1. Ms Nguyen's registration is suspended for three months. The suspension is stayed for one month.
2. Ms Nguyen's practice be supervised on a monthly basis for two years by Marg Safron (or another suitable psychologist approved by the Psychologists Registration Board (PBA)).
3. Ms Nguyen undertake further education or training in relation to ethics and business record keeping on the following terms:

1. The further education is to be provided by a psychologist approved by the PBA. 2. The content of the further education is to be approved by the PBA.

1. The duration of the further education is to be two days.

1. The further education is to be completed within three months of the PBA approving the psychologist providing the further education. 2. The further education is to be undertaken at Ms Nguyen's expense. 3. The psychologist providing the further education is to provide the PBA with a written report within 28 days of Ms Nguyen's satisfactory completion of the further education. 4. The further education is not to be considered as being in satisfaction of any continuing professional development requirements.
2. Ms Nguyen's practice be subject to six-monthly inspections for two years on the following terms:

1. The inspections are to be conducted by a person appointed by the PBA. 2. The inspections are to encompass 25% of Ms Nguyen's billing and practice information in relation to her VWA and TAC clients.

1. The person conducting the inspections is to provide the PBA with a written report within 28 days of completion of each inspection period.

1. The inspections are to be conducted at Ms Nguyen's expense.
2. Ms Nguyen refrain from having any interaction with the billings side of her practice for two years.
3. Ms Nguyen undergo counselling with Dr Alan Fox (or another suitable psychologist approved by the PBA) for a minimum of 12 months and for a further 12 months if recommended by the person providing the counselling at intervals recommended by that person. The counselling is to be undertaken at Ms Nguyen's expense.
4. Ms Nguyen is cautioned.
5. Ms Nguyen is reprimanded.

1. Sandra Nguyen is a registered psychologist. Between around 10 January 2006 and 16 January 2009 Ms Nguyen fraudulently invoiced the Victorian Workcover Authority (VWA) for approximately 396 psychological consultations that never took place and defrauded the VWA $50,684.12 (the VWA fraud). Between around 9 January 2006 and 19 April 2009 she also fraudulently invoiced the Transport Accident Commission (TAC) for approximately 244 psychological consultations that never took place and defrauded the TAC $14,770.00 (the TAC fraud).

1. On 13 January 2010, the Magistrates' Court of Victoria found Ms Nguyen guilty of:

1. One charge of obtaining financial advantage by deception under section 81 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (the Crimes Act) in relation to the VWA fraud. 2. One consolidated charge of obtaining financial advantage by deception under section 82 of the Crimes Act in relation to the VWA fraud.

1. Three consolidated charges of fraud in breach of section 248 of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) in relation to the VWA fraud.

1. Six consolidated charges of obtaining financial advantage by deception under section 82 of the Crimes Act in relation to the TAC fraud. 2. Seven consolidated charges of fraud in breach of section 116 of the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic) in relation to the TAC fraud.

1. The Court convicted Ms Nguyen and made a 15 month community based order. Ms Nguyen was also ordered to perform 100 hours of unpaid community work over 12 months in relation to the VWA fraud and 50 hours of unpaid community work over 12 months in relation to the TAC fraud, to be performed concurrently with the hours in relation to the TAC fraud. In addition, Ms Nguyen was ordered to undergo medical/psychological/psychiatric assessment and treatment as directed.

1. The Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria (PRBV) was subsequently notified of these matters by the VWA and the TAC and on 2 February 2010 the PRBV determined to refer its own motion investigation into Ms Nguyen's professional conduct to the Victorian Civil and Administration Tribunal (VCAT) for hearing and determination under section 46 of the Health Professions Registration Act 2005 (HPR Act).

1. As the PRBV was abolished on 1 July 2010[1], the Psychology Board of Australia (PBA) referred this proceeding to VCAT on 5 November 2010. The PBA, which was established on 1 July 2010[2], is able to continue to deal with notifications and complaints regarding psychologists which the PRBV had started but not completed dealing with prior to 1 July 2010 under section 289 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (the National Act)[3].

1. The HPR Act is the operating statute in relation to findings and determinations in this matter because it was the legislation applying at the time the notifications were made[4].

1. The PBA is seeking findings under section 77(1) of the HPR Act that:

1. In relation to allegation 1 (the VWA fraud, which is set out in paragraphs 1 to 3 above), Ms Nguyen has engaged in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct.
2. In relation to allegation 2 (the TAC fraud, which is set out in paragraphs 1 to 3 above), Ms Nguyen has engaged in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct.

1. Ms Nguyen admits the allegations and admits she has engaged in unprofessional conduct. However, she denies that she has engaged in professional misconduct.

1. Unprofessional conduct and professional misconduct are defined in section 3 of the HPR Act and the determinations available to VCAT are set out in section 77 (4) of the HPR Act.

Did Ms Nguyen engage in unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct?

1. The definition of unprofessional conduct as set out in paragraph 3 of the HPR Act includes:

(a) conduct of a health practitioner occurring in connection with the practice of the practitioner's health profession that is of a lesser standard than a member of the public or the health practitioner's peers are entitled to expect of a reasonably competent health practitioner of that kind

(b) professional performance which is of a lesser standard than that which the registered health practitioner's peers might reasonably expect of a registered health practitioner...

(i) an offence where the health practitioner's suitability to continue to practise is likely to be affected because of the finding of guilt or where it is not in the public interest to allow the health practitioner to continue to practise because of the finding of guilt, or

1. Professional misconduct is defined in paragraph 3(1) of the HPR Act as including:

(a) unprofessional conduct of a health practitioner, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, and

(b) conduct that violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed by members of the profession of good repute or competency, and

(c) conduct of a health practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's health profession or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of a health profession, that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not of good character or is otherwise not a fit and proper person to engage in the practice of that health profession.

1. The term professional misconduct has also been extensively judicially considered. For example, in the VCAT decision of the Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria v Stiglitz[5] the Tribunal referred to the judicial interpretation found in Pillai v Messiter[6] in which Kirby P stated:

The words used in the statutory test ("misconduct in a professional respect") plainly go beyond that negligence might amount to relevant misconduct, particularly if accompanied in difference to, or lack of concern for, the welfare of the patient. Departure from elementary and generally accepted standards, of which a medical practitioner could scarcely be heard to say that he or she was ignorant could amount to such professional misconduct. But the statutory test is not met by mere professional incompetence or deficiencies in the practice of the profession. Something more is required. It includes a deliberate departure from acceptable standards or such serious negligence as, although not deliberate, to portray indifference and abuse of the privileges that accompany registration as a medical practitioner.

1. The Tribunal was also referred to the decision of the Victorian Psychologists' Registration Board in Re: Lawrence Hayden[7] where the Board stated:

Of the essence of "professional misconduct" is the assessment of impropriety by reference to the evaluation of professional peers. The panel is of the view that what is required for an assessment of whether a practitioner has engaged in "professional misconduct" is an evaluation of the nature of the practitioner's conduct within the context of the impropriety, taking into account all of the circumstances of what the practitioner did. However, matters may go some distance towards explaining or mitigating the level of culpability on the part of the practitioner are not properly to be taken into account in determining whether the conduct would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable or worthy of strong reprobation, or falling a substantial way short of violating what would be accepted by professional peers: if relevant, they go to the penalty that should be imposed in respect of such conduct. They may well impact upon whether the practitioner is likely to repeat such conduct and thus whether or the extent to which the community needs to be protected from the practitioner or whether the practitioner or other practitioners need to be deterred by the imposition of a penalty upon the particular practitioner.

1. Similarly, Mandie J in Campbell v The Dental Board of Victoria[8] stated that:

...the test to be applied is whether the conduct violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed and approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency.

1. Whilst not all of these decisions relate to psychologists, it is well established that the law in relation to professional misconduct relates to all professions.[9]

The PBA's submissions in relation to professional misconduct

1. Ms Ellyard, counsel for the PBA, submitted that the Tribunal should find that Ms Nguyen engaged in professional misconduct when she defrauded the VWA and the TAC. Ms Ellyard relied on the contents of the Tribunal book to support the PBA's submission and did not call any further evidence. She also referred the Tribunal to a number of decisions, which she submitted supported a finding that Ms Nguyen has engaged in professional misconduct.

1. Specifically, Ms Ellyard submitted that the Tribunal should find that Ms Nguyen engaged in professional misconduct as defined in sections (b) and (c) of section 3(1) of the HPR Act, which are set out above. Ms Ellyard noted that as no question of Ms Nguyen's professional competency has arisen, section (a) does not apply.

1. In support of her submission, Ms Ellyard relied on the undisputed evidence that Ms Nguyen created 640 false invoices over three years and defrauded the VWA and the TAC over $64,000.00. She also relied on Ms Nguyen's own evidence that she only stopped creating the false invoices because she knew that she was being investigated.

1. Ms Ellyard told the Tribunal that when Ms Nguyen committed the fraud, the VWA and the TAC had placed her in a position of trust. She also pointed out that the fraud, which initially arose due to billing errors, rapidly became deliberate and sustained. It was not a momentary error of judgment, which was not to be repeated.

1. Ms Ellyard submitted that Ms Nguyen's dishonesty was a serious matter and noted that Ms Nguyen's treating psychologists, Dr Alan Fox and Ms Marg Safron both agreed in their oral evidence that this was the case.

1. Ms Ellyard also submitted that Ms Nguyen's conduct was a very significant departure from the standards expected by her colleagues and that her conduct supports a finding that Ms Nguyen was not of good character. This is particularly so because Ms Nguyen in her oral evidence was unwilling to agree that objectively, dishonesty constituted a significant breach of professional ethics.

1. Ms Ellyard also noted that Ms Nguyen sought to link her behaviour to post natal depression, which she suffered after the birth of her two children in circumstances where there was no evidence that her depression caused or contributed to her dishonesty. Ms Ellyard also relied on the fact that Ms Nguyen began committing the fraud before she became pregnant with her first. In addition, whilst she acknowledged that Ms Nguyen suffered from post natal depression after the birth of her two children, she made the point that if the Tribunal found that Ms Nguyen's conduct was caused by her depression, such a finding would only be relevant to the Tribunal's determination, not to whether or nor Ms Nguyen engaged in professional misconduct.

1. Ms Ellyard concluded by submitting that professional misconduct as defined in section (a) of section 3(1) of the HPR Act was made out on the objective facts in relation to what Ms Nguyen pleaded guilty to and that professional misconduct as defined in section (b) was made out by Ms Nguyen's attitude in cross-examination to the undisputed facts of the case.

Ms Nguyen's submissions in relation to professional misconduct

1. As stated in paragraph 8 above, Ms Nguyen denied that she engaged in professional misconduct, although her counsel, Mr Crisp conceded that she had engaged in serious conduct over a lengthy period.

1. Mr Crisp's submissions in relation to whether Ms Nguyen engaged in professional misconduct focused on the extent to which Ms Nguyen's mental state contributed to her misconduct. Specifically, he referred the Tribunal to a decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Verdins[10], which discussed the application, elaboration and refinement of the decision in R v Tsiaras[11], where the Court of Appeal identified five ways in which serious psychiatric illness not amounting to insanity was relevant to the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion.

1. In response, Ms Ellyard submitted that R v Verdins was not relevant to this matter as it relates to the principles to be applied in sentencing criminal offenders. She also submitted that in any case, it would not apply to Ms Nguyen's conduct because she was not suffering from depression or any other mental illness at the time she began defrauding the VWA and the TAC. As Ms Ellyard told the Tribunal, Ms Nguyen's depression did not cause her to commit fraud and does not excuse or explain her behaviour.

The Tribunals' finding in relation to professional misconduct

1. The Tribunal finds that Ms Nguyen engaged in professional misconduct. Ms Nguyen deliberately defrauded the VWA and the TAC more than $64,000.00 over three years and only stopped when she was caught. Ms Nguyen also admitted inducing her husband, an osteopath, who works out of the same premises at Ms Nguyen, into committing similar acts of fraud.

1. This conduct is clearly "violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed by members of the profession of good repute or competency" and is "a deliberate departure from acceptable standards".

1. In making this finding, the Tribunal has not taken into account Ms Nguyen's mental state. This is because we are satisfied that Ms Nguyen's mental state is not relevant to whether her conduct amounts to professional misconduct. As stated in Re: Lawrence Hayden at paragraph 14 above, "matters may go some distance towards explaining or mitigating the level of culpability on the part of the practitioner are not properly to be taken into account in determining whether the conduct would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable or worthy of strong reprobation, or falling a substantial way short of violating what would be accepted by professional peers: if relevant, they go to the penalty that should be imposed in respect of such conduct."

Determinations available under section 77 (4) of the HPR Act

1. Having found that Ms Nguyen has engaged in professional misconduct, the Tribunal may make one or more of the following determinations set out in section 77 (4) of the HPR Act:

1. require Ms Nguyen to undergo counseling 2. caution Ms Nguyen

1. require Ms Nguyen to undertake and complete further education or training within a specified period 2. impose any condition on Ms Nguyen's registration or endorsement 3. impose a fine of not more than $50,000 to be paid to the PBA 4. suspend Ms Nguyen's registration for a period specified in the determination 5. cancel Ms Nguyen's registration 6. order that Ms Nguyen undertake a specified period of practice under specified supervision 7. order that Ms Nguyen do or refrain from doing something in connection with the practice of her health profession 8. order that Ms Nguyen's practice be conducted for a specified period in a specified way or subject to specified conditions

1. order that Ms Nguyen's practice be subject to periodic inspection by a specified person for a specified period

1. order that Ms Nguyen report on the health practice of the practitioner to a specified person at specified intervals 2. order that Ms Nguyen not employ, engage or recommend a specified person or class of persons 3. disqualify Ms Nguyen from applying for registration under section 4 within a specified period if Ms Nguyen's registration is cancelled by the Tribunal or by a health practitioner registration authority of another State or Territory of the Commonwealth or of New Zealand.

The PBA's submission in relation to determination

1. Ms Ellyard submitted that the Tribunal ought to determine to:

1. suspend Ms Nguyen's registration for six months 2. order that Ms Nguyen's practice be supervised for two years

1. order that Ms Nguyen undertake further education or training in relation to ethics and business record keeping

1. order that ¼ of Ms Nguyen's billing and practice information in relation to her VWA and TAC clients be audited 2. order that Ms Nguyen refrain from having any interaction with the billings side of her practice for two years.

1. Ms Ellyard submitted that these determinations would protect the public and the standards of the profession and were appropriate given Ms Nguyen's serious and prolonged dishonesty and her personal circumstances.

1. Specifically, Ms Ellyard submitted that a six month suspension was appropriate given the objective seriousness of the conduct and taking into account Ms Nguyen's dishonesty, the large amount of money she defrauded and the length of time over which she committed the offences. Ms Ellyard told the Tribunal that a six month suspension was necessary to send a message to the public and other psychologists and that the profession's reputation would be brought into disrepute if Ms Nguyen's registration was not suspended.

1. Ms Ellyard conceded that Ms Nguyen should be given credit for her frankness in admitting her conduct but submitted that her attempt to explain away her behaviour as being an accident should be rejected by the Tribunal given how rapidly her actions became deliberate. She also reiterated her previous submissions that there was no medical evidence that Ms Nguyen was suffering from depression when she began defrauding the VWA and the TAC or that her depression was the reason she began and continued her conduct for over three years. Instead, the Tribunal should find that Ms Nguyen defrauded the VWA and the TAC due to her financial difficulties and that her personal circumstances are of limited relevance as they did not contribute to the conduct.

1. Ms Ellyard also referred the Tribunal to a number of decisions in support of her submission.

1. First, Ms Ellyard referred the Tribunal to a decision of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom in Patel v General Medical Council[12]. In this case, the Privy Council affirmed the decision of the Professional Conduct Committee of the General Medical Council to cancel the registration of Dr Patel, who had eight criminal convictions recorded against him and was sentenced to six months imprisonment for defrauding the Ministry of Defence £6,300 over eight months, despite strong mitigating factors. In their decision, the Privy Council observed that "a finding of dishonesty lies at the top end in the spectrum of gravity of misconduct" and that the Professional Conduct Committee "was right to subordinate those subjective factors to the objective need to protect the public interest"[13]. Ms Ellyard also referred the Tribunal to the decision in the Medical Practitioners' Board of Victoria v Dr D[14] that emphasises the importance of protecting the public and the reputation of the profession.

1. Ms Ellyard also referred the Tribunal to the VCAT decision of Honey v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria[15]. In this case, Dr Honey was suspended from practice for approximately 12 months after having been found guilty of three counts of serious unprofessional conduct and two counts of unprofessional conduct not of a serious nature. The unprofessional conduct related to Dr Honey's inappropriate personal and or sexual relationship with a former patient. Specifically, Ms Ellyard drew the Tribunal's attention to the Tribunal's consideration in that case of the relevance of the likelihood of repetition in making a determination, where it was noted that:

Often the very process of being found out in a breach means that sufficient safeguards are placed around the offending doctor to prevent him or her being given a similar opportunity to offend again.[16]

Ms Nguyen's submission in relation to determination

1. Mr Crisp submitted that Ms Nguyen would comply with any conditions imposed by the Tribunal but that it was not appropriate to suspend Ms Nguyen's registration, particularly because she was laboring under a number of disabilities at the time she began defrauding the VWA and the TAC. These disabilities included:

1. Ulcerated colitis, which affected her general well-being and prevented her from becoming pregnant.
2. Her IVF treatment.

1. Her post natal depression after her pregnancies.

1. Mr Crisp pointed out that Ms Nguyen's physical and mental ill health significantly coincided with her fraudulent behaviour and submitted that her illnesses directly led to this behaviour. He also pointed out that Ms Nguyen had no propensity for illegal conduct before she became ill or since she was diagnosed and treated for her depression.

1. Mr Crisp submitted that that it would be unfair and inappropriate to fail to take Ms Nguyen's mental state of health into account when assessing the determination in this case. Mr Crisp relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Verdins[17], which he submitted supports the proposition that it is appropriate to take into account the mental state and functioning of a practitioner when considering his or her conduct. He also pointed out that the authorities relied on by Ms Ellyard failed to take into account the practitioners' mental state at the time of offending and did not appear to involve practitioners who had suffered from any physical or mental ill health.

1. Mr Crisp also relied on the following matters in support of his submission that is it not appropriate to suspend Ms Nguyen's registration:

1. The PRBV did not suspended Ms Nguyen following the notification and she has been practising since the notification without reoffending. 2. Ms Nguyen's capacity to practise has not been questioned.

1. Ms Nguyen has rehabilitated and reformed herself, which has been accepted by the PBA. In particular, she is being treated by Dr Fox and has taken advantage of and benefited from this treatment.

1. It is likely that Ms Nguyen would have changed her behaviour had she received treatment for her depression earlier. 2. Ms Safron is supervising Ms Nguyen's practice and she is taking advice from Ms Safron. 3. Dr Fox and Ms Safron have assessed Ms Nguyen as unlikely to reoffend, which means that the public has nothing to fear from her continuing to practice. 4. Ms Nguyen is extremely remorseful about her conduct. 5. Ms Nguyen gave evidence at the hearing, which gave the Tribunal an opportunity to assess her level of remorse and shame and the extent to which she has rehabilitated and reformed herself. 6. As 90% of Ms Nguyen's patients are Vietnamese and Ms Nguyen is only one of two Vietnamese speaking psychologists in Victoria, she has patients who rely on her and are benefiting from her treatment and she is filling a need within the community. 7. She would be crushed if her registration was suspended and it would make it very difficult for her to re-enter the profession.

1. In summary, Mr Crisp submitted that Ms Nguyen's personal circumstances should be taken into account and that the result in this case should reflect the enormous progress Ms Nguyen has made and her lack of risk to the public. In support of this submission, Mr Crisp relied on the VCAT decision of the Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria v Stiglitz[18], where, in his submission, the Tribunal appropriately took into account the practitioner's personal circumstances in making its determination.

1. The applicable legal principles are set out by Judge Ross (as he was then) in Von Schrenk v Dental Practice Board of Victoria[19]. These are:

1. The Tribunal's powers to discipline for misconduct are primarily protective.
2. The disciplinary orders are also punitive.

1. Where the Tribunal's protective function is paramount and there is a choice of sanction, it is to be expected that the Tribunal will choose that sanction which maximises the protection of the public[20].

1. Because the Tribunal's disciplinary jurisdiction is punitive, in the service of protecting the public, the principles applicable to sentencing apply by analogy.
2. In sentencing generally it is necessary to balance just punishment; specific and general deterrence; denunciation; the protection of the community; and rehabilitation.
3. Specific deterrence is directed at the particular offender. The object of general deterrence is to prevent others from committing the offence by promoting an understanding that an offence is followed by substantial adverse consequences.
4. The nature and gravity of the misconduct is central to the process of determining an appropriate sanction.
5. It is appropriate to consider the practitioner's past discipline history and whether she has made admissions.

1. The maintenance of the professional standards of the profession in the eyes of the public[21].
2. The public interest in the practitioner's continuing to practice must be weighed against the public interest in protecting clients from any repetition of the conduct exhibited[22].

1. The personal burden on the practitioner is not to be given any great weight although it may be relevant to a minor extent[24].

Consideration of the applicable legal principles

1. We consider the defrauding of the VWA and the TAC by Ms Nguyen to be a very serious matter. Ms Nguyen defrauded a large amount of money over a long time and only stopped after she was caught. She also involved her husband, another health practitioner, in her dishonest conduct. Her dishonest conduct whilst she was in a position of trust represents a significant departure from professional standards and reflects poorly on her profession.

1. However, we consider that Ms Nguyen has done a great deal to rehabilitate herself and to ensure that her risk of reoffending is very low. In particular, Ms Nguyen admitted the allegations made against her and repaid the VWA and the TAC before her Magistrates' Court appearance. She has been in therapy with Dr Fox since December 2009 and has had 17 practice supervision sessions with Ms Safron since December 2010. We also accept Ms Nguyen's evidence that she has benefited greatly from her therapeutic sessions and the supervision of her practice and that she will continue to see both practitioners for at least the next twelve months.

1. In addition, we accept Ms Nguyen's evidence that she is no longer involved in the billings side of her practice and has restructured her financial affairs to significantly reduce her debts. We also accept the evidence given by Dr Fox and Ms Safron that Ms Nguyen's risk of reoffending is very low.

1. We are also satisfied that Ms Nguyen is remorseful and shamed by her behaviour, and note that she was publicly shamed by the reporting of her offences in the media.

1. However, we are not persuaded that Ms Nguyen's physical and mental health issues caused, explain or justify her conduct. Whilst Dr Fox told the Tribunal that Ms Nguyen's postnatal depression might have affected her judgment, he did not know her at the time she began offending and there is no other medical evidence to support Ms Crisp's submissions on this matter. In addition, we consider Ms Nguyen's attempt to link her postnatal depression to her offending and her failure during cross-examination to accept that dishonesty is a significant breach of ethical standards regardless of the surrounding circumstances indicates Ms Nguyen's insight into her behaviour may not be as comprehensive as it should be. That being said, we accept that Ms Nguyen does have substantial insight about the seriousness of her behaviour and that this should be taken into account when considering what determination ought to be made.

1. For these reasons, we are satisfied that specific deterrence is not an issue in this matter.

1. Instead, we consider that a determination that promotes general deterrence and thereby maximises the protection of the public and maintains the professional standards of the profession in the eyes of the public is what is required. The question for the Tribunal is whether is it necessary to suspend Ms Nguyen's registration to achieve this.

1. On the one hand, the suspension of Ms Nguyen's registration sends a strong message to the community and other psychologists that fraudulent conduct falls very short of acceptable professional conduct and will be followed by substantial adverse consequences.

1. On the other hand, Ms Nguyen has not offended before, is unlikely to reoffend and has rehabilitated herself. We also consider that there is a significant public interest in allowing Ms Nguyen to continue to practice. In making this finding we have taken into account Ms Nguyen's evidence, which we accept, that 90% of her clients are Vietnamese, that there are only a few other Vietnamese speaking psychologists in Melbourne and that her clients would be reluctant to use the services of an interpreter to discuss private matters. We also rely on Ms Safron's evidence that Ms Nguyen provides an important service to the Vietnamese community that cannot be not easily replaced.

1. After careful consideration of the circumstances of this matter, we have concluded that it is appropriate to suspend Ms Nguyen's registration for three months. Whilst we acknowledge the efforts Ms Nguyen has made to rehabilitate herself and the public interest in allowing Ms Nguyen to continue to practise, we consider a suspension is required to maintain the professional standards of the profession in the eyes of the public and to deter other practitioners from similar conduct. We consider three months an appropriate time in light of the many mitigating factors accepted by the PBA and the Tribunal, particularly Ms Nguyen's admissions and remorse, her substantial insight and her low risk of reoffending.

1. We have also determined to caution and reprimand Ms Nguyen. Whilst neither party made submissions in relation to the imposition of a caution or a reprimand, the Tribunal is able to make as many of the determinations set out in section 77(4) as it deems appropriate in the circumstances. In this case, we consider a caution and reprimand to be appropriate given the nature and gravity of the misconduct, particularly the amount defrauded by Ms Nguyen and the duration of her conduct and the fact that she engaged in the conduct whilst in a position of trust.

1. We have also determined to order that Ms Nguyen continue to attend counselling with Dr Fox (or another suitable psychologist) for at least 12 months and continue to have her practice supervised by Ms Safron (or another suitable psychologist) for two years, in addition to making the other orders sought by the PBA. We consider these determinations appropriate in light of Ms Safron's evidence that Ms Nguyen needs a further 12 months to work through issues relating to her sense of identity and past trauma, amongst other things, and her comment that she would only be prepared to continue to supervise Ms Nguyen if she were able to discuss matters with Ms Nguyen's therapist, who is continuing to treat Ms Nguyen's post natal depression and anxiety.

1. In conclusion, in making these determinations we have had regard to:

1. The nature and gravity of the misconduct.
2. The fact that Ms Nguyen admitted the unprofessional conduct, repaid the debt and has demonstrated substantial but not complete insight into her conduct.

1. Specific deterrence is not an issue as Ms Nguyen is unlikely to repeat her conduct.
2. General deterrence is an important issue.
3. Maintenance of the professional standards of the profession in the eyes of the public is an important issue.
4. The public interest in Ms Nguyen continuing to practice.

1. In relation to allegation 1 and 2, we make the following determinations:

1. Ms Nguyen's registration is suspended for three months. The suspension is stayed for one month.
2. Ms Nguyen's practice be supervised on a monthly basis for two years by Marg Safron (or another suitable psychologist approved by the PBA). The supervision is not to be considered as being in satisfaction of any continuing professional development requirements.

1. Ms Nguyen undertake further education or training in relation to ethics and business record keeping on the following terms:
   1. The further education is to be provided by a psychologist approved by the PBA.
   2. The content of the further education is to be approved by the PBA.
   3. The duration of the further education is to be two days.
   4. The further education is to be completed within three months of the PBA approving the psychologist providing the further education.
   5. The further education is to be undertaken at Ms Nguyen's expense.
   6. The psychologist providing the further education is to provide the PBA with a written report within 28 days of Ms Nguyen's satisfactory completion of the further education.
   7. The further education is not to be considered as being in satisfaction of any continuing professional development requirements.

1. Ms Nguyen's practice be subject to six-monthly inspections for two years on the following terms:
   1. The inspections are to be conducted by a person appointed by the PBA.
   2. The inspections are to encompass 25% of Ms Nguyen's billing and practice information in relation to her VWA and TAC clients.
   3. The person conducting the inspections is to provide the PBA with a written report within 28 days of completion of each inspection period.
   4. The inspections are to be conducted at Ms Nguyen's expense.
2. Ms Nguyen refrain from having any interaction with the billings side of her practice for two years.
3. Ms Nguyen undergo counselling with Dr Alan Fox (or another suitable psychologist approved by the PBA) for a minimum of 12 months and for a further 12 months if recommended by the person providing the counselling at intervals recommended by that person. The counselling is to be undertaken at Ms Nguyen's expense.
4. Ms Nguyen is cautioned.
5. Ms Nguyen is reprimanded.

[2] Section 31 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009.

[3] See also Medical Practitioners Board of Australia v Dr Amjad Mohammed Hafizullah [2010] VCAT 2126.

[4] The notifications were made to PRBV by VWA on 15 January 2010 and by TAC on 5 February 2010.

[5] [2010] VCAT 662.

[6] (No 2) (1989) 16 NSWLR 197.

[8] [1999] VSC 113.

[9] The New South Wales Bar Association v John Daniel Cummins [2001] NSWCA 284.

[10] [2007] VSCA 102.

[11] [1996] VicRp 26; [1996] 1 VR 398.

[12] [2003] UKPC 16.

[14] [2010] VCAT 52.

[15] [2007] VCAT 526.

[19] [2008] VCAT 2302 at [93]- [107].

[20] President Maxwell, Q_uinn v Law Institute of Victoria_ [2007] VSCA 122 at [30] - [31].

[21] See above at note 14 at paragraph 8. See also Medical Board of Australia v Piesse [2011] VCAT 859.

[24] Papps v Medical Board of South Australia [2005] SASC 345.