//
[2021] VCAT 899
General information, not legal advice.
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2021-08-10
Original judgment source is linked above.
Review and Regulation List - Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009, ss 5, 196(2), 196(4)(b) - Multiple boundary violations, inadequate psychological services, inappropriate advice, failure to make adequate records.
Psychology Board of Australia v Brideson (Review and Regulation) [2021] VCAT 899
1 We find that Ms Brideson engaged in a way that constitutes professional misconduct within the meaning of paragraphs (a) and (c) of the definition of professional misconduct in s 5 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (National Law).
1 Ms Brideson is reprimanded under s 196(2) of the National Law.
2 Ms Brideson is prohibited from providing, whether as employee, contractor, manager or volunteer, and whether directly or indirectly, any health service involving the provision of mental health, psychological or counselling services for a period of three years from the date of this order under s 196(4)(b) of the National Law.
1 This matter involves multiple ongoing breaches by Ms Brideson of her professional obligations as a registered psychologist.
2 It is a red flag and an example to the profession of what to avoid in the practice of psychology.
3 Experienced registered psychologists are required to maintain professional standards. Ms Brideson did not do so.
4 Psychologists are not permitted to engage in personal, non-therapeutic relationships with their clients because this has the potential to worsen their client's mental health, complicating and confusing the practitioner client relationship. Ms Brideson entered into a personal, non-therapeutic relationship with her client.
5 Where a relationship does exist, it is expected that a psychologist will obtain professional supervision or advice from a colleague prior to providing psychological services or will refer the client to a different psychologist. Ms Brideson did not do so.
6 Psychologists must appropriately diagnose their client's mental health condition(s) and provide adequate psychological services to them. They should undertake adequate psychological assessments, follow an appropriate process of diagnosis, adequately consider possible co-morbidities, obtain secondary opinions where appropriate, formulate adequate treatment plans and provide adequate evidence-based interventions. Ms Brideson did none of these things.
7 Psychologists must be aware of and ensure that their services do not contribute to any possible memory distortion in their clients. Ms Brideson took no care in this regard.
8 Psychologists must adequately assess and monitor their client's risk of substance abuse, self-harm or harm to others. Ms Brideson did not do so.
9 Psychologists must refer to and/or collaborate with appropriately qualified psychiatrists or other appropriately qualified health professionals to ensure adequate treatment is given where appropriate. Ms Brideson failed to do so.
10 Psychologists must liaise with other treating practitioners. Ms Brideson did not.
11 Psychologists must manage attachments which may be formed by their clients. Ms Brideson did not.
12 Psychologists must always ensure they have obtained and documented informed consent. Ms Brideson did not do so.
13 Psychologists must maintain adequate clinical notes. Ms Brideson did not.
14 Ms Brideson engaged in conduct over a lengthy period which we can only describe as inappropriate, confounding, disturbing and unacceptable.
15 It is conduct of this type that can and does cause significant harm to both clients and the reputation of the profession of psychology.
16 On 30 June 2020, the Psychology Board of Australia ("the Board") referred Ms Brideson's conduct to this Tribunal.
17 The matter proceeded to hearing before us on 3 August 2021 at which time the parties jointly tendered an Amended Notice of Allegations together with an Agreed Statement of Facts, Findings and Determinations and a detailed joint Tribunal Book. Ms Brideson acknowledges the shortfalls of her professional practice and admits the allegations set out in the Amended Notice of Allegations.
18 The parties invited us to make the agreed findings and determinations.
19 We now turn to a discussion of these matters which we will address as follows:
(a) Part A sets out the statement of agreed facts as agreed between the parties and our observations and discussion in relation to the agreed facts.
(b) Part B sets out the statement of agreed findings pursuant to s 196 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 (National Law) as agreed between the parties together with our observations and discussion in relation to the agreed findings.
(c) Part C sets out the statement of agreed determinations as agreed between the parties together with our observations and discussion in relation to the agreed determinations.
Registration history, relevant employment history and qualifications
2 Ms Brideson was first registered as a psychologist in Victoria on 6 April 1987 by the Psychology Board of Victoria.
3 Since 1 July 2010 and the commencement of the National Law, Ms Brideson has been registered as a psychologist (General) (registration number PSY0001118592) with the Psychology Board of Australia (Board).
4 At all relevant times, Ms Brideson, was registered as a psychologist under the National Law and the prior acts, namely the Psychologists Registration Act 2000 (Vic) and the Health Professions Regulation Act 2005 (Vic).
5 At all relevant times, Ms Brideson practised as a psychologist at her residential house in Toorak, Victoria.
6 Ms Brideson surrendered her registration on 2 October 2018 after receiving notice from the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency ([AHPRA]) of an investigation into her conduct referred to in this matter.
7 At all relevant times, Ms Brideson was obliged to comply with the applicable Code of Ethics for psychologists, namely the Australian Psychological Society Code of Ethics (October 2003) (the 2003 Code) and the Australian Psychological Society Code of Ethics (2007) (the 2007 Code).
8 The obligations imposed on Ms Brideson by the 2003 Code relevantly included that psychologists must:
9 The obligations imposed on Ms Brideson by the 2007 Code relevantly included that psychologists must:
10 Ms Brideson first met Client [XY] in 1992 at a psychology conference for survivors of child abuse that Ms Brideson facilitated.
11 Between 1992 and 2006, Ms Brideson socialised with Client [XY] occasionally, including meeting for coffee at cafes and meeting at Client [XY's] fitness business. Ms Brideson met with Client [XY] and [OL], [Client XY's] daughter, and Ms Brideson gave [OL] an angel plaque following the death of one of [OL's] classmates.
12 Between approximately May 2006 and March 2010 (Relevant Period), Ms Brideson provided psychological sessions to Client [XY] approximately 2 to 3 times per week.
13 At the time of commencing the therapeutic relationship with Client [XY], Ms Brideson had in the order of 19 years' experience practising as a psychologist.
14 Client [XY] commenced psychological treatment with Ms Brideson when Client [XY] was in a vulnerable condition following her divorce in 2004 and her mother's death prior to 2006, and by reason of her presenting symptoms.
15 Client [XY] presented with complex psychological symptoms, including suicidal ideation and self-harm. She reported that her early family life was abusive and she suffered child sex abuse including at the hands of her family. Client [XY] has experienced psychological difficulties all her life, and had experienced problems with heroin use in her late adolescence or early adulthood.
16 Notwithstanding sharing social interactions with Client [XY] prior to 2006, Ms Brideson commenced providing psychological services to Client [XY]. The personal relationship continued during and after Ms Brideson provided psychological services to Client [XY]. Ms Brideson did not:
17 Whilst Ms Brideson was providing regular psychological services to Client [XY] over the Relevant Period, Ms Brideson engaged in a personal, non-therapeutic relationship with Client [XY] which involved:
18 Whilst Ms Brideson was providing regular psychological services to Client [XY] during the Relevant Period, Client [XY] developed an intense attachment to Ms Brideson.
19 The breach of professional boundaries by Ms Brideson complicated and intensified the attachment Client [XY] had formed towards her and had the potential to worsen Client [XY's] mental health. Client [XY] was a survivor of child sexual abuse and was therefore particularly vulnerable to any departure from professional boundaries.
20 Client [XY's] regular therapeutic sessions with Ms Brideson ended in 2010. Between March 2010 and 2017, Ms Brideson continued to provide psychological services to Client [XY] on an infrequent basis, comprising of approximately 3 to 5 sessions per year.
21 From March 2010, Ms Brideson continued to engage in a personal, non-therapeutic relationship with Client [XY], which involved:
22 Ms Brideson continues to have a personal, non-therapeutic relationship with Client [XY].
23 Ms Brideson's conduct was in breach of the 2003 Code and the 2007 Code.
24 Ms Brideson did not provide adequate psychological services to Client [XY].
25 Ms Brideson did not, in their first or in any subsequent consultation, conduct an adequate initial assessment of Client [XY]. Client [XY's] file does not adequately document a description of Client [XY's] presenting psychological problems; the history of those problems; Client [XY's] current circumstances; a broad account of Client [XY's] relevant personal background including developmental history and history of psychological functioning; Client [XY's] past and current treatment history and her responses to that treatment; a detailed mental status examination; diagnosis and differential diagnoses; agreed upon treatment goals; and the treatments and interventions required in order to address the presenting problems and achieve the agreed upon treatment goals.
26 Ms Brideson did not obtain and document informed consent from Client [XY] prior to providing psychological services to Client [XY].
27 At the commencement of the treatment, Ms Brideson diagnosed Client [XY] with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Ms Brideson did not adequately consider that Client [XY] met the diagnostic criteria for DID, or the impact of depression and anxiety on her diagnoses, or whether DID and PTSD were co-morbid with other mental disorders.
29 From the outset of treatment, Ms Brideson believed that Client [XY] had been the victim of what she described as a 'satanic cult' which abused and murdered children. Ms Brideson formed this belief based upon what Client [XY] told her during the sessions.
30 Ms Brideson asked Client [XY] to agree to a treatment program which included a number of irregular requirements, including:
31 During the course of her psychological treatment, Client [XY] received medications intermittently, including anxiolytics and anti-depressants. Ms Brideson did not liaise or collaborate with an appropriately qualified psychiatrist regarding Client [XY's] treatment and did not adequately liaise or collaborate with Client [XY's] general practitioner.
32 Ms Brideson did not adequately assess and monitor Client [XY's] risk of substance abuse, self-harm and/or of harming others.
33 The treatment approach was not adequately supported by a body of clinical outcome research and was inconsistent with well-established evidence in the field of cognitive science and memory. Psychological treatments with demonstrated effectiveness for post-traumatic conditions, including trauma focused cognitive behavioural therapy, dialectical behavioural therapy and/or interpersonal therapy, were available to Ms Brideson but not adequately provided.
34 The techniques used by Ms Brideson had the potential to create false memories and distort existing memories of Client [XY].
35 Ms Brideson did not adequately manage the attachment Client [XY] had formed.
36 At the commencement of the psychological services, Ms Brideson knew that Client [XY] was the mother of [OL]. Between approximately May 2006 and June 2008, Ms Brideson knew that:
37 Ms Brideson provided advice to Client [XY's] daughter, [OL] about Client [XY].
38 In or about 2006, Ms Brideson advised [OL] not to tell anyone about Client [XY's] condition, and on or about 3 December 2007, Ms Brideson advised [OL]:
39 The advice Ms Brideson provided to [OL] about Client [XY] was inappropriate, in that:
40 Ms Brideson failed to refer [OL] to receive her own counselling from a suitable independent practitioner. Ms Brideson's conduct was in breach of the 2003 Code and the 2007 Code.
41 During the Relevant Period, Ms Brideson failed to make and keep adequate clinical records of the psychological services she provided to Client [XY] that contained sufficient detail to facilitate continuity of care, including but not limited to records relating to:
42 Ms Brideson did not record any adequate psychological assessment of Client [XY] at their first or in any subsequent consultation. Ms Brideson did not document an adequate treatment plan for Client [XY]. Client [XY's] clinical record did not contain periodical entries in relation to her progress toward treatment goals; any potential risk to Client [XY] or others identified and how any potential risk present was to be managed.
43 Ms Brideson's conduct was in breach of the 2003 Code and the 2007 Code.
20 In matters such as this, the civil standard of proof - the balance of probabilities - applies. The evidence is assessed against that standard having regard to the observations of the High Court in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336.
21 We must reach a comfortable level of satisfaction in finding the factual matters proved on the balance of probabilities, consistent with the seriousness of the allegations and reflecting the serious consequences of any finding. The Board bears the onus of proving the facts.
22 The parties jointly submitted, and we accept, that we could be comfortably satisfied Ms Brideson engaged in the conduct alleged in the Amended Notice of Allegations.
23 We make the following observations in relation to those proved facts.
24 We were concerned by the disregard for her professional responsibilities displayed by Ms Brideson. We agreed with the descriptors utilised by Mr Guy Coffey, Clinical Psychologist, who prepared a report on behalf of the Board. He characterised Ms Brideson's treatment of Client XY as "bizarre, reckless and exploitive."
25 Mr Coffey was critical of Ms Brideson's treatment approach, which he described as "inconsistent with well-established evidence in the field of cognitive science and memory."
26 He states that Ms Brideson's techniques were "flagrantly incautious in relation to the risk of creating false memories and distorting existing memories."
27 Once again, we agree with Mr Coffey's observations.
28 Ms Brideson, in response, directed our attention to Mr Coffey's acknowledgement that:
At the time of [Ms Brideson's] and [Client [XY's]] engagement, the beliefs and preconceptions informing [Ms Brideson's] treatment were discredited in the scientific community and among clinicians who ensure their practice is based on evidence. However, it is [his] understanding that a small minority of clinicians did hold [Ms Brideson's] view in respect to DID and its aetiology and treatment. [Ms Brideson] did not entirely invent her treatment approach and she may have found support for it among liked (sic) minded peers.
there is no evidence that [Ms Brideson's] intent was malevolent or indifferent to [Client [XY's]] well-being. On the evidence, [Ms Brideson] wanted to help [Client [XY]] and she expended considerable time and effort to do so.
29 We make the observation and comment that it does little to bolster the case of Ms Brideson that she did not entirely invent her treatment approach.
30 Further, we consider it generous of Mr Coffey to recognise any desire on the part of Ms Brideson to help her client.
31 The multiple boundary violations displayed in this case do not and cannot lead us to this conclusion.
32 We consider that Ms Brideson harboured, at best, a blind indifference to her professional obligations and the wellbeing of her client. Ms Brideson undertook work which was demonstrably beyond her professional competence, despite apparently recognising that this was a difficult and complex case. We were told by counsel on her behalf that she did so because she did not wish to leave her client in the wilderness. We did not accept that this explanation assisted her. We do not understand why Ms Brideson did not refer her client to an appropriate source of expertise given she was practising in a major Australian city where that expertise could have readily been found.
33 Ms Brideson's conduct was inconsistent with the 2003 and 2007 Codes.
34 She did not make and keep adequate records. She did not avoid dual relationships. She engaged in conduct which could impair her professional judgement and increase the risk of exploitation of her client.
35 Ms Brideson did not fully inform her client about the services she was providing. Nor did she obtain informed consent before disclosing confidential information obtained during the consulting relationship. She did not seek professional supervision or obtain any professional advice as to whether she should limit, suspend or terminate the provision of psychological services.
36 She did not keep adequate records. She did not act with the care and skills expected of a competent psychologist.
37 She did not take reasonable steps to prevent harm occurring as a result of her conduct.
38 Vulnerable clients must rely on the judgement and expertise of health practitioners. Clients cannot be expected to know what best practice is. The fact that no complaint was made by the client illustrates the power of the relationship between psychologist and client. This becomes particularly difficult for a client to detect where boundary violations exist.
39 Ms Brideson and her client were not friends. They were in a professional psychologist client relationship.
40 We consider that by her actions Ms Brideson brought her profession into disrepute.
41 We turn then to consider the appropriate findings.
44 The parties propose that the Tribunal find Ms Brideson engaged with Patient [XY] in a way that constitutes professional misconduct within the meaning of paragraphs (a) and (c) of the definition of professional misconduct in s 5 of the National Law as alleged in the Amended Notice of Allegations.
42 The definition of professional misconduct in s 5 of the National Law relevantly reads as follows:
professional misconduct, of a registered health practitioner, includes -
(a) unprofessional conduct by the practitioner that amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and
(c) conduct of the practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's profession or not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.
43 We are satisfied that, over an extended period between May 2006 and 2017, Ms Brideson behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct within the meaning of paragraphs (a) and (c) of the National Law.
(a) failing to maintain the professional boundaries that should delineate a psychologist/clinical relationship with her client, Client XY, by engaging in a personal, non-therapeutic relationship with Client XY before, during and after she provided psychological services to Client XY;
(b) failing to appropriately diagnose Client XY's mental health conditions and provide adequate psychological services to Client XY;
(c) failing to obtain professional supervision of the psychological services she provided to Client XY;
(d) failing to obtain Client XY's informed consent prior to providing her with psychological services and prior to disclosing information about Client XY's condition to others;
(e) failing to make and keep adequate clinical records of the psychological services provided to Client XY; and
(f) providing inappropriate advice to Client XY's daughter, OL, about Client XY.
45 We are satisfied that Ms Brideson engaged in unprofessional conduct that amounted to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience.
46 We are further satisfied that Ms Brideson engaged in conduct which occurred both within and outside the practice of Ms Brideson's profession, that was inconsistent with Ms Brideson being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession. Ms Brideson's conduct is serious.
48 In Psychology Board of Australia v Griersmith [2019] VCAT 52, the Tribunal stated at [67] (citations omitted):
The term 'fit and proper person' is not defined in the National Law but its meaning has been the subject of much judicial comment. The test does not carry defined criteria but allows for a wide range of matters to be considered. It includes not only whether a person has the necessary honesty, knowledge and ability but also whether the person possesses sufficient moral integrity and rectitude of character to permit them to be accredited to the public as a person to be entrusted with the sort of work the relevant registration or licence entails. The decision maker needs to make a value judgment and, in so doing, must make an assessment of the seriousness or otherwise of the particular conduct for evaluation. The same approach is to be applied to weighing matters in favour of the person. The test must be applied in the context of what the person will be authorised to do if the relevant permission is given.
49 Ms Brideson accepts that she was in a position of power and trust because of the therapeutic relationship. Ms Brideson accepts that her professional judgment was deficient in this case, and the deficiency in management potentially risked harm to Client XY.
50 We agree with the submissions of the Board, but rejected by Ms Brideson, that Ms Brideson's:
(a) personal, non-therapeutic relationship with Client XY;
(b) failure to provide adequate psychological services;
considered in its totality, is not only serious unacceptable conduct, but amounts to an abuse of the power and trust held by her in the relationship. We consider this to be indicative of deficient professional judgement.
51 We consider that Ms Brideson's rejection of the characterisation of her conduct as an abuse of power and trust is reflective of her lack of insight into the tremendous power held by psychologists dealing with vulnerable individuals.
52 The Board further contends that the conduct demonstrates that Ms Brideson does not have the knowledge and ability, nor does she possess sufficient moral integrity, to hold registration. Whilst Ms Brideson rejects this characterisation and assessment of her, we consider it to be the only conclusion open to us. We cannot otherwise explain her multiple shortcomings.
53 We finally turn to a consideration of the appropriate determinations.
45 The parties jointly invite the Tribunal to impose the following determinations under s 196(2) of the National Law:
54 The purpose of a determination is twofold: to protect the public, and to uphold and maintain the professional standards of the profession in the eyes of the public.[1]
55 The law relating to the making of determinations was extensively considered and summarised in Medical Board of Australia v Jansz [2011] VCAT 1026 at [358]- [373] and Medical Board of Australia v Naik [2009] VCAT 755 at [60]- [61], and was recently summarised by this Tribunal in Medical Board of Australia and Pharmacy Board of Australia v Lee [2019] VCAT 311 as follows:
(a) the purpose of the imposition of determinations is to protect the public;[2]
(b) determinations are intended to maintain proper ethical and professional standards for the protection of the public and also for the protection of the profession in the sense of maintaining stature and integrity in the eyes of the public;[3]
(c) determinations should in no way be punitive;[4]
(d) the objectives of determinations can be achieved by specific deterrence, that is, the deterrence of the person concerned from further inappropriate conduct; by general deterrence, that is, the deterrence of other practitioners minded to conduct themselves similarly; and by facilitation of rehabilitation on the part of the practitioner;
(e) personal matters such as shame, personal ordeal, and financial difficulty are of little relevance save insofar as they contribute to the specific deterrence of the practitioner;
(f) the likelihood of recidivism, or, put another way, an assessment of the ongoing risk posed by the practitioner, should be central to the imposition of a determination;[5]
(g) the degree to which the practitioner has acquired insight into his or her conduct is relevant to the assessment of the continuing risk posed by the practitioner;
(h) insight can include an understanding of the nature of the conduct, an acceptance that the conduct was wrong, an appreciation of why the practitioner engaged in that conduct, empathy with the consequences, and/or a willingness to take measures to identify risk factors and to do that which is necessary to avoid further transgressions; and
(i) any form of official censure is of consequence. It has been observed by the Courts that a reprimand is a serious matter for a professional person and should not be considered a 'slap over the wrist'.[6]
56 We accept that Ms Brideson has no other disciplinary history. We also accept that the notification process and this proceeding will have had a deterrent effect on Ms Brideson.
57 Because Ms Brideson has surrendered her registration and has advised the Tribunal that she has retired from practice, we accept that she now poses no ongoing risk.
58 Specific deterrence therefore has little work to do in this matter.
59 We agree with the joint submissions of the parties that general deterrence is a significant consideration in this matter. In assessing the importance of general deterrence, it is important to look at the nature and seriousness of the conduct and the risk of future harm if the conduct were engaged in by others.
60 In Psychology Board of Australia v Garcia [2015] VCAT 128, the Tribunal relevantly said at [46]:
General deterrence is a more important factor in the case. Psychologists treat vulnerable people. There is an inherent imbalance in the professional relationship. If this is allowed to transfer into a personal relationship, the potential exists for damage to the client. This is why there are rules designed to prevent such occurrences. These rules are fundamental to the regulation of the psychologist/client relationship. The disposition must reflect the Tribunal's support of this regulation and the requirement to illustrate that failing to meet the standard has disciplinary consequences.
61 We agree with the parties that, in order to discharge our protective function, we must impose a disposition that deters other practitioners from engaging in boundary transgressions.
62 It is important to send a clear signal to other practitioners that boundary transgressions are serious and will have serious consequences on a practitioner's ability to continue to practise.
63 Ms Brideson's conduct has the potential to bring the profession into disrepute and to damage the significant trust and confidence placed in the profession by clients and the public.
64 Through our disposition we must also endeavour to restore the reputation of the profession and protect the standards of the profession by ensuring that high professional standards are reinforced, and transgressions are denounced.
65 We agree with the parties that the determinations to be imposed in this matter must be sufficiently serious to demonstrate that psychologists who engage in conduct of this nature will not be permitted to remain as members of the profession or be permitted to provide other, unregulated, counselling or mental health services to the public.
66 We were referred by the parties to a number of cases in which the Tribunal ordered that the practitioner be reprimanded and variously made prohibition orders, imposed fines, a period of suspension, or conditions on the practitioner's registration, or a combination of these.
67 Although other cases are important, it is of course always necessary to focus on the factual matrix in the case before us.
68 The following aggravating features of this matter weigh heavily on our minds and are relevant to our determination:
(a) The boundary transgressions were obvious and occurred over a protracted period of time. This was not a one-off or isolated lapse in judgement - Ms Brideson's personal relationship with Client XY occurred over many years and continues to this day.
(b) Client XY was highly vulnerable with complex mental health issues, which exacerbated the power imbalance between Ms Brideson and Client XY.
(c) Ms Brideson demonstrated little insight into, or remorse for, her behaviour at the investigation stage and during the early stages of this proceeding. A letter from Ms Brideson's solicitors to the AHPRA investigator dated 20 November 2018 merely stated that Ms Brideson admitted to having a concurrent personal relationship with Client XY. It was only at the compulsory conference held in this matter on 9 February 2021 that Ms Brideson accepted that she has engaged in professional misconduct.
(d) There is no evidence that Ms Brideson has undertaken any training, further education or received mentor review in respect of maintaining professional boundaries with patients since the complaint in this matter was made. Although Ms Brideson rejects its practical relevance given she is now retired, with no intention of returning to practise, we consider it may have assisted her in coming to terms with the enormity of her conduct and her ongoing relationship with Client XY.
(e) Ms Brideson has not ceased her relationship with Client XY. Ms Brideson believes they remain on good terms with infrequent contact being made now and then via social media updates and other electronic means.
(f) The treatment Ms Brideson provided to Client XY was characterised by Mr Coffey as wholly inadequate, "inconsistent with well-established evidence in the field of cognitive science and memory" and "bizarre, reckless and exploitive". Whilst Ms Brideson rejects these latter descriptors, we agree with the Board that there is a real question surrounding Ms Brideson's competence and whether she has the necessary skills to practise safely.
(g) Ms Brideson's personal relationship with Client XY.
69 Ultimately, we agree with the parties that the determinations jointly sought by them in this case are appropriate.
70 A reprimand is a serious form of censure and an important tool in disciplinary proceedings by which the Tribunal can publicly condemn the behaviour of the practitioner.[7] A reprimand does not trivialise a serious lapse of professional standards and has the potential for serious adverse implications for the practitioner. It is appropriate to reprimand Ms Brideson in this case as the seriousness of her conduct is worthy of the censure.
71 A prohibition order will ensure that Ms Brideson cannot continue to provide counselling or any other, unregulated, mental health services to clients.
72 Although Ms Brideson is no longer registered as a psychologist, it would be open to her to seek work as a counsellor or mental health worker if such an order was not made, which could place the public and other vulnerable people seeking treatment and assistance with mental health conditions at risk.
73 The dispositions will send a clear message to other practitioners that there is an absolute prohibition against boundary transgressions and such conduct is not tolerated.
74 We will make the determinations as agreed by the parties.
[1] Ha v Pharmacy Board of Victoria [2002] VSC 322.
[2] Ha v Pharmacy Board of Victoria [2002] VSC 322, [91].
[3] Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] NSWSC 297; (1997) 41 NSWLR 630, 637; Ha v Pharmacy Board of Victoria [2002] VSC 322, [97].
[4] Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association [1960] HCA 40; (1960) 104 CLR 186, 201; New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt [1968] HCA 20; (1968) 117 CLR 177, 183.
[5] Mullany v Psychologists Registration Board, unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 22 December 1997 per Gillard J, p 13.
[6] Peeke v Medical Board of Victoria (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 19 January 1993).
[7] Peeke v Medical Board of Victoria (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 19 January 1993) cited in Pharmacy Board of Australia v Mak [2017] VCAT 1901, [27]-[28].
Psychology Board of Australia
Brideson
(1997) 41 NSWLR 630
(1968) 117 CLR 177
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(1960) 104 CLR 186