Proposed Plaintiff v Proposed Defendant

Supreme Court of Victoria|2019-06-06|Before: MOORE J

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - General litigation restraint order - Interlocutory application for declaratory relief - Common law right to unimpeded access to the Court - Plaintiff seeks access to computer facilities - Supreme Court Act 1986 s 21 - Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 ss 3, 5, 32, 54, 55, , , , .

1 The proposed plaintiff, Mr Julian Knight, is currently serving a life sentence at Port Phillip Prison for a mass shooting he committed in Melbourne on 9 August 1987. On 10 November 1988 he was sentenced to seven consecutive life imprisonment sentences with a minimum non-parole term of 27 years in relation to seven counts of murder and 46 counts of attempted murder to which he had pleaded guilty.

2 Mr Knight was declared a vexatious litigant on 19 October 2004,[1] and has been subject to an indefinite general litigation restraint order since 30 August 2016.[2] He has since made numerous applications for leave to commence various proceedings.

3 Mr Knight seeks leave to proceed with interlocutory applications in three proposed proceedings, being proceeding numbers S CI 2013 02043, S CI 2013 06673 and S CI 2013 02362. For convenience, I will refer collectively to these matters as 'the Proposed Proceedings'. For reasons that are not presently relevant, Mr Knight's applications for leave to commence the Proposed Proceedings have not yet been heard by the Court.

4 In each of the Proposed Proceedings he seeks an interlocutory order in the following terms:

A declaration that in the circumstances [his] common law right to unimpeded access to the Court entails access to computer facilities, as was provided to [him] by [Mr Craig Castle, in his capacity as General Manager of Port Phillip Prison], from 8 December 2017 to 15 January 2018, including access to printing facilities.

5 The issue for determination is whether leave should be granted to Mr Knight to commence, in each of the Proposed Proceedings, interlocutory applications seeking relief in the above terms.

6 For the reasons which follow, Mr Knight's applications for leave to proceed with interlocutory applications for the above relief in the Proposed Proceedings should be dismissed pursuant to s 58 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2014 (the Act).

7 In proposed proceeding S CI 02043 of 2013, filed with the Court on 16 April 2013, Mr Knight seeks leave to commence proceedings against the Adult Parole Board (the Board) for an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the Board's decision of 22 March 2013 refusing his request for a review of the Board's decision of 29 June 2012 refusing his request for a tentative release date. Mr Knight also seeks an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Board to review its decision of 29 June 2012.

8 In proposed proceeding S CI 06673 of 2013, filed with the Court on 24 December 2013, Mr Knight seeks leave to commence proceedings against the Board for an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Board to review its decision of 9 December 2013 in relation to parole.

9 In proposed proceeding S CI 02362 of 2013, filed with the Court on 24 December 2013, Mr Knight seeks leave to commence proceedings against Ms Claire Noone, the then Acting Director of the Department of Justice. Mr Knight seeks an order in the nature of certiorari quashing Ms Noone's decision of 11 April 2013 refusing his request for a rehabilitation and transition permit under the Corrections Act 1986. Relief is also sought in the nature of mandamus requiring Ms Noone to consider Mr Knight's request for a rehabilitation and transition permit according to law. Following the appointment of Mr Greg Wilson as the Director of the Department of Justice, on 10 November 2017, Daly AsJ made orders substituting Mr Greg Wilson as the proposed defendant in place of Ms Noone.

10 As has been noted, the Court has not yet heard Mr Knight's applications for leave to commence any of the Proposed Proceedings.

11 It is also necessary to refer to another proceeding sought to be commenced by Mr Knight. In proposed proceeding S ECI 03023 of 2018, Mr Knight seeks leave to commence a proceeding against Mr Craig Castle, the General Manager of Port Phillip Prison where Mr Knight is incarcerated. Mr Knight's application for leave to commence this proceeding also has not been heard by the Court. For convenience, I will refer to this proposed proceeding as 'Knight v Castle'.

12 In Knight v Castle, Mr Knight seeks leave to commence a proceeding in which relief in the following terms is sought:

A declaration that in the circumstances the plaintiff's common law right to unimpeded access to the Court entails access to computer facilities, as was provided to the plaintiff by the defendant from 8 December 2017 to 15 January 2018, including access to printing facilities.

13 The interlocutory relief sought by Mr Knight in each of the Proposed Proceedings[3] is in the same terms as the above order. On 25 July 2018, Daly AsJ made orders in each of the Proposed Proceedings that an application for interlocutory relief made by Mr Knight be listed for hearing on 30 October 2018. An order was also made dispensing with the requirement for Mr Knight to issue a summons.

Mr Knight's status as a vexatious litigant and legislative provisions

14 Mr Knight was declared a vexatious litigant on 19 October 2004 pursuant to s 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986.[4]

15 In October 2014, the Act came into operation and repealed s 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986. Pursuant to s 91 of the Act, an order in force declaring a person to be vexatious under s 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 was taken to be a 'general litigation restraint order' made under s 29 of the Act.

16 Section 29(1) of the Act vests power in a Judge of the Supreme Court to make a general litigation restraint order against a person if satisfied that the person has persistently and without reasonable grounds commenced or conducted vexatious proceedings. Such an order may direct that the person must not, for a period specified by the Court, commence or continue any proceeding in a Victorian court or tribunal without leave.[5]

17 On 30 August 2016, J Forrest J made the following orders:[6]

The defendant Julian Knight be the subject of a general litigation restraint order.
Mr Knight must not, without leave of the court or tribunal in which the proceeding is to be commenced, commence from this date any legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal, in this Court, an inferior court, or any tribunal.
Orders 1 and 2 are to remain in force indefinitely.
There be no order as to costs.

18 It is to be noted that the above orders prohibit Mr Knight from commencing, without leave, any 'legal proceedings'. The word 'proceeding' is defined in s 3 of the Act to include any interlocutory application taken in connection with or incidental to a proceeding before an Australian court or tribunal. The phrase 'interlocutory application' is defined in s 3 of the Act to have the meaning in s 5, namely, 'any process by which an interlocutory proceeding is commenced in an Australian court or tribunal, including a subpoena.'

19 Section 32 of the Act identifies the effect on a 'proceeding' of a general litigation restraint order. It provides that, on the making of such an order and subject to its terms, 'a proceeding to which the order relates is stayed; and a proceeding that is commenced in contravention of the order is of no effect.'

20 Given that the Act expressly defines 'proceeding' to include interlocutory applications, it is clear that Mr Knight requires the leave of this Court to commence his proposed applications for interlocutory relief in the Proposed Proceedings.

21 Division 3 of Part 8 of the Act regulates applications for leave to proceed under general litigation restraint orders. Section 54(1) provides that a person who is subject to a general litigation restraint order may apply to a Victorian court or tribunal for leave to commence or continue a proceeding. Pursuant to s 55, the Court must be satisfied of two things in order to exercise its discretion in respect of the grant of leave to a person subject to a general litigation restraint order: (1) that the proceeding is not vexatious; and (2) that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding. The onus is on the applicant for leave to prove both these elements.[7] The requirement that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding means that an applicant for leave must establish a 'real or reasonable prospect' that his or her claim for relief can succeed.[8]

22 Division 4 of Part 8 of the Act deals with general matters relating to applications for leave to proceed. Section 56 requires an applicant for leave to proceed to disclose by affidavit the following details when making an application for leave to proceed:

(a) details of each application for leave to proceed made by the person;

(b) details of each application for leave to commence or continue a proceeding made by the person under section 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986, as in force immediately before its repeal;

(c) details of each interlocutory application made or proceeding commenced or conducted by the person -

(i) that is a vexatious application or a vexatious proceeding; or

(ii) which has been stayed or dismissed on the basis of being made, commenced or conducted without merit;

(d) an explanation as to how the application for leave to proceed is materially different to each application referred to above;

(e) all other facts material to the application, whether in support of or adverse to the application, that are known to the applicant for leave.

23 Further to the requirements set out in s 55 of the Act, s 58 of the Act provides:

A Victorian court or tribunal may dismiss an application for leave to proceed made by a person if the Victorian court or tribunal is not satisfied that the application is materially different to a previous application made by that person.

24 Section 63 of the Act provides that the Court may determine an application for leave to proceed on the basis of written submissions and may determine such an application by conducting an oral hearing if the Court considers that there are exceptional circumstances and that it is appropriate to do so, having regard to the interests of justice.

Mr Knight's application for leave to commence the interlocutory applications

25 Due to the procedurally complex background in which the current applications for leave have been made as outlined above, Mr Knight, counsel for the respondents in each of the Proposed Proceedings and counsel for Mr Castle in Knight v Castle appeared before the Court on 30 October 2018 and made submissions about the further progress of the matter. At the hearing it was not controversial that, consistent with the terms of s 63(1) of the Act, the Court was to proceed by deciding Mr Knight's application for leave to proceed with the interlocutory applications on the basis of the written materials provided by him. In proceeding in this way, the Court has not had any regard to the various submissions previously made on behalf of the respondents in each of the Proposed Proceedings and those provided by counsel for Mr Castle in Knight v Castle.

26 In support of his application for leave to proceed with his applications for interlocutory relief in each of the Proposed Proceedings, Mr Knight was granted leave to rely upon the following affidavits filed by him in Knight v Castle:

(a) Affidavit of Julian Knight affirmed 4 April 2019 (the first affidavit);

(b) Further Affidavit of Julian Knight affirmed 4 April 2019 comprising ten paragraphs (the second affidavit);

(c) Further Affidavit of Julian Knight affirmed 4 April 2019 comprising eight paragraphs (the third affidavit); and

(d) Further Affidavit of Julian Knight affirmed 4 April 2019 comprising twenty paragraphs (the fourth affidavit).

Mr Knight also relied upon documents provided to the Court under cover of a letter dated 29 October 2018 (the further material).

27 In the first affidavit, Mr Knight annexes an affidavit filed by him in an earlier discontinued proceeding (S CI 2017 03800). As is presently relevant, Mr Knight deposes to the following matters in that affidavit:

(a) That, as a result of the major fire in the administration building at Port Phillip Prison on 29 November 2017, the prison remained in total or partial lockdown until 2 January 2018, with the prison library not reopening until 18 January 2018.

(b) During the lockdown on 8 December 2017, Mr Knight was provided with a copy of his computer account on CD-ROM and the loan of a laptop computer. The loan of that computer was subject to a short-term computer access agreement. Mr Knight deposes that he was provided with access to the laptop computer in his cell on a 'full-time' basis, but that he was not provided with access to a printer. He states that on 15 January 2018 the computer was taken away from him and not returned.

(c) On 16 January 2018 he was made to sign a new computer access agreement, which he states limits his access to the computer to use in the prison library for two hours on Tuesday afternoons and two hours on Thursday afternoons.

(d) When he had access to the computer on an 'in-cell full-time basis', he had access to it for 168 hours per week. He now has computer access for four hours per week. He further states that when he had access to the computer on an 'in-cell full-time basis,' he would spend 6-10 hours per day on the computer in preparing for his legal proceedings, which amounted to 42-70 hours per week.

(e) Mr Knight refers to various legal proceedings for which he is attempting to prepare. He is concerned that, if he is not given access to an in-cell computer, there is a risk that other prisoners or prison officers will view, either intentionally or inadvertently, material which he is preparing in the library.

28 In the second affidavit, Mr Knight deposes that, having proof-read a printed copy of the first affidavit, he noticed that it contained 'a number of assertions of fact that are misleading in the context of the instant proceeding.' He then proceeds to correct certain matters referred to in the first affidavit (as well as deposing to two additional matters). As amended by his second affidavit, in the first affidavit Mr Knight deposes to various matters including the following:

(a) In the period from 19 October 2004 when he was declared a vexatious litigant until 16 October 2014, he made numerous applications for leave to commence proceedings under s 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1986. Mr Knight lists and briefly summarises the subject matter of 20 judgments of this Court in relation to applications for leave to commence proceedings brought by him in the period between 2007 and 2014. Mr Knight also refers to two successful applications for leave to commence a proceeding in the above period which he says have not been reported. He further deposes to six additional applications for leave to commence proceedings in this Court in the above period that were withdrawn or discontinued by consent of all the parties which he briefly summarises.

(b) Mr Knight identifies seven[9] of the proceedings referred to in the above subparagraph which he describes as concerning 'access to a personal "in-cell" computer' (or in similar terms). In his second affidavit, he states that these references should be taken to refer to unsuccessful applications brought by him for permission to purchase his own computer, rather than for access to a prison supplied computer. On that basis he states that those proceedings are materially different to the relief sought in the present interlocutory applications.

(c) Mr Knight deposes to 11 applications for leave to commence proceedings brought by him between 16 October 2014 and 30 August 2016 which he states have been reported. He also refers to two other proceedings in the above period that were discontinued with the consent of all parties.

(d) Mr Knight identifies five reported judgments of this Court in relation to applications brought by him for leave to commence proceedings since 30 August 2016, as well as a further application for leave to commence a proceeding in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. He also identifies three applications for leave to commence proceedings in the Supreme Court since 30 August 2016 which have been discontinued with the consent of all parties.

(e) In his first affidavit, Mr Knight identifies five proceedings which, in his second affidavit, he deposes are 'similar to' the present proceeding.[10] Those proceedings are:

(i) Knight v Wise (S CI 2012 4160) in relation to which Mr Knight states 'the application for interlocutory relief in that proceeding was for a mandatory interlocutory injunction compelling the prison authorities to provide me with the means of producing court documents on a seven days a week basis (ie a personal "in-cell" computer).'

(ii) Knight v Adult Parole Board (S CI 2012 4155) in relation to which Mr Knight states 'the application for interlocutory relief in that proceeding was for a mandatory interlocutory injunction compelling the prison authorities to provide me with the means of producing court documents on a seven day a week basis (ie a personal "in-cell" computer).'

(iii) Knight v Wise (S CI 2013 3623) in relation to which Mr Knight states 'the application for interlocutory relief in that proceeding was for a mandatory interlocutory injunction compelling the prison authorities to provide me with reasonable facilities, including access to a computer on a seven days a week basis, for the duration of the instant proceeding.'

(iv) Knight v Corrections Commissioner, General Manager, Port Phillip Prison and General Manager HM Prison Barwon (S CI 2015 4361) in relation to which Mr Knight states that 'the application for relief in that proceeding included an order concerning my access to computer facilities in order to prepare court proceedings.'

(v) Knight v Corrections Commissioner, General Manager, Port Phillip Prison and General Manager HM Prison Barwon (S CI 2015 5543) in relation to which Mr Knight states 'the application for relief in that proceeding included an order concerning my access to computer facilities in order to prepare court proceedings.'

(f) In his second affidavit, Mr Knight states in relation to the five proceedings referred to in the previous sub-paragraph that the application brought in each of those proceedings was 'similar to the declaratory relief sought in the present proceeding, although the factual basis for the order sought in the present proceeding is materially different to that in the previous proceeding.'

(g) Mr Knight deposes in his first affidavit that two of the proceedings previously brought by him did concern the refusal by the prison authorities of his application 'for access to a personal "in-cell" computer.' He states however that the present proceeding is materially different to those proceedings 'in that it does not concern [his] access to a personal "in-cell" computer.'

(h) Mr Knight further deposes to the matters summarised in paragraphs [27(c)] and [27(d)] above. He also deposes that Mr Castle has informed him that he was not prepared to extend Mr Knight's access to a computer beyond that provided for in the computer access agreement signed by him on 16 January 2018. Mr Knight states that, since 16 January 2018, he has submitted repeated requests to Mr Castle to reinstate his access to the laptop computer on an 'in-cell' basis, or to have his access to the computer at the prison library extended, and to purchase a computer printer, or to have the library printer added as an approved printer. He states that all of these requests have been refused by Mr Castle.

(a) On 20 March 2018, his access to a CD drive on the laptop computer to which he had access since 8 December 2017 was blocked by Mr Castle.

(b) He made repeated requests to access the CD drive because nearly all of his legal files were stored on the CD drive and that he has not received a response to his requests.

(c) He made repeated requests to purchase a computer or to have the loan of a computer, to purchase a printer and to have increased access to the prison library, all of which requests had been refused.

(d) His printing requests to Mr Castle take up to six weeks to be actioned.

(e) He has access to the prison library two afternoons a week. Another prisoner studying for a single university subject was said to have access to the library for four afternoons per week.

30 In the fourth affidavit, Mr Knight deposes to the following matters:

(a) On 3 August 2018, he was charged by Victoria Police with two counts of breaching s 31A of the Corrections Act 1986 in relation to two USB devices found in his cell in May 2018 and that he is unrepresented in relation to those charges.

(b) In July 2018, he was reported by a corrections officer for using the stand-alone computer in the prison library to view his 'legal CDs' and later charged with breaching certain provisions of the Corrections Regulations 2009 in relation to that usage. On 17 July 2018, a disciplinary hearing in relation to his use of the library stand-alone computer was adjourned pending advice from Corrections Victoria as to whether he was permitted to use library computers or not.

(d) From 27 June 2018 to 12 August 2018, he submitted ten Prisoner Request forms variously for the use of a printer, access to library facilities and the reactivation of his CD drive. Mr Knight deposes that these requests have either not been approved or have not been the subject of a response.

31 The further material relied upon by Mr Knight is the following:

(a) A letter dated 11 October 2017 to Mr Knight from the Principal Registrar of the Victims of Crime Assistance Tribunal.

(b) An order in proceeding no Z324/2017 in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal staying that proceeding on certain terms.

(c) An order dated 29 June 2018 made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in proceedings between Mr Knight and the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

(d) A letter dated 16 April 2018 from Mr Knight to the Civil Registry of the Melbourne Magistrates' Court in relation to the filing of a claim for damages against the Commissioner of Corrections Victoria.

(e) The orders made by Associate Justice Daly referred to in paragraph [13] above.

(f) A letter from the Court's Practice Court Co-ordinator to Mr Knight dated 17 August 2018.

(g) A charge sheet and summons in relation to the USB's found in his cell referred to above.

(h) A letter dated 19 October 2018 from Doogue George Solicitors to Mr Knight.

(j) A document entitled 'Commissioner's Requirements' in relation to 'Prisoners' Computers' issued in May 2015 by Corrections Victoria Commissioner.

(k) A document entitled 'Commissioner's Requirements' in relation to 'Prison Libraries and Prisoner Access to Legal Resources' issued by Corrections Victoria Commissioner dated August 2014.

32 At the outset, it is to be noted that what Mr Knight seeks in his proposed interlocutory applications is the making of a declaration. I have serious reservations about whether such a declaratory order could be made by the Court in the proposed interlocutory applications. In Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan,[11] Gummow and Hayne JJ observed that an interlocutory order made in the form of a declaration affecting the rights of a respondent was 'wrong' and that an 'interlocutory declaration' is a form of order not known to the law.[12] In AED Oil Ltd (ACN 110 393 292) v Puffin FPSO Ltd,[13] the Court of Appeal observed as follows:[14]

Even if it were accepted that an interlocutory or interim declaration is not available in Australia, this would not, in our opinion, exclude the possibility of a declaration of rights in the course of interlocutory proceedings where the declaration finally determines an aspect of matters in dispute and does not operate only as a declaration for the interim. In our opinion, a declaration of this type could sensibly be described as "urgent".

33 In the present matter, if the Court made the declarations sought by Mr Knight in the proposed interlocutory applications, those declarations would not determine an aspect of the matters in dispute in the Proposed Proceedings set out in paragraphs [7]-[9] above. Further, the declarations sought by Mr Knight would only operate for an interim period, namely, until the determination of his applications for final relief in the Proposed Proceedings. For these reasons, I have serious doubts that Mr Knight has established, as he is required to do in accordance with s 55 of the Act, that his claim for interlocutory relief has a real or reasonable prospect of success. It is, however, unnecessary to express a concluded view on this matter given my conclusion, for the reasons detailed below, that Mr Knight's applications for interlocutory relief should be dismissed in accordance with s 58 of the Act.

34 Section 58 of the Act provides that a Victorian court may dismiss an application for leave to proceed made by a person if the court is not satisfied that the application is materially different to a previous application made by that person. Section 56(1)(d) obliges a person subject to a litigation restraint order who makes an application for leave to proceed to provide an explanation as to how the application for leave to proceed is materially different to previous applications brought by the person. As stated by McDonald J in Knight v Corrections Commissioner & Ors:[15]

... It is no function of the court to conduct its own inquiry with a view to satisfying itself that the current application is materially different to previous applications made by Mr Knight. Rather, the scheme of the Act imposes an obligation upon a person subject to a general litigation restraint order to place material before the court which enables the court to have the requisite satisfaction that an application is materially different to previous applications made by the applicant.

35 The interlocutory order that Mr Knight seeks in each of the Proposed Proceedings (see paragraph [4] above) does not itself specify the actual access to computer facilities which Mr Knight considers will properly give effect to his common law right to unimpeded access to the Court. Instead, that access to computer facilities is described indirectly as being that which was provided to him by Mr Castle in his capacity as General Manager at Port Phillip Prison from 8 December 2017 to 15 January 2018, including access to printing facilities. I have summarised Mr Knight's evidence about his access to computer facilities in that period in paragraph [27] above. Mr Knight states that during this period, he was provided with access to a computer in his cell on a full time basis. Thus, in his applications for interlocutory relief, what Mr Knight seeks in substance is a declaration that, in the circumstances, his common law right to unimpeded access to the Court entails him having access to a computer in his cell on a full time basis (as well as access to printing facilities).

36 Mr Knight has identified in his evidence to the Court five proceedings which he describes as being 'similar' to the present applications.[16] In three of those proceedings,[17] Mr Knight deposes that he sought a mandatory interlocutory injunction compelling the prison authorities to provide him with 'the means of producing court documents on a 7 days a week basis (a personal 'in-cell' computer)' or 'with reasonable facilities, including access to a computer on a 7 days a week basis'.

37 Mr Knight's statement that the interlocutory relief sought in the above three proceedings is 'similar' to the declaratory relief sought in the Proposed Proceedings is a vast understatement and cannot be accepted. There is no discernible difference between Mr Knight being provided with access to a computer in his cell on a full time basis (as he seeks in his applications for interlocutory relief) and Mr Knight being providing with the means of producing court documents on a 7 day a week basis, being what Mr Knight describes as having a personal 'in-cell' computer (being the relief he sought in the earlier proceedings referred to above).

38 This conclusion is not altered by the fact that Mr Knight now seeks a declaration rather than a mandatory injunction. The proposed declaration would, in effect, formally declare Mr Knight's right to certain computer access, being in substance the same access he asked the Court to compel the respondents in the previous three proceedings to provide to him. The fact that the declaration sought by Mr Knight extends to include access to printing facilities does not alter the analysis, given the requirement under the Act for the applications to be materially different.

39 In relation to the other two of the abovementioned five proceedings,[18] Mr Knight states that the application for relief in those proceedings 'included an order concerning [his] access to computer facilities in order to prepare court proceedings.' No further information is provided by Mr Knight about the nature of the order sought by him in those proceedings, save for the limited further information set out in the relevant paragraphs of the first affidavit. Mr Knight has, in those instances, failed to provide an explanation as to how the present applications for leave to proceed are materially different to the applications for relief in these two proceedings.

40 In so far as Mr Knight's evidence to the Court[19] is that some or all of the five so-called 'similar' proceedings are materially different to the present applications for interlocutory relief because these earlier proceedings concerned applications by him to purchase his own computer, rather than for him to have access to a prison supplied computer, that evidence cannot be accepted as it is inconsistent with Mr Knight's other evidence to the Court. In particular, in relation to the three proceedings referred to in paragraph [36] above, Mr Knight deposes that they were each applications for mandatory interlocutory injunctions for 'the prison authorities to provide me' with certain computer access.

41 In relation to all five of the so-called 'similar' proceedings, Mr Knight states that 'the factual basis' for the order sought in the present proposed interlocutory applications is materially different to that in the previous proceedings. This claim is misdirected. The claimed existence of different factual bases for the bringing of applications for orders which in substance are the same does not engage with the relevant question under s 58 of the Act; namely, whether or not the Court is satisfied that an application brought by a person is materially different to a previous application made by the person. This is consistent with the approach adopted by Digby J in Julian Knight v Corrections Commissioner.[20] His Honour concluded that an application brought by Mr Knight should be dismissed pursuant to s 58 of the Act because the claim brought by him and the ancillary relief sought in a summons were substantially the same as the relief sought by Mr Knight in an earlier proceeding: 'Both proposed proceedings were directed to the same ends, namely an order effecting the applicant's transfer back to Port Phillip Prison and release of and access to the applicant's legal materials.'[21] Analogously here, as I have explained above, the proposed interlocutory applications are directed to the same ends to which the applications in each of the five so-called similar proceedings were directed.

42 For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the proposed interlocutory applications are materially different to those brought by Mr Knight in the previous five proceedings referred to above. The Court is indeed affirmatively satisfied that the proposed interlocutory applications are substantially the same as the applications brought by Mr Knight in the three proceedings previously brought by him referred to in paragraph [36] above.

43 The Court will accordingly order that Mr Knight's application for leave to proceed in respect of the interlocutory applications in the Proposed Proceedings be dismissed.

[1] Attorney-General v Knight [2004] VSC 407.

[2] Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Knight [2016] VSC 488.

[4] Attorney-General v Knight [2004] VSC 407.

[6] Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Knight [2016] VSC 488.

[7] Knight v Thomas [2015] VSC 293, [25].

[8] Knight v Corrections Commissioner [2016] VSC 50 [97], [100].

[9] Knight v Money [2009] VSC 242; Knight v Hastings [2010] VSC 99; Knight v Wise [2011] VSC 313; Knight v Deputy Commissioner, Corrections Victoria [2012] VSC 506; Knight v Adult Parole Board [2013] VSC 97; Knight v Wise (No 2) [2013] VSC 339; Knight v Wise [2014] VSC 76.

[10] Mr Knight refers in particular to the following proceedings: Knight v Wise (S CI 2012 4160); Knight v Adult Parole Board (S CI 2012 4155); Knight v Wise (S CI 2013 3623); Knight v Corrections Commissioner, General Manager, Port Phillip Prison and General Manager, HM Prison Barwon (S CI 2015 4361); Knight v Corrections Commissioner, General Manager, Port Phillip Prison and General Manager, HM Prison Barwon (S CI 2015 5543).

[16] See sub-paragraph [28(e)] above.

[17] Knight v Wise (S CI 2012 4160), Knight v Adult Parole Board (S CI 2012 4155) and Knight v Wise (S CI 2013 3623).

[18] See sub-paragraphs [28(e)(iv)]-[28(e)(v)] above.

Proceedings Act 2014

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