Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal|2010-05-04

Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria v Mair (Occupational and Business Regulation) [2010] VCAT 534 (4 May 2010)

Occupational & Business Regulation List - psychologist - disciplinary proceeding -sexual relationship between patient and psychologist - Psychologists Registration Act 2000 sections 3, 6 and 141(1A) - Health Professions Registration Act 2005 s 169 - Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 s 146(4)(b)

The respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct of a serious nature within the meaning of s 48(1)(a) of the Psychologists Registration Act 2000, namely, unprofessional conduct within the meaning of s 3(a), (b) and (c) of the definition of "unprofessional conduct" of the Act. The unprofessional conduct relates to -
1. Transgression of professional boundaries by allowing an inappropriate personal relationship to develop between the respondent and ON.

(i) pursuant to s 48(2)(c) of the Act the respondent is reprimanded.

(ii) pursuant to s 48(2)(g) of the Act the respondent is suspended from practising as a psychologist until 28 February 2011.

(iii) pursuant to s 48(2)(d) of the Act the respondent continue therapy at her own expense for a period of 12 months from this date by a clinical psychologist approved by the applicant Board and the clinical psychologist should provide quarterly reports to the applicant Board which state -

(a) a summary of treatment he/she is providing; and

(b) the respondent's capacity to work ethically and competently as a psychologist.

(iv) pursuant to s 48(2)(e) of the Act a condition is to be placed on the respondent's registration to the effect that at the time of the respondent commencing to practise, she is to be supervised, for a period of at least two years, by a psychologist approved by the Board at the expense of the respondent.

This proceeding was commenced by the applicant against the respondent psychologist by a letter of referral, which letter was subsequently amended. The amended letter of referral relevantly states :

From on or about February 2006 until on or about June 2007, Ms Mair engaged in unprofessional conduct as defined in paragraphs (a) and/or (b) and/or (c) and/or (d) of the definition of 'unprofessional conduct' in section 3 of the PR Act, in that she engaged in an inappropriate sexual relationship and/or inappropriate social relationship with her

(b) former client, Mr X, within an inadequate period of time after the termination of her professional relationship,

thereby entering and engaging in a dual relationship and transgressing professional boundaries.

(The "Mr X" referred to in the letter of referral is known as "ON" for the purposes of this proceeding).

"Unprofessional conduct" is defined in s 3 of the Psychologists Registration Act 2000 (the Act) to mean -

"unprofessional conduct" means all or any of the following -

(a) professional conduct which is of a lesser standard than that which the public might reasonably expect of a registered psychologist; or

(b) professional conduct which is of a lesser standard than that which might reasonably be expected of a registered psychologist by his or her peers; or

(d) infamous conduct in a professional respect; ...

The Act is relevant in this proceeding as the notification in this matter took place after 1 July 2007 in relation to events prior to that time. Because the notification is after that date the matter is validly before the Tribunal.
Dr Freckelton SC for the applicant succinctly summarised the provision of s 169 of the Health Professions Registration Act 2005 which, in turn, referred to (for the purposes of this proceeding) the Psychologists Registration Act 2000.

Section 169 says ... that the Tribunal can only make those orders and decisions which would have been open in relation to conduct engaged in at the relevant time. The conduct relevant here is conduct that was during the earlier Act, so that throws the Tribunal back to the terminology and the concepts of the Psychologists Registration Act 2000_._

Section 48 of the Act deals with the conduct of "the panel", which for the purposes of this proceeding, should be read as "the Tribunal". Relevantly s 48 of the Act reads :

48. Findings and determinations of a formal hearing into conduct

(1) After considering all the submissions made to a formal hearing into the professional conduct of a registered psychologist the panel may find that -

(a) the psychologist has, whether by act or omission, engaged in unprofessional conduct of a serious nature; or

(b) the psychologist has, whether by act or omission, engaged in unprofessional conduct which is not of a serious nature; or

(2) If the panel finds that the psychologist has, whether by act or omission, engaged in unprofessional conduct of a serious nature, the panel may make one or more of the following determinations -

(a) require the psychologist to undergo counselling;

(d) require the psychologist to undertake further education of the kind stated in the determination and to complete it within the period specified in the determination;

(e) impose conditions, limitations or restrictions on the registration of the psychologist;

(f) impose a fine on the psychologist of not more than $2000;

(g) suspend the registration of the psychologist for the period specified in the determination;

(3) If the panel finds under sub-section (1)(b) that the psychologist has, whether by act or omission, engaged in unprofessional conduct which is not of a serious nature, the panel may make any determination which a panel at an informal hearing is able to make upon making such a finding.

The respondent was born on 7 August 1977 and is now aged 32 years. The respondent attended Monash University and completed a Bachelor of Science with a double major in Psychology. She then commenced a post graduate diploma of Applied Psychology which she completed in 2001. After serving two years of supervised practice, in June 2003 the respondent became a registered psychologist.
The history of the respondent's work as a psychologist is set out in her statement dated 9 January 2009 as follows :

I completed a Post Graduate Diploma in Applied Psychology at Monash University's Caulfield campus in 2001. I then completed two years of supervised practice with a supervisor, Gina Cidoni.

I finished supervised practice in early 2003. I became registered in June 2003.

I worked as a Community Corrections Officer with Corrections Victoria for a year and a half, from November 2000 - August 2002. My work involved supervising offenders who were on non custodial sentences or out on parole. This was a supervisory role as a case manager. I was not working as a clinician.

In August 2002, I left Corrections Victoria and worked externally as a probationary psychologist with an employment agency for about 10 months. I then worked briefly as a Project Development Officer at NorthWestern Mental Health for around 10 months. I then returned to work as a psychologist for Corrections Victoria. I have not checked my employment records, but believe this was in February 2004.

The respondent still works for Corrections Victoria, although at the commencement of the hearing the respondent was on secondment to the Department of Racing and Gambling as a project and policy officer. The secondment was for a period of 3 months from 14 December 2009. Upon completion of such secondment, the respondent has been on sick leave from the Department of Corrections.
Upon Corrections Victoria becoming aware of the events referred to in the notice of referral above (see paragraph 1 hereof), the respondent's duties changed from being a clinician. At paragraphs 47 ff of the respondent's witness statement dated 9 January 2009, the respondent describes her employment up until the time of her secondment to the Department of Gaming and Racing. The respondent stated :

I advised my managers at the Corrections Victoria of my transgression and my application for the intervention order in August 2008.

My employer placed a condition on my employment at that time, which was not to have contact with any clients (offenders), or to supervise any staff. I was allowed to continue in the role of a Program Officer. I was provided with regular internal supervision. My employer is aware that I have also been engaged in regular external supervision and has supported me with this.

In December 2008, the Deputy Commissioner of Prisons and Transitional Services, Mr Rod Wise, issued me with a first and final formal warning in relation to departmental misconduct. I provided a letter by Dr List to confirm that I was attending regular counselling appointments to address the transgression. I accepted that I had transgressed the department's code of conduct.

After the issuing of the warning, my employers made a decision to allow me to return to clinical work. I will be allowed to work with clients and will be allowed to supervise staff if required. I intend to return to a clinical position in February 2009.

It should be noted that when the respondent returned to her position as a psychologist at the Dame Phyllis Frost Centre in February 2009, conditions were placed on her registration by the Board. At paragraph 24 of the respondent's witness statement of 30 November 2009, she states those conditions :
1. In April 2009, the Board placed conditions on my registration which require me to
  - 24.1 refrain from engaging in any role whereby I assume the responsibility for clinical supervision of psychologists who provide direct psychological services to the community
  - 24.2 undertake fortnightly supervision at my expense with a clinical psychologist who is approved by the Board. They must provide quarterly reports to the Board, commencing on 30 July 2009, about my progress in supervision, at my expense. This supervision will address the following issues
    - (a) Professional boundaries;
    - (b) Power imbalances in the therapist-client relationship;
    - (c) Vulnerabilities in the psychologist that can impact upon the exercise of good judgment; and
    - (d) Transference and counter-transference.
  - 24.3 continue to engage in counselling at my own expense with Dr David List, registered psychologist, or, should he be unavailable, by another clinical psychologist approved by the Board, who will provide quarterly reports to the Board, at my expense, which address the following issues
    - (a) A summary of treatment he is providing.
    - (b) His view as to the likelihood of my engaging in further unprofessional conduct, or any similar behaviour, as described in my affidavit, sworn 9 January 2009; and
    - (c) My capacity to work ethically and competently as a psychologist.

The first quarterly report will be provided by 30 April 2009.

24.4 If there are any changes to my employment with the Department of Justice or I leave the Department to engage in another position, I will immediately notify the Board. Consequently, the agreement will come back at that time to the Board for renegotiation.

24.5 Refrain from engaging in private practice.

ON was released from prison after having served 4 years of a 6 year term for manslaughter. At the time of ON's release from prison, he was on parole. As part of a condition of his parole, ON was obliged to undergo treatment to address his offending behaviour. As a result, Community Corrections Office referred ON to the respondent.
After having assessed that ON was not suitable for group therapy, the respondent treated ON on a one on one basis. Initially, the consultations were approximately once weekly but after about six months, the consultations were reduced to fortnightly.
The consultations were conducted in a meeting room where the respondent sat on one side of a table and ON sat on the other side.
It seems clear that the therapy sessions given by the respondent to ON commenced in June 2005 and concluded in approximately 12 January 2006. At this time, the respondent referred ON for a neurological assessment with an organisation called "ARBIAS (Acquired Brain Injury Assessment Unit)".
It is clear that during that time both ON and the respondent developed some romantic feelings for each other.
At page 48 of the transcript, the respondent describes the commencement of these feelings in the following terms. She stated :

I think it would have been in the latter third of the treatment period that ON made some advances towards me in therapy whereby he would try to hold my hand in therapy and he also discussed his intention or his desire to have a relationship with me after therapy had concluded. ...

Initially I rejected those advances and I tried to reiterate that we had a professional relationship, that we didn't have a personal relationship and I tried to re-explain the purpose of our professional relationship and that that behaviour wasn't acceptable.

... There was a time towards the latter part of therapy, probably around the same period where I started to feel some feelings towards him also.

... I think slowly I became less insistent that he for example stop holding my hand or stop making advances, I think I made more - I allowed that.

... He was trying to make physical contact with me and wanting to have a relationship with me.

.... Did it go beyond hand holding in therapy? No, it didn't.

After the respondent's counselling sessions with ON had concluded for that time, in approximately early February 2006 (probably Saturday 6 February 2006), the respondent made a visit to ON's house in Seaford. That first visit lasted from 1 to 2 hours. During that time, both the respondent and ON expressed their feelings for each other and there was apparently some kissing and cuddling between them.
There were a number of further visits by the respondent to ON's house, where eventually intercourse took place. Further, there were occasions where the respondent and ON would go out together to places such as a restaurant or for a walk. Also, on occasions, the respondent spent nights at ON's house.
Following an incident in about the middle of April 2006 when ON became violent, the respondent decided to cease her relationship with him. At page 60 of the transcript, the respondent described the incident -

I think it all came to a head one day when I saw him at his residence and he got upset with me and angry with me for taking a phone call and became abusive and threatening and he threw a clothes airer like towards me and it went across the other side of the room and broke the window.

... then he approached me and I thought that he was going to hit me but I managed to de-escalate the situation and managed to leave the premises and it was after that that I had decided for personal and professional reasons I couldn't continue with the relationship.

... In the back of my mind I knew what I was doing was wrong professionally and that started to I guess grate on my consciousness if you like more and more and the guilt - I was feeling a lot of guilt as well.

Later (at page 64 of the transcript), the respondent describes how she attempted to inform ON that the relationship had ended. She stated -

I think it might have been on the phone, um, that I explained to him that I couldn't continue with the relationship for um personal and professional reasons, um, and also because I - I had feared - I feared for my safety um after the incident at his residence.

A few days after the telephone call, which we have described, ON was arrested for assaulting his father. As a result, he breached his parole and was returned to prison for approximately 3 months.
Even though the respondent's treatment of ON ostensibly finished, although not formally terminated, in January 2006, it was not until 24 July that the respondent completed her Clinical Services Individual Treatment Outcome Summary. In that summary, the respondent reported that she had 21 sessions with ON between 27 June 2005 and 12 January 2006. It should be noted that it is usual for such summaries to be completed by the psychologist as soon as practicable after the therapeutic treatment had stopped.
While ON was in prison, he telephoned the respondent on one occasion and sent her a birthday card (the respondent did not give ON her address but he found it out by apparently seeing a bill in the respondent's handbag). There does not appear to have been constant contact between the two during this period. That is, until 31 January 2007, when ON was again released on parole.
On 1 February 2007, ON made numerous telephone calls to the respondent which appeared to be of a very short duration. Later that day, the respondent telephoned ON (on his new mobile number which he had obtained after leaving prison) and there was a conversation just short of one and a half hours.
The respondent said as a result of past events and that telephone conversation, she was scared of ON and wanted to end the relationship. She further stated that in order to end the relationship, she made a trip to Rye where ON was living with his parents.
At paragraph 36 of the respondent's affidavit of 9 January 2009, the respondent describes what happened on her visit to Rye -

I gave in and went to see him in Rye, where he was living with his mother and stepfather. Once again, part of me was trying to placate and pacify him. I had no intention of resuming a relationship with him, but he clearly had in mind that he wanted to resume the relationship. I had to consistently keep explaining to him that this wasn't going to happen. This went on for a few hours. He initiated sex with me that day, I did not want to have sex with him but I was too afraid to resist. I told him that I did not want to have sex, but he said something about having to wait for 8 months and I gave in. I did not want the intimacy to happen, but I did not try to stop him any further. That was the last time I was intimate with him.

Between 2 February and 8 June 2007, there were many telephone calls between ON and the respondent. From the respondent's mobile telephone records, it would appear that she made approximately 37 calls to ON and he made some 19 calls to her. Many of these calls were for a period of a long duration - in excess of half an hour - and some of the calls were in fact in excess of one hour.
At paragraphs 37 and 38 of the respondent's affidavit of 9 January 2009, the respondent makes comments on these telephone calls, where she states-

ON kept trying to make contact with me after this. I kept re-iterating that a relationship could not happen. During one phone-call, he mentioned that he knew where my family lived. I took this to be a threat.

The phone calls then started at work. I told ON during one conversation that 'this has to stop, you can't call me at work anymore'. I suggested that he could go and see another doctor or psychologist if he needed further support, but that he could not talk to me. He would agree not to contact me again, but then a couple of months later, he would make contact again. This continued throughout 2007 and into 2008.

As a result of the respondent not wanting ON to contact her anymore, and the fear that she had of him, on 19 August 2008, the respondent applied for and was granted an intervention order against ON. Ultimately, that order was made for a period of 10 years.
It was at this time, the respondent decided to make a confession of her relationship with ON to the applicant. Those circumstances are described in paragraphs 39 and 40 of her affidavit -

In August 2008, I was doing training for a week. ON contacted the office where I was working several times over the course of about two days. ON was becoming more persistent and erratic in his approaches. I was scared of him.

I applied for an intervention order. When I was at the counter at the Melbourne Magistrates Court applying for the order, I filled out the form explaining how I knew ON. At that point, I realised that I needed to come out with the entire truth and address it. I then rang the Psychologist's Registration Board from Court and said that I needed to speak to somebody about an ethical transgression. I spoke to the CEO and she requested that I put my concerns in writing, so I sent the letter dated 28 August 2008.

As a result, the telephone conversation was followed up by a letter dated 20 August 2008, to the applicant, which described the development and the relationship. In the last two paragraphs of that letter, the respondent makes it clear the fact that she knew she had done wrong and that she was remorseful. In those two paragraphs, she states as follows :

I disclosed all of the above to my employers yesterday. While agreeing that I have behaved in an unprofessional and unethical manner, they have decided to support my continued employment with the department, pending the outcome of the Board's decision. I am currently employed as a "Senior Programs Officer", which means that I have no direct client contact. My employers have stipulated that I should not have any client contact or act in a supervisory role. I have agreed to this.

I am gravely sorry for, and ashamed of, my behaviour. I have agonised over this situation for some time, but have struggled to find the courage to admit to my misconduct and face the consequences. I realise I have not only placed myself at risk, but also the organisation I work for, and the profession as a whole. I am prepared to accept whatever consequences the Board and my employer see fit. In the meantime, I acknowledge that I need to seek external supervision/counselling to address the reason why I made the decision I did. I intend to commence this as soon as possible. I have wanted to address this previously, but feared that I would be reported in the course of doing so. I believe I still have something to offer the profession, and I am hopeful that by addressing my own misconduct, that I will be better for it.

During cross-examination, the respondent admitted that she had not recently read the Australian Psychological Society "Code of Ethics", neither had she read the Society's Ethical Guidelines. However, from the answers that the respondent gave, it is quite apparent to us that she was aware of the existence of the same. The Ethical Guidelines at p 51 deal with the prohibition of psychologists having sexual relations with their clients. The same reads as follows :

The Code of Ethics (1997) of the Australian Psychological Society includes Sections that specify restrictions on the types of non-professional relationships that psychologists may have with current and former clients. In drawing up these Guidelines, it was noted that psychiatrists in Australia are prohibited from having sexual relations with any clients, regardless of time elapsed since termination of the professional relationship. These Guidelines, developed for psychologists, proscribe sexual relations with current and former clients but take into account the diverse nature of professional relationships that psychologists may have with clients, and the broad definition of client provided in the Code of Ethics (the Code).

Two Clauses of Section B 'Relationships with Clients' are pertinent:

B7. Psychologists must avoid dual relationships that could impair their professional judgement or increase the risk of exploitation. Examples of such dual relationships include, but are not limited to, provision of psychological services to employees, students, supervisees, close friends or relatives.

B8. Psychologists must not exploit their professional relationships with clients sexually or otherwise.

In the case of sexual relationships, the restriction on psychologists engaging in sexual relationships with clients (Clause B8, and see below Clauses B9 to B12) is part of the broader restriction on psychologists engaging in dual relationships with clients (B7). There are also relevant specific issues related to psychologist-client physical contact (see guidelines relating to procedures/assessments that involve psychologist-client contact) and broader issues related to boundaries in professional relationships (see Guidelines on managing professional boundaries and multiple relationships).

Sexual relationships are not just relationships involving sexual intercourse but are construed more broadly.

The restrictions on sexual relationships with current and former clients (as defined below) are set out in the Code, Section B 'Relationships with Clients':

B9. Sexual relationships between psychologists and current clients must not occur. When a therapeutic procedure entails some level of physical intimacy with a client, informed written consent must be obtained from the client or the client's legal guardian prior to the introduction of that procedure.

B10. No psychologist may engage in a sexual relationship with a former client when less than two years have expired since the ending or termination of the professional relationship.

Dr Freckelton submitted that ON was extremely vulnerable and while he was in that vulnerable state, the respondent took advantage of him by having a romantic and sexual relationship with him.
In support of this submission, Dr Freckelton cited a number of factors that both made ON vulnerable and gave the respondent specific knowledge of his history and medical (including psychological) condition. At paragraph 38 of Dr Freckelton's submissions, he summarises a number of factors which were known to the respondent as a result of her treatment of ON. He states :

Ms Mair learned many intimate things about ON during therapy, including

b. not feeling validated by his family and his history of neglect

c. the divorce of his parents before he was a teenager

g. cognitive distortions that he might form in relation to women to whom he was attracted

k. his tendency to manipulate people and situations to try to retain control over situations he experienced as threatening

l. his difficulties in managing his emotions by putting up fronts, being very closed and having low self-esteem

n. his having suffered various traumas to his head.

Further, Dr Freckelton also at paragraph 40 of his submission set out a number of psychiatric factors which made ON vulnerable and the respondent was conscious of this vulnerability. At paragraph 40, Dr Freckelton stated :

Ms Mair was conscious of the potential for ON to have a Borderline Personality Disorder, underlying dysphoria and a potential brain injury. She also formed the view that he might have or be developing problematic drinking behaviour, as well as having an anger management problem. He was significantly labile in his moods.

While the facts relied on by Dr Freckelton are in fact correct, we are of the view that stating the facts in the way Dr Freckelton has, does not give a true picture of the situation. We accept the fact that the respondent's behaviour was not predatory and that she did not set out to have an emotional affair with ON. While not excusing the respondent's conduct in any way, it is important to note that her feelings for ON grew over a period of time. Clearly, when the respondent first noticed she had feelings for ON, she should have referred him on to another psychologist immediately and stopped treating him. However, unfortunately she did not take that course.
There has been no evidence put before us as to the effect that the respondent's conduct had upon ON. When we say this, it is not a criticism of the applicant because the applicant subpoenaed ON to give evidence. However, ON refused to obey the subpoena and thus, we were deprived of the advantage of knowing what effect, if any, the relationship with the respondent had on ON. In our view, we should not accept the fact that ON's psychological state worsened in any way because of the respondent's behaviour. It is not suggested, in any way, that the lack of evidence as to any causal relationship between the acts of the respondent and ON's psychiatric state excuses the respondent for her wrongful conduct.
However, it is very difficult for us to look at the conduct of the respondent in isolation without having the benefit of whether such conduct was detrimental, of benefit or otherwise to ON.

The respondent has realised that she has done wrong, and has done her best to ensure that the problem is not repeated. She has been having regular psychological sessions with Dr David List, a well known and respected psychologist in Melbourne. Three reports from Dr List dated 9 December 2008, 27 April 2009 and 27 August 2009 have been tendered in evidence before the Tribunal, as well as Dr List's clinical notes. Dr List attended the Tribunal during the hearing, gave further evidence and was cross-examined.
In his report of 9 December 2008, Dr List makes the following points :

.... I have been providing psychological services to Ms Michelle Mair since September 2008.

Ms Mair initiated contact with me in August 2008 following her admissions to the Board and Corrections Victoria regarding her ethical transgression ...

Ms Mair has regularly attended all her appointments and demonstrated a willingness to address difficult and confronting issues. She recognises that she has compromised her own professional code of conduct as well as the reputation of the department she is employed by. She has demonstrated insight into her behaviour at the time of transgression, and has demonstrated a preparedness to pursue a sometimes rigorous self-examination with my assistance. I am also aware that she is being provided with supervision in her workplace, which she has reported as being very helpful.

I believe that her initiative in notifying the Board and the Department, and her engagement in professional therapy since this time, are strong indicators that she is taking this issue seriously with integrity. Based on our discussions, my observations, and my experience with these matters, I do not see any benefit in the withholding, or the withdrawal, of Ms Mair's clinical practice. In my opinion, the professional risk posed is minimal. Given that her registration is still active and that she is engaged in supervisory process externally and internally, I have no concern about her resumption of her clinical activities in the interim prior to the eventual VCAT hearing.

In his report of 27 April 2009, Dr List makes the point that the respondent's conduct with ON was anomalous, that the respondent has genuine remorse and that she has ascribed no responsibility to ON. He further states :

... there is no aspect of her presentation that has caused me concern in relation to her competence.

Insofar as I am aware, her previous professional history is without ethical blemish and she has reportedly initiated (and has maintained) full disclosure to her employer.

Ms Brenda Dolieslager who is the Statewide Clinical Service Manager of Clinical Services Corrections Victoria, Department of Justice, and who has the job of supervising the respondent has made three reports dated 17 February 2009, 18 August 2009 and 25 November 2009.
In the first report, Ms Dolieslager states as follows :

... Ms Mair has accepted full responsibility of her past behaviour and the resultant consequences, and has been open to feedback and guidance. She has been consistently open, honest and forthcoming with information, even when this has clearly been difficult. She worked through significant experiences of personal and professional shame and remorse (both of which must be appropriately managed so as not to become risk factors in and of themselves) and she has shown a clear understanding of the impacts of this situation on others, including her former client, the organisation generally, her family, and her direct managers.

I recommend that Ms Mair is given opportunity to demonstrate her capacity to practice ethically and competently over the next 12 months, with additional supervisory and oversight arrangements in place and a continuation of her work with Dr List as an additional support.

In Ms Dolieslager's report of 18 August 2009 she states :

Overall, Ms Mair has been engaged, open and able to explore a range of issues within the context of her own functioning, personally and professionally, and her clinical practice, both current and historical.

In a similar vein, Ms Dolieslager in a report dated 25 November 2009 has concluded :

I continue to be of the opinion that Ms Mair's risk of future inappropriate and harmful behaviour in a clinical context is no more than that of any of the employees in Clinical Services, or indeed elsewhere. In fact, it may be less, given the events of the past 18 months, in particular the intensive self-exploration and therapy/supervision she has received around this issue from a variety of different people. She is possibly more informed and more aware of her vulnerabilities and of the situations and warning signs that might indicate she is at risk of inappropriate behaviour than many of her peers, given the dedicated work she has done on understanding her professional misconduct and her functioning more generally.

It is clear that since the event of the respondent's relationship with ON, she has made significant steps not only to obtain psychological help for herself from Dr List and supervisory help from Ms Dolieslager, she has also attended two courses in relation to ethical conduct. She has attended 14 hours of training arranged by "Psychoz Publications" being a professional development seminar on Developing Ethical Maturity for Helping Professions. She has also attended 42 hours of professional training with Centre of Supervision Training. That training comprised becoming an effective supervisor 1, becoming an effective supervisor 2, and ethical maturity in the helping professions making difficult decisions at work.

Dr Freckelton has suggested that the respondent lacks credibility and that her evidence should not be accepted particularly in relation to her denial of a love affair between ON and herself after ON was released from jail. That is, the respondent said that there was no love affair during this period between her and ON. The one occasion of sexual intercourse took place between them and many hours of telephone conversations were involved in the respondent trying to protect herself and others from ON. Further, Dr Freckelton submitted that Dr List's evidence and Ms Dolieslager's evidence should be looked at in the light that they accepted the respondent's history of her relationship with ON, which history Dr Freckelton submitted was flawed.
In criticising the respondent's credit, Dr Freckelton made the following points :
1. The respondent's confession of her wrongful conduct to the applicant was not out of any real remorse but was because she was taking out an intervention order, she thought her wrongful conduct would be discovered in any event.

When giving evidence, the respondent admitted that the making of the confession at that time was because her affair with ON was likely to be public. The intervention order was the occasion for her making the confession, in fact she wanted to make the confession in addition to clear her conscience and unload herself from the burden that the affair had caused.

We accept the respondent's version of events surrounding her confession relating to the relationship with ON. That is, the respondent made her confession in part because she thought her relationship with ON would become public as a result of the intervention order and the matter had been weighing upon her for a period of time, and she wanted to confess to the situation because she knew she had done the wrong thing.

Dr List stated that in his long experience including his experience as past President of the applicant Board, he had never known any other psychologist to confess to a sexual relationship with a client.

The respondent had failed to bring the therapeutic relationship to an end prior to having an affair with ON.

Dr Freckelton said that the therapeutic relationship had not finished before the affair started because while no further therapeutic treatment took place, the respondent had failed to properly or at all bring the therapeutic relationship to an end. In fact, what the respondent did was to put the therapeutic relationship on hold while ON was assessed for acquired brain injury from a neurological psychologist through ARBIAS.

Dr Freckelton is correct that the therapeutic relationship between ON and the respondent had not been brought to an end, and it should have been. Nonetheless, the sexual relationship between the respondent and ON should be seen in the light that no further therapeutic treatment took place once the personal relationship had commenced.

Dr Freckelton also relied on the respondent's statement and evidence in relation to the completion of the therapeutic relationship. At paragraph 25 of her witness statement, the respondent stated:

I did not see ON or have any contact with him for about 2 months after the completion of treatment. I then made a very misguided and impulsive decision.

At page 169 of the transcript, Dr Freckelton asked the following question :

I suggest to you that in paragraph 25 of that, you stated that you had no contact with ON for about 2 months after the completion of treatment.

The respondent answered "Yes". Then Dr Freckelton asked :

However, in spite of the apparent contradiction of the respondent between her witness statement and her oral evidence, we gained the impression that she was attempting to tell the truth. Any deviation of the truth, we believed came from both her highly emotional state and her own confusion of the events. We do not believe that she intended to deliberately deceive us on this point.

Dr Freckelton placed reliance on the telephone records of the respondent and ON after ON had been released from prison. These records show that lengthy conversations took place between the respondent and ON at that time. A number of those conversations had been instigated by the respondent telephoning ON. The respondent stated that she only saw ON on one occasion after he had left prison and that was when sexual intercourse occurred between them because the respondent was scared of ON and she wanted to try and break the relationship. Dr Freckelton submitted that we should not accept the fact that the respondent was trying to end her relationship with ON as soon as he got out of prison, but on the contrary was fertilising the same. He stated that we should make this finding on the basis of the numerous telephone calls that took place.

While the respondent may have been misguided in both her act of sex with the respondent and the many telephone calls that took place after ON was released from prison, that is not to say that the respondent did not give us a correct version of events.

Dr List stated that he believed the respondent's conduct was an attempt by her to placate ON in order to prevent the difficulties that the respondent perceived (and correctly so) that her relationship with ON was causing her, the people around her and ON himself.

In the way that the respondent gave her evidence, we see no reason to not accept her version of the facts in this particular instance.

We accept the respondent as a witness of truth. While there were clearly a number of inconsistencies in her evidence, we formed the view on looking at her in the witness box and the way she answered questions, she was doing her very best to tell the truth of this unfortunate circumstance in which she found herself. We did not gain the impression that she was attempting at any time to cover things in the witness box that might not be beneficial to her.
Further, in coming to this view, where there are inconsistencies with her original documents, we accept her explanation that she was either embarrassed to give the true situation or in the emotional state she was in at the time, it was a true mistake. Thus, we find that the respondent is a witness of truth.
Dr Freckelton also raised the fact that the respondent when filling out the form in the Magistrates' Court for the intervention order, did not refer to the fact that there was a sexual relationship between her and ON. However, we note that the respondent went back to the first page of the form, just after she had completed the same, and noted that there was a personal relationship between her and ON that lasted for approximately two months.
We do not believe it is proper to attack the respondent's credibility because of the way she filled out the application for an intervention order. It is clear that on completing the form, she immediately noticed that there was no mention of the personal relationship between her and ON and corrected that matter by writing on the first page of the form. The magistrate who granted the intervention order could not have been deceived and was not deceived.

We have above dealt with the definition of "unprofessional conduct" in s 3 of the Act (see paragraph 2 of these reasons).
Ms Hubble, counsel for the respondent, has admitted that her client's conduct pursuant to s 48 of the Act is unprofessional conduct of a serious nature.
Dr Freckelton stated in his client's view, the respondent's conduct is more than unprofessional conduct of a serious nature, which conduct is referred to in s 48(2) of the Act. Dr Freckelton stated we should find that the respondent's conduct is "professional misconduct" and such conduct comes within the definition of "infamous conduct" in a professional respect within (d) of the definition.
"Professional misconduct" is similar and amounts to the common law definition of professional misconduct. Dr Freckelton described the common law meaning of "professional misconduct" as : "conduct that is disgraceful or is dishonourable from the perspective of peers of good repute and competency, or conduct worthy of strong reprobation, or conduct substantially falling short of what is reasonably to be expected of a practitioner".
Sub-section (d) of the definition of "unprofessional conduct" refers to, "infamous conduct in a professional respect". This is the highest end of misconduct which the applicant submits is the proper finding for us to make in this proceeding.

Dr Freckelton referred to Allinson v General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 QB 750 at 760-761 and he stated by reference to that case :

The test is whether a professional has done something in pursuit of his or her profession which would reasonably be regarded as 'disgraceful or dishonourable by professional colleagues of good repute and competency'. ...

The words 'infamous' and 'disgraceful' have been held to denote conduct deserving of the strongest reprobation and indeed so heinous as to merit, when proved, the extreme professional penalty of striking off. (see Felix v General Dental Council [1960] AC 719 at 720. Certain kinds of conduct are manifestly incompatible with the role of a registered practitioner.

In Basser v Medical Board of Victoria [1981] VicRp 88; [1981] VR 953 at 968, O'Bryan J dealing with a situation of a medical practitioner prescribing dangerous drugs to drug addicts considered the meaning of "infamous conduct". At 968 line 10 ff, his Honour stated :

I shall now state some propositions relevant to a case in which the charge of 'infamous conduct' concerns a medical practitioner who in the conduct of his medical practice is alleged to have prescribed drugs improperly, unreasonably, or in a manner which would be contrary to good medical practice.

Infamous conduct may be proved if a medical practitioner in the course of conducting his medical practice is shown to have acted with reckless indifference to the possible harmful consequences of his acts. It would be necessary to show that the medical practitioner realized the possible harmful consequences of his acts and was recklessly indifferent to their consequences.
Infamous conduct may be proved if a medical practitioner in the course of conducting his medical practice is shown to have acted with a high degree of negligence amounting to gross incompetence.
In cases in which 'reckless indifference' or a 'high degree of negligence' is alleged, it will also be necessary to provide that right-thinking competent medical practitioners would regard the acts of the person charged as reprehensible, disgraceful, shameful or dishonourable. This may be inferred from all the circumstances.

Counsel for the Board contends that the appellant was guilty of acts amounting to 'reckless indifference' and 'gross negligence', those acts being particularized in the charge in paras (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g). In R v Medical Board of Victoria; Ex parte Epstein, [1945] VicLawRp 8; [1945] V.L.R. 60, Lowe, J gave examples of gross incompetence or negligence which might constitute infamous conduct. I would add the following examples which are relevant to the charge in the present case.

(a) Persistently, wrongly, prescribing toxic drugs for a patient or patients.

(b) Wilfully prescribing toxic drugs contrary to law.

(c) Persistently departing from general and approved practice in examining and prescribing for patients. Something more serious than merely being out of step with generally accepted medical opinion in the community on the subject would be necessary.

(d) Persistently undertaking the treatment of patients suffering from a particular illness when his own experience and expertise was inadequate to undertake the treatment competently by the standards accepted generally in the medical profession.

I believe that if a case of reckless indifference or gross negligence were proved against a medical practitioner in a professional respect right-thinking competent colleagues of the person charged would inevitably regard such conduct as reprehensible, disgraceful, shameful, or dishonourable. Therefore, the essential elements of a charge of 'infamous conduct' under s 171(1)(b) would be established.

In this particular instance, we find that the respondent in having a romantic and sexual relationship with ON did not conduct herself with reckless indifference to the possible consequences of her acts.
This was a situation where, at this point, the respondent admits was wrongful. However, at the time of the conduct, the conduct fell far short of reckless indifference and it also falls short of what can be said to be "recklessly indifferent to their (the acts) consequences". There is no evidence to show that the respondent made a habit of having personal relationships with her clients. Her relationship with ON was a "one off". It was clearly a situation where the respondent should have known better. However, she became involved in a situation that grew upon her gradually. She had no initial intent to have the type of relationship with ON that occurred. What in fact happened was that the respondent let her feelings get the better of her. It was something that we find was out of character.
Further, we find that the respondent's conduct was not so negligent as to amount to gross incompetence. The word "gross" would suggest almost the worst type of conduct. This does not fall into that situation. This is not a situation where the respondent used her practice for predatory purposes and did so with intent. While it is not necessary to find that the respondent's actions were the worst conceivable wrongful conduct, it is necessary for a finding of "infamous conduct" to find that the respondent's actions were at the higher end of the scale.
In this particular instance, the respondent's conduct while being serious was not conduct at the higher end of the scale. There is no predatory aspect to her conduct and she did not commence treating ON with the purpose of developing a personal relationship. In fact, for some considerable time during the treatment when ON tried to hold the respondent's hand, she withdrew her hand immediately.
Further, we do not find that the respondent acted with "reckless indifference" or a "high degree of negligence". As we have stated, the respondent's personal relationship with ON was something which eventuated over a period of time. Of course, that does not excuse the respondent. However, in our view, it is insufficient to find that her conduct was "reckless indifference" or a "high degree of negligence". There is nothing to suggest that at the time the conduct was being perpetrated, the respondent was aware of the harm it was doing to ON. In fact, at this particular moment, we still do not know whether the conduct has harmed ON or otherwise.
Thus, after having made these findings, we have come to the conclusion that the respondent's conduct falls short of what can be described as "infamous conduct".
In coming to the conclusion that the respondent's conduct was not infamous, we have taken account of a number of facts :
1. Other than the personal sexual relationship between the respondent and ON the therapy that was conducted was otherwise appropriate. This is not to downplay the serious nature of the respondent's conduct, but it is a matter that must be taken into account.
2. While the therapy between ON and the respondent had not been brought to a formal conclusion, the therapy had stopped at the time that the personal relationship had commenced and it was not sought by the respondent to have that therapy continue after the relationship commenced.

We also note that there is not always formal closure of a therapeutic relationship between the client and the therapist. While there should in fact be formal closure, there are often circumstances that prevent such formal closure happening. Clearly, the circumstances of this proceeding are one of those types of matters.

The conduct of the respondent was a one off type of conduct even though it continued for a number of months. Further, it is noted that the only way that the applicant was able to make its case, was through the words of the respondent. As we have mentioned, ON did not make a complaint and did not appear to give evidence.

This is a situation of transference between the respondent and ON. It was a situation where the respondent did not have the "tools" to deal with what happened.

As we have mentioned, Ms Hubble has conceded that her client has committed unprofessional conduct of a serious nature within the meaning of s 48(1)(a) of the Act. In light of the correct concession made by Ms Hubble, it is not necessary for us to go into detail of the authorities in relation to unprofessional conduct of a serious nature. Suffice to say that the respondent's conduct comes properly within what Kellam J (as President of VCAT) said in Parr v Nurses Board of Victoria, unreported, VCAT 2 December 1998. There, his Honour stated :

Clearly such conduct would not be serious if it was trivial, or of momentary effect only at the time of the commission or omission by which the conduct was so defined. It must be a departure, in a substantial manner, from the standards which might be reasonably expected of a registered nurse. The departure from such standards must be blameworthy and deserving of more than passing censure.

Thus, we find that the respondent's conduct is unprofessional conduct of a serious nature.

Dr Freckelton submitted that in the event that we do not find that the respondent's conduct falls into the infamous category, that we should find that the respondent's conduct falls into the category of "professional misconduct". This is conduct that evolved through the common law and has now been given statutory recognition in the Health Professions Registration Act 2005 where at s 3 of that Act, by way of definition, the common law of professional misconduct is stated as follows :

(a) unprofessional conduct of a health practitioner, where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence; and

(b) conduct that violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed by members of the profession of good repute or competency; and

(c) conduct of a health practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner's health profession or occurring otherwise than in connection with the practice of a health profession, that would, if established, justify a finding that the practitioner is not of good character or is otherwise not a fit and proper person to engage in the practice of that health profession;

In Dr Freckelton's submissions, he has correctly set out the law and its development in this country as to the meaning of "professional misconduct":

Applying the authorities, Dean J held in the Victorian Supreme Court decision Re a Solicitor[1] that 'misconduct' 'in a professional capacity' under s 15 of the Legal Profession Practice Act 1958 (Vic) bore the same meaning as described by the House of Lords in Myers v Elman in respect of 'professional misconduct'. To a similar effect, Gillard J in Mullany v Psychologists Registration Board[2] held that while 'professional misconduct' is not defined in the Psychologists Registration Act 1987 (Vic) it 'has a well established meaning in this State in respect of the activities of professional persons. The word 'misconduct' has been considered with reference to solicitors. Here we are concerned with 'professional misconduct'. The definition of 'misconduct' which has been accepted in this State is that stated by Dean J in Re a Solicitor.

On the same issue, Eames J has commented of juridical interpretation of the expression 'professional misconduct' that the words, 'comprised conduct which was more than mere professional incompetence, or mere deficiencies in professional practice, but would encompass conduct which included 'a deliberate departure from accepted standards or such serious negligence as, although not deliberate, to portray indifference and an abuse of the privileges which accompany registration as a medical practitioner'. Per Kirby P in Pillai v Messiter (No 2) [1989] 16 NSWLR 197 at 200.[3]

A third version of the test was enunciated by Mandie J in Campbell v The Dental Board of Victoria[4] who followed the formulation of the Queensland Full Court in Adamson v Queensland Law Society Inc[5]:

The test to be applied is whether the conduct violates or falls short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency.

In our view, the respondent's conduct was of the type of standard that both violates and falls short of the standard of the professional conduct observed or approved by the profession. It is also conduct which is of a lesser standard than that which the public might reasonably expect of a registered psychologist. It is clear that a psychologist must not have personal relationships with a client while that client is being treated.
In this particular instance, while we accept that ON did not receive any further treatment from the respondent once the personal sexual relationship commenced, as Dr Freckelton pointed out, the relationship was technically still subsisting. It was in abeyance pending the result of the neuropsychological testing which was being performed at the respondent's request. The therapeutic relationship had not formally been brought to an end. Further, the sexual relationship between the respondent and ON did not commence or continue on as a spur of the moment decision. It commenced after the respondent made a decision to travel to Seaford to seek out ON. This conduct is less in a substantial degree of the standard of the professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession or members of the public.
We note that in some circumstances, it may be appropriate for a psychologist to have a personal and sexual relationship with an ex-client. However, that relationship should not commence until at least two years have expired since the therapy was brought to an end. In this particular instance, the therapy was not brought to an end and, in any event, it was only a short time after the last therapeutic session between the respondent and ON that the conduct commenced.
Taking all these matters into account, we have formed the view that the respondent's conduct is properly categorized as "professional misconduct" within the meaning of paragraph (c) of the definition of "unprofessional conduct" in the Psychologists Registration Act.

The authorities are clear that the purpose we must bear in mind when making our determination is the protection of the public, deterrence, maintenance of proper ethical and professional standards and maintaining the reputation and integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public. Clearly, our determination should not be punitive in nature but must be framed with the considerations referred to above in mind.
In considering the public interest, it is important to note that the public interest in the practitioners continuing to practise and serve the community must be weighed against the public interest in protecting clients from any repetition of the conduct exhibited by the respondent. Preserving the public's confidence in the profession must also be taken into account.
It is noted here that both Dr List and Ms Dolieslager believe that the respondent is remorseful and now insightful as to the wrong she has done. They also believed that it is unlikely that there would be a repetition of this wrongful conduct by the respondent.
It is clear from s 1 of the Act that the main purpose of the Act is :
1. to protect the public by providing for the registration of psychologists and investigations into professional conduct and fitness to practise of registered psychologists.
Further, the attitude of the legislature can be detected from s 6(2)(a) of the Act where it is stated :

The Board may refuse to grant registration to an applicant on any one or more of the following grounds -

(a) the character of the applicant is such that it would not be in the public interest to allow the applicant to practise as a registered psychologist.

In a recent case where SM Davis was a member of the Tribunal (Chinese Medicine Registration Board v Schulte [2010] VCAT 453, unreported, 12 April 2010), at paragraph 17, the panel quoted from a decision of SM Davis in Dr Mark Pearson-Gills v Chiropractors Registration Board [2006] VCAT 436, where it stated :

In Dr Mark Pearson-Gills v Chiropractors Registration Board [2006] VCAT 436, the Tribunal (SM Davis) there set out what the design of the Chiropractors Act was to achieve. That Act is in similar terms to the Chinese Medicine Registration Act and what is stated there equally applies to this situation. At paragraph 147 ff it was stated :

Thus it is apparent that the Act was designed to protect the public and looks at the interest of the community. In Robbins v Business Licensing Authority (2000) VCAT 457 (29 January 2000), Kellam J considered the public interest in the context of the Motor Car Traders Act. For this purpose, I do not consider there is any real difference between public interest in relation to the Motor Car Traders Act or in relation to the Chiropractors Act. At p 4 of that decision, his Honour considered the public interest and what it meant. He stated :

It is apparent that the term 'public interest' embraces matters, among others, of standards of human conduct acknowledged to be necessary for the good order and well-being of the public, and in the circumstances of this case, those members of the public who buy and sell motor cars. Accordingly, the function of the Business Licensing Authority (and this Tribunal on an application to review a decision of the Authority) is entirely protective, not punitive. The Authority (and this Tribunal) may only grant permission for a person who has a conviction for a serious offence within the last ten years to be employed in a customer service capacity, if satisfied that to do so will not be contrary to the public interest.

As Murphy J said in Inglese v Estate Agents Board & Anor (unreported Supreme Court of Victoria, 15 August 1988):

'If an estate agent is to be disqualified, the purpose which the Tribunal should have in mind is not the punishment of the individual (though it may appear to be a punishment to him) but the importance of protecting the public and the necessity to maintain standards in the conduct of an estate agent's business'.

Those words apply equally to motor car traders, and their employees, under the system established by the Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant has been punished by the criminal justice system, the issue of the protection of the public remains to be considered.

I would add to what his Honour said that the "words apply equally" to the chiropractic profession.

The Tribunal should consider what is necessary for general deterrence purposes. This may include such considerations as the need to send a message to practitioners generally that conduct of this nature is unacceptable and will be met with appropriate consequences. It is also relevant to consider the interests of the public in observing that the profession upholds its rules of ethics and that they can trust that registered chiropractors maintain strong ethical standards.

I agree with the submission made by Ms McLeod. This is in line with what I decided in Whiting v AMC Investments Pty Ltd (2005) VCAT 1830 (22 August 2005).

The principles quoted above apply equally to wrongful conduct pursuant to the Act.

In this particular instance, we note that the action of the respondent in relation to ON while continuing for a period of months, was a one off in the sense that she had practised for three years and she had not had any problems arising in that time. From this point of view, it is necessary that the respondent have a period of suspension, but that suspension should not be to the point where it is crushing. Psychologists are an important component of the mental health system in Victoria and the wellbeing of Victorians. This is something that must be balance against the behaviour of the respondent.
We also accept the evidence of Dr List and his opinion that there is unlikely to be a repetition of these matters or any future wrongful conduct at all concerning the respondent's practice as a psychologist. We accept the fact that the respondent now has full insight into her actions, she is very remorseful and as a result her wrongful conduct is not likely to be repeated.
Given these circumstances, we do not agree with Dr Freckelton's submission that a proper determination in this matter is cancellation of the respondent's registration. That, in our view, would be a crushing determination that would not be in the public interest.
It is important that a message to other practitioners that the type of conduct engaged in by the respondent is not acceptable. In sending a message such as this, we do not believe it is necessary for the respondent's registration to be cancelled. We are of the view that the suspension we will impose will be of a sufficient length of time for other members of the psychology profession to "get the message".
Further, we are of the view that it is not necessary to cancel the respondent's registration in order for the public to maintain confidence in the psychological profession. Again, we are of the view that the period of suspension that we will impose will in fact be sufficient for the public to maintain confidence in the psychological profession and confidence that wrongful conduct will not be tolerated.
Dr Freckelton cited a number of cases which he said had similarities to the present where the registration of the professional person was cancelled. However, Dr Freckelton did concede that each case must be decided on its own merits. We believe that the cases cited by Dr Freckelton are distinguishable from the present.
In Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria v Hardam [2009] PRDB (Vic) 3, it is noted that the psychologist had adopted a therapeutic approach with the client that involved significant physical contact. In the particular instance of the present case, it is not suggested that the physical contact between the respondent and ON was part of the therapy although, at one point, the respondent thought that the physical contact may be of some assistance. Further, the respondent's conduct relating to ON was not her usual method of treatment.
The matter of Re Paul Francis Mott (Psychologists Board of Victoria 7 March 2000) concerned a contemporaneous sexual relationship while therapy was continuing. Again, that situation is different from the present where therapy itself had stopped even though the therapeutic relationship may not have been terminated.
Further in a matter of Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria v Schirmer [2009] VCAT 2349, it was clear that the psychologist did not understand the significance of boundary violations as the respondent does in this situation (see paragraph 37).
Thus, in our view, it is appropriate in this situation that the respondent's registration as a psychologist should be suspended for a period of time rather than cancelled. We have come to this conclusion largely because of the professional evidence of Dr List and Ms Dolieslager, who are both of the view that the respondent is unlikely to re-offend and that she is fully remorseful and gained insight. We accept their opinion. In these circumstances, we see no benefit in cancelling the respondent's registration which would force her at a later time to re-apply to the Board. We believe that the matters that the Board would need to consider when determining whether to re-register the respondent, have been put in evidence before us. We are of the view that the suspension that we will impose and the conditions that we will put on the respondent will be sufficient to fulfil our obligations in dealing with matters such as these. Those obligations have been referred to above.
Therefore, we intend to suspend the respondent's registration until 28 February 2011. In suspending the respondent's registration to this time, we have taken into account the lengthy time since the conduct between the respondent and ON occurred. Further, we have taken into account the fact that the respondent made a full confession to the Board and she is now remorseful and insightful and it is unlikely that the respondent will re-offend. Further, we have taken into account the fact that it is a considerable period of time since the respondent has worked as a psychologist. We also note that the hearing of this application commenced on 15 February 2010 and was adjourned for a lengthy period through no fault of the respondent. Thus, the respondent has had this proceeding generally and this hearing in particular "hanging over her head" for a long time.
A summary of the orders we intend to make is that we will suspend the respondent's registration to practise as a psychologist until 28 February 2011. In addition, we require the respondent to:
1. continue therapy at her own expense for a period of 12 months with a clinical psychologist approved by the Board. That psychologist should provide quarterly reports to the Board.
2. be supervised, for a period of at least two years, by a psychologist approved by the Board at the expense of the respondent, upon the respondent commencing practice.

[2] Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 22 December 1997 at p 9

[3] McGrath v Medical Practitioners Board, unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 1 November 1996

Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria v Mair

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (169 paragraphs)

Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria v Mair (Occupational and Business Regulation) [2010] VCAT 534 (4 May 2010)

Parties