in the proper context in which Ms Wasson sent the disputed email her statement that "the applicant had not provided a resume as required" was accurate. Further it was it is submitted by the respondent that Ms Wasson took all reasonable steps to ensure that the information was accurate having regard to the purpose for which the information was used.
[23]
[58] In submissions in response to direction 2 (g) of the directions of 15 April 2020 the respondent relied upon previous submissions (20 February 2020). These stated that the tribunal could not be satisfied that the applicant's complaint was substantiated and as such the complaint should be summarily dismissed. This dismissal should occur pursuant to sections 47 and/or 48 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act2009 (Qld)(the QCAT Act) or dismissed with a finding that the complaint is not substantiated pursuant to section 178 of the IPA.
[24]
[59] The respondent submitted that if the tribunal is satisfied that the applicant's complaint is substantiated the only remedies available to the applicant, having regard to these successful application to transfer, would be an order pursuant to section 178(a)(iii) that the respondent apologise for its interference with the applicant's privacy and an order pursuant to section 178 of the IPA that if the complaint is substantiated an accompanying order be made in the terms that no further action is required to be taken.
[60] The respondent relied upon and repeated previous submissions on summary dismissal. The Education Department stated that apart from an order for an apology provided by section 178 (3) the applicant sought relief not available to him by a complaint under the IPA.
[61] It was further submitted that the amounts claimed as compensation were unsupported by any evidence filed by the applicant.
[62] It was the Education Department's submission that even if the applicant could substantiate his claim for lost income and superannuation there was no prospect that the applicant could establish, on the balance of probabilities, that such a loss was suffered by him because of the action or practice complained of i.e. a breach of the respondent's obligations under the IPA caused by use of his personal information in the email dated 8 August 2017.
[63] Additionally if it was possible for the applicant to establish a breach of the respondent's obligations under IPP 8, by use of his personal information in email (which was denied by the respondent), it was submitted that the applicant could not establish that the breach caused the economic losses allegedly suffered.
[64] The respondent also submitted that there was no evidence before the tribunal that any practice of the respondent warranted any order pursuant to section 178 (a)(i) or section 178 (a)(ii) and as such no order was sought. Similarly, the order pursuant to section 178 (a)(iv) sought by the applicant is not supported by any evidence before the tribunal that the applicant has suffered any expenses in connexion with making the complaint therefore no remedy pursuant to section 178(d) is available.
[25]
[65] To this point I have spent a large part of these reasons setting out the factual issues and the submissions. This is a process made more difficult by the simple fact that an enormous amount of what has been submitted by Dr Purje is completely irrelevant to his application.
[66] Multiple attempts have been made by the tribunal to narrow the issues and to focus the parties, in particular the applicant, upon the issues that could be determined within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. These attempts have been largely unsuccessful. Dr Purje continued to file material that, while obviously very close to his own heart and experience, was completely irrelevant to the legal issues at hand. This information was also outside of the factual scope of what is to be decided by the tribunal. Additionally this material it did not relate directly to his circumstances.
[67] The courts have traditionally exercised the summary jurisdiction to dismiss claims with caution and it is with such caution that I approach this application.
[68] It is abundantly apparent that this dispute has already taken an enormous toll timewise, financially and perhaps emotionally on all parties, most particularly Dr Purje. As is often the case in disputes of this nature people adopt defensive positions and seek to prosecute what they perceive to be other wrongs or harms that have been done to them. A referral to the tribunal of a complaint under the IPA is not a vehicle for such collateral goals. The tribunal cannot consider these irrelevancies but does recognise the personal impact of these disputes on individual parties.
[69] As previously stated, I have spent a large part of these reasons outlining the material submitted by both parties. Such a discussion does not mean that I accept the relevancy of these submissions nor does it mean that I can expand the tribunal's jurisdiction to accommodate Dr Purje's long list of issues.
[70] My role in this matter is to decide whether the miscellaneous matters application for striking out or dismissal should be granted or refused. In order to fulfil this obligation it was necessary for me to consider all of the material filed in the tribunal. As the member deciding the issue of dismissal I will not and have not entered the arena and sought to assist either party with their submissions or the conduct of their cases. In making my decision I am exclusively guided by my legislative duties and the case law surrounding this area of jurisdiction.
[26]
[71] I refer to the decision of Member Hughes in the decision of Gobus v Cairns and Hinterland Hospital and Health Service & Ors.[3] While that case dealt with an Anti-Discrimination Act claim and this matter involves an alleged IPA breach there is much commonality between this case and the discussion had by the learned member in that case. In particular the discussion of the appropriate approach of a tribunal when a case involves an applicant who is unrepresented and this applicant files irrelevant material and does not address the appropriate issues under the legislation and/or address any appropriate remedies including any proof of the amount of compensation being claimed.
[27]
... great care must be exercised to ensure that under the guise of achieving expeditious finality a plaintiff is not improperly deprived of his opportunity for the trial of his case by the appointed tribunal.[4]
[28]
That caution is amplified within the Tribunal context to conduct proceedings in a way that is accessible, fair, just and according to principles of natural justice.[5] Summary relief to end proceedings early should only be granted in clear cases.[6]
...
The threshold to dismiss a complaint of reprisal without a full and proper hearing is therefore high. To surmount this, the respondents assert that they have been unnecessarily disadvantaged in responding to the contentions and that continuing to a hearing is an abuse of process.[7]
On its face, much of Mr Gobus's material is at worst, scandalous and best, irrelevant. Allegations of conspiracy and judicial reprisal and seeking forms of relief not within the Tribunal's jurisdiction may be considered vexatious.[8] However, the Tribunal is not a jurisdiction where parties are expected to exchange particularised pleadings as would be the case in a court.[9]
The adequacy of Mr Gobus's contentions is to be considered in a reasonable, realistic and pragmatic way: perfection in pleading practice is not an end in itself.[10] This is especially so in a jurisdiction that contemplates self-representation, embraces cost-effectiveness and eschews an unnecessarily technical approach.
The material facts can be gleaned from a reading of the contentions and material as a whole.[11] Despite the Respondents' submissions that many of Mr Gobus's contentions make it impossible to respond in any meaningful way, they have proceeded to analyse them, respond to them, cite evidence and make submissions to refute them. The Respondents have therefore shown a commendable understanding of the case they must meet and not been unnecessarily disadvantaged.[12]
[29]
[72] After consideration of all of the evidence filed in this matter, I find that there is only one incident that may possibly give rise to a breach of the IPA in particular IPP 8. To be clear the incident is the sending of the email of 8 August 2017 and whether that email of itself forms a breach of IPP 8 and the consequences that flow from that. I find this question is most appropriately one for a tribunal member to determine after a hearing. It is at that this time that a decision can be made after a conclusion is reached about whether the facts as established lead to a breach of the IPA and an appropriate remedy.[13]
[73] It would be well advised for Dr Purje to acknowledge and understand that my finding about dismissal is not a wholesale invitation for him to continue to file irrelevant material. I have decided not to dismiss the application because there is one issue that may be within the tribunal's jurisdiction i.e. whether the email of 8 August 2017 breached the IPA, in particular IPP 8 and if so what if any remedies may flow from that.
In a jurisdiction where parties are often not legally represented, it is not unexpected that many of (the applicant's) contentions have not been articulated with legal precision or may on their face appear to lack merit. The rules and procedures of the Tribunal do not result in the precise identification and statement of the issues in the way court procedures do.[15] Those issues that may be considered vexatious or irrelevant may be curtailed with proper management during the conduct of the hearing. One of the respondents is the State of Queensland. As a model litigant, it will be able to assist the Tribunal.
[31]
[75] Those words ring true in the current circumstances. Dr Purje is not legally represented; he has not articulated his contentions with legal precision and on their face many of them appear to lack merit.
[76] In common with the Gobus decision many of Dr Purje's contentions "re-ventilate questions of fact and issues the subject of determinations in other jurisdictions, those findings are not determinative of the issues before the Tribunal".[16] A tribunal needs to be mindful of its jurisdiction and I caution all parties to be aware of the tribunal's obligations as a creature of statute.
[32]
[77] In determining whether a dismissal should be granted I considered the decision of State of Queensland & Anor v Aigner[2013] QCATA 151, [46].
[33]
The Tribunal's role [is] not to decide the case on the evidence before it but, rather, to determine whether an arguable case, no matter how weak, is demonstrated so that a strike out is either warranted, or unwarranted.
[34]
[78] On the face of the material Dr Purje may find it difficult to establish that there has been a breach of the IPA and that any remedy flows from that in his favour. The Education Department has filed a large amount of information that indicates that contrary findings could be made on the evidence i.e. other findings than those sought by Dr Purje.
[79] However, summary dismissal should not be granted simply because it appears an applicant is unlikely to succeed on an issue of fact.[17] This will need to be properly explored and considered at a full hearing, rather than dealt with summarily.
[80] Dr Purje should be given an opportunity to present his case in relation to a possible breach of the IPA at a full hearing. From the submissions and evidence before me it appears that there is a question of fact in relation to whether the email of 8 August 2017 was accurate or inaccurate and what if any relevance this has to Dr Purje's complaint.
[35]
[81] Section 47 of the QCAT Act confers on the Tribunal the power to dismiss or strike out proceedings and relevantly provides that:
[36]
(1) This section applies if the tribunal considers a proceeding of a part of a proceeding is-
(a) frivolous, vexatious or misconceived; or
(b) lacking in substance; or
(c) otherwise an abuse of process.
(2) The tribunal may-
(a) if the party who brought the proceeding or part before the tribunal is the applicant for the proceeding, order the proceeding or part be dismissed or struck out;
[37]
In the Tribunal case of Murtagh v QBCC,[18 ]Member Traves noted that:
[38]
[16] Pursuant to section 47(2)(a) the tribunal may exercise its discretion to strike out or dismiss a proceeding or part of a proceeding brought by an applicant. If a proceeding has been dismissed or struck out under section 47 a proceeding of the same kind relating to the same matter cannot be started before the tribunal without leave.
[17] The power applies to both the original jurisdiction and the review jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
[18] The power should be exercised sparingly so that claims that are groundless or which lack merit are barred. If there is a real question to be tried then dismissal at an interlocutory stage is not appropriate.
[39]
Additionally, in the case of _Felstead v Bundaberg Homes Pty Ltd,[19 ]_Senior Member Brown noted that:
[40]
[39] Section 47(2)(a) empowers the tribunal to strike out or dismiss a proceeding or part of a proceeding brought by an applicant. It requires the exercise of a discretion by the tribunal. In exercising the discretion it is necessary to consider whether it is either necessary or appropriate to do so in the circumstances.
...
[76] The exercise of the discretion to strike out requires a consideration of the factors relevant in an application under UCPR r 171: ensuring the relevant documents filed in the Tribunal disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence, do not prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding, are not unnecessary or scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process.
[41]
[84] In _Beck v Kerry M Ryan Pty Ltd,[20 ]_Senior Member Brown also noted that:
[42]
[22] Section 47 of the QCAT Act is, in effect, a summary judgment power. In an application for summary judgment under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) current QCAT President Daubney J found in Elderslie Property Investments No 2 Pty Ltd v Dunn:
[43]
... the court needs to be satisfied not only that the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending all or a part of the claim, but also that 'there is no need for a trial of the claim or the part of the claim'.
[44]
[23] As to the onus of proof in an application for summary judgment, Daubney J held:
[45]
As this is the plaintiff's application, the burden of satisfying the court of the matters referred to in UCPR 292(2)(a) and (b) rests on the plaintiff: see Qld Park Pty Ltd v Lott; as his Honour observes there, this approach is consistent with that under the former rules. As under the former rules, where a plaintiff leads evidence to make out a prima facie entitlement to judgment, the evidentiary onus shifts to the defendant: see Qld Park Pty Ltd v Lott.
[46]
[24] Summary judgment will be granted in only the clearest of cases. The power conferred by s 47 should only be exercised in those cases where it is clear that a party has no real prospects of success and there is no need for a hearing. For KMR to be successful in the application for summary dismissal, I must be satisfied that has no real prospect of success in the proceeding and that there is no need for a hearing in respect of his claim against KMR. As McMeekin J observed in Reardon v Deputy Commissioner for Taxation:
[47]
The test to be applied has been expressed in various ways, but all of the verbal formulae which have been used are intended to describe a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.
[48]
[85] Dr Purje's application is not one where I can be satisfied that I have a high degree of certainty of the ultimate outcome of the proceeding if it were to go to trial in the ordinary way.
[86] As a result of this I think that it is only fair and reasonable to allow the matter to go ahead regarding the one area that the tribunal has jurisdiction over and not the multiple areas described in Dr Purje's material and that is whether or not there has indeed been a breach of the Information Privacy Act and if so what was that breach and what if any damage any remedies flow from such a breach.
[49]
[87] Dr Purje has failed to properly identify and submit or plead relevant evidence. However, a careful reading of the material and the submissions does indicate that there is one area of evidentiary contention or factual contention i.e. the accuracy of the email sent by Ms Wasson on 8 August 2017.
[88] I am not convinced that Dr Purje has understood that conducting his case in the manner that he has done so to date may result in the proceedings being dismissed. In this tribunal examples of parties misunderstanding their obligations are not uncommon. The tribunal is a jurisdiction where most parties are not legally represented. I do not intend to deny Dr Purje a hearing because he does not know what is expected by the tribunal.
The Tribunal has an overarching discretion on who can be called to give evidence and may refuse to allow a party to call evidence on a matter or cross-examine a witness.[22]
[51]
[90] This would appear to be an opportune case for the tribunal to exercise the discretion referred to in the previous paragraph.
[52]
It is always a very serious step to deprive a party of a cause of action without a hearing on the merits, and 'extreme care' must be taken before doing so.[23]
[53]
[92] It may be that the Dr Purje is ultimately unable to substantiate any of his contentions, but I am of the view that it is appropriate that he be given an opportunity to do so at a hearing.
[93] As I have decided that this matter should progress to a hearing, unless the parties arrive at an alternative solution, it is appropriate that the issue of any application for costs arising out of this application be reserved and are to be dealt with at the conclusion of the substantive proceedings in OCL032-19.
[54]
The miscellaneous matters application to dismiss or strike out proceeding OCL032-19 is refused.
Any application for costs arising from this application be reserved to be dealt with at the conclusion of the substantive proceedings in OCL032-19.
The miscellaneous matters application to dismiss or strike out proceeding OCL032-19 is refused. Any application for costs arising from this application is reserved to be dealt with at the conclusion of the substantive proceedings in OCL032-19 [Orders 1–2].
[41] Dr Purje referenced Mr Lim's, Acting Privacy Commissioner, letter of 6 February 2019 that included the words that "financial compensation for injury to feeling or humiliation suffered can be a component of resolution of a privacy complaint". Based on Mr Lim's quote from the IPA legislation the applicant submitted that the remedies that were the available to him were maximum amount of $100,000 and the unreserved apology. Dr Purje attached a lengthy draft apology. He submitted that the public interest necessitates it be published as a full-page publication in the earliest edition of the Courier Mail, a newspaper.
[42] The remedies ultimately sought by Dr Purje in his latest submissions represent a change to the original orders he sought from the tribunal.
[43] Doctor Purje also attached a document called "What is justice" - a transcript of a lecture given in August 2014 by the then Chief Judge of Victoria.