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[2025] NSWCA 232
plaintiff. The Court declared that Samantha Gow was not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll of Australian Lawyers, ordered her name removed from the roll, and ordered her to pay the applicant’s costs.
The Court removed Samantha Gow from the roll of Australian lawyers after finding that her conduct, taken together, showed she was not fit and proper to remain a lawyer. The Court relied on her failure to complete a required course, acting as a solicitor without a current practising certificate, dishonest use of client money, forged court orders, and further offending. The trust-account conduct and the false court orders would each have been enough on their own to warrant removal. Gow did not take an active part in the proceedings, but the Court assessed the evidence independently.
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2,726 words · generated 06/10/2026
The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales applied for a declaration that Samantha Gow was not fit and proper to remain on the Roll of Australian Lawyers and for an order removing her name. The application invoked the Court's original jurisdiction, including its inherent jurisdiction and s 264 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (Uniform Law) ([2]-[3]).
6 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Gow was admitted in New South Wales on 15 February 2013 ([11]). In March 2016 she sought a practising certificate allowing her to practise as a principal. She gave an undertaking to complete the next available Practice Management Course. The Law Society granted extensions, but she had not completed the course by 30 June 2017. On 14 December 2017, the Law Society refused to renew her practising certificate, resolving that she was not fit and proper to hold one ([13]-[21]). The Court treated 14 December 2017 as the relevant point after which she lacked a current practising certificate.
The Prothonotary relied on a range of conduct between 2014 and 2024. It included Queensland offending in 2014; failure to comply with the undertaking; conduct concerning client Mrs Ferguson's money; presenting herself as a solicitor in court after her practising certificate had ceased; forging and using purported Federal Circuit Court parenting orders; and later offending involving bail, assault, and driving ([8], [17]-[19], [22]-[77]).
Gow was served but did not file an appearance or evidence, attend directions hearings, or take steps to oppose the orders. The Court was satisfied that the applicant had made ample attempts to inform her of the proceedings and the evidence supporting the allegations. The case therefore proceeded on the papers ([4]). Her absence did not mean that the Court could simply grant the application by default. It remained responsible for deciding whether the evidence established unfitness and whether removal was appropriate ([5]).
Adamson JA gave the principal reasons. Bell CJ agreed ([1]). McHugh JA also agreed and added a brief observation about the seriousness of forging and uttering purported court orders ([94]). The Court made all three orders sought: declaration of unfitness, removal from the roll, and costs against Gow ([93]).
The Court first stated the standard and its own role. Even in an unopposed application, it had to satisfy itself that Gow was presently unfit and likely to be unfit for an indefinite future ([5]). Given the gravity of the allegations, they had to be proved on the balance of probabilities to the Briginshaw standard ([78]). The Court found that the evidence was sufficient to prove the particularised allegations ([79]). It observed that the applicant's inferences could more readily be drawn where Gow chose not to give evidence to refute the evidence, while still making clear that the Court itself had to assess the case ([5], [78]-[79]).
The reasons considered the cumulative pattern. Gow had undertaken to complete the Practice Management Course and repeatedly failed to do so over almost 18 months. Adamson JA considered that this showed she could not be trusted to fulfil an undertaking and was cavalier about obligations associated with her right to practise ([82]). The Court also referred to her breaches of bail undertakings as part of evidence of disregard for obligations to courts and a willingness to put personal convenience ahead of duty ([83]).
The practising-certificate issue mattered in its own right. The Court found that after 14 December 2017 Gow was no longer a qualified entity in the relevant sense and was prohibited by ss 10 and 11 of the Uniform Law from engaging in legal practice or representing that she was entitled to practise ([84]). Her conduct in the proceedings involving Volkswagen Financial Services and in purportedly acting for Mr Hadfield was inconsistent with those prohibitions ([85]). The Court also considered that her language and conduct misled courts about her status, and breached the trust courts are entitled to place in legal practitioners who appear before them ([84]).
The findings concerning Mrs Ferguson were particularly serious. Mrs Ferguson, then 72 and retired, transferred $57,500 to Gow's trust account for a proposed property purchase ([22]). Gow transferred $20,500 from that account to her office account. The office account was overdrawn before the first transfer, and withdrawals from it included $10,343.43 for personal expenses ([24]-[26]). The Fidelity Fund process found a dishonest default of $10,379.98, which was paid to Mrs Ferguson with interest ([34]-[36]). Adamson JA found that Gow had treated the money as her own and that the conduct harmed Mrs Ferguson and her trust in the legal profession ([87]-[88]). This conduct, together with misuse of the trust account, was independently sufficient to warrant removal ([92]).
The Court treated the forged orders as a separate and grave category. The documents purported to be Federal Circuit Court parenting orders, although no relevant proceedings were on foot and the file number did not exist in the Court's records ([59]-[60], [67]). Gow sent one document to the children's father and delivered another to the school. The documents were used to induce those people to act as though the orders were genuine, including in relation to the child's residence and school attendance ([60]-[66]). Adamson JA described the conduct as deliberate and premeditated, and as undermining the community's confidence in documents that appear to be court orders ([89]). McHugh JA added that forging and uttering purported court orders showed disregard for the administration of justice and demanded removal ([94]). Adamson JA expressly held that the forgery and uttering conduct, like the trust-account conduct, independently warranted removal ([92]).
Finally, the Court considered later offending, including breach of a bail undertaking in 2021, common assault in 2023, and driving offences committed in 2023 and 2024 ([70]-[77]). It treated those events, alongside the other conduct, as evidence of a pattern of disregard for the law ([90]-[91]). The result rested on the whole body of proved conduct, not on a single undifferentiated allegation: the reasons identify both an overall cumulative basis and two independently sufficient categories ([92]).
This judgment does not purport to change the statutory framework or announce a new general test. It applies existing principles to a particular record. The Court located its jurisdiction in its inherent jurisdiction and s 264 of the Uniform Law ([3]). It also applied the existing requirement that a court independently assess present and future fitness before removal, whether or not an application is opposed ([5]).
The judgment describes two functions of detailed factual findings in removal cases. First, if the practitioner later applies to return to the roll, the court hearing that application must take account of the conduct that led to removal. Secondly, detailed findings educate the profession about conduct inconsistent with continued practice ([7], citing Bridges v Law Society of New South Wales [1983] 2 NSWLR 361 and Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Einfeld [2009] NSWCA 255). The decision therefore makes findings not merely to resolve the current application, but also to provide a record relevant to any future return application and to professional standards.
On proof, the Court applied the balance of probabilities together with the Briginshaw approach to the gravity of the allegations ([78]). The decision does not replace that standard with a different test. It explains how the seriousness of the claims affects the assessment and notes the evidentiary context of Gow's decision not to provide evidence.
On trust money, the Court referred to Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v XX [2025] NSWCA 4 and its discussion of misappropriation, the importance of trust accounts, and public confidence in the profession ([87]). The Court applied that concern to the facts before it and concluded that Gow's conduct independently justified removal ([92]). It did not decide a new statutory rule about trust accounting.
The judgment also applied ss 10 and 11 of the Uniform Law to the post-certificate conduct it found. Its specific statement was that after 14 December 2017, Gow was prohibited from engaging in legal practice or representing that she was entitled to engage in it ([84]). The decision applies those provisions to the recorded appearances and statements; it does not establish findings beyond the particular conduct proved in this case.
Accordingly, the “after” position shown by this judgment is an application of established jurisdictional, evidentiary, and professional-fitness principles to extensive conduct. It provides a detailed factual determination and an outcome, rather than a stated doctrinal departure.
At [5], the Court said it had to satisfy itself that Gow was “presently unfit to practise” and “likely to be unfit in the indefinite future.” In plain English, an unanswered application was not automatically enough. The judges had to assess whether the evidence supported removal and whether the unfitness was not merely temporary.
At [7], the Court explained why it was setting out detailed findings. Those findings could matter if Gow later sought to return to the roll, and they also inform the profession about conduct inconsistent with continued practice. This explains why the reasons recount the evidence in detail rather than giving only a short conclusion.
At [78], Adamson JA said the allegations had to be proved on the balance of probabilities to the Briginshaw standard. She also noted that the applicant's proposed inferences could more readily be drawn where Gow chose not to give evidence refuting the case. In plain English, the Court scrutinised serious allegations carefully, but the absence of evidence from Gow meant the applicant's evidence had no contrary evidence from her to answer it. It did not remove the applicant's burden of proof.
At [82], Adamson JA connected the repeated failure to complete the course with trustworthiness. The point was not simply that a course remained unfinished. The Court treated repeated failure to honour an undertaking to the regulator as relevant to whether Gow could be trusted to comply with obligations attached to practice.
At [84], the Court explained that after the practising certificate was not renewed, Gow was prohibited from practising or representing herself as entitled to do so. It also found that her conduct exposed people to the risk of receiving legal services from an uninsured entity and misled courts about her professional status. The paragraph connects regulatory status with both public protection and candour to courts.
At [89], the Court described the false court orders as a deliberate attempt to influence people to act in a way that suited Gow. In plain English, the seriousness arose not only from creating false documents, but from using apparent court authority to influence a parent and school staff and thereby undermine confidence in genuine court orders.
At [92], Adamson JA stated both the overall conclusion and the independent significance of two categories of conduct. The cumulative case showed unfitness, while the trust-account conduct and the false court orders each independently warranted removal. This is important to the structure of the decision: the outcome did not depend only on combining numerous less serious events.
At [94], McHugh JA characterised the purported court orders as especially grave because they showed disregard for the administration of justice itself. His Honour's observation reinforces, rather than replaces, Adamson JA's analysis.
The judgment is most directly relevant to removal applications involving a combination of serious dishonesty and conduct that undermines confidence in the legal system. Its strongest fact-specific examples are misuse of client trust money and deliberate creation or use of purported court orders. The Court expressly said each of those categories independently warranted Gow's removal ([92]).
It is also relevant where a practitioner has lost a practising certificate but continues to act, or presents themselves in a way that implies they remain entitled to practise. The Court examined the actual representations and court appearances, and linked them to ss 10 and 11 of the Uniform Law ([84]-[85]). The finding was based on the record of Gow's statements and conduct in particular matters, not simply on the fact that she had once held a certificate.
Repeated disregard of a professional undertaking may also be relevant, especially where the undertaking relates to a condition of practice and has been the subject of extensions. The Court considered the extended period of non-compliance as evidence bearing on whether Gow could be trusted to fulfil professional obligations ([82]).
The decision also shows that non-professional convictions may be considered in context. The bail, assault, and driving conduct contributed to the Court's assessment of disregard for legal obligations and the law ([83], [90]-[91]). The reasons do not say that any one such offence, standing alone, necessarily results in removal. The relevant conclusion was based on the cumulative record, alongside the independently sufficient trust-account and forged-orders conduct.
The case does not establish that every failure to complete a course, practising-certificate lapse, conviction, or trust-account irregularity will produce the same result. The Court assessed the evidence and seriousness of the conduct in combination, and made specific findings about the respondent's conduct.
The judgment is dated 23 October 2025. The text provided contains no decisions issued after that date and therefore does not establish how later courts have treated Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Gow [2025] NSWCA 232. Any claim about later adoption, distinction, or criticism would require sources beyond this judgment.
The decision itself explains the authorities on which it relied. At [5], it cites Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v XX [2025] NSWCA 4, Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Duncan [2024] NSWCA 147, Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power [2008] NSWCA 135, Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente [2019] NSWCA 33, and Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska [2020] NSWCA 163 for the Court's responsibility to assess present and future fitness. At [7], it invokes Einfeld and Bridges for the importance of detailed findings in removal cases and possible future applications to return to the roll.
At [78], the Court cites Briginshaw, The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341, Power, and Carr v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2020] NSWCA 276 in relation to proof of serious allegations. At [80], it quotes New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279 on the significance of integrity to clients, other practitioners, the judiciary, and public confidence. At [87], it discusses XX in relation to trust money.
Those citations show the legal context adopted by the Court in Gow. They do not supply evidence of how later courts have treated the Gow decision itself.
The judgment expressly identifies some limits in the available evidence. In relation to the driving offences, the Court said the evidence did not reveal when, or in what circumstances, Gow had been disqualified, or when the vehicle became unregistered ([91]). The Court nevertheless treated her preparedness to drive in those circumstances as irresponsible and relevant when combined with the other conduct. It did not determine the missing background facts.
The reasons also record that Gow did not participate substantively. That meant the Court assessed the applicant's evidence without evidence from Gow refuting it ([4], [78]-[79]). The judgment does not record her explanation for the course non-compliance, the alleged practising-status representations, the transfers from the trust account, or the forgery. It would therefore be inaccurate to treat the judgment as having considered a competing account of those events.
The Court did not decide whether Gow might ever be returned to the roll. It explained that the findings made on removal would be relevant to any future application, but no such application was before it ([7]). Nor does the decision specify the precise evidentiary or procedural requirements for a future return application.
Finally, the judgment determines Gow's fitness on the proved record; it does not state that every one of the listed offences or regulatory failures would independently justify removal. Its express independent findings concern her conduct relating to Mrs Ferguson's trust money and her forgery and uttering of purported Federal Circuit Court orders ([92]).
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Gow [2025] NSWCA 232
Hearing dates: 7 October 2025 — on the papers
Decision date: 23 October 2025
Before: Bell CJ at [1]
Adamson JA at [2]
McHugh JA at [94]
Decision: (1) Declare that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll of Australian Lawyers.
(2) Order that the name of the respondent be removed from the Roll of Australian Lawyers.
(3) Order the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.
Catchwords: LEGAL PRACTITIONERS — disciplinary proceedings — application by Prothonotary for removal of name from roll — practitioner convicted of criminal offences — breach of undertakings to Law Society — failure to complete practice management course — practising without a practising certificate — holding-out as solicitor — misappropriation of trust monies — forgery and uttering of false court orders — subsequent criminal offending including breaches of bail, common assault and driving offences — practitioner unfit to remain on roll
Legislation Cited: Bail Act 1980 (Qld), ss 29, 33
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 61
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), s 8
Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), ss 6, 10,11, 138, 144, 148, 264, 388
Queensland Criminal Code, s 488
Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld), ss 6, 10
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 14.3
Cases Cited: Bridges v Law Society of New South Wales [1983] 2 NSWLR 361
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34
Carr v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2020] NSWCA 276
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Duncan [2024] NSWCA 147
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente [2019] NSWCA 33
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v XX [2025] NSWCA 4
Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska (2020) 102 NSWLR 655; [2020] NSWCA 163
Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Einfeld [2009] NSWCA 255; (2009) 258 ALR 768
Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135
New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284
The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Applicant)
Samantha Gow (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
K Curry (Applicant)
Not applicable (Respondent)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor's Office (Applicant)
Not applicable (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2024/232330
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
By amended summons filed on 18 December 2024, the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (the applicant) sought a declaration that the respondent, Samantha Gow, is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of legal practitioners (the roll), and an order that her name be removed from the roll. This application invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction, derived from its inherent power and s 264 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW).
The respondent did not file an appearance and took no active part in the proceedings although she was served. The application therefore proceeded on the papers.
The respondent was admitted as a lawyer in New South Wales in February 2013. In March 2016, a practising certificate was issued to her to practise as a Principal of a Legal Practice on her undertaking to the Law Society to complete the next available Practice Management Course. Thereafter she practised through a company, Sam Gow Pty Ltd, as trustee for the Gow Family Trust, under the name “Gow Group Global Legal Services”. She failed to comply with her undertaking and on 14 December 2017 the Council of the Law Society resolved that she was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. No further practising certificate was issued to her.
The Prothonotary relied on 27 particulars spanning the period 2014-2024. These included:
• 2014 convictions in Queensland for breach of bail, being drunk in a public place, and committing public nuisance;
• failure between 2016 and 2017 to comply with an undertaking to complete a Practice Management Course;
• dishonest conduct in 2017 concerning client monies, resulting in a successful Fidelity Fund claim by Mrs Ferguson;
• falsely holding herself out as a solicitor in Queensland and New South Wales in 2018, including in R v Hadfield and Volkswagen Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd v Gow;
• 2021 convictions in Queensland for forging and uttering court documents purporting to be orders of the Federal Circuit Court, for which she was sentenced to nine months imprisonment (suspended after 70 days);
• breach of bail conditions in 2021;
• a 2023 assault on her mother, resulting in a 12-month Community Corrections Order and an apprehended-violence order; and
• 2024 driving offences in Victoria, resulting in fines and licence disqualification.
The respondent made no submissions or appearance to oppose the relief sought.
The Court held (Adamson JA, Bell CJ and McHugh JA agreeing) declaring the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of legal practitioners**:**
(1) The evidence established that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll: [81].
(2) The respondent’s repeated failure to comply with her undertaking to the Law Society to complete a Practice Management Course demonstrated that she could not be trusted to fulfil obligations associated with her right to practise. Her continued holding-out as a solicitor after her practising certificate had lapsed misled courts and breached the trust reposed in legal practitioners. Her misappropriation of client funds and the forgery of false court orders demonstrated serious dishonesty and a willingness to put personal interests above duty. Her further offending, including breaches of bail, common assault and driving offences, indicated that she is prepared to breach the law for her own convenience and cannot be trusted to abide by it: [82]-[91] (Adamson JA), [94] (McHugh JA).
(3) The cumulative effect of the conduct proved against the respondent was that she was not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll: [92].
(4) The respondent’s misuse of the trust account and her separate conduct in forging and uttering court orders of the Federal Circuit Court would each independently have warranted her removal from the roll: [92].
New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v XX [2025] NSWCA 4, considered.
BELL CJ: I have had the benefit of reading the reasons of Adamson JA. I agree with those reasons and the orders her Honour proposes.
ADAMSON JA: By amended summons filed on 18 December 2024, the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (the applicant) seeks a declaration that the respondent, Samantha Gow (the respondent) is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll of legal practitioners (the roll) and an order that the respondent’s name be removed from the roll.
This Court has original jurisdiction to make these orders under its inherent jurisdiction: s 264 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW).
Although the respondent was served (having consented to service by email) and has had several interactions with the applicant since the original summons was filed on 24 June 2024, she neither filed an appearance, nor attended any directions hearings, nor filed any evidence, nor took any steps to actively oppose the orders. I am satisfied that the applicant, through the Crown Solicitor’s Office, has made ample attempts to make the respondent aware of the proceedings, including the detail of, and evidence supporting, the allegations made against her. No substantive response has been received from the respondent, although she sent an email to the applicant’s solicitor on 2 September 2024, asking that her appearance at the directions hearing be “excused”. The applicant has received no further communication from her. The respondent has failed to engage with these proceedings. Accordingly, this matter is to be determined on the papers.
Although the respondent has not appeared to oppose the orders sought, this Court must satisfy itself independently not only that she is presently unfit to practise but also that she is likely to be unfit in the indefinite future such that the removal of her name from the roll is appropriate: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v XX [2025] NSWCA 4 (XX) at [15]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Duncan [2024] NSWCA 147 at [3] (citing Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135 (Power) at [9], Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Parente [2019] NSWCA 33 at [33], [45] and Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Zhukovska (2020) 102 NSWLR 655; [2020] NSWCA 163 at [99]).
For the reasons given below, I am persuaded that the applicant has discharged his onus of proving that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll and that, accordingly, the respondent’s name ought be removed from the roll.
This Court is obliged to set out the findings of fact on the basis of which a practitioner’s name has been removed from the roll: see the summary of authorities in [2009] NSWCA 255; (2009) 258 ALR 768 at [12]-[16]. There are two reasons for this. First, in the event that the respondent applies to be returned to the roll, the Court hearing such an application is required to take into account the conduct on the basis of which the order for removal was made: [1983] 2 NSWLR 361 at 362-363 (Moffitt P). Secondly, the making of detailed factual findings serves to educate the profession as to the conduct which has been found to be inconsistent with continued practice.
(a) R v Hadfield in the Supreme Court of Queensland in Brisbane when she purported to act on behalf of Mr Hadfield (particulars (n)-(p)); (b) Volkswagen Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd v Gow the Magistrates Court of Queensland at Cleveland (particular (q)); (c) Gow v Volkswagen Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd in the Local Court of New South Wales at Tweed Heads (particular (r)); and
2018 Law Society of NSW finding of dishonest act or omission of the respondent resulting in a claim by Mrs Ferguson against the Fidelity Fund (particulars (s)-(aa)).
The particulars include conduct both in New South Wales and Queensland. The Legal Services Commission in Queensland conducted its own investigations into the respondent’s conduct in purporting to act as, and holding herself out as, a solicitor and also her criminal conduct. It provided that material to the applicant to support the present application.
I propose to address the particularised allegations in chronological order.
The respondent was born in 1979. On 15 February 2013, the respondent, then 33 years old, was admitted as a lawyer to the Supreme Court of New South Wales and her name was entered on the roll. She has not been admitted elsewhere.
The respondent held a practising certificate as an employee of a legal practice (supervised) from 11 March 2013.
In March 2016, the respondent applied for a variation to her practising certificate to practise as a Principal of a Legal Practice of an Incorporated Legal Practice. Her then current practising certificate was subject to condition 3, which required her to complete a Practice Management Course. On 25 March 2016, the respondent gave a solicitor’s undertaking, to complete the next available Practice Management Course. On the basis of that undertaking, condition 3 was removed and condition 4, which recorded the undertaking, was imposed. Thereafter, the respondent was issued with a practising certificate as a Principal of a Legal Practice.
From April 2016, the respondent practised through a law practice known as “Gow Group Global Legal Services”, which was operated through a company, Sam Gow Pty Ltd as trustee for the Gow Family Trust, later known as 1189 Properties Ptd Ltd (the Gow company), of which the respondent was the sole director and shareholder.
The respondent was granted numerous extensions of her undertaking. However, when she still had not done the Practice Management Course as at 30 June 2017, her practising certificate was not renewed for the following practice year (1 July 2017-30 June 2018). On 14 December 2017, the Council of the Law Society refused to renew the respondent’s practising certificate for the 2017/2018 year. The applicant appears to accept that the respondent held a practising certificate up to 14 December 2017.
The respondent’s failure to comply with her undertaking to complete the Practice Management Court and associated conduct is relied on by the applicant in support of the relief sought and will be addressed below.
As referred to above, despite non-compliance with her undertaking to complete the Practice Management Course, the respondent’s practising certificate was renewed and extensions granted for her to complete the course. However, as at 30 June 2017, she had still not complied with her undertaking and no further practising certificate was issued. She was referred to the Law Society’s Professional Standards Department for failing to comply with her undertaking.
On 14 December 2017, the Council of the Law Society refused to renew the respondent’s practising certificate for the 2017/2018 year, resolving that she was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate. Its reasons for its resolutions included the following:
The Lawyer’s conduct demonstrates her failure to appreciate the nature and obligation imposed by the Undertaking provided and the condition imposed on her practising certificate and/or the seriousness in failing to comply with the Undertaking and condition.
The nature of the Lawyer’s alleged conduct is of such seriousness that the Council believes that the protection of the public warrants the cessation of the Solicitor’s right to practise.
On 14 December 2017, the Law Society appointed Richard Flynn as manager of the respondent’s law practice. On 16 December 2017, Mr Flynn informed the respondent by telephone that she was no longer permitted to practise as a solicitor, hold herself out as a solicitor or operate a trust account. In a letter dated 20 December 2017, Mr Flynn confirmed his appointment and what he had told her in the telephone conversation.
As referred to above, the respondent’s practising certificate for the year ended 30 June 2017 was not renewed and no further practising certificate was issued.
On 15 August 2017, the respondent offered to act as solicitor for Mrs Ferguson, aged 72 years and retired, who wanted to buy a unit in Surfers Paradise with an associate for $125,000. The respondent gave Mrs Ferguson her trust account details and asked her to transfer $57,500 (for her half-share in the unit less the deposit) into that account, which she did on 4 September 2017. At the time of this transfer, the respondent’s trust account had a nil balance.
On 16 September 2017, the respondent met Mrs Ferguson in a car park, showed her a contract on her mobile phone and asked her to sign it electronically. Mrs Ferguson did so, believing that it related to her purchase of the unit. She received no information from the respondent and was unable to contact her after November 2017, despite repeated requests for the return of the money.
Of the sum of $57,500 which Mrs Ferguson had deposited into the respondent’s trust account, the respondent transferred a total of $20,500 to her office account as follows.
| Date of transfer | Amount of transfer | | 21 September 2017 | $3,500 | | 28 November 2017 | $5,000 | | 6 January 2018 | $1,500 | | 28 January 2018 | $500 | | 7 February 2018 | $10,000 | | TOTAL | $20,500 |
The respondent’s office account showed that withdrawals were made from the office account for the respondent’s personal expenses totalling $10,343.43.
The respondent admitted that the office account was overdrawn immediately prior to the first transfer referred to above on 21 September 2017.
On 27 January 2018, Mrs Ferguson sent the respondent an email in the following terms:
This is 3 months ago and no communication. You have no office and meet at a service station.
This is all to keep from returning my money which I have constantly asked for and no answers from you.
17 years of saving and all I have. You have no morals and obviously take advantage of elderly in this position. Absolutely disgusting.
On 10 May 2018, Peter Edwards, who had been appointed by the Law Society to investigate the matter, interviewed the respondent. A transcript was made of the interview. The respondent informed Mr Edwards that Mrs Ferguson was still a client of hers, admitted that she had authorised the transfer of a total of $20,500 from the trust account to the office account but maintained that the transfers were made to enable payment for “services rendered” and that she had issued invoices for each amount. When it was put to the respondent that she had not issued any invoices to Mrs Ferguson, she responded, “That is not true”.
On 20 July 2018, Mr Edwards reported to the Law Society on his investigation. He expressed the view that the respondent had breached the following provisions of the Uniform Law:
| Section | Conduct | | 138 | Disbursing trust money of $20,500 to her office account without authority and failing to repay trust money totalling $57,500 when directed. | | 144(2)(b) | Withdrawing trust money of $20,500 for legal costs contrary to the applicable procedures and requirements. | | 148 | Causing a deficiency of $20,500 in both the law practice trust account and trust ledger account for Mrs Ferguson. | | 388 | Misleading the investigator (Mr Edwards) in relation to her dealings with Mrs Ferguson, including that she “issued” tax invoices to Mrs Ferguson. |
By letter dated 31 July 2018, Mr Flynn advised Mrs Ferguson of her right to make a claim on the NSW Law Society Fidelity Fund for the disparity (in the order of $10,000) between what she had paid and what Mr Flynn had been able to recover. Mrs Ferguson lodged a claim which was received by the Law Society on 16 August 2018.
Kathryn Byron was appointed to investigate Mrs Ferguson’s claim against the Fidelity Fund. In her report of 15 November 2018, she identified the following issues: first, whether the respondent performed any relevant work; second, whether any work performed was of value to Mrs Ferguson and, if so, how that value might be offset; and, third, whether the respondent had acted dishonestly or made dishonest omissions.
As to the third matter, Ms Byron relevantly found:
It seems very unlikely that any proper costs would have been anything like $10,000.00. Rather, the following matters suggest that the invoices totalling $10,000.00 were an attempt to cover a dishonest taking of that amount:
• the date errors in the ledgers
• the absence of any documents related to the claimed work
• the transfers from trust after the December 2017 refusal of a pc [practising certificate] and appointment of the manager
• Ms Gow’s attempts, as recently as July 2018, to withdraw the balance of the trust and office accounts, including her creation of a new “trust” account.
(a) find that a default occurred within the meaning of section 219 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (‘Uniform Law’), being a failure of the law practice 1189 Properties Pty Ltd trading as Gow Group - Global Legal Services in respect of $10,379.98 of $57,500.00, received from the claimant on 4 September 2017, this failure arising from dishonest acts or omissions of the law practice’s associate Samantha Catherine Gow; and
(b) determine the claim by wholly allowing it for the amount of $10,379.98 plus interest on that amount at the rate of 5% per annum from 16 August 2018 to the date of notification of allowance.
It follows that [the respondent] engaged in a course of dishonesty which is confirmed by the [respondent’s] conduct on 23 September 2017 when she transferred trust money to an overdrawn account and her failure to repay.
On 12 March 2018, Volkswagen Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd (VW) filed an application in the Queensland Magistrates Court at Cleveland (the Cleveland Magistrates Court) for delivery of goods, being an Audi motor vehicle (the Audi) of which the Gow company was the lessor and the respondent was the guarantor under the lease.
On 15 March 2018, the magistrate, by order, authorised the repossession of the Audi. VW repossessed the Audi on 24 March 2018.
On 10 April 2018, the Gow company and the respondent applied to set aside or stay the order for repossession. Their application came on for hearing in the Cleveland Magistrates Court before Magistrate Sarra on 18 April 2018. In the course of the hearing, the respondent said of the Audi:
[The Audi’s] got my belongings in it. … [A]ll my … client files are in the boot.
I have a practising certificate in Queensland at the moment under my firm, your Honour.
It was just basically one client’s files. It’s probably, like, two folders in the boot.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Magistrate set aside the application to injunct the sale of the vehicle; directed that the files be retrieved from the vehicle within a specified time; ordered the respondent (Ms Gow) to pay costs of $600; and noted that the matter would be referred to “the Legal [Services] Commission” for its consideration.
On 11 June 2018, at the Magistrate’s request, the Administration Officer of the Local Court at Cleveland emailed the transcript and the orders made to the Legal Services Commission, which investigated the conduct.
On 7 March 2018, the prosecution of Vaughn Hadfield was listed for review before Boddice J of the Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane. Mr Hadfield’s then solicitors, Hannay Lawyers, sought and were granted leave to withdraw from representing him. The matter was stood down as Mr Hadfield was not present in Court, in breach of a condition of his bail.
When the hearing of the matter resumed at 2.02pm, the respondent sought leave to appear on behalf of Mr Hadfield. She did not explain why leave was required but informed the Court:
Your Honour, I’ve just been talking with my learned friend in the break in relation to a bit of a firm mix-up on the defence perspective. I wasn’t aware that Mr Hannay’s firm appeared this morning. I don’t act for that firm. And I just wanted to put that on the record. We were only retained, pretty much yesterday, your Honour. And we would like to seek a further adjournment, if your Honour’s minded for - sorry - two further adjournments. One for early - next week at the Court’s discretion for a bail variation application and, also, a further one for this matter to be brought into some sort of organisation and funding to be also brought into some sort of organisation.
…
… [I]n my respectful submission, your Honour, in relation to that is that my client has instructed me that he was not aware he was to attend - sorry, his solicitors that were on the record on Friday, Hannay Law, told him that he wasn’t to attend on Friday - he was advised by them to attend today. There’s been a lot of confusion just for my limited understanding so far in relation to my client’s understanding of what was going on with his matters and what he’s actually being charged for, indicted for, etcetera. Which, even myself, was just clarifying the number of indictable offences is different to what I was initially instructed, also.
So in my respectful submission, your Honour, the time that’s necessary even though there has been a very long delay. And it’s my intention to bring it as short as possible and try and fix this matter because it’s very messy and in the quickest time that I possibly can, your Honour.
(Emphasis added.)
You have interfered with the proper administration of justice in terms of the listings of this court in the attitude you have taken to date. I am not going to tolerate it anymore. So you need to cooperate with your solicitor.
(Emphasis added.)
I [indistinct] to seek leave at the moment. I am a solicitor, but I have a problem with my practising certificate to appear today [indistinct] Mr Hadfield is in the court.
Your Honour, I have made some enquires over the last fortnight, since we were here last, in relation to Mr Hadfield’s legal matters with Legal Aid and also the Department of Public Prosecutions. Now, [indistinct] the only thing with Gabrielle, who I believe is the legal officer on this matter - and I have sent a request through two weeks ago, in relation to receiving a copy of the indictment along with any other QP9s, etcetera, that would assist with my looking into this matter for him. I did call this morning because I have not had a reply to that email , so I call when - in the break, to their office and I was advise[d] that Gabrielle was on leave, but I did leave a message for, I believe, her assistant Samantha to call me back but I haven’t received a response [from] that either. So I’m - I have forged ahead with some progress, your Honour, however, I do need to inform the court that there is a real problem with our funding. There seems to be a problem with Legal Aid, in particular. There’s a dis -there’s an argument whether his funding was cancelled or whether it was refused. I was informed just before the court today that [indistinct] in Southport [indistinct] that he would need to, possibly, make an appeal to that decision. However, we still haven’t really established whether - what the decision actually was to appeal to start with.
(Emphasis added.)
On the basis of the respondent’s representations to the Court that the funding for representation was still being sorted out, Boddice J adjourned the matter again and listed it for review on 2 May 2018.
The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld) informed the Legal Services Commissioner (Qld) that there was no electronic record at that office of any communication having been received by that office on that day.
The appearance on 21 March 2018 was the last occasion on which the respondent appeared on behalf of Mr Hadfield.
On 1 May 2018, the respondent filed a statement of claim in the Local Court of New South Wales at Tweed Heads (the Tweed Heads Local Court) in which she alleged that VW’s repossession of the Audi on 24 March 2018 was unlawful. The statement of claim was served on VW on 8 May 2018. On 30 May 2018, the respondent filed an application for default judgment (which was premature as VW had 28 days from service of the statement of claim within which to file a defence: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), (UCPR), r 14.3). VW filed a notice of motion seeking that the proceedings be struck out as an abuse of process or, in the alternative, on the basis that they were frivolous or vexatious. The notice of motion was served on the respondent on 7 June 2018 and listed for hearing on 26 June 2018 before Dunlevy LCM.
In the course of the hearing, the following exchange occurred between Dunlevy LCM and the respondent:
HIS HONOUR: Are you actually a solicitor?
PLAINTIFF: Yes your Honour.
NAUGHTON [representative for VW]: She is not admitted as a solicitor on the roll.
PLAINTIFF: I am not admitted at the moment because there are things going on with my law firm that I am still dealing with, with the Law Society. I am representing myself today.
HIS HONOUR: I understand and you can represent yourself as a litigant in person.
PLAINTIFF: Yes, by profession yes.
(Emphasis added.)
| Sequence | Date | Offence charged | | 1 | 30 Jan 2018 | Forge a document with intent to defraud, in circumstances where the document appeared to have been issued by lawful authority, namely by the Federal Circuit Court (the Circuit Court). | | 2 | Utter a forged document to [DW], with intent to defraud, in circumstances where the document appeared to have been issued by lawful authority, namely by the Circuit Court. | | 3 | Forge a document with intent to defraud, in circumstances where the document appeared to have been issued by lawful authority, namely by the Circuit Court. | | 4 | 6 Feb 2018 | Uttered a forged document, with intent to defraud, in circumstances where the document appeared to have been issued by lawful authority, namely by the Circuit Court. |
The statement of facts tendered on sentence was accepted by the respondent. The following is a summary of these facts.
The respondent and [DW] were married in 2002 and had children, including SW, who was born in 2004. They divorced in 2008. There was an informal arrangement between them as to custody of, and access to, the children. SW lived with the respondent and went to a local school (the Local School). However, in January 2018, SW told her father that she wanted to live with him. DW agreed and, on 23 January 2018, enrolled her in a school which SW had previously attended (the College).
On 29 January 2018, the respondent sent the following text to DW:
[SW] does not go to [the College] anymore. She is enrolled in [the Local School] and that is where she will stay that is also where [JW, another child in the family] is going. I will be advising school of this tomorrow and the court.
At the time this and subsequent texts (see below) were sent, there were no relevant court proceedings on foot.
On or about 30 January 2018, DW received a text message from the respondent which attached a document which purported to be parenting orders made by “Judge Jarrett” of the Circuit Court with respect to SW in respect of file number ZB3062/201 (the first orders). The document identified DW as the respondent to the proceedings but did not show the respondent (Ms Gow) as a party. The first orders included an order that SW live with Ms Gow, that DW submit to psychological assessment, and that SW attend the Local School. The first orders purported to be signed by “Judge Jarret” (Jarrett J) of the Circuit Court (paragraph 10 of the statement of facts).
After sending the first orders to DW, the respondent sent the following text to him:
You need 2 organise for [SW] to be brought home within the hour and I don’t want you anywhere near my house and let[‘]s hope you have enough sense not 2 be arrested in front of ur daughter
These are not the last of the orders I am seeking either. Do you have a lawyer or should I have the police serve you with the other court documents?
Still 2 self absorbed 2 learn. That’s a Family Court Order [DW] ...... What you think your [scil.] above the Judges 2!?
This court order was uttered to induce DW to act in a way detrimental to his lawful right to have custody of SW at the relevant time.
On 6 February 2018, the respondent went to the front office of the College and handed a document which purported to constitute orders of the Circuit Court to a staff member of the College (the second orders). The orders were in the same terms as the one referred to above but, in this version, the respondent was listed as the applicant. The staff member informed the respondent that SW had left school that day. The respondent left the document with her and said that she would return the following day.
On 7 February 2018, the respondent attended the College and demanded that SW be sent home with her. She referred to the second orders and alleged that DW had “stolen” SW. The principal telephoned DW, who attended the school. An agreement was reached, as a result of which SW went home with the respondent.
On 20 February 2018, the respondent contacted the principal of the College to arrange for SW to be collected so that she could be enrolled in the Local School. The principal said that he would honour “the document” (being the second orders). The respondent collected SW from the College.
The second court orders were uttered to induce the College to act in a way detrimental to a legal right it enjoyed, which was, in effect, to have SW, who was enrolled in the College, attend the College.
In mid-February 2018, DW contacted the Circuit Court to discuss the first orders and cited the file number for its reference. He was told that no orders had been made in any matter involving DW or the respondent on 30 January 2018; the file number did not exist in the court records; and a similar file number (ZB 3602 of 2001) related to the matter between the parties in 2001.
On 24 May 2018, a search warrant was executed at the respondent’s residence in her presence and in the presence of her solicitor. Her mobile phone and computer files of MS Word documents similar in appearance to the first and second orders were seized. On 8 June 2018, a search warrant was executed at the College, in the course of which the second orders and documents relating to SW’s enrolment were seized.
On 16 September 2021, the respondent was sentenced (for the four offences) to a term of imprisonment of nine months, which was suspended after 70 days in custody (which equated to the pre-sentence custody from 8 July 2021 to 15 September 2021).
On 21 June 2019, the respondent entered into a bail undertaking in the Queensland Magistrates Court at Brisbane to appear at Southport on 1 July 2019 and subsequently, whenever the matter was listed. The address at which she was to reside for the purpose of her bail was her residence in Banora Point, Queensland. The matter was listed before the court on 7 January 2021. On 6 January 2021, the respondent emailed the prosecutor saying that she could not attend court as she was living in New South Wales and was prevented by COVID-19 restrictions from attending. The prosecutor endeavoured to obtain information about the respondent’s then current address, without success.
When the respondent failed to appear at the Local Court at Southport on 7 January 2021, a warrant was issued for her arrest. The police facts recorded:
When questioned as to why she failed to appear the defendant stated that she was under COVID19 lockdown in Tweed Heads at the time of her appearance. She further stated that she did not surrender herself immediately after lock down was lifted because she planned to contest the validity of the warrant through the District and Supreme courts.
On 11 April 2024, the respondent was convicted by the Local Court at Tweed Heads (following her plea of guilty) of an offence of common assault contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), committed on 5 July 2023 against the respondent’s mother.
MacMahon A/LCM’s remarks on sentence included the following narrative, based on the police facts:
… Apparently, there was a plan for the complainant [the respondent’s mother] and Ms Gow and the children to travel to Sydney on the day in question.
Ms Gow was woken by her mother. A dispute followed about matters which are not outlined in any particular detail, other than that she became frustrated towards her mother. The accused threw a jewellery box at the victim, hitting her on the forearm, causing her pain and a small bruise, then threw a number of other items at the victim, including a chair, which hit the victim on her buttock and her lower back. The accused then picked up a toothbrush and held it in her hand towards the victim’s face with a clenched fist, causing the victim to be worried about her wellbeing. The accused’s brother took hold of her, and the accused threw the toothbrush at the victim, hitting her in the upper chest.
The circumstances were made worse by the fact that the accused’s young children, ten and 11, were present in the house. They sought help from another member of their family. They then left the property and went next door to find safety. The police arrived and they observed the accused at the time to be erratic and appeared to be in a hyper state and to be upset and crying. She was arrested. She did not resist the arrest, and she was cautioned and taken to the police vehicle and taken to the Tweed Heads Police Station.
| Date | Offence | | 30 December 2023 | Drive while disqualified. | | Use unregistered motor vehicle on highway. | | 4 January 2024 | Drive while disqualified. | | Use unregistered motor vehicle on highway. | | Fail oral fluid test within 3 hours of driving. |
The gravity of the allegations made by the applicant against the respondent is such that they need to be proved on the balance of probabilities to the Briginshaw standard (Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34): see, for example, The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Sukkar [2007] NSWCA 341 at [16]; Power at [40]; and Carr v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2020] NSWCA 276 at [112]. However, the inferences for which the applicant contended can more readily be drawn in circumstances where the respondent has chosen not to give evidence refuting the evidence adduced against her. This is not a case where the respondent’s right to silence might operate to moderate the duty of candour which she owes to this Court: cf. Power at [28] (Hodgson JA, Beazley and McColl JJA agreeing).
The evidence adduced on behalf of the applicant which forms the basis of the findings made above is sufficient to prove the particularised allegations made in support of the claim for relief to the requisite standard.
In New South Wales Bar Association v Cummins (2001) 52 NSWLR 279; [2001] NSWCA 284 at [20], Spigelman CJ explained why legal practitioners must conduct themselves in accordance with the highest standards of integrity:
There are four interrelated interests involved. Clients must feel secure in confiding their secrets and entrusting their most personal affairs to lawyers. Fellow practitioners must be able to depend implicitly on the word and the behaviour of their colleagues. The judiciary must have confidence in those who appear before the courts. The public must have confidence in the legal profession by reason of the central role the profession plays in the administration of justice. Many aspects of the administration of justice depend on the trust by the judiciary and/or the public in the performance of professional obligations by professional people.
The evidence establishes that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll.
The respondent’s extended and repeated failure over a period of almost 18 months (from March 2016 to December 2017) to comply with her undertaking to the Law Society to complete a Practice Management Course demonstrates that she cannot be trusted to do that which she has undertaken to do and that she is cavalier about compliance with obligations associated with her right to practise.
The respondent’s breaches of bail undertakings in 2014 and subsequently in 2021 indicate, together with other evidence, a disregard of her obligations to the courts before whom she appeared as a party and as a legal representative. They are consistent with other evidence which indicates that she is prepared to put her personal interest and convenience ahead of her duties to the court.
At least from 14 December 2017, the respondent ceased to be a “qualified entity” within the meaning of s 6 of the Uniform Law since, as she did not have a current practising certificate, she was no longer an “Australian legal practitioner”. After that date, the respondent was prohibited from engaging in legal practice (s 10 of the Uniform Law) or representing that she was entitled to engage in legal practice (s 11 of the Uniform Law). Further, she became uninsured, thereby exposing those for whom she acted to deception and to the risk of obtaining professional legal services from an uninsured entity. She also misled the courts before whom she appeared by using language which was apt to imply that she was entitled to act as a legal practitioner or failing to express the reason why the leave to appear which she sought was required. She acted, not only in breach of the statutory prohibitions, but also in breach of the trust which courts are entitled to repose in legal practitioners who appear before them.
The respondent’s appearances in respect of her own matters against VW (in the Cleveland Magistrates Court and the Tweed Heads Local Court) and when purporting to appear on behalf of Mr Hadfield in the Queensland Supreme Court constitute breaches of the statutory prohibition.
It might be observed that even if the respondent was entitled to take instructions from Mrs Ferguson in August 2017 (on the basis of the applicant’s concession that the respondent had a right to practise until 14 December 2017), she was required to cease to act for her as soon as the decision was made by the Law Society on 14 December 2017 not to renew her practising certificate. After that date she was prohibited from representing that she was entitled to engage in legal practice. However, the only conduct particularised by the applicant in respect of Mrs Ferguson is the respondent’s conduct which gave rise to the claim on the Fidelity Fund. Accordingly, I do not take into account her continuing to act for Mrs Ferguson after 14 December 2017 (if indeed she did so) against the respondent.
40 As explained in Li at [22]-[23], the appropriate maintenance of trust accounts is critical to upholding confidence in the legal profession and the misappropriation of any sum of money by a lawyer is a gross violation of the oath or affirmation which every new lawyer makes on admission to practice, namely to “truly and honestly conduct” themselves in the practice of a lawyer of the Supreme Court of New South Wales: see also Barwick v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 32 at [118] and Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Dimitrious [2015] NSWCA 258 at [21]. In Li at [24], Bell CJ added that:
“Such dishonourable conduct harms the reputation of lawyers practising in this State and undermines public confidence in the legal profession: Croke at [13]. As such, the damage done by the Respondent’s acts extended well beyond the clients and principals of the firm by which he was employed. The relief sought by the Law Society is entirely justified.”
41 It was said by this Court in Green at [65] that “the ordinary consequence of misappropriation of trust funds by a practitioner is removal from the roll”. …
While Mrs Ferguson received financial compensation from the NSW Fidelity Fund (because of the finding that the respondent had acted fraudulently), her trust in the legal profession was damaged by the respondent’s conduct. Mrs Ferguson suffered considerable stress over a lengthy period as a result of the prospect of losing her life’s savings. But for the diligence of the NSW Law Society, the money which had not yet been dissipated may not have been recovered from the respondent.
The respondent’s conduct in forging and uttering documents in January and February 2018 (in connection with the custody of SW to make it appear as if they were generated by the Circuit Court) is egregious. She deliberately misled innocent persons, DW and the staff of the school where SW was enrolled and caused DW to relinquish custody of SW, who had expressed a desire to live with him rather than the respondent. DW and the school staff acted immediately to comply with what appeared to be court orders but which were, in fact, fake documents which the respondent had produced with a view to obtaining a result which suited her. The respondent’s conduct had the consequence of undermining the trust which the community is entitled to place in documents which appear to be court orders. Her conduct in forging and uttering purported court orders was a deliberate and premeditated attempt to influence people to act (on pain of contempt of court) in a way that suited her.
The respondent’s convictions for breach of her bail undertaking in 2021 and common assault in July 2023, when taken together with the other established conduct are consistent with a pattern of disregard for the law.
The driving offences committed by the respondent in December 2023 and January 2024 also exhibit a disregard for the law. The evidence does not reveal when, or in what circumstances, the respondent was disqualified for driving at the time of the offences or when the vehicle which she was driving became deregistered. However, her preparedness to drive in these circumstances was not only illegal but also irresponsible. Taken together with other evidence, it tends to indicate that she is prepared to breach the law for her own convenience and that she cannot be trusted to abide by the law.
The cumulative effect of the conduct proved against the respondent is that she is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll. Further, the respondent's conduct in relation to Mrs Ferguson and the misuse of the trust account and her separate conduct in forging and uttering court orders of the Federal Circuit Court would each independently have warranted her removal from the roll.
I propose the following orders:
Declare that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll of Australian Lawyers.
Order that the name of the respondent be removed from the Roll of Australian Lawyers.
Order the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs of the proceedings.
McHUGH JA: I agree with Adamson JA. I would add one observation. For a lawyer to forge and utter any document is extremely serious. Such conduct discloses not only dishonesty but a willingness to manipulate others for personal advantage. But for a lawyer to forge and utter what purport to be court orders is, as Adamson JA says, egregious. The respondent’s conduct discloses a lack of insight into, and a disregard for, the administration of justice itself. It demands her removal from the roll.
**********
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Gow [2025] NSWCA 232
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(2020) 102 NSWLR 655
(2009) 258 ALR 768
(2008) 71 NSWLR 451
(2001) 52 NSWLR 279
The Court declared that Samantha Gow was not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll of Australian Lawyers, ordered her name removed from the roll, and ordered her to pay the applicant’s costs.
The applicant relies on 27 particulars in support of the relief sought in the amended summons. He contends that these particulars cumulatively demonstrate that the respondent is not a fit and proper person to remain on the roll. The particulars can be summarised as follows:
2021 convictions in the Magistrates Court of Queensland (particulars (a)-(e));
2014 findings of guilt in the Magistrates Court of Queensland (particulars (f) and (g));
2024 Local Court of New South Wales findings of guilt (particulars (h) and (i));
2017 Law Society of NSW finding that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and its refusal to renew her practising certificate (particulars (j)-(m));
2018 conduct in continuing to act as a solicitor in:
The respondent’s conduct in inducing Mrs Ferguson to pay $57,500 into the respondent’s trust account and then treating the money as her own by paying it into her office account and using it for general expenses is particularly serious. In XX, the Court said of misappropriations by legal practitioners of clients’ funds: