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[2016] WASAT 36
State Administrative Tribunal (WA)
2016-04-13
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) the location, number, size and species type of existing and proposed trees and shrubs, including calculations for the landscaping area;
(d) those areas to be reticulated or irrigated; and
I certify that this and the preceding [209] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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[1] Although nothing turns on it in this case, we note that the term 'convenience store', when used in the definition of the land use 'petrol filling station', does not mean the defined land use 'convenience store' in TPS 3. As noted earlier, prescribed definitions in Sch 1 of TPS 3 apply under cl 1.7.1 of the Scheme '[u]nless the context otherwise requires'. There are three contextual indications to the effect that 'convenience store', when used in the definition of 'petrol filling station', does not mean 'convenience store' as defined in the Scheme. First, the defined land use 'convenience store' includes 'the retail sale of petrol' in the second limb of paragraph (a) of that definition, whereas the definition of 'petrol filling station' distinguishes between the retail sale of petrol and a convenience store ('petrol filling station' 'means land and buildings used for the retailing of fuel and petroleum products and may include a convenience store ...'). Secondly, as noted earlier, the primary focus or emphasis of the land use definition 'petrol filling station' is on the retail sale of petrol or fuel and a 'convenience store', if it exists, would be secondary to that primary focus. It would make no sense for the secondary component to contain and repeat the primary focus or emphasis of the land use. Thirdly, the definition of 'petrol filling station' imposes a maximum floor area of 300m² on 'a convenience store' which may be included in a 'petrol filling station', whereas the definition of 'convenience store' already contains in paragraph (d) a similar, but not identical, floor area restriction. If 'convenience store', when used in the definition of 'petrol filling station', means 'convenience store' as defined in the Scheme, it would not need to impose a similar floor area restriction. Rather, the expression 'convenience store', when used in the definition of 'petrol filling station' in TPS 3, bears its ordinary meaning.
In addressing a submission made by an adjoining land owner over whose land the development site has an easement conferring a right of carriageway, the Tribunal also determined that the development application is not incompetent or incapable of approval in the absence of owner's consent given by the owners of the adjoining property. In this regard, the Tribunal determined that the reasoning and decision of the High Court of Australia in North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd [1996] HCA 20; (1996) 185 CLR 470 applies in relation to planning law in Western Australia.
Capelight Nominees Pty Ltd and City of Swan [2015] WASAT 85
Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v North Sydney Council [2007] NSWCA 164; (2007) 155 LGERA 52
Holland v Jones [1917] HCA 26; (1917) 23 CLR 149
Mirvac Mandurah Pty Ltd and City of Mandurah [2006] WASAT 44
Robertson and Shire of Murray [2009] WASAT 171; (2009) 67 SR (WA) 66
West Coast Enterprises Pty Ltd and Shire of Exmouth [2007] WASAT 316
The question in the present case is whether one provision in an instrument made by the Minister as delegated legislation prevails over a different provision in the same instrument. Were it not for the eschewing by Kirby P in Coffs Harbour of the approach based on s 109 of the Constitution to the operation of s 36 of the EPA Act, it would be tempting to adopt the 'covering the field' test as the appellant in its written submissions pressed upon the Court, notwithstanding that it appears to have fallen out of favour in some contexts not presently relevant: cf Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission [2006] HCA 8; (2006) 224 ALR 625 at 636 [48]; [2006] HCA 8 at [48]. Close attention to the particular and complex provisions of cl 28D indicate an appearance of exhaustiveness on the subject of building heights within the Centre thereby creating an incompatibility and inconsistency between it and cl 30. I do not think that one is departing from the ordinary natural meaning of 'inconsistency' which, as Kirby P points out in Coffs Harbour, involves incongruity as well as incompatibility, by concluding that that incompatibility or incongruity or lack of harmony between the substance of the two provisions results not only from a comparison of the objectives and controls of each but also from the 'appearance of exhaustiveness' on the same subject matter of cl 28D with respect to development within the Centre with the consequence, as mandated by cl 28A, that cl 28D prevails to the extent of the inconsistency over cl 30.
(1917) 23 CLR 149
(2006) 224 ALR 625
(1996) 185 CLR 470
(2007) 155 LGERA 52
(1994) 84 LGERA 324