1. Ms Coleman is an experienced psychologist who has been in private practice since 1989. She is the director of a clinic operating in Bendigo. She finds herself before this Tribunal arising from her treatment of a female patient, Ms K.
2. Ms K was referred to her on 22 August 2008 by a general practitioner. The main presenting feature of the referral seems to have been problems arising at Ms K's work in a telemarketing centre said to be in the nature of harassment and bullying. The initial consultation occurred on 3 September 2008 and there were further consultations on 12 September, 1 and 17 October and 18 November 2008. There may also have been a consultation on 17 September. Ms Coleman does not mention it in her statement to the Tribunal although her patient records submitted to the Board on 14 December 2010 indicate a consultation on 17 September for which no charge was made; the clinic diary contains a notice of an appointment was made for Ms K at 3.00 pm that day. The copy of patient notes submitted by Ms K (which she asserts is a complete copy) contains no reference to that date although she refers to it in her statement to the Tribunal. There are two undated pages of handwritten notes which may or may not refer to that consultation.
3. The Tribunal has not seen the original notes; we do however note that the copies taken by Ms K are by no means complete as the version submitted by Ms Coleman has extra pages of handwritten written notes clearly made contemporaneously with some consultation. This is quite apart from the alterations that are the subject of some of the allegations levelled against Ms Coleman. The absence of the original notes (for whatever reason) is just one of the many unsatisfactory facets of this matter.
4. Before turning to the allegations and the particulars of the case it is necessary to make some preliminary remarks about the respondent. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations and the events that gave rise to them, the Tribunal accepts that although her actions were misguided and naive, they were the product of a desire to assist Ms K, a young lady she perceived to be troubled and in need of assistance, both financial and professional. Ms Coleman gave evidence, she was robustly cross-examined by the Board's counsel, she impressed as a credible witness, she made appropriate concessions where necessary and did not, in our view, attempt at any time to dissemble. We also noted (as a matter of background only) that in the recent past, one of Ms Coleman's employees had embezzled substantial funds from her practice thus causing her considerable anguish and subsequent financial detriment.
5. Her counsel did not cross-examine any of the Board's witnesses. There was some limited (albeit faint) submission about the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R.67 (H.L.) but the matter was not argued fully. In any event, in cases such as this the rule has limited (if any) applicability. Pursuant to orders of the Tribunal made by consent on 8 May 2012 a timetable was established for the serving and filing of all parties' materials with the final order to the effect that no party was to present at the hearing a case different from that contained in the filed material and no further evidence in chief was to be adduced or extra witnesses called without the leave of the Tribunal. Whilst , according to the rule in Browne v Dunn, it would be "wrong, unreasonable or even perverse" for the Tribunal to reject evidence upon which there are been no relevant cross-examination (Poricanin v ACI [1979] 2 NSWLR 419, 426, the rule does not, in matters such as this (where all the material is in the hands of all the parties before the hearing), preclude the Tribunal from giving consideration to anomalies that arise from a consideration of all the evidence and thus does not preclude the Tribunal from rejecting any part of Ms K's evidence in chief .

1. The allegations made against Ms Coleman are as follows:

Allegation 1 - Transgression of Professional Boundaries

5.1 From on or about 18 November 2008 to on or about 20 April 2010, Ms Coleman engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition of unprofessional conduct in section 3(1) of the HPR Act, or professional misconduct, as defined in paragraph (b) of the definition of professional misconduct in section 3(1) of the HPR Act, in that, during the course of Ms Coleman's professional relationship with her client, Ms K, and/or within an inappropriate time thereafter, Ms Coleman engaged in conduct that transgressed the professional boundaries that should, and ordinarily do, delineate the professional relationship between a psychologist and client, by engaging in interactions of a financial, social and/or personal nature with Ms K.

(a) Ms K attended consultations with Ms Coleman on 3, 12 and 17 September 2008, 1 and 17 October 2008, and 18 November 2008; and/or

(b) During or immediately after the period that Ms Coleman provided psychological treatment to Ms K, Ms Coleman engaged in a dual relationship with Ms K by offering to engage and/or engaging Ms K to perform work for her and/or paying Ms K for that work:

(i) at Ms Coleman's alpaca farm, halter-training alpacas and cleaning out their water-troughs; and/or

(ii) at The Anna Centre - a psychology practice of which Ms Coleman is the director and the location where Ms K attended consultations with Ms Coleman - as an administrative assistant, office receptionist and office manager; and/or

(c) Soon after terminating her therapeutic relationship with Ms K, Ms Coleman engaged in a dual relationship with Ms K by socialising with Ms K and Ms K's de facto partner by:

(i) inviting Ms K and [her partner] to have drinks and/or dinner at her home with her family on between four to six occasions; and/or

(ii) attending Ms K's home for social occasions twice; and/or

(iii) on or about 17 December 2009, attending upon the home of Ms K and [her partner] and giving them a roasting dish and bottle of wine as a house-warming gift; and/or

(iv) in early 2010, giving Ms K a hug following a dispute between Ms Coleman and Ms K; and/or

(d) Ms Coleman employed Ms K's de facto partner to perform, and/or condoned an arrangement whereby [he] did perform, work for The Anna Centre:

(i) assisting Ms K to reconcile accounts in the practice's Quickbooks computer program; and/or

(ii) performing maintenance work on the practice's computers and making recommendations to Ms Coleman regarding purchasing new computer software and hardware; and/or

(e) Ms Coleman inappropriately attempted to enter into a financial arrangement with Ms K and [her partner] by proposing that they purchase a share of her business, the psychology practice, The Anna Centre.

Allegation 2 - Failure to Appropriately Manage Termination of the Professional Relationship

5.2 From on or about 18 November 2008 to on or about 28 November 2008, Ms Coleman engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition of unprofessional conduct in section 3(1) of the HPR Act, or professional misconduct, as defined in paragraph (b) of the definition of professional misconduct in section 3(1) of the HPR Act, in that Ms Coleman failed to appropriately manage the termination of her professional relationship with Ms K.

(a) Ms Coleman unilaterally terminated Ms K's therapy, and/or

(b) Ms Coleman failed to provide Ms K with advance notice that she would be terminating her therapy; and/or

(c) After terminating Ms K's therapy, Ms Coleman failed to safeguard Ms K's ongoing welfare.

Allegation 3 - Failure to Maintain Confidentiality

5.3 From on or about 18 November 2008 to on or about 20 April 2010, Ms Coleman engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition of unprofessional conduct in section 3(1) of the HPR Act, or professional misconduct, as defined in paragraph (b) of the definition of professional misconduct in section 3(1) of the HPR Act, in that Ms Coleman failed to safeguard the confidentiality of information obtained by her during her provision of psychological services to Ms K.

(a) Ms Coleman inappropriately and/or unnecessarily disclosed information obtained from Ms K during the therapeutic relationship without Ms K's consent to do so:

(i) about Ms K's health to Ms K's colleagues at The Anna Centre; and/or

(ii) about Ms K's health and Ms K's experience at her previous employment in an Employer Injury Claim Report, dated 20 April 2010; and/or

(b) Ms Coleman employed (Ms K's partner] to perform, and/or condoned an arrangement whereby [he] did perform, work for The Anna Centre at The Anna Centre where Ms Coleman's records in relation to her treatment of Ms K were stored.

Allegation 4 - Failure to Maintain Accurate Records

5.4 On a date after 10 August 2010, Ms Coleman engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition of unprofessional conduct in section 5 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (Vic) (National Law), or professional misconduct, as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition of professional misconduct in section 5 of the National Law, in that Ms Coleman failed to maintain accurate records in relation to her treatment of Ms K.

(a) Ms Coleman altered the original version of her records in relation to Ms K by:

(i) deleting from her original record of her consultation with Ms K on 17 October 2008 the paragraph:

Homework was set - to put the rational/irrational alternatives into her own words and to write down a couple of situations where she thinks she needed to use this material, bring them back to the next session so we can process them; and/or

(ii) adding to her original record of her consultation with Ms K on 17 October 2008 the paragraph:

At conclusion of session [Ms K] quite buoyant. She chose not to make further appointments and felt that she was now able to cope independently; and/or

(iii) deleting from her original record of her consultation with Ms K on November 2008, the paragraph:

Booked [Ms K] back in for regular sessions; and/or

(b) Ms Coleman failed to preserve her original records in relation to her treatment of Ms K; and/or

(c) Ms Coleman failed to identify the original records in relation to her treatment of Ms K and the altered version of those records as separate documents in her records.

5.5 On or about 14 December 2010, Ms Coleman engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition of unprofessional conduct in section 5 of the National Law, or professional misconduct as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition of professional misconduct in section 5 of the National Law, in that, in responding to Ms K's notification Ms Coleman knowingly made false statements to the Board and provided inaccurate clinical records to the Board.

(a) By letter dated 14 December 2010 to the Board, Ms Coleman provided clinical records in relation to Ms K that included the alterations she made to those records outlined in Allegation 4; and/or

(b) By letter dated 14 December 2010 to the Board, Ms Coleman falsely stated:

At conclusion of session on 17/10/2008 [Ms K] stated she did not think she needed further sessions and made no further appointments; and/or

(c) By letter dated 14 December 2010 to the Board, Ms Coleman falsely stated in relation to her consultation with Ms K on 18 November 2008:

I note that Ms K states that further appointments were made. There is no evidence available to me to suggest that further appointments were made.

1. The findings we are urged to make are either findings of unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct. In this Tribunal the burden of proof lies with the applicant and the standard of proof is generally that set out in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336. at 361-3 per Dixon J. That is, the standard is on the balance of probabilities bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegations. The allegations in this case are serious and thus require a high level of satisfaction and an actual persuasion on our part in any findings we might make as to the proof of the various contested facts.

1. The relevant definitions are as follows. Section 3(1) of the Health Professions Registration Act 2005 (relevantly in force from 1 July 2007) provides :

(a) conduct of a health practitioner occurring in connection with the practice of the practitioner's health profession that is of a lesser standard than a member of the public or the health practitioner's peers are entitled to expect of a reasonably competent health practitioner of that kind;

(a) unprofessional conduct of a health practitioner, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and

(b) conduct that violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed by members of the profession of good repute or competency; and

1. Section 5(a) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) 2009 (in force from 1 July 2010) provides as follows:

unprofessional conduct, of a registered health practitioner, means professional conduct that is of a lesser standard than that which might reasonably be expected of the health practitioner by the public or the practitioner's professional peers and includes -

(a) a contravention by the practitioner of this Law, whether or not the practitioner has been prosecuted for, or convicted of, an offence in relation to the contravention;

UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT v PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

1. Before turning to a consideration of the evidence, we have thought it useful to recall the difference between unprofessional conduct on the one hand, and professional misconduct on the other. The latter definition is a restatement of the common law principle. Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc [1990] 1 Qd R 498 was a case relating to a solicitor who was said to have shared receipts from his practice with an unqualified person and then sought to cover his tracks by false statements to the Law Society. At p.507 Thomas J opined that some findings of professional misconduct were sustainable in the case before him and stated that -

The test to be applied is whether the conduct violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency

1. In Campbell v Dental Board of Victoria [1999] VSC 113 Mandie J dealt with an appeal from the Board's findings of professional misconduct. At paragraph 20 his Honour had this to say-

Turning to "professional misconduct" or "unprofessional conduct", in Ex parte Attorney-General re a Barrister and Solicitor (1972) 20 FLR 234, the ACT Supreme Court (Fox, Blackburn & Woodward JJ), referring among others to South Australian authority, said (at 242-3):

"The expression `unprofessional conduct' was considered in Re R, A Practitioner of the Supreme Court [1927] SAStRp 9; [1927] S.A.S.R. 58 and the following was said in the joint judgment of Murray C.J., Angas Parsons and Richards JJ.: `In our view `unprofessional conduct' is not necessarily limited to conduct which is "disgraceful or dishonourable", in the ordinary sense of those terms. It includes, we think, conduct which may reasonably be held to violate or to fall short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved of by members of the profession of good repute and competency.' This statement was affirmed in Re - A Practitioner of the Supreme Court [1937] SAStRp 34; [1937] SASR 316, 320-1 and the Full Court in that case added the observation: `... but the real standard is not any pedantic standard at all, but such a standard of conduct as commends itself to practitioners of good repute and good standing.' ... It is recognized that negligence and want of professional skill are not necessarily in themselves misconduct. In Re W.C. Moseley [1925] NSWStRp 17; (1925) 25 S.R. (N.S.W.) 174 Street C.J., with whom Gordon and James JJ. concurred, said: `I agree that mere neglect or delay in the transaction of a client's business does not necessarily amount to misconduct of such a character as to be punishable by the court in the exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiction, but it may do so, and each case must depend upon its own circumstances. It may be difficult sometimes to know where to draw the line, but, wherever it should properly be drawn, I think that, in the present instance, the neglect was of such character, and took place in such circumstances, as to carry the case well over it and into the region of professional misconduct.' In Re a Solicitor [1972] 1 W.L.R. 869, at p.873, Lord Denning M.R., with whom Karminski and Orr L.JJ. concurred, said: `In my opinion negligence in a solicitor may amount to a professional misconduct if it is inexcusable and is such as to be regarded as deplorable by his fellows in the profession."

In Pillai v Messiter (No.2) (1989) 16 NSWLR 197, the New South Wales Court of Appeal considered the statutory test of "misconduct in a professional respect" under the Medical Practitioners Act 1938 (NSW). Kirby P said (at 200):

"With the latest, and further, amendment it is arguable that the substitution of the new statutory test of `professional misconduct' may introduce for consideration a wider class of conduct than has hitherto been regarded as relevant. But that is a question which can remain for a future case. It may not be examined in this appeal, because of the way in which the case was conducted before the Tribunal. `Misconduct' means more than mere negligence: The words used in the statutory test (`misconduct in a professional respect') plainly go beyond that negligence which would found a claim against a medical practitioner for damages: Re Anderson, (at 575). On the other hand gross negligence might amount to relevant misconduct, particularly if accompanied by indifference to, or lack of concern for, the welfare of the patient: cf Re Anderson at (575). Departures from elementary and generally accepted standards, of which a medical practitioner could scarcely be heard to say that he or she was ignorant could amount to such professional misconduct: ibid. But the statutory test is not met by mere professional incompetence or by deficiencies in the practice of the profession. Something more is required. It includes a deliberate departure from accepted standards or such serious negligence as, although not deliberate, to portray indifference and an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner: cf Allinson (at 760-761). These are the approaches which have been taken in our courts. .'"

1. In Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria v Grolaux [2009] VCAT 901 that theme was picked up and at paragraph 53 the Tribunal opined that 'professional misconduct" was reserved for the more serious boundary transgressions. We note that in that particular case the Tribunal's panel included two appropriate health professionals, that is, two medical practitioners. So it is here; two appropriately qualified psychologists form the majority members of this panel.

The Tribunal accepts the clear evidence that Ms K attended sessions with Ms Coleman on 3 and 12 September 2008, 1 and 17 October 2008, and 18 November 2008. It also accepts the clear evidence that Ms Coleman offered Ms K paid work. The offer was in two parts. First was the offer to assist with the alpacas and second to assist with some clinic administrative chores. Just when either offer occurred is not clear. Ms K says it occurred during the 18 November consultation, Ms K's partner stated that "shortly after the consultation on 18 November 2008, [Ms K] informed me that [Ms Coleman] had offered her a few hours work with her alpacas"; in his letter to the Board on 19 December 2010 he said "either at that appointment, or shortly after that appointment Ms Coleman offered [Ms K] some work with her Alpacas". Ms K states that later on that day Ms Coleman also offered her casual employment doing "filing, archiving, creating data bases and other administrative tasks". She accepted the role. Ms Coleman's evidence is that the offer did not occur until approximately one week after the November consultation and the work was offered during a telephone conversation. Time sheets provided to the tribunal indicate some work commenced on 19 and 24 November but the records do not indicate in what capacity the work was undertaken. The time sheets were completed by Ms K. But in any event the first pay cheque (probably for alpaca work) occurred on 21 November for work said to have been performed on 19 November. In any event it is clear (at least in relation to the offer of alpaca work) that Ms Coleman's recollection is faulty. Some time in January or February 2009, Ms K took over two evening receptionist spots and on 3 March 2009 she took the position as office administrator following the abrupt resignation of another staff member. She continued in that role until 15 or 16 April 2010, at which stage she submitted a WorkCover claim and then filed a range of complaints against Ms Coleman with a range of other institutions.

1. The Australian Psychological Society has published Ethical Guidelines (8th edition) which are said to complement the Society's Code of Ethics (2007). The Guidelines describe multiple relationships as follows:

Multiple relationships occur when a psychologist, rendering a psychological service to a client, also is or has been:

(a) in a non-professional relationship with the same client;

(b) in a different professional relationship with the same client;

(c) in a non-professional relationship with an associated party; or

(d) a recipient of a service provided by the same client.

When determining whether to enter into a multiple relationship, a psychologist needs to consider;

Whether their personal needs are taking precedence over the needs of the current or former client (eg. the psychologist is wanting a friend to talk to about shared experiences). Often this problem occurs when the psychologist is experiencing personal difficulties such as separation or a loss of some kind.

Their personal motive and what they stand to gain through the multiple relationships with the current or former client. Evidence suggests that there is considerable scope for rationalisation in such situations and it is highly recommended that psychologists consult with a senior psychologist if in any doubt, or seek counselling to address issues which have been identified through this self-reflection process that may adversely affect their professional practice.

Is entering into the secondary relationship necessary, or should I avoid it?

Can the multiple relationship potentially cause harm to the client?

If harms seems unlikely or avoidable, would the additional relationship prove beneficial?

Is there a risk that the secondary relationship could disrupt the therapeutic relationship:

While multiple relationships are not always avoidable and can even be beneficial in some circumstances, they may potentially lead to impaired judgment, and sometimes inferior harmful, service delivery. Therefore if a multiple relationship is necessary or has arisen, it needs to be managed effectively so that benefits to the client are heightened and the potential for harm is avoided. The responsibility for maintaining boundaries rests with the psychologist, not the client. Psychologists exercise sound professional judgment in all situations in order to respect their client's autonomy while avoiding harm to the client.

1. Standard C.3 of the Society's Code of Ethics is headed "Conflict of Interest". Relevantly the Code provides-

C.3.1. Psychologists refrain from engaging in multiple relationships that may:

(a) impair their competence, effectiveness, objectivity, or ability to render a psychological service;

(b) harm clients or other parties to a psychological service; or

(c) lead to the exploitation of clients or other parties to a psychological service.

C.3.2. Psychologists who are at risk of violating standard C.3.1. consult with a senior psychologist to attempt to provide an appropriate resolution that is in the best interests of the parties to the psychological service.

1. Whilst none of this is set in stone and the guidelines do not have the force of law, they are eminently sensible and provide a modicum of advice for practitioners generally. Indeed they are designed to avoid the very situation in which Ms Coleman now finds herself. We accept that Ms Coleman's intentions were entirely altruistic and that there was no self serving motive. In the past she had paid her children to perform both sets of tasks. Notwithstanding that altruism, we concluded that Ms Coleman had little knowledge of her ethical responsibilities and certainly had not informed herself about recent guidelines, particularly those about multiple relationships. She certainly did not seek advice from other psychologists and indeed, we doubt the necessity to do so crossed her mind.
2. There is no evidence to support the allegation that Ms Coleman employed Ms K's partner but she did nothing to stop him assisting Ms K. It follows that we find allegations 5.1 (a) and (b) in paragraph 6 herein made out. We are not persuaded that allegations 5(1) (c) (d) and (e) can be made out for the following reasons.
3. Allegation 5(1) (c) suggests that the socialising as alleged is a transgression of professional boundaries. Ms Coleman's evidence was that there were, from time to time, social events attended by all staff. We accept that evidence and note it was corroborated by Ms McOrmond-Borgelt and Ms Mann, two employee psychologists at the clinic. The allegation that an employer giving her employee a housewarming gift amounts to a transgression of professional boundaries is simply nonsense and in any event it occurred more than twelve months after the end of the therapeutic relationship.
4. Similarly we are not persuaded that anything turns on Ms K's partner assisting her with some of her computer tasks for which she apparently was not competent to perform or was not suitably trained to perform. If it suggested that Ms K's partner accessed patient records (and we do not believe that is the allegation) he would only have been able to do with the assistance of Ms K. Ms K stated that Ms Coleman offered to pay Ms K's partner and to "add it to her hours". Ms Coleman hotly denies this. The Tribunal again notes the time sheets completed by Ms K bear no indication of her claim and that her partner denied he was so paid. In the circumstances before us, we do not consider the assistance proffered to Ms K by her life partner to be a transgression of boundaries. Rather we think it was just what it appears - an offer to help someone obviously in need of assistance.
5. We do not accept the allegation that Ms Coleman tried to persuade Ms K to buy a share of the practice. Ms Coleman told the Tribunal she did recall that at the staff meeting she indicated that it was not necessary to be a registered psychologist in order to own the business but denies this was addressed to Ms K. She disputes she made any offer to Ms K. Despite their evidence about this alleged offer, neither Ms K nor her partner have copies of the documents which Ms K says were given her by Ms Coleman. That in itself is unusual in the context of this case. Ms K's partner stated that Ms K brought home documents she said were given to her by Ms Coleman. In his letter dated 19 December 2010 sent to the applicant Ms K's partner stated that "[Ms K] informed me that Ms Coleman proposed that [she] and the other two psychologists buy a quarter share each in the practice. The value that she proposed to [Ms K] put the value of goodwill at 4 or 5 times the annual profit of the practice."
6. Ms McOrmond-Borgelt referred to the offer made by Ms Coleman and appended to her statement a copy of the accountant's summary concerning the proposed sale of business. This was the documentation given to her by Ms Coleman. It is a comprehensive document with income projections based on the previous year's figures and specifically refers to the possible purchasers as Ms McOrmond-Borgelt, Ms Mann and another non-related (but nominated) person. There is no mention in the documents of Ms K and further, the valuation of goodwill is not as stated by Ms K's partner. It is considerably less. It seems unlikely this document was given to Ms K and in the circumstances of such anomalous evidence, the allegation is not made out.
7. Allegation 2 relates to the termination of the therapeutic relationship between Ms Coleman and Ms K. We find allegations (a) and (b) proved. Whenever it was that the therapeutic relationship ended, it was ended in a clumsy, unprofessional and thoughtless fashion. Ms K's statement to the Tribunal was as follows:

About a week after my consultation with Meddwyn on 18 November 2008 I attended the Anna Centre for the next appointment that I had scheduled with Meddwyn. I told Hayley that I had arrived for my appointment and I sat on the couch in the waiting room. Meddwyn came out from a consultation with another client and suggested that she and I drive to her alpaca farm. During the car trip, Meddwyn told me that she could no longer see me as a client as she was now my boss and that the therapeutic relationship had ended. Meddwyn mentioned that I could consult one of the other psychologists at the Anna Centre.....I do not believe that Meddwyn offered to refer me to psychologist at another practice. ......After this conversation, we arrived at the alpaca farm and Meddwyn showed me what to do with her alpacas.

1. This is of course slightly at odds with her evidence about what transpired on 18 November and the time sheet indicating payment for alpaca work ostensibly performed on 19 November. Further there is no evidence in the clinic diary to support her contention that any further appointments were made after 17 October 2008 apart from the emergency consultation on 18 November arranged on that morning by her partner. In her complaint to the Board dated 28 May 2010, Ms K gave the following version:

Approximately one week later [after18 November] I attended The Anna Centre to have my consultation with Meddwyn. Meddwyn explained to me that she could no longer see me as her client as she was now my employer. Meddwyn did tell me that I could see one of the other psychologists at the practice; however, I did not feel comfortable with this. I was shocked that my therapy had ceased so quickly without any prior knowledge that this was going to be the case, especially since I had made ongoing appointments with Meddwyn the week prior.

1. The matter of whether or not ongoing appointments were made will be dealt with later in these reasons but the more probable view is that Ms K did not have a scheduled appointment on that day.
2. The Australian Psychological Society's Code of Ethics deals with termination of psychological services. (See general principle B of the Code, paragraph 11.1). The thrust of the Code is that the main focus should be the psychological wellbeing of the client as well as ensuring reasonable arrangements for the continuity of service provision. Whether Ms Coleman terminated the relationship in the car on the way to her farm, or by telephone a week or so after the 18 November consultation (as was her evidence) seems not to matter in the long run. Nor is it of great moment whether or not Ms Coleman offered a referral to another external practitioner given the contextual settings in this matter. Again we are mindful of Ms Coleman's evidence that she was seeking to help Ms K in circumstances where her client had been telling her that she and her partner were financially stressed and were having difficulties meeting their rent. But mindful of the guideline and what might be seen as best practice, we think this should have been handled in a more formal fashion and not by way of a casual statement. In our view an explanation should have been given in a clinical one-on-one setting and more positive arrangements for ongoing treatment should have been traversed fully. By that we mean there should have been a consideration of the client's perceived needs for further treatment with the practitioner indicating her treatment recommendations and canvassing appropriate options.
3. During cross-examination by the Board's counsel, Ms Coleman confessed she was confused about the temporal delineation in any event, but that is not something we are obliged to consider. But her point is valid. When does time cease to run in relation to multiple relationships? Does it follow that one should never employ anyone who has been a patient no matter how many years have passed? In Ms Coleman's eyes, the therapeutic relationship had come to a natural conclusion on 17 October 2008 when, according to her statement dealing with the alteration of notes, she said "I was concerned that the notes gave the impression that as at 17 October 2008 there were to be further appointments whereas, although further appointments were discussed, Ms K finally resolved during that session that she did not require further appointments."
4. We are not persuaded that Ms Coleman failed to have regard to Ms K's ongoing welfare once the termination occurred. We have already remarked about the failure to deal properly with a referral to another psychologist but apart from that, the evidence is clear that Ms Coleman continued to have regard for Ms K's welfare. It is true there appeared to be no awareness of the dangers inherent in commencing a dual relationship but she continued to employ Ms K and indeed increased her times and remuneration over a period of time well in excess of a year.
5. Allegation 3 relates to confidentiality. We are not persuaded this allegation is made out. Ms K herself told staff about her chronic fatigue disorder. Ms Beverley Lindrea , a receptionist who worked at the Anna Centre from 2006, gave evidence that Ms K had told her she suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome and her recollection was that Ms K had said words to the effect of "I'm stuffed, you know that I have got chronic fatigue." We accept Ms Coleman's explanation that "given that Ms K had already disclosed that she suffered from chronic fatigue I did not see that there was an issue in requesting staff...to be considerate of Ms K....... It would have been abundantly obvious to the other psychologists that Ms K was suffering from chronic fatigue_."_ In fact that was the understanding of Judith Mann, that is, that there would be days when Ms K was unwell and that others needed to be understanding.
6. In relation to the information contained in the Employer Injury Form dated 20 April 2010, arguably the information referred to was simply based on the history given by Ms K's own doctor contained in his or her medical certificate dated 15 April 2010. As the Tribunal understands it, the medical certificate was part of the claim submitted to WorkCover by Ms K. Dr Kemp's certificate stated that Ms K "has suffered from work place bullying chronic fatigue and depression in the past." We have not considered, for the purpose of this finding, Ms Coleman's responsibilities under the Accident Compensation Act 1986 but on the evidence before us we are not persuaded she breached any confidentiality requirement in completing the WorkCover form.
7. In relation to particular (b) of allegation 3, we refer to our earlier comments that the evidence does not support the claim made. If Ms K's partner did access Ms K's personal details, it would only have been with her acquiescence. There is simply no credible evidence to support the claim that Ms Coleman permitted him or condoned access by him to patients' personal records.
8. There is no question that allegation 4 (a) (b) and (c) is made out. Whilst we have no particular reason to doubt the explanation given by Ms Coleman concerning alterations to the clinical notes, the clear evidence is they were altered; she was as the Board's counsel put it "caught red-handed". She failed to preserve the original notes and failed to identify the altered version in her records. Ms Coleman gave evidence that the alterations were made because she thought the original versions were not an accurate version of what had actually transpired during the consultations. And to some extent there is some logic to part of her explanation as the Tribunal accepts that it is more probable than not that there were no further appointments made after 17 October 2008 except for the emergency appointment arranged on the morning of 18 November. We have examined the diary closely and although the entries are made in pencil there is only one visible erasure in the relevant period that can be discerned and it is not for Ms K.
9. In relation to allegation 5 we are persuaded that particular (a) is proved. In relation to paragraph (b), whilst it is true this refers to the altered version of the notes, we are not persuaded that it is an inaccurate statement because we have formed the view that no further appointments were made. Our view is the same in relation to particular (c).
10. The result is that we have found the following allegations proved:

1. We have given consideration to the findings that must be made in relation to each of the allegations and in so doing we have considered the two reports provided to the Tribunal by Professor Love in his capacity as an independent expert. It was his firm view that Ms Coleman's conduct was unethical in respect of all the allegations. That we depart from the thrust of his report to some slight degree is because we have had the benefit of hearing Ms Coleman and considering the totality of the other evidence adduced before the Tribunal.
2. In the case of each allegation we have formed the view that Ms Coleman engaged in unprofessional conduct. We are satisfied that in relation to allegations 1 and 2, she has engaged in unprofessional conduct as defined in paragraph (a) of the definition of unprofessional conduct in section 3(1) of Health Professions Registration Act 2005. In the case of allegations 4 and 5, we find she has engaged in unprofessional conduct as defined in paragraph (a) of section 5 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) 2009.
3. We have had regard to the cases put before us and have concluded that Ms Coleman's conduct was not so egregious as to warrant the more serious finding of professional misconduct. In particular we have turned our minds to earlier cases involving transgression of boundaries where the conduct has been found to be callous and predatory and often of a sexual or grossly negligent nature. That is not the case here. Whilst not seeking to minimise the seriousness of Ms Coleman's conduct, we are not persuaded that her lack of care and consideration or her conduct was of such a nature to "carry the case well over and into the region of professional misconduct". Similarly we are not of the view that her conduct was so serious or so negligent as "to portray indifference".
4. The Tribunal having made findings of unprofessional conduct by Ms Coleman it now adjourns the matter for further hearing of submissions concerning determination.
5. The Tribunal's registry is directed to contact the parties to fix a suitable date for further hearing.