1. The respondent is reprimanded pursuant to section 196(2)(a) of the National Law.
2. The respondent's registration as a psychologist is suspended for a period of one month to commence on 21 October 2019.
3. Upon resumption of practice by the respondent after the period of suspension of her registration has expired, a condition is imposed on her registration to the effect that she must provide a certificate of currency in respect of appropriate professional indemnity coverage to the applicant and AHPRA on an ongoing annual basis and that the review period for the condition is five years pursuant to s 196(1)(b)(iii) of the National Law.

This is an edited version of reasons given orally at the conclusion of the hearing.

1. Ms Sheree McDonald, the respondent in this matter was first registered as a psychologist on 8 April 1991. The Psychology Board of Australia (the Board) was established and replaced the previous State and Territory Boards or participating jurisdictions and regulatory jurisdictions on 1 July 2010. Accordingly, Ms McDonald has been subject to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (National Law) since that time, including over the period in which the conduct alleged in the Notice of Allegations occurred, being on dates occurring between 1 July 2012 and 28 November 2016.
2. Ms McDonald has agreed to the Summary of Facts submitted by Counsel for the Psychology Board of Australia and part of the Summary outlines that:

Ms McDonald submitted online applications for renewal of her registration as a psychologist to APHRA under section 107 of the National Law on the following dates:

1. The applications for renewal of registration included declarations by Ms McDonald under section 109(1)(a) of the National Law that the Board's registration standards had been met. The declarations made by Ms McDonald were to the effect that in the preceding period of registration she had practised in accordance with the requirements of the Board's professional indemnity insurance registration standard and if her registration were renewed she would practice in accordance with the requirements of the Board's professional indemnity insurance registration standard.
2. It subsequently transpired as a result of an audit that Ms McDonald's registration standards for the period 1 December 2015 to 30 November 2016 which was an audit period, she was required to lodge a response to the Notice by completing an audit checklist and attaching any relevant supporting documentation. At Part 8 of the checklist Ms McDonald indicated that she had not practised in accordance with the requirements of the Board's professional indemnity registration standard during the audit period.
3. Following an exchange of correspondence, allegations were raised against Ms McDonald. We have today considered three allegations. The first relates to the failure to maintain adequate and appropriate professional indemnity insurance cover. The allegation is that:

Ms McDonald engaged in professional misconduct within the meaning of the definition of 'professional misconduct' in paragraph (a) and/or (b) and/or (c) of section 4 of the National Law and/or unprofessional conduct within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition of unprofessional conduct contained in section 5 of the National Law, meaning professional conduct that is of a lesser standard than that which might reasonably be expected of the practitioner by the public or the practitioner's professional peers in that she contravened section 129(1) of the National Law, namely that between on or about 1 July 2012 and/or about 30 August 2016 Ms McDonald failed to maintain adequate and appropriate professional indemnity insurance cover in accordance with the Board's registration standard and in contravention of section 129(1) of the National Law.

1. At this point it should be noted that Ms McDonald admits the fact of this allegation. We will deal with the allegations one by one. The Tribunal has been invited to find unprofessional conduct being the alternative to the primary charge of professional misconduct.
2. The reasoning which brings the Tribunal to find that the conduct constitutes professional misconduct in relation to allegation 1 is the unfortunate fact that the conduct occurred over an extended period and the occurrence of several renewal applications. It wasn't an isolated incident. However, in finding that the matter constitutes professional misconduct, the Tribunal finds that the conduct is not sufficiently serious to warrant the effect of the operation of sub-section (c) of section 5 of the National Law.
3. It is useful at this point to turn to section 5 and look at the definition of professional misconduct contained in section 5.

(a) Unprofessional conduct by the practitioner that amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience.

(b) More than one instance of unprofessional conduct that when considered together amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience.

(c) Conduct of the practitioner whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's profession or not that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.

The Tribunal considers and certainly there was no argument from Counsel representing the Board that sub-section (c) has no application in this matter.

1. It is also the question then of whether the misconduct is under sub-sections (a) and/or (b). It is the view of the Tribunal that the conduct is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of equivalent training or experience and that there has been more than one instance in this particular instance. So sub-sections (a) and (b) both apply. The reason that we say that the conduct is substantially below the standard reasonably expected is that professional indemnity insurance is a base requirement for registration and that on several occasions this has not been the case in Ms McDonald's particular circumstance where she just did not have professional indemnity insurance. The requirement for professional indemnity insurance to be held by a psychologist is one which is there for the protection of the public so that if there was some circumstance which would lead to a claim by a member of the public against the psychologist there is an assurance that there is a mechanism in place for dealing with the complaint and if necessary compensating the claimant. That is one of the pillars upon which the profession of psychologist can stake its reputation, that there is an assurance that those who consult psychologists are treated in appropriate ways and that goes beyond the actual treatment by the psychologist. It goes to the system of assurance which is in place to give members of the public comfort that if anything does go wrong there are ways of dealing with it.
2. Allegation 2 is that on various occasions between about 31 October 2012 and on or about 28 November 2016 Ms McDonald knowingly and/or recklessly made false declarations to AHPRA. The declarations were that during the proceeding period of registration she practised the profession only while covered by a professional indemnity insurance that meets the Board's registration standard and if her registration were renewed she would only practice the profession while covered by professional indemnity insurance that meets the Board's registration standard.
3. We return to the finding that between on or about 1 July 2012 and on or about 30 August 2016, Ms McDonald did not hold professional indemnity cover. This is a contravention of the Board standards.
4. The question of whether the contravention was knowingly and/or recklessly. We are not satisfied that the contravention was knowingly. We heard from Ms McDonald and from what she has told us we conclude that the contravention is reckless. That is to say, not deliberate, but not having regard to any particular concern on Ms McDonald's part at the time that she may have fallen into error. Ms McDonald ought to have known that she was not covered by professional indemnity insurance and to that extent we note that Ms McDonald has been registered as a psychologist for some considerable time although it is quite possible that in the earlier years of her practice the system of regulation and with particular emphasis on professional indemnity insurance payment may have been different but it has been a requirement for sufficient time for Ms McDonald as an experienced member of her profession to have been aware of the requirement of professional indemnity insurance and indeed she did tell us that but in terms of this particular allegation it is clear that she has not paid sufficient attention to the question at the appropriate time and therefore, falls into the category of being reckless.
5. The third allegation is one that Ms McDonald engaged in unprofessional conduct within the meaning of paragraph (a) of the definition of unprofessional conduct at section 5 in that on and from 7 November 2012 she contravened section 130(1) of the National Law by failing to give notice within seven days that a relevant event occurred. The relevant event is further defined in relation to a registered health practitioner including where appropriate that professional indemnity arrangements are no longer in place in relation to the practitioner's practice of the profession.
6. Ms McDonald did not notify the Board that she did not have appropriate professional indemnity arrangements in place until she returned her audit checklist which was received by AHPRA on 24 November 2017.
7. That third charge is one of unprofessional conduct and that is found. The Tribunal was invited to find in relation to the first two charges that they constituted unprofessional conduct and we have found professional misconduct under sub-sections (a) and (b) in relation to the first charge and in relation to the second charge we also find that the allegations as submitted also constitute professional misconduct under sub-sections(a) and (b) of section 5 of the National Law.
8. These findings are made having regard to the standard of proof as required in such matters. To be clear the standard is the balance of probabilities but in accordance with the test set out in the case of Briginshaw v Briginshaw[1]. This requires the Tribunal to reach a comfortable level of satisfaction in finding the matters proved on the balance of probabilities consistent with the seriousness of the allegations and reflecting the serious consequences of any finding and we do so.
9. The next matter is the determination. The purposes of a determination are not punitive, however, as has been remarked in many cases, they may have a punitive effect but this is not the purpose. The purposes may be said to be specific deterrence, general deterrence, protection of the public and maintenance of, putting it one way - public confidence in the profession, another way is maintenance of the reputation of the profession.
10. In considering the appropriate determination, it has been submitted on behalf of the Board that the Tribunal should impose a global determination rather than individual determinations in relation to the three matters. The Tribunal agrees with this submission. The course of conduct which has led to these allegations is a single course of conduct but the allegations make reference to the several aspects of the course of conduct. Accordingly we are of the view that a global determination is appropriate. We have received two references in relation to Ms McDonald. We note also that in the course of her career as a psychologist, she has had no history of disciplinary action and we also note that the particular allegations do not involve any allegations of impropriety in the course of her interaction with clients of her practice. There is nothing to suggest that Ms McDonald practices professional psychology as such with anything other than propriety.
11. These allegations might be said to be merely administrative but they are far more serious than that. They go to the very structure of the profession having protection for those who avail themselves of the services of members of the profession and also to the regulation of the profession by the regulatory authorities in such a manner that ensures that the public is protected.
12. The question of specific deterrence does not loom large here. We say that because of Ms McDonald's clean record up until this point. She has also made the point, and relevantly so, that as soon as she realised the situation she took out insurance and has maintained it and to a greater or lesser degree she has co-operated with the Board in the conduct of this proceeding. Her insight into the seriousness of the matter may not have initially been as great as it could have been, however by the time the matter has come to us for determination we are satisfied that Ms McDonald now has insight into the conduct and we are satisfied that specific deterrence is not a large factor. However, general deterrence is of a much more significant nature in the sense that it must be emphasised to members of the profession that it is necessary to comply with the requirements of the regulator and the reasons for compliance and that is the protection of the public which then leads us onto the next consideration that the determination must take note of the need for protection of the public.
13. The maintenance of public confidence in the profession or the reputation of the profession is also a factor that it leads in from the protection of the public in the sense that members of the public gain a certain degree of comfort from knowing that professionals to whom they go for assistance are governed by a system of regulation and that there are requirements contained within that system of regulation which are there for their protection. That in turn leads to an increase in the public confidence in that profession and that in turn leads to a greater willingness on the part of the public to seek assistance from members of the profession and a more effective delivery of that assistance. So it can be seen that whilst on the one hand one might say that it is only just an administrative detail, it is far more complicated than that, it goes to the very heart of the relationship between a psychologist and client.
14. We have considered the submission made by the Board's representative as to the determination. We have also heard from Ms McDonald in relation to the determination. We are satisfied that there is no issue in relation to a reprimand pursuant to section 196(2)(a) of the National Law and a condition being imposed upon Ms McDonald's registration to the effect that she must provide the certificate of currency in respect of appropriate professional indemnity insurance coverage to the Board and AHPRA on an on-going annual basis and that the review period for the conditions is five years pursuant to section 196(1)(b)(iii).
15. The question really to be determined at this point is whether the Tribunal should suspend Ms McDonald's registration. It has been submitted on behalf of the Board that this should occur and be for a period of one month, however with a qualification that the suspension should commence at a time of the Tribunal's decision. We are satisfied that it is appropriate to suspend Ms McDonald's registration for a period of one month for the reasons already given.
16. After further submissions, we order that the suspension of Ms McDonald's registration is for a period of one month to commence on 21 October 2019. The condition which will be imposed upon Ms McDonald's registration is the effect that she must provide a certificate of currency in respect of appropriate professional indemnity insurance coverage to the Board and to AHPRA on an on-going annual basis and he review period for the condition is five years from today.

[1] [1938] 1660 CLR 336.