WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; medical appeal; admission of fresh evidence; application to admit further statement rejected; Lukacevic v Coates Hire Operations Pty Ltd applied; challenge to assessment under the psychiatric impairment rating scale of self-care and personal hygiene, concentration, persistence and pace, social functioning and travel; Held - Medical Assessment Certificate revoked.

1. On 28 August 2025 Ms Purcell, the appellant, lodged an Application to Appeal Against the Decision of a Medical Assessor. The medical dispute was assessed by Doug Andrews, a Medical Assessor, who issued a Medical Assessment Certificate (MAC) on 1 August 2025.
2. The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal under s 327(3) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act):
   • availability of additional relevant information (being additional information that was not available to, and that could not reasonably have been obtained by, the appellant before the medical assessment appealed against);
   • the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria, and
   • the MAC contains a demonstrable error.
3. The delegate is satisfied that, on the face of the application, at least one ground of appeal has been made out. The Appeal Panel has conducted a review of the original medical assessment but limited to the ground(s) of appeal on which the appeal is made.
4. Rule 128 of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the PIC Rules) and Procedural Direction PIC7 - Appeals, reviews, reconsiderations and correction of obvious errors in medical disputes set out the practice and procedure in relation to the medical appeal process under s 328 of the 1998 Act. An Appeal Panel determines its own procedures in accordance with r 128(1) of the PIC Rules.
5. The assessment of permanent impairment is conducted in accordance with the SIRA NSW Workers Compensation Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 4th ed

1. Ms Purcell worked for the respondent in a transcription role. She was exposed to details of graphic violence of and abuse of children and her mental health deteriorated. She has not worked since April 2019.
2. Proceedings were commenced in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission) claiming lump sum compensation. Ms Purcell was referred for an assessment of her whole person impairment, with a MAC being issued on 1 August 2025. She appeals against that assessment.

1. The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.
2. As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the worker to undergo a further medical examination because there was sufficient information contained in the MAC and supporting documents to determine the appeal.

1. Section 328(3) of the 1998 Act provides that evidence that is fresh evidence or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received in relation to a medical assessment appealed against may not be given on an appeal by a party unless the evidence was not available to the party before the medical assessment and could not reasonably have been obtained by the party before that medical assessment.
2. The appellant seeks to admit the following evidence:

(a) statement of Ms Purcell dated 28 August 2025.

1. The appellant's submissions do not address s 327(3)(b) of the 1998 Act and she does not indicate that she relies on that ground of appeal. The submissions in respect of incorrect criteria and demonstrable error (which are general in their nature) purport to rely on the further statement, which is described as being "obtained and prepared in response to the MAC".
2. The appellant submits that the statement outlines the "mistaken basis" on which the Medical Assessor reached his conclusions. The appellant then proceeds to outline what are said to be errors in the assessment. In respect of the evidence, the appellant submits that the statement ought to be admitted and considered as without the document the errors could not be ventilated by the appellant. Further it is submitted that it is not merely criticism of the assessment but it is evidence of a medical kind as it pertains to matters relevant to the psychiatric impairment ratings scales (PIRS). The appellant relies upon the remarks of Hodgson JA in Lukacevic v Coates Hire Operations Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 112 at [78] (Lukacevic), submitting that the statement has substantial premia facie probative value as it is particular. The appellant then refers to the objectives and other sections of the Personal Injury Commission Act 2020.
3. The respondent opposes the admission of the evidence as it cavils with the history and findings in the MAC, and the criteria for admission cannot be made out when the evidence is procured in response to the decision which is seeks to vitiate. The respondent refers to CSR Limited v Ewins [2020] NSWSC 511 (Ewins).
4. The Appeal Panel decline to admit the evidence. Firstly, the appellant has not explained why the material could not reasonably have been obtained before the assessment. It was open to Ms Purcell to provide a statement, and in fact two such statements are attached to the Application to Resolve a Dispute. It is insufficient for an appellant to rely on the fact that the statement was prepared in response to a Medical Assessment in order to satisfy the requirement of s 328(3); else every worker would have an automatic right of appeal by preparing a statement criticising a MAC. That is not the appropriate construction of the section. This issue was addressed in Ewins as referred to by the respondent. Supplementary reports were held not to be fresh evidence in Kitanoski v JB Metropolitan Distributors Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 1802 (at [73]).
5. The appellant refers to Lukacevic at [78], per Hodgson JA, who states:

"A dispute by the worker as to the history set out in the certificate, or the observations made by the AMS, can readily be raised; and it could be raised honestly or dishonestly, on strong or flimsy grounds. Having regard to the matters I have set out, in my opinion it would be reasonable for an AP not to admit evidence raising such a dispute unless that evidence had substantial prima facie probative value, in terms of its particularity, plausibility and/or independent support. Otherwise, simply by raising such a dispute, going to a matter relevant to the correctness of the certificate, a worker could put the AP in a position where it had to have a further medical examination conducted by one of its members. I do not think this would be in accord with the policy of the WIM Act."

6. Lukacevic is principle for circumstances where a statement could satisfy s 328(3) of the 1998 Act. It would be reasonable, according to Hodgson JA, to not admit evidence unless that evidence had "substantial prima facie probative value". The Appeal Panel are not satisfied that the evidence so relied upon in the present case fits that description or the examples given by Hodgson JA. It is true that the evidence is particular in that it describes Ms Purcell's view of her own functioning. But it is the Medical Assessor's role to determine how functioning accords with an assessment of impairment, subject to the PIRS. The evidence is particularly the type of evidence that fits into what should be rejected according to Lukacevic - it is evidence that fits in with the description in [76] of that case:

"Suppose that the worker disputes that the history set out in the certificate was the history he/she gave, and/or disputes the observations recorded in the certificate. If so, the assertions of the worker on those topics, if they concern a matter relevant to the correctness of the certificate, could qualify as additional relevant information not available or obtainable before the medical assessment, within s 327(3)(b) of the WIM Act, and thus give a ground of appeal."

7. It is not, as the appellant submits, information of a medical kind - it is lay evidence, interpreting what was said on the day of examination to how that would or should accord with an assessment of impairment. A worker is unable to give medical information in a statement.
8. None of the references to the system objects or principles set out in the PIC Act displace the statutory requirement in s 328(3). There is nothing within the evidence given by the appellant that satisfies the requirements in s 328(3) as interpreted by Lukacevic. The Appeal Panel accordingly decline to admit the further statement of the appellant.

1. The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.

1. The parts of the medical certificate given by the Medical Assessor that are relevant to the appeal are set out, where relevant, in the body of this decision.

1. Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated in full, but have been considered by the Appeal Panel.
2. In summary, the appellant provides discursive submissions that are, at times, difficult to follow and identify what specifically, is alleged to be in error. Those submissions mention four of the six PIRS. In respect of each PIRS, the appellant submits:

(a) Self care and personal hygiene - the appellant could not live independently without regular support, with the appellant relying on her wife and on an app to ensure self care activities such as showering;

(b) Concentration, persistence and pace - the Medical Assessor erred, contrary to Ballas, by utilising irrelevant matters such as the playing of role-playing games, and did not consider the true extent of what is involved in the games, and the extent to which the appellant participated;

(c) Social functioning - the Medical Assessor did not correctly consider the impairment to the relationships with Ms Purcell's wife, brother and friends, and

(d) Travel - the appellant's impairment should have been assessed at a greater rating, as the true effects on travel were not correctly observed or reflected in the assessment. When Ms Purcell travelled without her wife, the effects were immense and she struggled psychiatrically.

1. In reply, the respondent responds to each of the PIRS the worker appeals against. The respondent submits that the MAC is thorough and having regard to the history included and the reporting to the Medical Assessor, on each occasion the class assessed was correct.

1. The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made. The appeal concerns the Medical Assessor's assessment of the PIRS and the consideration of the appeal is therefore limited to that issue (per Basten JA in Queanbeyan Racing Club Ltd v Burton [2021] NSWCA 304 at [26]):

"Secondly, s 328(2) requires that the review 'is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.' Because the gateway function of the Registrar is satisfied if 'at least one of the grounds' has been made out, it appears that the Appeal Panel is not limited to the ground held by the Registrar to have been made out, but may consider all grounds of appeal raised in the appellant's application. On the other hand, it is clear that the Appeal Panel is not permitted to look for errors which are not part of the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made."

2. In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons. Where there are disputes of fact it may be necessary to refer to evidence or other material on which findings are based, but the extent to which this is necessary will vary from case to case. Where more than one conclusion is open, it will be necessary to explain why one conclusion is preferred. On the other hand, the reasons need not be extensive or provide a detailed explanation of the criteria applied by the medical professionals in reaching a professional judgement.
3. Given the appeal centres on the assessment undertaken by the Medical Assessor under the PIRS, it is appropriate to briefly discuss how psychological injuries are assessed in accordance with the Guidelines first.

1. Assessments of impairment are undertaken "in accordance with" the Guidelines, per s 322(1) of the 1998 Act. The Guidelines provide that psychological injuries are to be assessed using the PIRS.
2. The PIRS provide for six scales, "each of which evaluates an area of functional impairment" (cl 11.11 of the Guidelines). The appellant has challenged the Medical Assessor's assessment in four of the PIRS. The scales give examples of activities that are to be taken into account when assessing the class of functional impairment. The class descriptors range from no or minor deficit, through to totally impaired. This is explained by Campbell J in Ferguson v State of New South Wales [2017] NSWSC 887:

"Class 1 relates to a situation where there is no psychological deficit, or a minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population. Class 5 pertains to a person who is totally impaired by his injury, and the classes between are in an ascending order of impairment."

3. Each area of functional impairment provides a series of examples, that are "examples only" (cl 11.12). In Jenkins v Ambulance Service of New South Wales [2015] NSWSC 633, Garling J considered the construction of the PIRS in the context of the examples given. He provided some commentary on the construction of the Guidelines:

"The submission of the plaintiff that, in assigning a class of impairment to each scale, the AMS is restricted only to the examples of activities listed in the tables or, alternatively, to those activities as a minimum, cannot be accepted." (at [57])

4. The criteria in the Guidelines are not prescriptive. They must be read as a guide capable of being surmounted by other relevant facts (Rogers v Health Services Union NSW [2025] NSWSC 291 at [45]).
5. The Appeal Panel will now turn to each functional area challenged by the appellant, in the way they appear in the appellant's submissions, in turn.

1. The Medical Assessor assessed class 2 impairment in this PIRS.
2. In the PIRS table on page 12 of the MAC, the following reasons are provided for that assessment:

"Ms Purcell struggles with motivation but contributes to household chores, including loading the dishwasher, sweeping, tidying and doing most of the laundry. She often doesn't eat until around noon or later, but then eats prepared meals. She sometimes binges in the evening. She showers every second day, sometimes after prompting from her wife, but she has set up an app to remind herself, indicating a degree of self-efficacy. She was well presented and neatly groomed at the interview."

3. The appellant submits that Ms Purcell would not be able to live independently without regular support, and the use of the app to remind of showers is not "normal" in the sense that the population do not rely on an app to undertake self-care.
4. Table 11.1 provides the following relevant criteria in this PIRS:

"Class 2 Mild impairment: Able to live independently; looks after self adequately, although may look unkempt occasionally; sometimes misses a meal or relies on take-away food. > > Class 3 Moderate impairment: Can't live independently without regular support. Needs prompting to shower daily and wear clean clothes. Does not prepare own meals, frequently misses meals. Family member or community nurse visits (or should visit) 2-3 times per week to ensure minimum level of hygiene and nutrition."

5. The first thing the Appeal Panel would note is that all experts who have assessed Ms Purcell, including Dr Smith for the applicant and Dr Young for the respondent, have provided class 2 in this PIRS. Although an assessment of impairment does not involve weighing different medical opinions to choose a preferred assessment, but rather an assessment of impairment in accordance with the Guidelines on the day of assessment, this provides a relevant starting point for consideration of the appellant's submissions. It becomes a more difficult task to assert error when the class argued for has not been assessed by any expert. There is a lack of evidence supporting the submissions provided.
6. In the history provided, the Medical Assessor noted that Ms Purcell appeared neat and well-groomed on examination. This supports the assessment provided by the Medical Assessor.
7. In terms of the use of an app, the appellant submits that this is inconsistent with class 2 impairment. The Appeal Panel do not accept this submission. The use of an app as a prompt suggests, to the contrary, that the appellant is engaged with her own self care and capable of self-reflection to understand her own hygiene needs. This is not evidence of an inability to live independently. The evidence is that Ms Purcell sometimes needs prompting from her wife to shower, which she does every second day. This is within the normal variation for the population.
8. There is nothing within the history taken by the Medical Assessor, and the supporting documentary information that suggests an assessment of class 2 was in error. This ground of appeal is not made out.

1. The Medical Assessor provides the following reasons for assessing class 2 impairment in the table on page 13 of the MAC:

"Ms Purcell plays complex role-playing games for up to 3 hours at a time. She enjoys creative writing but is struggling to focus on this hobby. She is distracted by inner thoughts. She completed a Certificate III in business studies with extra support and extensions from TAFE. She failed to complete a Certificate III in library studies but is now enrolled in a Diploma in Librarianship and Information."

2. The appellant submits that the Medical Assessor did not focus on conduct relevant to the employment context, and instead focussed on irrelevant matters such as Ms Purcell's ability to partake in role-playing games, with reference to Ballas and Abdal v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2025] NSWSC 478 (Abdal). The appellant further submits that the Medical Assessor did not consider the restricted basis upon which the appellant participates in same.
3. The respondent submits that having regard to the histories disclosed the Medical Assessor was entitled to allocate class 2 in this PIRS.
4. The relevant classes under Table 11.5 of the Guidelines provide the following:

"Class 2 Mild impairment: Can undertake a basic retraining course, or a standard course at a slower pace. Can focus on intellectually demanding tasks for periods of up to 30 minutes, then feels fatigued or develops headache. > > Class 3 Moderate impairment: Unable to read more than newspaper articles. Finds it difficult to follow complex instructions (eg operating manuals, building plans), make significant repairs to motor vehicle, type long documents, follow a pattern for making clothes, tapestry or knitting."

This ground of appeal raises a number of issues. It is first appropriate to consider Ballas and Abdal. The appellant makes a number of references to Ballas in submissions, in particular [93] of that decision, which provides:

"Whilst it is no doubt correct that an AMS must exercise a degree of clinical judgment in assigning a class of seriousness to each area which he or she is required to address in completing a medical assessment, the characterisation of conduct as going to "social and recreational activities" on the one hand, as opposed to any of the other five scales on the other hand, is not a matter of discretion."

To that the Appeal Panel would also refer to [94]:

"Even if there may, as a matter of English language, be some overlap between some of the scales or categories of functional impairment, for the purposes of the WPI assessment exercise, particular conduct will fit within one or other of the scales. This calls for the correct characterisation of the conduct, ie whether it goes to "self care and personal hygiene", "social and recreational activities", "travel", "social functioning (relationships)", "concentration, persistence and pace" or "employability". This does not involve an exercise of discretion. If conduct is wrongly assigned to one scale, when it should have been assigned to another, this will result in the AMS taking into account an irrelevant consideration in the context of assigning a class to each of the distinct scales. This will inevitably bear upon the calculation of the WPI which is critical for an injured worker's entitlement to compensation."

As a starting point, Ballas is binding authority on the Commission. However, it must be considered in context, being judicial review of a decision of a delegate declining to allow an appeal to proceed to an Appeal Panel. Ballas has been discussed in a number of decisions at the Supreme Court level. It was considered by Basten JA in Lancaster v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 929 (Lancaster):

"The plaintiff's reading of Ballas would have surprising consequences. It would mean that every time a medical specialist considered under one scale an activity which a court determined properly fell under another scale, he or she committed jurisdictional error which could be the subject of review in the Supreme Court. The proposition that gambling (or running) may fall within the descriptor 'social and recreational activities' if carried out in company (whatever that might imply) but not if carried out alone, and the assessment by a medical specialist whom a court determined had failed to apply that distinction so as to render his or her determination a nullity would be a surprising consequence. It would involve reading down the term 'recreational' by reference to the generic and imprecise exemplars in the class descriptions, so as to impose a legal constraint on the valid exercise of power by the medical specialist. A similar exercise would potentially be available for each of the other scale descriptors. > > Even if such an implausible reading of the joint reasons in Ballas were correct, it was not necessary for the determination in Ballas. In any event, no similar error is alleged to have occurred in the present case: the question here is whether the Appeal Panel erred in assigning a particular class (that is level of severity) in relation to conduct which concededly fell within the particular scales (or categories)."

Similar caution was similarly expressed in Botha v Secretary, NSW Department of Customer Service [2024] NSWSC 781 (Botha) by Stern JA (at [14]):

"Their Honours held, on the facts of that case, that the finding of the medical assessor that the worker 'sees one friend regularly' fell 'squarely within the 'social functioning (relationships)' scale', and, by implication, not within the Social and Recreational PIRS: at [96]. It is important that this finding is not taken out of its own factual context. It should not be read as holding that social and recreational activities with friends, or even with one friend, cannot properly be characterised as going to the Social and Recreational PIRS. In Ballas, the worker submitted (and there is nothing to suggest that that submission was contradicted) that there was no reference in the history set out in the medical assessor's certificate to the worker seeing the 'one friend', and it was not possible from the medical assessor's assessment to know in what circumstances that contact occurred (as recorded in Ballas at [35], [81]). The dearth of information in Ballas to explain in what context the worker saw that one friend informs their Honours' conclusion as to characterisation. The mere fact that the worker saw a friend regularly would not indicate that the occasion on which she did so was properly categorised as a social and recreational activity."

The Appeal Panel view the appellant's submissions, with reference to Ballas, similarly as to those made in Lancaster and Botha. That is that there is nothing impermissible about considering the worker's activities in engaging with role-playing games as part of concentration, persistence and pace. The Medical Assessor has not considered activities that go to how Ms Purcell interacts with others, or attends events without a support person (functioning that would go to the social and recreational activities PIRS). The Medical Assessor has considered an activity (role-playing games) in the context of how that activity demonstrates her functional capacity in the PIRS of concentration, persistence and pace. This is not inconsistent with Ballas. 10. The appellant also refers to Abdal. Firstly it is noted that this decision, arising out of a motor accidents claim, concerned different guidelines under a different scheme (albeit with many similarities). Secondly, it is clear that in Abdal that the parties failed to bring certain authorities to the court's attention, particularly Lancaster and Espana v Architectural Projects Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 1504. In Georges v Musico [2025] NSWSC 1085, Griffiths AJ went as far as to say that Abdal was "plainly wrong". 11. The Appeal Panel's view is that any appeal to Ballas at [93] has no relevance in the present circumstances. The Medical Assessor has not exercised discretion where he had none. He has applied the Guidelines considering an activity that goes to the specific area of functional impairment, being concentration, persistence and pace. 12. The appellant further attacks the determination on a merits basis, suggesting that the Medical Assessor did not consider the true extent to what is involved in the role-playing games. 13. The Appeal Panel do not accept this submission. Per Jenkins, the Guidelines are not proscriptive but rather represent examples of activities only. The examples given involve focussing on intellectually demanding tasks (for class 2), or things like newspaper articles, complex instructions, and following patters (for class 3). Role-playing games are not explicitly mentioned in the Guidelines, but that does not mean that they are an irrelevant example of functioning. Ms Purcell clearly demonstrates an ability to concentrate. There is no evidence within the MAC that the Medical Assessor was not aware of what is required to participate in such games. The Appeal Panel would further note that the members are aware of such requirements having participated in same. The volume and extent to which Ms Purcell engages in such activities is entirely inconsistent with class 3 impairment. 14. Further and in any event, the Medical Assessor has considered other activities engaged in by Ms Purcell, including creative writing and engagement in learning through TAFE. These activities are within the relevant considerations provided for by the Guidelines. Although Ms Purcell's level of functioning may be impaired compared with her pre-injury state, there is nothing in the assessment to suggest that the Medical Assessor has erred. This ground of appeal is not made out.

1. The Medical Assessor assessed class 1 in this PIRS, providing the following reasons:

"She has a close and loving relationship with Stacey. She is also close to her mother and sister. She maintains contact with her father in Tasmania. She is estranged from her oldest brother, predating her work injury. She has maintained a close circle of about 12 friends but has lost some less-close friends because of her social disengagement. She is functioning within the normal range in the general population."

2. The appellant submits that the Medical Assessor did not properly consider Ms Purcell's impairment to her relationships with her wife, brother and friends. The respondent submits that the Medical Assessor was entitled to reach his conclusion based on his clinical judgement.
3. The Guidelines provide the following criteria for classes 1 and 2 in this PIRS:

"Class 1 No deficit, or minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population: No difficulty in forming and sustaining relationships (eg a partner, close friendships lasting years). > > Class 2 Mild impairment: Existing relationships strained. Tension and arguments with partner or close family member, loss of some friendships."

4. The Medical Assessor also comments on the other assessments of impairment provided by Drs Young and Smith:

"Today, Ms Purcell did not report strain in her relationship with her wife**;** instead, she described a loving and supportive relationship. They share an interest in gaming and do almost everything together. Ms Purcell spoke warmly of her partner. Additionally, she has a group of a dozen friends with whom she interacts several times a week. She has continued good relationships with her mother and sister. She has less contact with her father, keeping in touch by email. This pattern is long-standing, predating her work injury. She has lost contact with some friends, whom she described as being in her outer circle, because she sees them less frequently. She has a demonstrated capacity to form and maintain relationships. Dr Young's statement says as much."

5. The Appeal Panel note that there is a degree of interruption to Ms Purcell's social functioning given in the reasons provided in the PIRS Table and the above commentary provided in the body of the MAC. The Appeal Panel acknowledge that there is a fine line distinction between classes, but in circumstances where Ms Purcell has lost friendships, has reduced contact with her father and mother, but has maintained a strong relationship with her wife, the descriptor in class 1 does not apply. That is, Ms Purcell does not have a "minor deficit attributable to the normal variation in the general population". She has demonstrated strained relationships, including loss of some friendships.
6. On that basis the Appeal Panel accept that the Medical Assessor has erred in his assessment of Ms Purcell's social functioning. The correct assessment is class 2 impairment and on this basis the MAC will be revoked.

1. The final PIRS challenged is that of travel. The Medical Assessor provides the following reasons in the PIRS table:

"She is anxious away from home and prefers to have her wife for company. However, she goes out alone if Stacey is unavailable. She walks to local venues and travels by public transport to visit her doctors, with trips lasting one to 1.5 hours. She visited Canberra with Stacey, staying for one week. Her anxiety would limit her on unfamiliar trips."

2. The Guidelines provide the following criteria for consideration in classes 2 and 3 under travel:

"Class 2 Mild impairment: Can travel without support person, but only in a familiar area such as local shops, visiting a neighbour. > > Class 3 Moderate impairment: Cannot travel away from own residence without support person. Problems may be due to excessive anxiety or cognitive impairment."

3. The appellant submits that the "true effects" of the appellant travelling without her wife were not correctly observed or reflected in the assessment. Whilst the appellant has travelled without her wife, the effects on her were immense and she struggled as a result of needing to do so.
4. The respondent submits that the history recorded shows the appellant is able to travel without a support person in familiar areas, consistent with class 2.
5. The Appeal Panel agree with the respondent's submissions. Ms Purcell has an ability to travel away from her own home without a support person, although she prefers to have her wife with her. This is entirely inconsistent with class 3 impairment, which requires an inability to travel without a support person. She walks locally and travels to her doctors which takes 1.5 hours, but is limited by anxiety. These factual circumstances are entirely consistent with class 2 impairment. The appellant's submissions do not identify a demonstrable error; they merely show disagreement with the outcome of the assessment. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is not made out.

1. As indicated the appellant's submissions were discursive and did not particularly address, with great clarity, the requirements of s 327(3) of the 1998 Act. Nonetheless the Appeal Panel have identified an error in the assessment under the PIRS of social functioning and the MAC will be revoked on that basis. For abundant clarity, the Appeal Panel agree with and confirm the other PIRS, including those not challenged. There is no error demonstrated with those PIRS.
2. The new classes in ascending order are 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, which is a median class of 2 and a total of 13. Based on the conversion table at Table 11.7 of the Guidelines, this is whole person impairment of 7%. There has been no challenge to the deduction made by the Medical Assessor, or the inclusion of the adjustment for treatment effect, and the Appeal Panel agree with and confirm those are appropriate. The treatment effect of 2% should first be added and then a deduction made, which will be reflected in the certificate, although the order makes no difference to the outcome.
3. Accordingly, the MAC will be revoked and replaced with an assessment of 8%, although this makes no difference to the outcome in terms of Ms Purcell's entitlement to compensation.
4. The new certificate is attached to this statement of reasons.

This Certificate is issued pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998.

The Appeal Panel revokes the Medical Assessment Certificate of Medical Assessor Doug Andrews and issues this new Medical Assessment Certificate as to the matters set out in the Table below:

Chapter, page and paragraph number in NSW workers compensation guidelines

Chapter, page, paragraph, figure and table numbers in AMA 5 Guides

Proportion of permanent impairment due to pre-existing injury, abnormality or condition

Sub-total/s % WPI (after any deductions in column 6)

Total % WPI (the Combined Table values of all sub-totals)