Purewal v Health Care Complaints Commission [2025] NSWCATOD 123;

1. The HCCC then in its submission crystallised the subject of the External Appeal document as follows:

"The Applicant is therefore seeking an external review of the following:

(1) the decision made by the Health Care Complaints Commission ("the Commission") to refer complaints about her to the Medical Council of NSW ("the Council"), following the Commission's complaint assessment process under Section 25B of the Health Care Complaints Commission Act 1993 (the "HCC Act").

(2) decisions made by the Commission during the assessment process."

1. The background to the Appellants External Appeal application, is stated by the HCCC to be as follows:

"Background

I. The Health Care Complaints Commission is an independent body for the purposes of receiving and assessing complaints under the HCC Act relating to health services and health service providers in New South Wales. The assessment function is described in Sections 19, 20 and Division 4 of the of Part 2 of the HCC Act. The Functions of the Commission are explained more broadly at Section 80(1) of the HCC Act.

II. Section 93 of the HCC Act confirms that the HCC Act prevails in any circumstance of inconsistency with the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) 2009 (the 'National Law').

III. The Applicant is a registered medical practitioner who was first registered in NSW in 2019. She has previously worked as a GP Registrar in Wollongong NSW.

IV. On 31 December 2024, a mandatory notification was made by the Applicant's GP Supervisor, Dr Mon Tut, to the Medical Council of NSW.

V. On 3 January 2025 and 25 January 2025, the Commission received notification by AHPRA of two (2) Complaints in relation to the Applicant. The Complaints received by the Commission concern the same subject matter as the notification regarding the Applicant to the Medical Council, detailed in page 2 of the Medical Council's 18 March 2025 Decision.

VI. The Commission commenced its assessment of the Complaints.

VII. On 13 February 2025, the Medical Council held an inquiry to consider exercising powers under Section 150 of the National Law in relation to the complaints about Applicant.

VIII. On 18 March 2025, the Council made its Section 150 Decision.

IX. The Council imposed conditions on Dr. Purewal's registration pursuant to Section 150 of the National Law and referred the matter under Section 150 F to an Impaired Registrants Panel.

X. The Commission was notified of the Section 150 Decision on 18 March 2025, as required under Section 150D of the National Law.

XI. On 14 April 2025, the HCCC's Assessment process was completed and the Applicant was provided notification of the HCCC's Assessment Decision to refer the matter to the Medical Council of New South Wales (the 'Assessment Decision')."

1. Section 55 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 is as follows:

55 Dismissal of proceedings

(1) The Tribunal may dismiss at any stage any proceedings before it in any of the following circumstances -

(a) if the applicant or appellant (or, if there is more than one applicant or appellant, each applicant or appellant) withdraws the application or appeal to which the proceedings relate,

(b) if the Tribunal considers that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance,

(c) if the applicant or appellant (or, if there is more than one applicant or appellant, each applicant or appellant) has failed to appear in the proceedings,

(d) if the Tribunal considers that there has been a want of prosecution of the proceedings.

1. In order to adopt section 55 as the platform for its' dismissal application, the HCCC has clearly sought to apply under s 55(1)(b). However, it seems that if the argument is that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal sought to be pressed before it, then the need to attach the application to a particular section of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (CAT Act) may not be necessary. The Tribunal does has the ability to determine matters relating to its jurisdiction as a preliminary to the hearing of a cause, should the issue be raised by a party of the Tribunal itself. (see Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn (2022) 276 CLR 216; [2022] HCA 16 at [62]-[63]).)
2. The argument of the HCCC is developed in its submission as follows:

"The decisions made by the Commission during its assessment of the complaints were made as part of its assessment powers in Division 4 of the HCC Act. This includes the Commission's referral decision:

Section 19: Initial assessment of complaints

(1) On its receipt by the Commission, a complaint is to be assessed.

...

Section 20: The Purpose of Assessment

(1) The assessment of a complaint is for the purpose of deciding whether--

• the complaint should be investigated

• the complaint should be conciliated or dealt with under Division 9

• the complaint should be referred to the Health Secretary in accordance with section 25 or 25A

• the complaint should be referred to another person or body in accordance with section 25B or 26

• the Commission should decline to entertain the complaint.

Section 25B Reference of Complaints to be Dealt with By Professional Councils

(1) Following the assessment, the Commission may refer a complaint to the appropriate professional council (after consultation with that council) if it appears that the complaint (or part) should be referred to the professional council for consideration as to whether the professional council should take any action under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) , such as performance assessment or impairment assessment.

Note--: Section 13 (2) requires the Commission to refer a complaint to the professional council if either the Commission or the professional council is of the opinion that it should be referred.

(2) Despite section 27 (3), the Commission must discontinue dealing with a complaint (or part) under that section that has been referred to a professional council under this section.

28 Notice of action taken or decision made following assessment

(1) The Commission must give the parties to the complaint notice in writing of the action taken or decision made by the Commission following its assessment of the complaint. The notice is to be given within 14 days after the Commission takes that action or makes that decision.

...

(9) The Commission may review a decision made after assessing a complaint if requested to do so by the complainant, and must do so if the request is made within 28 days after the complainant is notified of the decision.

...

The HCC Act does not provide for external review in the Tribunal of administrative decisions made by it under any of the above provisions. The Tribunal therefore lacks the jurisdiction to preside over these proceedings.[1]"

Whilst it has been said that the Tribunal's power to dismiss proceedings summarily is one to be used sparingly[2], the nature of the present application warrants determination in a "just, quick and cheap manner and without the need for a full hearing on the merits to establish the evidence.[3]

1. The Tribunal notes that in -1 Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34 at [23] The High Court stated:

"Jurisdiction, in the most generic sense in which it has come to be used in this field of discourse, refers to the scope of the authority that is conferred on a repository. In its application to judicial review of administrative action the taking of which is authorised by statute, it refers to the scope of the authority which a statute confers on a decision-maker to make a decision of a kind to which the statute then attaches legal consequences. It encompasses in that application all of the preconditions which the statute requires to exist in order for the decision-maker to embark on the decision-making process. It also encompasses all of the conditions which the statute expressly or impliedly requires to be observed in or in relation to the decision-making process in order for the decision-maker to make a decision of that kind. A decision made within jurisdiction is a decision which sufficiently complies with those statutory preconditions and conditions to have "such force and effect as is given to it by the law pursuant to which it was made". See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597 at 613 [46]; [2002] HCA. 11.

1. The Appellants Reply to the HCCC submission was contained in an email to the Registry of the Tribunal on 29 August 2025. It is as follows:

Dear NCAT Registrar,

I refer to your correspondence dated 29 August 2025 regarding the listing on 1 September 2025.

I consent to the matter being determined on the papers on the threshold question of jurisdiction. I am self-represented and not a lawyer. I defer to the Tribunal as to the proper forum. If NCAT has no enabling jurisdiction to review the HCCC referral decision, I now understand I may have been steered to the wrong forum and I have no intention of wasting the Tribunal's time.

For completeness and the Tribunal's convenience, I attach a replacement Page 7 (Table of Contents/Annexures) that was missing from my submission dated 30 June 2025). I respectfully ask that this page be accepted and inserted at page 7 of those submissions.

Given my consent to determination on the papers, the listing on 1 September 2025 may be vacated, and the jurisdictional question determined administratively.

If the Tribunal determines there is no jurisdiction, I would be grateful if the orders record dismissal for want of jurisdiction with no order as to costs, and without prejudice to my separate appeals concerning the Medical Council. I reserve all rights to seek any available relief in the proper forum, including judicial review in the Supreme Court of NSW (Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 69; UCPR Pt 59) and any internal appeal rights to the NCAT Appeal Panel on any question of law.

1. In Shapkin v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2025] NSWCATOD 66 (Shapkin) the Tribunal considered the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear an appeal against an administrative decision made by Council of the Law Society of New South Wales to refuse his application for the grant of a practicing certificate. Having set out in detail the submissions of the parties the Tribunal concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear the administrative review application lodged by Mr Shapkin. In reaching that determination the Tribunal stated as follows:

Does NCAT have jurisdiction to decide the application brought by Mr Shapkin?

40. NCAT's first duty is to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in relation to an application.

41. NCAT is a tribunal with limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction and functions are derived from the NCAT Act, enabling legislation and legislative instruments beyond its enabling legislation, as well as regulations and statutory rules. NCAT cannot exercise jurisdiction beyond that set out in statute, other than its anterior jurisdiction to decide whether proceedings brought before it are within its limited jurisdiction (see e.g. Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn (2022) 276 CLR 216; [2022] HCA 16 at [62]-[63]).

42. NCAT has "such jurisdiction and functions as may be conferred or imposed on it by or under [the NCAT Act] or any other legislation": NCAT Act, s 28(1). Relevantly, NCAT has "administrative review jurisdiction" in the circumstances set out in s 30 of the NCAT Act. Section 30(1) states that the ADR Act provides for the circumstances in which NCAT has administrative review jurisdiction over a decision of an administrator. Under s 9(1) of the ADR Act, NCAT has "administrative review jurisdiction" over a decision (or class of decisions) of an administrator if enabling legislation provides that applications may be made to NCAT for an administrative review of the relevant decision (or class of decision).

1. The Tribunal then addressed matters specific to the provisions of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW). However, as statements of general principle the decision of Armstrong J, the President, the following further statements are helpful to this determination.

52. I make some brief comments on the applicant's submission that NCAT has authority to decide his applications because the NCAT Act "in and of itself" confers the requisite jurisdiction on NCAT by operation of s 28 or s 29, or both of those statutory provisions.

53. Section 28(1) makes it clear that NCAT is a tribunal whose jurisdiction and functions are limited to those conferred or imposed by legislation. NCAT has the kinds of jurisdiction referred to in s 28(2) of the NCAT Act. The applicant accepted, at the jurisdiction hearing, that NCAT did not have the administrative review, appeal or enforcement jurisdiction contemplated by s 28(2) in the present circumstances. That is correct.

54. However, the applicant nonetheless contended that NCAT has "general jurisdiction" (within the meaning of s 28(2)(a) and s 29) to decide his applications "by default" (i.e. because NCAT does not have administrative review, appeal or enforcement jurisdiction). He said there is no requirement for s 29(1)(a) to be met, in addition to s 29(1)(b). This is not correct. Both limbs of s 29(1) must be met before NCAT's general jurisdiction is engaged.

55. In his textbook on statutory interpretation, Emeritus Professor D C Pearce states that "[t]he starting point in any consideration of the effect of 'and' and 'or' are that they are to be given their usual meaning", referring to Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 (2018) 264 FCR 249; [2018] FCAFC 110 at [27], [36] (D C Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (10th ed, 2024, LexisNexis). The applicant does not point to any authority or statutory construction principle that would suggest the word "and" (at the end of s 29(1)(a)) should be given any other meaning other than its usual meaning. I do not accept the applicant's submission about the proper construction of s 29(1).

56. Here, s 29(1)(a) is not met (and the applicant does not contend that it is). The result is that NCAT's general jurisdiction is not engaged.

57. The applicant's alternative submission is that s 28 of the NCAT Act, considered alone, confers the requisite jurisdiction on NCAT. In particular, he points to s 28(3), which states that: "Subject to this Act and enabling legislation, the Tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of matters arising before or after the establishment of the Tribunal". "Enabling legislation" is defined in s 4(1) of the NCAT Act to mean:

legislation (other than this Act or any statutory rules made under this Act) that -

(a) provides for applications or appeals to be made to the Tribunal with respect to a specified matter or class of matters, or

(b) otherwise enables the Tribunal to exercise functions with respect to a specified matter or class of matters.

58. At the jurisdiction hearing, the applicant accepted that there is no "enabling legislation" which confers the requisite jurisdiction on NCAT in the present case. He nonetheless asserted that the words "the Tribunal has jurisdiction in respect of matters....after the establishment of the Tribunal" in s 28(3) mean that, from the time he lodged his applications at NCAT's Registry, NCAT therefore had jurisdiction or authority to determine them by operation of s 28(3). This construction of s 28(3) ignores the opening words in the sub-section "Subject to this Act", the other sub-sections in s 28, as well as other provisions in the NCAT Act.

59. Subject to any transitional jurisdiction conferred by the savings or transitional provisions in Sch 1, Pt 2 of the NCAT Act, s 28(2) of the NCAT Act is an exhaustive statement of the types of jurisdiction conferred on NCAT. None of those jurisdictions (administrative review, appeal, enforcement or general jurisdiction) is engaged in the present circumstances. Section 28(3) is not an independent or "stand-alone" source of jurisdiction or authority which somehow circumvents the statement of NCAT's jurisdictions in s 28(2).

...

62. On a further point, the applicant has not explained how there is a "matter" before NCAT for the purposes of s 28(3). While there is no definition of "matter" included in the NCAT Act, in the context of s 28(3) the term "matter" might be thought to involve the existence of some entitlement to a review, or some cause of action in the party applying to NCAT for relief, being some right, privilege or protection given by law. The applicant is unable to point to any statutory entitlement, or other legal right, to the merits review he seeks in NCAT.

63. In summary, the applicant has not identified any statutory provisions in the NCAT Act, the Uniform Law, the Application Act, or other Act, which confer jurisdiction on NCAT to decide the administrative review application (and the stay application) brought by him in relation to the Decision. The applications must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. I will make an order accordingly.

Other reasons which might establish that the Appeal sought to be heard by the Tribunal should be summarily dismissed.

1. The Complaint which the HCCC referred to the Medical Council of NSW to which the Appellant addresses this proceeding, is itself the subject of another proceeding filed by the Appellant in the Tribunal. That proceeding names the Medical Council of NSW as the respondent and seeks remedy against the decision made and action taken by the Medical Council of NSW when addressing the very Complaint which was referred to it by the HCCC. It is that referral which the Appellant challenges in this proceeding.
2. The proceeding commenced by the Appellant against the Medical Council of NSW has been given a file number 2025/00190899. There is a second proceeding she has also commenced in the Tribunal against the Medical Council of NSW which has been given a file number 2025/00118437. Both those proceedings were before the Tribunal on 17 July 2025. Orders were made in those two proceedings, on that day, which inter alia, listed the proceedings for hearing on 24 and 25 September 2025.
3. There has been no issue raised by either party to the proceedings abovementioned, thus far, to suggest there is a preliminary jurisdictional issue to be argued at the allocated hearing date. Thus it is clear that in that hearing the Appellant will be able to have determined any action against the Medical Council which she has clearly articulated and given required notice of to the Medical Council.
4. As a consequence of the above listing for hearing of the actions brought by the Appellant against the Medical Council of NSW, a determination will be made as to the Complaint which the HCCC referred to the Medical Council of NSW and which the Appellant challenges. Thus, looking to s 55 of the CAT Act there is another reason why this proceeding should be dismissed. That reason is that the Appellant now has two proceedings before the Tribunal which challenge the Complaint originally made to the HCCC and then addressed by action on the part of the Medical Council of NSW.
5. The attempt to have the Tribunal consider two actions which address the same cause is potentially an abuse of process. That potential abuse I accept was not deliberate and that it arises by virtue of the Appellant being self-represented in the proceeding. I also conclude that the proceeding can be seen as "misconceived" as stated in s 55 of the CAT Act, thereby giving rise to a further reason for it to be summarily dismissed.
6. The Tribunal determines, accepting the submission of the HCCC and the principle set out in Shapkin that the External Appeal form filed by the Appellant on 13 May 2025 be summarily dismissed.

1. There being no application before the Tribunal for costs, I conclude a cost order will not be made.

(1) The External Appeal form filed by the Appellant on 13 May 2025, is dismissed for want of jurisdiction and pursuant to s 55 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW).

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

[1] Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34, at 26.

[2] NG v Chinese Medicine Board of Australia [2017] NSWCATOD 36.

[3] State of New South Wales v Plaintiff A [2012] NSWCA 248 at [17]- [18].