Port Phillip City Council v Hickey [2001] VSC 129

6. The history of the matter began with an application 1415/1999 lodged by Ashley Williams and Sarah Morgan, the fifth and sixth respondents in this appeal, seeking a permit to erect a garage with studio and storage loft on the rear frontage to Albert Place as part of their residence at 49 Robe Street St Kilda. The council gave notice of its decision to grant the permit by notice dated 21 March 2000. One of 14 objectors to the proposal, the first respondent, Maureen Hickey QC, lodged an application for review with VCAT on 11 April 2000.

9. Ms Hickey and Mr Williams and Ms Morgan are the owners of Units 1 and 2 respectively on plan of subdivision 18926 - numbers 47 & 49 Robe Street respectively. The application for a planning permit relates to part of 49 Robe Street and to the common property at the rear of 49 Robe Street. Each of 47 and 49 Robe Street comprises a building sharing a party wall. At the rear of each unit there is an area of common property on the plan of strata subdivision extending the full width of both Units 1 and 2, being approximately, 12.4 metres, and having a depth of five metres. Notwithstanding that the property is common property, the parties appear to have erected a dividing fence which defines a physical boundary and extends the boundary between 47 and 49 Robe Street not otherwise occupied by the party wall. The result is that the common property at the rear of 49 Robe Street is used by Williams and Morgan for the purpose of car parking and associated landscaping and that immediately to the rear of 47 Robe Street is used by Ms Hickey for similar purposes. The dividing fence is approximately 2.6 metres in height.

13. At the outset of the hearing before the Tribunal, on 17 August 2000, the legal representative for the council invited Ms Hickey to raise and argue legal contentions which she argued would render it illegal for the responsible authority to grant any permit for the proposed development and for the Tribunal to direct the issue of such a permit. They were raised in her statement of grounds of objection. The first was ground 4 which was in the following terms:

"Insofar as the proposed development relates to the common property of body corporate number 18926, the application is unauthorised and invalid not having been made by or on behalf of the body corporate, the only body possessing the capacity to make such an application in respect of the common property.:

An additional ground to review served on 31 July was as follows:

"5. Neither application for a planning permit was or is competent on account of non-compliance with the provisions of the Sub-Division Act 1988: see Sub-Division Act 1988 s. 5; Sub-Division (Body Corporate) Regulations 1989 (Statutory Rule No. 249/1989) and Strata Tiles Act 1967. Accordingly neither decision of the responsible authority is valid."

She presented her submissions on these matters and was supported by the objectors who were present in person. Submissions were made in response on behalf of the responsible authority and its submissions were supported by Mr Jewell on behalf of the permit applicants. The argument on what was described as the "preliminary point" concluded mid afternoon and it was agreed amongst the parties that even if a ruling on the preliminary point could be given forthwith it would be impossible to conclude the hearing that day. The Tribunal noted in its subsequent reasons that no party was enthusiastic at the prospect of proceeding to more general planning merits without a determination on the "preliminary point". The Tribunal stated:

"We elected to reserve our ruling on the 'preliminary point' leaving the parties to consider the most convenient course for the further hearing of the matter once the reserved ruling was published."

Submissions at the Tribunal hearing - objectors

22. In its reasons, the Tribunal summarised the argument advanced by Ms Hickey in support of the above grounds. The Tribunal noted that Ms Hickey had submitted that the proposal involved a re-development on Lot 2 of the subdivision which was registered as a plan of strata subdivision 18926 pursuant to the terms of the Strata Titles Act 1967 and registered pursuant to that Act on 16 May 1983 at the Office of Titles. The Subdivision Act 1998 had repealed the Strata Titles Act but by virtue of provisions of the schedule to the Act the Subdivision Act controlled the operation of strata title subdivisions and regulated them. Relying on s.32 of the Subdivision Act Ms Hickey submitted that a disposition of the fee simple in all or any part of common property or the alteration of boundaries of any land by the body corporate could only be achieved by unanimous resolution of the members of the body corporate. She submitted to the Tribunal that the members of that body corporate for this subdivision were herself and the proponents. She argued that she was opposed to the development and, therefore, insofar as the development had either of the above effects there had not been compliance with s.32 and "in any event she would not consent to any such thing".

25. She also relied on s.28A of the Subdivision Act which prohibited dealings with common property by a member of a body corporate except as part of a dealing with a member's lot, or under s.32 or s.32A of the Act or by the body corporate in accordance with the regulations. She submitted that the proponents had not attempted to adopt any of these courses. I note that s.32A concerned consolidations and re-subdivisions and such courses involved the submission of new plans to the responsible authority and registration at the Office of Titles. The tribunal noted that Ms Hickey argued that the proposed development was situated on common property and the promotion and completion of that development involved a dealing with common property which was to be carried out without compliance with any of the requirements of the Subdivision Act 1988.

28. Ms Hickey also submitted to the Tribunal that it would be offensive to the Torrens system of title and to the Transfer of Land Act and the Subdivision Act to permit or to facilitate in any way a situation where the situation "on the ground" departed from what appeared in the register kept at the Office of Titles. She submitted that the proposal involved an increase in the lot entitlement of the deponents by detaching common property and attaching it to their allotment. This required a new plan of subdivision, she submitted.

31. The Tribunal noted that Ms Hickey also relied on the Subdivision (Body Corporate) Regulations 1989. There being no evidence that the body corporate had adopted other rules, the regulation rules applied. They included a regulation in the following terms:

"A member must not, and must ensure that the occupier and other members does not - (a) use the common property or permit the common property to be used in such a manner as to unreasonably interfere with or prevent its use by other members of occupants of lots or their families or visitors."

35. She submitted that to erect a permanent structure which excluded her and her invitees and licensees as part of the common property would breach that standard rule. Finally she relied upon s.28 of the Subdivision Act which provided

"(c) the owners for the time being of the lot are the members of the body corporate while they are owners; and (d) any common property vests in those owners as tenants in common in shares proportional to their lot entitlements".

Submissions at the Tribunal hearing - the council

40. The council argued before the Tribunal that the planning system did not concern itself with issues of title and that if Ms Hickey's private property rights were threatened or imperilled then the proper course for her was to take proceedings in court. The council's representative referred to s.48 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987 which, he said, plainly contemplated that persons other than the owner of the subject land could seek a permit for its use and development and the only requirement of the section was that the owner either consented to the application or else the authority had before it notice that the owner had received notice of the application. Its representative argued that there was an analogy in the relationship of restrictive covenants to the planning scheme and referred to the history of the planning legislation and restrictive covenants with the position having been reached under the Planning and Environment Act 1987 where s.60 permitted the removal or modification of restrictive covenants. The council's representative argued, however, that to obtain a permit for a development in breach of a restrictive covenant did not in itself entail the covenant's removal or modification. The result was that, if a permit was granted which, if carried out, would involve a breach of a restrictive covenant and no permit was given to modify or remove the covenant, it remained competent for the person entitled to the benefit of the covenant to seek its enforcement in the Supreme Court. He further argued that the erection of a building partly on common property in this instance did not amount to a "dealing" with the common property or a modification of lot entitlements within the subdivision or the granting of a permit to do so. He argued that the terms of the subdivision and the entitlements of the owners and the delineation of the common property remain as they were on the plan in 1983 which had not been subject to any modification, consolidation or re-subdivision. He finally observed that there had been a defacto subdivision and apportionment of the common property as a result of the fence.

44. The Tribunal handed down its reasons on 1 September 2000. In them it stated that it accepted in general that in exercising jurisdiction under the planning legislation the Tribunal was not

"primarily concerned with or called upon to make determinations as to title or to decide issues under the general law of property".

It noted, however, that there may be occasions where it is proper for the tribunal to determine issues of title.[1] The tribunal then stated that the effect of the argument for the authority was that not only that the title issue raised by Ms. Hickey did not render the grant of a permit illegal but that the title issue would be an irrelevant consideration in determining whether to grant a permit. The tribunal then referred to s. 48 of the Act. After referring to its heading "What if the applicant is not the owner?", the section was quoted:

"(1) If the applicant is not the owner of the land for which the permit is needed, an application must -

(b) include a declaration by the applicant that the applicant has notified the owner about the application.

(2) The person must not obtain or attempt to obtain a permit by wilfully making or causing to be made any false representation or declaration either orally or in writing."

The Tribunal then noted the effect of s. 57 of the Act which gives a right of objection to a permit application for use or development to "any person who may be affected by the grant of a permit". The Tribunal then asked the rhetorical question - why does the statute require the owner to consent or to be notified if issues of title are irrelevant? They noted that there were ample provisions to protect the owner of land who has an interest as an owner or occupier of nearby land. The Tribunal reasoned that s. 48 was enacted upon the premise:[2]

"that the owner of land the subject of a permit application for use or development has an interest in the character of owner in the outcome of the application and has a right to be heard in that character under section 57 as an objector."

It then noted that it interpreted the word "owner" in s. 48 to refer to the holder of the fee simple interest in land as opposed to short term lease holders, purchasers, option holders and the like.

56. The Tribunal then referred to s. 60 of the Planning and Environment Act which sets out the matters which a responsible authority must consider in determining a permit application. It noted that while the rights of "owners" are not specifically mentioned, the responsible authority is obliged to consider "all objections . . . which it has received . . .". It reasoned that the mechanism of s. 48 is calculated to enable an owner on becoming aware of a permit application to lodge an objection. Section 60(1)(b)(iii) was referred to as empowering the authority to consider in its discretion "any other relevant matter" and the Tribunal concluded that the opinions of "owners" will be relevant. The Tribunal then stated that for these reasons it rejected the submission for the authority that the ownership issue was irrelevant.

59. The Tribunal then turned to the question of the ownership of the land in question. It noted that the material from the Titles Office showed that part of the development was to be erected on land designated as "common property" under a registered plan of sub-division and that the proposed development was to be for the sole use and occupation of one only of the tenants in common. The Tribunal found that this use of the common property would be in violation of the standard rules provided for in the Sub-division (Body Corporate) Regulations Form 2 in that it "would unreasonably exclude one of the co-owners of the relevant common property from enjoyment of it".

62. The Tribunal then referred to the fact that there appeared to have been a de-facto sub-division of the common property since the inception of the sub-division. It then referred to the issue of adverse possession and asked whether it was possible to regard the apparent intrusion on common property as justified by adverse possession. It concluded that that could not be so. Reference was made to the complexity of adverse possession issues and the fact that the mere erection of a fence may not be sufficient to constitute adverse possession[3]. Next it noted that the definition of "owner" found in the Planning and Environment Act, s. 3, refers the issue of ownership to the Register Book kept under the Transfer of Land Act 1958. They took the view that in an ordinary permit review application it would generally be inappropriate for the Tribunal to seek to go behind the register on an issue of ownership. Finally it also noted that the matter of acquisition of the estates by adverse possession under the Transfer of Land Act is "reposed in the Registrar of Titles" as a result of s. 60-62 of that Act. The Tribunal suggested as an alternative that the issue might arise in court by way of a defence to proceedings relying on the Limitation of Actions Act 1958 but concluded that the Administrative Division of the Tribunal exercising its review jurisdiction seems to have no role to play in these matters.

65. The Tribunal then stated its conclusions. It noted Ms. Hickey's submission that the issue of a permit in the circumstances described is prohibited by law and that this prohibition applied equally to the responsible authority and the Tribunal. It indicated that it thought that that was an unlikely consequence for reasons referred to earlier in its reasons. It concluded, however,:

"We are persuaded the issues raised by Ms. Hickey as to ownership are relevant to the exercise of the discretion to issue or not issue a permit. As at present advised, we regard those issues as so significant that they would in themselves justify determination by this Tribunal that no permit should issue and that the responsible authority's determination should be set aside."

The Tribunal then indicated that it would fix the matter for directions to consider the further conduct of the application.

70. The matter came on as a Directions Hearing before Deputy President McNamara on 26 September 2000. The other member of the Tribunal, member Davis, was not in attendance. In summary the following occurred. Mr Bissett, the solicitor appearing on behalf of the original applicants for the permit, Morgan and Williams, submitted that the matter should be set down for further hearing on the preliminary point to enable him to put argument on the preliminary matters. Mr Bissett relied on the passage quoted above where the Tribunal stated "As at present advised, . . . should be set aside". Deputy President McNamara remarked that Mr Bissett was seeking to have the Tribunal change its mind in respect of the conclusion that it reached in its interim decision. Mr Bissett responded that his clients simply wished to have the opportunity to raise matters in response to the preliminary submission made by Ms Hickey. The council's representative supported that argument. Ms Hickey then submitted that any further submissions should not be permitted on the preliminary point. The Tribunal then indicated orally that it rejected Mr Bissett's application and ordered that the responsible authority's determination be set aside and directed that no permit issue.

74. The Notice of Appeal lists seven grounds of appeal and five questions of law as follows:

" GROUNDS OF APPEAL A1 - The Tribunal erred in having regard to the fact that the first respondent as the owner of Unit 1, 49 Robe Street, St Kilda ("Unit 1") had not provided her consent to the proposed use and development of the subject land. A2 - the Tribunal erred in finding that the views of the first respondent as owner of Unit 1 in relation to non planning considerations were relevant to its decision. A3 - The Tribunal erred in having regard to an irrelevant consideration, namely that the first respondent as the owner of Unit 1 had not provided her consent to the proposed use and development of the subject land. A4 - the Tribunal erred in regarding the absence of the consent of the first respondent as determinative of the application before it. A5 - the Tribunal erred in determining the application before it solely on the basis of the proprietary rights asserted by the first respondent. A6 - The Tribunal denied the appellant, and the fifth and sixth respondents (as applicants for the permit, and respondents to the application for review):- (a) natural justice; (b) procedural fairness - in determining the application before it without hearing the merits of the application. A7 - the Tribunal denied the appellant and the fifth and sixth respondents: - (a) natural justice; (b) procedural fairness - by finding the first respondent's argument in relation to the absence of consent to be of such significance as to be determinative of the application before it without having regard to any other considerations bearing upon the merits of the application. B - The questions of law which arise for determination are as follows:- Questions of Law B1 - Was the absence of consent of the first respondent to the proposed use and development of the subject land a relevant planning consideration? B2 - Did the Tribunal have regard to an irrelevant consideration, namely the absence of consent by the first respondent to the proposed use and development of the subject land? B3 Was the consent of the first respondent to the proposed use and development of the subject land a mandatory consideration to which the Tribunal was obliged to have regard and give effect? B4 - Was the absence of the consent of the first respondent to the proposed use and development of the subject land determinative of or fatal to the application for a permit? B5 Did the Tribunal deny the appellant and the fifth and sixth respondents:- (a) natural justice; (b) procedural fairness in determining the application before it without:- (c) hearing the merits of the case; (d) having regard to any other considerations bearing on the merits of the application?"

79. The first five grounds of appeal concern the relevance of the absence of the co-owner's consent to the determination of the Tribunal.

82. For the council it was submitted before me that the presence or absence of consent was an irrelevant consideration in the permit application. It submitted that s. 48 of the Planning and Environment Act (above) contemplates that permit applications can be made in relation to land by persons other than the owner. It requires only either the consent of the owner or evidence that the owner was notified of the application. There was no obligation to obtain the views of the owner about the application. Counsel submitted that if the owner does not consent, the owner has the same rights as any other objector to participate in the planning process. It was submitted that if the owner's consent was a pre-requisite then the absence of such consent would be a bar to the grant of a permit and s. 48 would have been drafted differently. Counsel also submitted that there is a clear distinction between what counsel referred to as private and public law obligations. It was put that the public has no interest in a contract between private individuals. Many members of the public, however, may have a sufficient interest in a planning permit application to entitle them to appear and participate in any relevant hearing. It was further submitted that the granting of a planning permit has no impact upon the rights of the owner or in this case co-owners. It does no more than remove planning restrictions imposed upon the development of a particular piece of land (see Pimas Group Pty Ltd v Maratime Services Board of New South Wales (1994) 82 LG ERA 205; Paino v Woollahra Municipal Council (1990) 71 LG RA 62; Eaton & Sons Pty Ltd v The Council of the Shire of Warringah [1972] HCA 33; (1972) 129 CLR 270.) It was submitted further that to require an investigation of the consent issue in each application could result in endless inquiries. Counsel submitted that if the owner had planning objections to raise, the owner could do so otherwise and that whether the owner consented or not was not a planning matter.

85. Ms Hickey submitted that the Tribunal decision should be upheld on the basis that the application was unauthorised and invalid on the ground that only the body corporate could make an application in respect of the common property. Alternatively, it was put that the other co-owners must at least acquiesce. The argument advanced was thorough and detailed and it involved consideration of the Strata Titles Act 1967, Sub-Division Act 1988 and the Body Corporate Regulations made under that Act and the Transfer of Land Act 1958.

88. Accepting for present purposes that no development could lawfully occur on the common property pursuant to any permit without the consent of the body corporate, the issue to be determined is whether a member of the body corporate could seek a permit prior to obtaining the consent of the body corporate to the implementation of any permit obtained. In my view, it is quite clear that the Planning and Environment Act contemplates persons other than the owner of the property in question applying for a planning permit. The only basis, in my view, on which an argument might be mounted that an application for a permit in the above circumstances would be invalid is if the prohibition on dealings under s. 28 A of the Sub Division Act applied to prevent an application for a permit.

"28A. Dealings with common property. (1) The share in the common property of a member of a body corporate cannot be dealt with except - (a) as part of a dealing with the member's lot; or (b) under section 32 or 32A; or (c) by the body corporate in accordance with the regulation."

Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 28 refer to title matters and Section 32 and 32A also refer to matters going to title and boundaries. The expression "dealing" is not defined in the Sub Division Act 1988. The term is one used in the Transfer of Land Act 1958 and I suggest that in the Subdivision Act 1988 it relates to dealings of the kind referred to in that Act.

96. Ms Hickey argued that the implementation of any permit would result in insurance and other liabilities being imposed on the body corporate and herself and exclusive possession being taken of part of the common property. The argument assumes that the co-owner with the permit is not stopped in implementing the permit. That would be a matter for the other co-owner. She would have her remedies in the courts. That would be a burden for her but one should not assume implementation of the permit to be likely, when the co-owner is in a position to stop implementation of any permit.

99. In my view, the objectors cannot point to any statutory or regulatory provision which renders invalid an application for a planning permit over common property of a body corporate by a member of the body corporate, or, for that matter, a complete stranger. The Tribunal, therefore, was correct in my view in ruling that the absence of the body corporate from the application was not fatal to the application. It is necessary, therefore, to return to the issues raised by the appellant.

102. The first three grounds of appeal challenge the relevance of the Tribunal considering the fact that Ms Hickey had not provided her consent and considering her views.

105. I have great difficulty understanding how the owner's refusal to give consent and the owner's views can be said to be irrelevant to a planning permit application. It is implicit in the legislation that the position of the owner and his or her views may be relevant. In addition, to take an extreme case, if the owner of the property refuses to give consent, it would be highly relevant for the authority and, subsequently the Tribunal, to know whether there was any realistic prospect of such consent being given. If not, it could be highly relevant to the authority and the Tribunal in deciding whether to reject the application as futile. It should be borne in mind that while a permit may be given a lengthy duration, in the absence of express provision, the permit lasts for two years. An application in those circumstances may well be futile. Councils and VCAT ought to be able to deal summarily with futile applications. For these reasons I am not persuaded that the first three grounds of appeal are made out.

108. Ground 4 alleges that the Tribunal erred in regarding the absence of consent as determinative of the application before it. Ground 5 alleges that the Tribunal erred in determining the application solely on the basis of the proprietary rights asserted by the respondent.

111. These matters may be dealt with shortly. In my view, the Tribunal's reasons do not support the conclusion that it did either of the above. It indicated that the application was not prohibited by the matters referred to by Ms Hickey. It then went on to say however, that the issues raised by her as to ownership were "relevant to the exercise of the discretion to issue or not issue a permit". It then stated that

"As at present advised, we regard those issues as so significant that they would in themselves justify a determination by this Tribunal that no permit should issue . . .".

In my view the Tribunal was indicating that the issues raised by Ms Hickey were of such significance that they outweighed other relevant considerations. They did not ignore any other considerations.

117. The critical grounds of appeal in this matter are the last two grounds of appeal which allege a denial of natural justice. Whether those grounds are made out depends principally on how one interprets the concluding remarks in the original reasons of the Tribunal given on 1 September 2000 and the events that occurred on the subsequent Directions Hearing.

120. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Tribunal in its concluding remarks expressed a tentative view that the issues raised by Ms Hickey were so significant that they would in themselves justify a determination that no permit issue. Counsel further submitted that on the subsequent Directions Hearing, which had been set down to enable decisions to be made about the further conduct of the matter, including the exercise of the discretion, the authority sought to make submissions relevant to the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion to issue or not issue a permit but was denied that opportunity by President MacNamarra who said that the decision had been made.

123. On the other hand, Ms Hickey submitted that the statements made in the reasons for judgment were final views and that the authority had had the opportunity to make submissions on the preliminary question, the hearing of which had occurred at the request of the authority. The subsequent application related to those same questions. The council and the applicants had, therefore, had an opportunity to be heard and were not entitled to a further opportunity to be heard.

126. The sequence of events was that on 17 August 2000 the parties were given the opportunity to debate as a preliminary issue, whether a permit application was prohibited by law on the basis of the submissions made by Ms Hickey. On 1 September 2000 having expressed its conclusion on that issue, the Tribunal then went on to express its views on the issues raised by Mr Hickey in so far as they were relevant to the exercise of the discretion to issue a permit. The views expressed were tentative ones and the matter was adjourned for further consideration.

129. When the matter came on before the Tribunal at the subsequent Directions Hearing on 26 September 2000, Mr Bissett sought to put further arguments for Morgan and Williams on what were described as preliminary matters but did so by relying expressly on part of the Tribunal's reasons namely:

"As at present advised, we regard those issues as so significant that they would in themselves justify a determination by this Tribunal that no permit should issue and that the responsible authority's determination should be set aside."

133. A fair interpretation of Mr Bissett's position was that he wanted to be heard on the merits. The Tribunal had originally adjourned the matter to enable a further hearing on the merits of the application. The only decision adverse to Morgan, Williams and the authority was the tentative decision on the discretionary matters. Mr Bissett and the council wanted to address argument to that matter. It follows in my view that Morgan, Williams and the council sought to be heard on issues upon which they had not been heard and on which they should have been given an opportunity to be heard. Unfortunately, Mr Bissett appears to have treated the above tentative decision as included in the interim decision on the preliminary question and the Deputy President responded saying that Mr Bissett was seeking to have the Tribunal change its interim decision.

136. The language used by Mr Bissett appears to have led to confusion between the tribunal, the council and the applicants as to what it was that had been decided and what it was that was being pursued. The language used by Mr Bissett was inaccurate and imprecise. Nonetheless, the reality was that there was a denial of natural justice.

139. There was discussion before me as to what would be relevant matters in considering the merits of the application but I think it inappropriate for me to embark upon any analysis of that question. I have indicated, however, that it would be relevant for the Tribunal to consider the position being taken by the co-owner Ms Hickey and the question of the extent to which the grant of a permit may be futile. It would be up to the council and Ms Hickey and no doubt the applicants and objectors to give thought to what in the circumstances of this case are relevant matters for the Tribunal to consider. The Tribunal will have to have regard to the directions set out in the relevant legislation and planning scheme as to what matters should be considered.

142. For the foregoing reasons I am satisfied that ground 7 has been made out. I am not persuaded that ground 6 is made out. It alleges that there was a denial of justice in the Tribunal determining the application without going fully into the merits of it. It would be a matter for the Tribunal to determine whether in all the circumstances it would be appropriate to embark upon hearing for the merits of the application or how far it should explore the merits. On the material before me it is not possible to assess whether the Tribunal should have held a full hearing on the merits or whether it would have been open to it, for example, to inform itself briefly of the applicant's case taken at its highest, the relevant planning considerations and then to assess whether in light of the co-owner's position, the application by the other co-owners should fail.

146. The denial of natural justice ground having been made out, the appeal must be allowed and the matter remitted to VCAT for further hearing and determination according to law. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the matter should be referred to a newly constituted tribunal. My tentative view is that, although that will involve duplication, delay and additional cost, the appeal having succeeded on a natural justice argument, the matter should not be returned to the same tribunal. Justice must be seen to be done[4]. I will hear further argument on that issue.

[1] citing Calabro v Bayside City Council {1999} VSC 509 and referring to the declaratory power s. 149B of the Planning and Environment Act.

[3] citing Riley v Pentilla [1974] VicRp 67; [1974] VR 547

[4] Northern NSW FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal & Anor (1990) 26 FCR 39; Australian Trade Commission v Underwood Exports P/L (1997) 49 ALD 426; see discussion M. Batskos, Natural Justice and the Constitution of Tribunal Membership AIAL Forum No. 16.