Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This is the published version of ex tempore reasons delivered on 17 July 2025. Grammatical changes have been made and headings added for ease of reading. Mentioned legislation, case law and parts of read documents have also been more fully extracted and cases properly cited.
2. These are parenting proceedings relating to the child, X born in 2021 ('X'). The proceedings were initiated by the Mother, Ms Whiting ('the Mother'), as against the Father, Mr Bandy ('the Father'). Just to be clear, X is currently living in Belgium with the Father and his parents, and X is the subject of a court order made in City S Family Court in Belgium in May 2025. I will come to that Order in more detail later in these Reasons.
3. The Mother's Initiating Application was filed on 26 May 2025. Since that date, the Mother filed a large number of other documents, including affidavits, written submissions and other applications, which are largely replicas of previous documents filed, although some do include new material. Her Initiating Application for Final Orders was amended by an Application dated 26 June 2025 but largely repeated the orders that were sought in her original Application.
4. The Mother's Application reads as follows:

NOTE: The respondent is not allowed to know about these recovery orders sought - as it will endanger my child even more than what she already is with him now.

ORDERS SOUGHT

1. Recovery Order - That a recovery order be issued directing the Australian Federal

Police and any other necessary and relevant national/international parties to locate and

recover my child:

• Full name of child: [X] ([Country T] nationality)

• Date of birth: [...] 2021

• Recovered from: [Mr Bandy], Father (Belgian nationality, Address [C Street] Belgium)

• Recovery to: [Ms Whiting] ([Country T] nationality and Australian permanent resident), Address [U Street, Town V, State M]

2. Execution of Warrant - That a warrant be issued authorising officers of the Australian Federal Police and/or [State M] Police and/or any other relevant

national/international party to:

• Enter and search any premises, by force, if necessary, where there is reasonable cause to suspect [X] may be found;

• Take possession of [X] and return [X] to the applicant who is lawfully entitled to custody and care of my child in accordance with the Family Court parenting orders dated 15 July 2024: to myself, her mother, [Ms Whiting]

3. Use of Reasonable Force and Assistance - That such warrant authorises the use of reasonable force and permit police officers to obtain any necessary assistance, including locksmiths, to gain entry to premises where my child may be located.

4. Prohibition Order (if applicable) - That the respondent be restrained from removing or attempting to remove my child from his address where she is being held captive now (Either [Mr Bandy] his address [C Street, Town W] or his parent's address [Ms J] [Y Street, Town Z] Belgium pending further order of the court.

5. Other orders as the Court deems just - That such further or other orders be made as the Court deems just in the circumstances in relation to protection of my child and in immediately safeguarding her return to me her lawful guardian and only trusted person since birth.[1]

1. The note for the Father not to be informed of her application is otiose, because the Father has been involved in these proceedings; although, he has not appeared today. The matter has now been proceeding for well over an hour today, and he was invited to attend the Court by Microsoft Teams, but has not done so.
2. He did appear when the matter was last mentioned on 20 June 2025 in City E. At that time, I ordered that the matter be set down for a hearing on 17 July 2025 at 9.30am and that both parties could file any further information that they believed might assist their case by a certain date. It was also noted:

4. The matter is listed to determine whether or not there has been a significant change of circumstances, such that the Court should entertain the mother's application in relation to parenting orders, noting that as recently as [...] May 2025, the juvenile court in Belgium made Orders in relation to [X] and further noting that [X] lives in Belgium and is subject to orders of the Belgium court.

5. The mother appealed the original decision of the juvenile court, and although the appeals court did allow her appeal in part, that was only in relation to a relaxation of supervision orders but ultimately [X] remains in the care of the grandparents, and orders have now been made for [X] to be returned to the father's care.

6. On the face of it, Australia is clearly an inappropriate forum to hear this matter, particularly if there are proceedings still ongoing in Belgium, which is unclear, but at the very minimum there have been no significant change in circumstances since the Family Court of Australia last dealt with this matter in Australia, and certainly, on the face of it, no change in circumstances since the Belgium court last dealt with this in May 2025.

7. There may also be the question of issue estoppel.

8. The mother wants to argue that there has been a level of corruption between Australia and Belgium and that the Belgium court has acted fraudulently and this Court is providing her with this last opportunity to put cogent evidence before the Court that might establish what she is saying, but more importantly, establish that there has been a significant change in circumstances and that Australia is the appropriate forum to deal with this matter.[2]

1. So what I have just stated was all previously known to the Mother, and the Mother has appeared in person today. As I said, the Father has not appeared. The Father did file an affidavit of 18 June 2025 that I have read. I have also read the large amount of documents that have been filed by the Mother as listed on the portal:
   • The Initiating Application of the Mother filed on 26 May 2025;
   • Her affidavit in support filed on 26 May 2025;
   • A copy of the handwritten application for a family violence order of 26 May 2025;
   • An Application in a Proceeding filed on 26 May 2025;
   • Four sets of written submissions dated 1 June 2025;
   • A further affidavit of 6 June 2025;
   • A further affidavit of 9 June 2025;
   • The Amended Application of June 2025; and
   • The Application in a Proceeding of 13 June 2025;
   • An affidavit of herself again of 13 June 2025;
   • Written submissions - two on 14 June 2025 and one on 15 June 2025;
   • A further affidavit of 14 July 2025; and
   • Some further written submissions on 16 July 2025.
2. Some of those documents were hard to read, but I have read through all of them, and I have taken all of the information into account together with the information that has been provided by the Mother verbally, not only today but on the other occasions that she has appeared before the Court.
3. I have given the Mother every opportunity today to provide reasons as to why the Court should, as she requests, in this child's best interests, engage Australian police officers to travel at some extraordinary expense to Belgium and then retrieve this child contrary to existing Belgian orders, put that child on a plane, and take X from those settled circumstances in Belgium back to Australia.
4. I have asked her on a number of occasions to tell me why that would be in the child's best interests and whether it would even be possible. She has made no inquiries with Federal Police or State M police as to whether they would even be willing to contemplate acting on such an order if I were to make it. But I have not received such information. As I say, there has been a very large amount of material put before the Court and now I have been conversing with the Mother for well in excess of an hour and a half in relation to this matter.
5. Now, as I say, the Father did file an affidavit on 26 June 2025, which I have read, and there was also some information-sharing information received on 16 January 2025 from Child Safety Services ('CSS'). That information does refer to contact with CSS presumably by the Mother - but they are referred to as a 'community member' so perhaps not the Mother. So that contact is on 28 May 2025 - I read in that document, but just quoting from parts of it:

On 28 May 2025 contact was received from a community member in relation to concerns that [X] was removed from the care of [Ms Whiting] and relocated to the care of [Mr Bandy] in Belgium, and that she has reportedly regressed in her development since this time. It was allegedly -

it says -

that [X] is at risk of physical, sexual and psychological harm in the care of [Mr Bandy]. The outcome was [AA Organisation] will close the current matter following submission of this response to the FCFCOA -

which is this Court -

given [X] is not currently residing in [State M].

1. Interestingly, back in January 2025 - prior to the hearing that occurred before Williams J, in the Family Court, in February 2025 - there was a report made to CSS and it is quite lengthy. There were, in fact, reports made to CSS on 16, 20, 21 January, 13 February and 19 February, noting that the hearing before Williams J was on 5 February 2025.
2. And there was a report received from State M Police that Ms Whiting noticed blood in X's nappy after spending time with Mr Bandy and X would become hysteric when going into the care of Mr Bandy. It was further noted that Ms Whiting had noticed that X was engaging in age-inappropriate behaviour, being uncomfortable around men and not allowing Ms Whiting to remove her nappies or clothing whilst changing or showering. It was further reported that Ms Whiting had observed X to play with a toy in the front of her pants, remove the clothes of the doll, get embarrassed if she was seen with the naked doll, and to lay on the doll and thrust into the doll.
3. It goes on:

Contact was received from a mandated reporter in relation to [Ms Whiting] disclosing having experienced family violence and that she had made allegations to [State M] Police that [Mr Bandy] had sexually assaulted [X].

A report was received from [State M] Police in relation to [Ms Whiting] alleging that [Mr Bandy] perpetuated family violence in their relationship, that [Mr Bandy] had allegedly sexually assaulted [X]. The report provided information regarding the relationship between the parents, [Ms Whiting] and [X] moving to Australia, and [Mr Bandy] being successful in his application to have [X] returned to Belgium. It was also outlined that [Ms Whiting] had been provided advice by police to apply for a family violence order through a private application, that police had attempted to seek information from Belgian authorities as to any ongoing investigations relating to the parties. [Ms Whiting] was reported to have discussed [X] having displayed sexualised behaviours with police such as touching her vagina and inappropriate play with dolls. [Ms Whiting] reported she believed that [X] had experienced sexual harm due to her observations of [X]'s behaviour, having found blood in her nappy and she was [an infant], and [X] being clingy and experiencing behavioural changes when she would spend time with [Mr Bandy].

Contact was received from a community member. Who stated CSS had removed [X] from the care of [Ms Whiting] [in] February 2025 and placed her in the care of [Mr Bandy], and that CSS needed to go to Court immediately for a recovery order. The caller was concerned that [X] was at an imminent risk of abuse.

[AA Organisation] consulted with CSS and advised that CSS were requested to assist [State M] Police in executing a warrant to return [X] to the care of [Mr Bandy]as per a Court order. A Child Safety officer was present for the purpose of attempting to assist with making the transition as smooth as possible for [X] given she had not seen [Mr Bandy] for around two years. CSS advised the police attempted to interview [X] when they executed the warrant; however, given her age and dialect, no further details were provided. CSS advised that based on the available information there was no clear evidence to suggest that [Mr Bandy] had harmed [X].

Police advised that they did not view footage of [X] interacting with dolls as evidence of abuse and [Ms Whiting] was unable to provide additional information regarding her experiences of family violence. CSS advised that [X] was transported to the care of [Mr Bandy]. CSS advised that [Ms Whiting] was provided advice that she could discuss her concerns for [X]'s safety with [AA Organisation] and that she would seek legal advice around care arrangements for [X]. [AA Organisation] made multiple attempts to contact [Ms Whiting] unsuccessfully. Contact was received from a mandated reporter, who was advised by a community member that [X] had been abducted by her father and returned to another country against the wishes of [Ms Whiting] and existing orders.

(Emphasis added)

1. Now, I have read that part of the report out because that information was subject to some discussion today and was information that the Mother wanted to rely upon as to the nature of what was happening at the time X was returned to the Father pursuant to the warrant that had to be executed because the Mother would not return X to the Father pursuant to the original order made by Williams J in July 2024. As can be seen, that account differs quite significantly from the account of the Mother. Further, the police, as I have said, determined, so far as this document is concerned, that Mr Bandy did not pose a risk to the child. And as I have said, that all of these issues in relation to concerns regarding Mr Bandy were raised with police at that time.

1. This matter has a significant litigation history in this Court.
2. X was removed from Belgium (in or around 2022) by the Mother to Australia and the Father made an application - a Hague Convention application - that was finalised by Williams J on 19 July 2024, following a hearing on 8 July 2024. It was determined by Williams J (in Whiting & Secretary, Department of Families, Fairness and Housing [2024] FedCFamC1F 479) that X would be returned to Belgium pursuant to the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) and substantial orders were made to give effect to that order.
3. Those orders were appealed by the Mother (Whiting & Secretary, Department of Families, Fairness and Housing (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 245). The Court of Appeal on 18 December 2024 determined that the appeal should be dismissed.
4. The matter then came before Williams J on 8 January 2025 because further orders were made at that time for X to be returned to the Father in Belgium. I do not have a copy of that order, nor that decision, but I accept what the Mother says - that an order was made on that day. She says that the Order was made for X to be specifically returned to the Father.
5. The Mother says that that is where a change of circumstances arose because in reality X was not unilaterally placed in the Father's care, but rather was placed into foster care with her grandparents. The Mother argues that that was, in effect, a breach of Williams J January order. I think the Mother agrees that she would not have wanted X to be returned to the Father's care without there being a level of supervision because the Father had not spent time with X for two years prior to the order being made but nevertheless the Mother argues that that was an effective breach of Williams J orders.
6. The matter then came before Carter J on 15 January (Whiting & Secretary, Department of Families, Fairness and Housing (No.2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 25) and at that time the Mother sought urgent orders to stay the enforcement of the final orders, but the Mother failed to attend the hearing of her stay Application. It was also noted by the Court that the Mother had not filed an application for special leave to the High Court, nor a notice of appeal, and as such, her Application for a stay was dismissed.
7. The matter then came before Williams J on 11 February 2025 (Whiting & Secretary, Department of Families, Fairness and Housing (No 3)) [2025] FedCFamC1F 70), and I will be reading quite a bit from this decision, but on that day, it was ordered that a warrant be activated - and this is why I know there was an order made on 8 January, because the order states:

...the warrant referred to in paragraphs 16 to 18 of the orders made 8 January 2025 be activated.

1. That then led to X being placed back in the Father's care and if my understanding is correct, that is when the police became involved. The Mother says that she has a video of X being distressed when X was taken from her arms in the presence of Police. I have no doubt that video does show that. I suspect X would have been very distressed being removed from the Mother at that time and it would have been a harrowing scene when the warrant had to be executed with the assistance of State M Police and the assistance of CSS.
2. I have no doubt that that video would be very difficult viewing. I do not intend to watch the video for the reason that it will not assist with my decision today, but no doubt evidences a distressing scene where a warrant had to be executed because the Mother would not travel with X back to Belgium, as had been suggested by Williams J in her Reasons of 11 February 2025.
3. Now, I will read some of Williams J decision made in February 2025 because it sets out the history quite succinctly and has other references in here that perhaps provide some context to the Mother's application today and ultimately to these Reasons.
4. So, I will start at paragraph 4 of Williams J's decision:

On 6 March 2024 the applicant, that is, the father, filed an application seeking the return to Belgium of [X] -

that is X -

• pursuant to the relevant provisions of the regulations (Hague return application). The requesting father is the father of the child. The respondent opposed the return application. The Hague return application was heard on 8 July 2024, when both parties were represented by experienced counsel. At the hearing of the application, the only issue for determination was the state of the child's habitual residence. The respondent conceded the remaining jurisdictional facts and did not raise any regulatory exceptions to return. Most significantly, the respondent did not assert that the return of [X] to Belgium would place [X] at a grave risk of harm or intolerable situation.

Subsequent to the hearing, judgment was reserved. On 19 July 2024, orders were made and reasons delivered which required the respondent to return [X] to Belgium within 14 days subject to the requesting father paying for flights for the respondent and the child, and the sum of €7500 to the respondent to enable her to obtain accommodation in Belgium. The background to this dispute between the parties is referred to at paragraphs 20 to 32 of my reasons of 19 July 2024.

(Emphasis added)

In her affidavit of 4 September 2024 in support of the application in an appeal, the respondent foreshadowed her intention to seek leave to adduce further evidence about events which she asserted had occurred since the hearing. These events pertained to her assertions of family violence perpetuated by the requesting father. Despite the contents of the affidavit, the respondent, who was represented during the appeal proceedings by two different firms of lawyers, failed to file any application in the appeal proceedings to adduce further evidence pertaining to alleged family violence.

On 5 September 2024, the respondent filed an application in a proceeding seeking a stay of the orders of 19 July 2024 pending the determination of the appeal (stay application). In support of the stay application, the respondent swore an affidavit, filed 5 September 2024, wherein she again deposed to her intention to seek leave to adduce further evidence in the appeal about significant events pertaining to family violence she alleged had been perpetuated by the requesting father. Solicitors representing the respondent prepared the affidavit on her behalf.

(Emphasis added)

1. Moving a bit further through the timeline that is relevant for my purposes:

The enforcement application was heard and determined on 8 January 2025, when orders were made by me in accordance with the minute prepared by the applicant. The respondent acted on her own behalf at the enforcement hearing. At that hearing, I was satisfied the respondent was aware and understood the obligations to return the child, of which she had been aware since July 2024, and her options to do so. I was also satisfied she had been properly provided with a copy of the orders being sought by the applicant and the applicant's affidavit in support of the enforcement orders sought.

Her former solicitor appeared at the hearing to seek leave of the Court to cease representing the respondent, and prior to leave being granted, he confirmed the respondent had been provided with all the relevant documents. At the hearing on 8 January 2025, the respondent again foreshadowed an application to the Court pertaining to family violence she asserted she, and possibly the child, had been subject to by the requesting father. To date, no such application has been made.

(Emphasis added)

1. Reading a bit further on, her Honour refers to Carter Js decision that I have already referred to. At paragraph 23, Williams J states:

Subsequent to the decision of Carter J, the appellant and the respondent engaged in extensive email correspondence about whether or not the respondent would return [X] to Belgium, which were exhibited to his application. The emails demonstrate at various times the respondent seemed to agree to return [X] to Belgium, and in one email to Country Q, that she ostensibly required further time to do so and failed to unequivocally commit to return with the child. Arrangements were made for the respondent to hand over the child, to return to Belgium in the presence of the court child expert at City E Registry of this Court on 4 February 2025, and the respondent was notified of the arrangements to do so.

On 4 February 2025, the Mother attended City [E] Registry of the court with a support person, however, did not produce [X] as she was required pursuant to the enforcement orders. On 5 February 2025, the applicant filed an affidavit seeking the activation of the warrant pursuant to paragraphs 16 to 18 of the orders made on 8 January 2025. The affidavit was served on the Mother via email at her usual email address.

1. Now, at paragraphs 31 and 32, her Honour dealt with the submissions of the parties before her on that day. In relation to the Mother, Williams J said:

The respondent made similar submissions to those made by her on previous occasions, including the hearing on 8 January 2025. She reiterated her allegations of family violence against the requesting father, the danger [X] would be exposed to if returned to the father's care, her intention to provide evidence of her allegations, her intention to pursue her allegations in the Australian legal system; her difficulties with past lawyers, none of whom followed her instructions; difficulty in securing future legal representation, which is her right; and her dissatisfaction with the court and the legal system. She perceives herself as a victim of the legal system and believes she has been consistently denied an opportunity to present her "case" to the Court.

I accept the submissions of counsel for the applicant and agree the warrant should be activated to ensure the return of [X] to Belgium. In reaching my conclusion, I have had regard to the following factors which collectively persuade me the warrant should be activated:

(a) The respondent did not pursue any grave risk of harm regulatory exception in the initial return proceedings ...

(i) file any application in the appeal to adduce further evidence of asserted grave risk of harm, nor filed any application in the High Court for special leave, despite foreshadowing her intention to do so.

(b) She has been granted numerous indulgences by the courts, including leave to file a notice of appeal out of time and a stay of the return orders of 19 July 2024.

(c) The respondent's allegations against the requesting father have come more florid and egregious with the passing of time.

(d) Her representations about the proceedings and orders in Belgium are incorrect per the affidavit of [Ms BB], filed 18 December 2024, at paragraph 8.

(e) The respondent was well aware [X] would be returned to Belgium following her unsuccessful appeal.

(f) Every conceivable step has been taken to ensure the respondent was able to return the child, including payment of air fares and payment of €7500 to enable her to establish herself in Belgium.

(g) Her conduct was deliberately equivocal about whether she would return or not, as demonstrated by the documents exhibited at hearing.

(h) Appropriate arrangements had been made for the handover of [X] to their child court expert.

(i) The respondent was well aware of the consequences of her refusal to accompany [X] to Belgium.

(j) The respondent had failed to obtain legal representation despite her advising the court as from January 2025 that she intended to do so.

(k) There were no submissions about the likelihood of obtaining legal advice in the immediate future and indeed, the respondent alluded to the financially prohibitive cost of being able to do so.

(l) The respondent has received legal advice during the proceedings from at least four sets of solicitors and many competent counsel, and she has consistently expressed her dissatisfaction with their advice.

(m) Lack of legal knowledge is a misfortune, not a privilege -

(Emphasis added)

and citing Gallow & Dawson, at 34: her Honour says this:

It is most unfortunate the respondent did not unequivocally agree to accompany [X] to return to Belgium. She was told on numerous occasions during the various court proceedings that returning [X] to Belgium with her accompanying [X] would be the least distressing option in circumstances where the respondent unilaterally removed [X] from Belgium to Australia without the consent or knowledge of the father almost two years ago.

She is also aware there are extant parenting proceedings in Belgium, where she is able to raise her purported grievances against the requesting father. The respondent is well aware of the consequences and impact of [X] being removed from a parent pursuant to a warrant and she alone has the power to avoid that distressing experience for her child. The return of [X] to Belgium in this instance is consistent with the fundamental obligations to return, as provided in the Regulations (Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 Commonwealth).

(Emphasis added)

1. As I have already said, the fact that the Mother did not accompany X to Belgium when that return order was made, in circumstances where she had known that that order was to be made from as early as 19 July 2024 - for the Mother to submit to this Court that X was distressed and she has video of the same when X was removed from her so that X could be returned to Belgium pursuant to the warrant - this was a situation of her making. Her making. And the situation would have been far less distressing for X if she had taken up what Williams J suggested - that she travel with X to Belgium - but she chose not to.
2. Now, as I have indicated, there have also been proceedings in Belgium and those proceedings have occurred since X returned to Belgium after the warrant was executed in February 2025. The Mother has been involved in those Belgian proceedings and has confirmed with me today that many of the matters that she is putting to me today, as reasons as to why X should be returned to Australia pursuant to a recovery order were put to the Belgian Court.
3. Accepting what she has said, there is a strong argument that the doctrine of res judicata applies, that is, that she estopped from bringing her application because these issues have already been litigated. Alternatively, the information before this Court which clearly existed at the time that she was before the Belgian Court in 2025, should have been put to that Court and therefore the principles of 'Anshun estoppel'[3] applies.
4. In any event, the affidavit from the Father sets out relevant information relating to the current circumstances that exist for X in Belgium. So, his affidavit reads as follows:

3. The return of [X] was ordered by an Australian Court after an entire procedure, including an appeal process, had been correctly completed.

4. I refer to an email from the public prosecutor in Belgium (exhibit A) stating that as her father, I was indeed entitled to collect [X] from Australia, which I did after receiving authorisation from the Australian Court.

5. The Australian Court no longer has jurisdiction to make further settlements regarding [X] based on international private law. This is the responsibility of the state in which [X] resides and is administratively registered.

Next:

6. [X] has never legally resided in Australia. This was solely due to her Mother's abduction.

7. [X] is registered in Belgium (exhibit B) and resides in Belgium.

8. By order of the Belgian Juvenile Court, which makes decisions in [X]'s best interests, it was determined that I, as her father, have sole parental authority over [X] (exhibit C).

9. [Ms Whiting] was heard in the proceedings before the Juvenile Court judge. She lodged an appeal but her appeal to have [X] entrusted to her care was rejected (exhibit D). If [Ms Whiting] wants to be involved in [X]'s life and wants to have contact with her, she must turn to the Belgian Juvenile Court.

I read in that affidavit.

1. Now, as to the annexures to the Father's affidavit, annexure A is an email dated 16 December 2024 - so I assume was sent for the purposes of the proceedings that were occurring at that time the matter was in the Family Court - from a Ms CC, who is described as coming from the public prosecutor's office. It reads:

The Mother's claim that [X] would be placed in foster care upon returning to Belgium is currently unfounded. To date, no judgment has been issued by a Belgian Court apart from the [City S] Court of Appeals ruling [...] July 2024. This ruling upheld the [City S] Family Court's judgment, [...] June 2024, which determined that both parents share parental authority over [X]. The child's domicile is to be registered at the father's address in Belgium. [X]'s principal residence is to remain with her Mother in [Country T]/Belgium. The Mother is explicitly prohibited from travelling abroad with [X] except for trips to Belgium and [Country T].

(Emphasis added)

It goes on:

The Court of Appeal further ruled, contrary to the Family Court, that the general welfare centre, [City SS Contact Centre] should initially oversee "restarting, unblocking and restoring physical contact between [X] and the father in the child's best interests, and at the child's pace". This decision aligned with the recommendations from a prior social survey. Importantly, the Court of Appeal did not involve their welfare centre due to any security concerns. Additionally, the Court of Appeal noted that both parties had expressed a willingness to involve supporting services to facilitate the initial renewal of contact between [X] and the father; however, in a letter dated 24 August 2024, the [City S] social welfare centre informed that they could not commence the contact restoration process, citing the following reasons:

• [Ms Whiting], referred to them by the Justice Department, refuses to sign an agreement to initiate the guidance.
• [Ms Whiting] is unable to visit the centre during operating hours.
• There is insufficient communication between [Ms Whiting] and the social worker.

These circumstances suggest that the Mother does not intend to comply with the Court of Appeal's judgment. If the Australian Supreme Court upholds the recent decision issued by the Australian Family Court on 19 July 2024 and the Mother continues to refuse to return to Belgium with the child, there would be no legal barrier preventing the father, as a holder of parental authority, from arranging the child's transfer to Belgium himself. In such a case, the public prosecutor's office may instruct the Juvenile Court judge to issue provisions, if necessary, to ensure the child's protection and return.

My office cannot predict the protective measures that the Juvenile Court judge may decide to implement; however, the child's best interests will remain central to the judge's considerations in according with the principle of subsidiarity under child protection law. Only the least intrusive measures will be applied. At present, my office has identified no objective concerns or harmful elements that would prevent [X] from residing with the father, potentially under the supervision of youth protection services.

(Emphasis added)

1. As at 16 December 2024, there was no difficulty with X residing with the Father but potentially under the supervision of youth protection services. I emphasise this because the Mother raised - as a significant change of circumstances, or I think her words were in contravention of the order made 8 January 2025 - that X went into a foster care arrangement with the Father's parents as opposed to being in the Father's care alone. The Mother would not have agreed to the Father's time being unsupervised in any event. But as can be seen, what was contemplated as at December 2024 by the Belgian Court of Appeal prior to Williams J finally dealt with the matter in February 2025.
2. A further document annexed to the Father's affidavit, was what is called a 'substitution decision', of the court of first instance, City S, Family and Juvenile Court. It is dated May 2025. It states:

Having regard to the order of The Court of [...], [City S] division, Juvenile Court division of [...] April 2025 concerning:

[X] -

I will just read quickly through it:

The following measure was imposed: the function residents, more specifically, residents in a foster family (perspective seeking), with the family of [Mr DD] and [Ms J] -

whom I presume are the Father's parents; they give their address -

subject to compliance with the following condition: establishes an unrestricted contact between [X] and her father. This would effect from 24 April 2025 provisionally and, at the most, until 17 August 2025, under the supervision of the Social Service Juvenile Court in application of article 48.1-9 decrees of the decree of 12 July 2013 on integral youth assistance.

The Juvenile Court may always replace the measures taken. At the request of the minor, her [sic] legal representative, the Social Service Juvenile Court referred to in article 56 of the decree of an integral juvenile aid of 12 July 2013 or the public prosecutor, with another measure provided for in article 48.1 of the decree of integral juvenile aid of 12 July 2019.

Given the information obtained.

The minor was not heard, given her age. She was represented by [Mr EE] lawyer of -

(Emphasis added)

it gives the address:

Considering the elements related to the personality and the environment of the minor and the disturbing educational situation at the time of the previous orders, and the current psychosocial conditions concerning the minor, as reflected in the report, and requested of the Social Juvenile Court dated [...] May 2025.

[In] May 2025 a cabinet meeting was called in function of organising a contact arrangement between [X] and her Mother in accordance with the judgment of the [...] [City S] Court of Appeal dated [...] April 2025.

At this cabinet meeting, [X] was represented by her juvenile attorney, and further present were the social services counsellor, the guidance counsellor and the foster care service, [X]'s father assisted by his attorney.

[X]'s Mother was not present nor was she represented by her lawyer, notwithstanding that she had been properly notified of this cabinet meeting. More than that, she herself was requesting the meeting.

At the start of the cabinet meeting, when it was determined that the Mother was not present, the Juvenile Court was informed that the Mother had left for Australia the day before.

Under these circumstances, a visitation arrangement cannot be established between [X] and her Mother. The Mother's unpredictable attitude does not serve [X]'s best interests. From a developmental perspective, every child needs valuable contact with both parents, even if the parents no longer live together.

On the occasion of the Cabinet decision, the father requests the grant of exclusive parental authority over [X]. The Juvenile Court may rule on all measures of parental authority referred to in Book 1, Title IX of the Civil Code, insofar as they are related to [X] Protection Measures Audit. In view of the fact that the Mother resides in Australia until further notice, the Court can assume that it is not possible for the parents to make joint decisions on behalf of [X]. It therefore appears appropriate to determine that the father will exercise exclusive parental authority over [X] for the time being.

The current pedagogical interest of the minor requires that the judicial measure defined below be imposed...

(Emphasis added)

The Court went on to say:

The Juvenile Court imposes with respect to [X] the following measure: the function residence, more specifically residence in a foster family, perspective-seeking, with the family of [Mr DD] and [Ms J] living -

and it gives their address -

Provides that exclusive parental authority over [X] is granted to the father, being [Mr Bandy],

Measures under the supervision of the Social Services Juvenile Court, and this from [...] May 2025 to 17 August 2025.

(Emphasis added)

1. I do not believe the Mother appealed that decision, and that is, as far as I am aware, the decision that remains extant and binding on the parties and provides for the living arrangements for X at the current time in Belgium. It is not clear to me whether there are still proceedings on foot, and that becomes relevant to the question as to whether or not Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum to deal with this matter.
2. Doing the best I can from reading the document, it certainly is clear that the Belgian Juvenile Court has jurisdiction over X and could make further orders if required. It is also clear that the supervision requirement, as ordered, ends on 17 August 2025.
3. I have earlier read, further orders can be made on the request of X's attorney, the Father's attorney, Social Services - seemingly an array of people and organisations.
4. But it is not clear to me as to whether the proceedings have actually ended in the Belgian Court, or whether they remain on foot. It would be speculative for me to make a finding one way or the other.

1. There is an initial question as to whether this Court has any jurisdiction to deal with matters concerning X, who now resides in Belgium with her Father and grandparents. In my view, this Court does have jurisdiction, by virtue of section 65C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('the Act'), under the heading "Who may apply for a parenting order", and clearly, a parent can apply for a parenting order. And Ms Whiting is clearly a parent of X.
2. The other relevant provision is section 69E. That is headed "Child or Parent to be Present in Australia." And that section reads:

Proceedings may be instituted under this Act in relation to a child only if [X] is present in Australia or [X] is an Australian citizen or a parent of [X] is an Australian citizen or is present in Australia on the relevant day.

1. 'The relevant day' is the day that the Application was filed. I am satisfied that the Mother was present in Australia on the day her application was filed. The Mother has confirmed she was. This Court has jurisdiction to deal with the parenting arrangements for X.
2. And that is the Mother's point. She puts her position most eloquently, that this Court has jurisdiction to deal with X and to make orders in relation to her best interests. One of the orders that a Court can make is for a recovery order. In those circumstances, the Mother argues, the Court should, having regard to her concerns as to the harm that currently exists for X in Belgium, exercise its power to make a recovery order and require State M police, Australian police or, if possible, international police to act on that recovery order.
3. That is her position. Her position, in that technical sense, is correct. The Court does have the power to make a recovery order. The essential question is should the Court exercise the jurisdiction that it clearly has.

1. The Mother's material, without any doubt, sets out the significant concerns she has as to the process that she has been through in Australia, and indeed in Belgium, in relation to dealing with Courts, dealing with police, dealing with other organisations, and dealing with lawyers in relation to her desire to keep X living with her in Australia. Australia was the country to which she fled with X, without the Father's consent, in or about 2022, because the Mother and X were in Australia for two years before the Hague Convention proceedings were finalised in Australia.
2. The Mother makes significant complaints and continues to make those complaints before me. She feels slighted by the way in which the proceedings were dealt with by Williams J, by the Full Court, and the way police dealt with her. All these concerns have been raised.
3. I have attempted to point out to Ms Whiting that this Court is largely unable to take into account any matter that occurred prior the orders were made by Williams J on 11 February 2025 - orders that she did not appeal.
4. All of her concerns should have been put to Williams J in July 2024, the Full Court in December 2024 and/or Williams J in February 2025. That information was either not put before Williams J or was put, and it was not sufficient to persuade Williams J that X should not be returned to Belgium.
5. Recounting all those concerns to me now is not particularly helpful. The Mother had the right to appeal which she did not exercise. She says she did not have the ability to do so - did not have the money. That is irrelevant for my purposes. An appeal is the proper process that you must undertake if you are not happy with the decision of a court.
6. The same can be said for the proceedings in Belgium. As I have mentioned, the Mother had every right to appeal the decisions of the Belgian Court, which she did and in fact has successfully appealed or partially successfully appealed part of an earlier decision made, I think, in July 2024 in Belgium, relating to supervision conditions.
7. So, the Mother knows how to operate in the Belgian Court system. She filed an appeal there. She knows that she also had the ability to file an appeal in relation to the decision made in May 2025 by the Belgian Court. She chose not to do so.
8. As I have indicated, many of the matters that the Mother has put to me today either have been raised in either the Court in Australia in 2024 and 2025 and/or the Belgian Court in 2024 and 2025, including in the Belgian Court after X had been returned to Belgium. Therefore, to re-agitate these matters before the Court offends the doctrine of res judicata, that is, I cannot re-determine matters that have already been determined.
9. Further, if information that I have received now that existed at the time that those proceedings had occurred had not been put before the various courts, such as the video from January 2025, such as the police information that the Mother referred to me as annexed to her affidavit, such as the information that I read to the Mother which largely mirrored that was contained in the annexure to her affidavit - if that information had not been put by her before the Courts when she had the opportunity to do so, then, she should probably be estopped from putting it before this Court pursuant to the doctrine of Anshun estoppel. So there is probably a very strong case that these proceedings should be dismissed or at least permanently stayed by virtue of either the doctrine of res judicata and/or Anshun estoppel.

1. There is also a very strong case that this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum to hear this matter. As I have indicated, this child is subject to Court orders made in Belgium as recently as May 2025. The Mother has chosen not to appeal that decision. The proceedings have been in the Court in Belgium since seemingly August 2024, after X returned to Belgium.
2. As stated, the Mother appealed the Belgian decision made in April 2025 and was somewhat successful with that appeal. So the Mother understands that process, has been involved in that process, is able to operate in that process unrepresented. For an unknown reason, the Mother did not choose to engage herself in the process that was before the Belgian Court in May 2025, even though she requested the meeting. She returned to Australia.
3. As I have said, it is unclear whether the Belgian proceedings are still on foot. If they are, then, there is no doubt that the Belgian City S Family Court and Juvenile Court is the appropriate Court to be dealing with matters relating to a child who lives in Belgium and who is subject to orders of the Belgian court. And it is a clearly inappropriate forum to use this Court to try and gain orders to deal with a child who not live in the jurisdiction.
4. In my view, a continuation of these proceedings in those circumstances would be oppressive in the sense of seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging or vexatious in the sense of productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment. And I am quoting there from the decision of Henry & Henry [1996] HCA 51; [1996] 185 CLR 571.
5. X lives in Belgium with the Father and is subject to orders of a Court in Belgium, and those Court proceedings may still be on foot. There is also significant doubt that any order made in this Court would be enforceable in the Belgian Court. I have significant doubt and certainly no evidence to suggest that if I was to make a recovery order today requiring X to be returned to the Mother in Australia, that police from Australia or Belgian police would act on that order.
6. To suggest that State M or Australian federal police officers would spend resources, travel to Belgium, execute a recovery order and remove X in the face of an existing Belgian order, to suggest that the police would do that, is frankly fanciful, and police would be frankly appalled if I was to suggest that they do so.
7. There are, as the Mother well knows, appropriate mechanisms to retrieve a child who has been removed from one country to another is via the provisions of the Hague Convention and the relevant legislation that gives operation to that Convention in countries bound by that Convention. That is the process that has now completed in Australia with the eventual order requiring X be returned Belgium. And that is what occurred.
8. What the Family Court was effectively saying, in the Hague proceedings, was that the appropriate forum to hear the family law dispute was in the country from which X was taken. So that was what the Court ordered. But I am being asked to effectively reconsider that order, I do not believe that I should be doing so.
9. The Mother is aware of the processes and procedures that exist in this Court and in the Court in Belgium. She can still today go to the Belgian Court, make an application, appeal the decision of May, make whatever application she would like. She can make an application, if she wishes, for X to live in Australia. That is something that she could do. She can fight that application on its merits in Belgium. She can engage lawyers for her in Belgium to undertake that task. That is something she can do today. Whether or not she would be successful with an application of that nature, is unknown.
10. But that is the appropriate forum to deal with such an application. It is, as I have said, oppressive for the Mother to expect this Court to undertake such a process in Australia. In my view, this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum to deal with the Mother's application.

SHOULD THIS COURT RECONSIDER THE 11 FEBRUARY 2025 ORDERS

1. Finally, I have asked the Mother to consider whether or not the Court should reconsider the order made by Justice Williams with reference to section 65DAAA, of the Family Law Act 1975I (Cth) ('the Act'). Now, this may be a completely unnecessary consideration because, as I have said, for the reasons stated, these proceedings should be dismissed. But to ensure that all bases are covered and to ensure that I was not missing something fundamental, I asked the Mother to provide me with evidence as to whether or not there had been a significant change of circumstances since the order was made by Justice Williams 11 February 2025.
2. It might be argued what I should be asking is whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the orders were made in Belgium in May 2025. That probably is a very good question. Nevertheless, I did ask the Mother to consider the question - has there been a significant change of circumstances since 11 February 2025?
3. When I refer to section 65DAAA, that is a more recent insertion into the Act. It is headed 'Reconsideration of Final Parenting Orders'. And it states:

(1) If a final parenting order is in force in relation to a child, a Court must not reconsider the final parenting order unless:

(a) The Court has considered whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made.

(b) The Court is satisfied that in all the circumstances and taking into account whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made, it is in the best interests of [X] for the final parenting order to be reconsidered.

(2) For the purpose of determining whether the Court is satisfied as mentioned, and without limiting section 60CC, which is the section that sets out the principles that must be considered or the factors that must be considered when considering the best interests of a child, the Court may have regard to any matters that the Court considers relevant, including the following:

(a) the reasons for the final parenting order and the material upon which it was based;

(b) whether there was any material available that was not available to the Court that made the final parenting order;

(c) the likelihood that if the final parenting order is recognised, the Court will make a new parenting order that affects the operation of the final parenting order in a significant way, (whether by varying, discharging or suspending the final parenting order in whole or in part or in some way);

(d) the potential benefit or detriment to [X] that might result from reconsidering the final parenting order.

1. Now, as I have said, the question of what is a 'parenting order' or a 'final parenting order' probably means the orders made on 11 February 2025, which was the orders requiring the return of X to Belgium pursuant to the relevant regulations. But as I say, it could mean the order that was made in the Belgian Court.
2. A parenting order has the meaning prescribed to it under section 64B(1) of the Act. 64B(1) states:

(a) an order made under this part, including an order until further order dealing with the matter mentioned in subsection (2) -

Or an order made under this part discharging or varying the order. However, declaration or order under subdivision E of division 12 is not a parenting order.

1. It seems to me that, it is the final parenting order made by Williams J on 11 February 2025 - which really was the order executing the warrant, which was referred to in the orders of 8 January 2025 - that might be 'reconsidered'.
2. The Mother very helpfully has attached the 8 January 2025 order to her affidavit of 14 July 2025, although not all of it - I only have paragraphs 11 and following. Paragraph 11 refers to the child's departure from Australia, causing X to be removed. Paragraph 11 remains in full force and effect until the letter from the central authority is received. The order goes on:

13. On notification from the Belgian Central Authority via the Australian Centre Authority that the Respondent and child have departed Australia and arrived in Belgium, the father pay the Respondent such sum as may be required to reimburse the Respondent in full for the invoiced costs of the flights for the Respondent and child to return to Belgium with such amount to be paid into the Respondent's nominated bank account.

14. The Respondent and father be permitted to provide and rely upon a copy of these order in any competence court in Belgium or [Country Q].

15. In the event that the Mother does not comply with paragraph 3 of these orders:

(a) the father be at liberty to come to Australia and collect [X] for the purposes of returning [X] to Belgium and the obligations on the father to pay the financial amount pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 13 of these Orders are discharged.

b) the Respondent do all acts and things necessary to and cooperate with the State Central Authority to facilitate the return of [X] including but not limited to preparing the child's belongings for departure to Belgium including the packing of all clothes, belongings, toys, toiletries and medication, if any that might be required by [X] for the duration of travel and providing those provisions to the father, at handover as prescribed in 15(c) herein; and

c) the Respondent cause [X] to attend at the [City E] Registry of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia at [City E] ("the handover address"), Child Minding Centre on a date to be advised ("the handover date") and cause [X] to be delivered to the Father, and immediately upon handover, the Respondent leave the Court complex and thereafter be restrained from interfering with [X] leaving the handover address with the Father.

d) the Respondent be, and is hereby restrained by herself, her servants or agents from being at or within 5 kilometres of the airport from which the child's return flight is to depart on the date of departure; and

e) the Registry of the Court release to the father upon his attendance at the [City E] Registry any and all passports held in the name of [X] for the purposes of returning X to Belgium.

(emphasis added)

1. I think the Mother complains that she was not able to prepare X, because X was removed from her arms at a police station, I believe she said, and she had video of the same. Sounds like a most unfortunate situation. Again, I reiterate the scene might have been avoided if the Mother had chosen to get on that plane herself with X and de-stressed a significantly stressful situation.
2. As I have said, section 65DAAA firstly requires me to consider whether or not there has been a significant change of circumstances. If there has not been, then, that is an end to the matter.
3. The only significant change that the Mother has really pointed to is that set out in her affidavit of 14 July, and it is her last annexure to that affidavit where she refers to a letter from - it is a report dated 14 April 2025 and it relates to the foster care period February 2025 to April 2025.
4. And this was a report to the Belgian Court, by the looks of it. I have no doubt was taken into account when the matter was determined in the Belgian Court in April and also in May 2025.
5. And the Mother points to the presentation of the child. But I will read from that report:

At the moment, there is uncertainty about the permanent place for [X] as Mother did not agree with the decision of the Juvenile Court and has filed an appeal.

From a foster care perspective, we are partly aware of [X]'s history, but we focus on [X]'s current stay and development with foster carers.

We know that Daddy has a right to unlimited contact and that there is a contact ban for Mom.

In consultation with the consultant, we have not had any contact with the Mother yet. We are awaiting further instructions from the consultants.

We would like to inform you that the report could not be prepared earlier because we wanted to include information from the experience survey (conducted on 25/03/2025 - feedback meeting on Friday 11/04/2025) in our reporting.

2. RECENT EVOLUTION IN FOSTER FAMILY

Apart from the personal processes of foster carers and father, we mainly want to portray [X]'s from a foster care perspective.

[X]'s arrival in the foster family grandparents happened quite drastically after a stay of one and a half years abroad. Despite the joy of grandparents and Dad to be able to hold [X] in their arms again, it meant a sudden turnaround in [X]'s life, ending up in a family where she no longer knew the people well, a different environment, different sounds and smells, a different bed. So it was a new situation for everyone: grandparents who start taking care of their grandchild day and night, [X], who ends up in a different family and context.

According to Mommy (grandmother), the first few weeks went well. But it was noticeable it brought a complete upheaval in daily life for everyone. It was a search for how to deal with [X] and what her needs were. In the meantime, almost two months have passed, and we hear that [X] is starting to get used to daily activities, to the daily rhythm. We hear that the nights are going better because in the beginning, [X] woke up regularly at night and was restless. We also hear that Mommy is getting better at 'reading' [X] and is trying to guide and correct her as best she can. Mummy herself worked as [an educator] for many years, which means that she has the necessary tools to guide [X] based on her education and experience. During one of our conversations with foster carers, we hear that Mummy is concerned about certain behaviour and [X] displays ([X] asks for food all day long and [X] fears to hurt Mommy out of nowhere; [X] displays unhealthy physical behaviour in her puppet show). Out of that concern, Mommy asked to think about asking how to deal with these situations.

Given the history, foster carers are very, very concerned about [X]'s physical activity, which is why [X] is never left alone.

(Emphasis added)

1. I should point out at this point, the Mother has now left the Court with her supporter.

Indicate that if they cannot be with [X], there are family members who will help to take care of [X].

We know that Daddy is allowed unlimited contact with [X], but to date, it is unclear to what extent Daddy is allowed to do something alone with [X] (e.g. visiting friends). Given this uncertainty, Daddy has decided to only see [X] during the day in consultation with grandparents. Daddy does come to the foster family for dinner and puts [X] in bed. Grandparents also go to Daddy's farm where [X] has plenty of space to play outside.

(Emphasis added)

[X] has now been in the foster home full-time for almost two months, which has allowed her to take small steps in developing a new attachment relationship with Mommy and Daddy.

She can also continue to build her relationship with her father at this time. From one of the conversations, we know that [X] still has a vague memory of 'father's house'.

During an individual moment with [X], we could hear 'Mom' being mentioned, but it was unclear how [X] experiences Mom's absence.

We know that foster carers and Dad find it important that [X] can have contact with her Mother in the same way, but in a safe way. [X] can and may talk openly about Mother/[State M] (which she is now starting to do).

Currently, [X] is under constant supervision of the foster parents, resulting in limited to no interaction with peers. This can be detrimental to her development. Furthermore, [X]'s chances of integrating and growing in a social environment are currently being hampered due to the uncertainty surrounding her residence, which unconsciously creates unrest and uncertainty.

Given [X]'s history, we felt it was important at the start of the foster care situation to register [X] for an experience survey in order to gain insight of her wellbeing, her living and experiential world and her functioning

On March 25, 2025, an experience study was conducted on [X]. On Friday, April 11, 2025, we had a feedback meeting with a therapist from foster care together with the paternal grandmother and Dad. The study revealed that [X] has a serious attachment disorder.

(Emphasis added)

1. That is one of the matters that the Mother raised as amounting to a significant change in circumstances. She pointed to documents annexed to her affidavit material, which she says evidenced - and I think this was documentation from 2023 - that show that the Mother had a significant attachment to X and that X was functioning very well in her care.
2. The Mother's argument is that this information demonstrates that a significant change of circumstances has occurred because X now has a serious attachment disorder.
3. The only other significant change that the Mother says she can point to is that Williams J's orders of 8 January 2025 contemplated X being returned to the Father when, as seen from the documents that I have read from the City S Family and Juvenile Court, X was placed into foster care with the Father's parents under supervision. And these reports, the report I have just read, gives some feedback from that supervision.
4. The Mother says that those are the significant changes of circumstances, whilst also referring back to the alleged violence, abuse, sexual violence and abuse that the child, she says, has suffered. I, however, can only consider significant changes in circumstances that has occurred since the February order was made, as opposed to circumstances that might have existed at the time the matter was being heavily litigated before Williams J and Carter J and the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia.
5. The question is whether or not the matters to which the Mother relies amounts to a significant change of circumstances. The issues that have been raised by the supervisors that I have just read, particularly in relation to X's attachment issues and also the regression in X as of 14 April 2025 are certainly concerning. In my view, however, although very concerning information, it could not amount to a significant change of circumstances where the Mother added to the child's distress by not doing what Williams J urged her to do, and that was to travel with X back to Belgium. Further, that information has been provided to the Belgian Court, and that Belgian Court was not persuaded by that information, to change X's living arrangements, noting that the Belgian Court ordered that supervision of the Father's time with X, will end August 2024.
6. Further, the information was provided in April 2025 - it is now July 2025. I can infer from the decision made by the Belgian Court in May 2025 that it was satisfied as to the living arrangements for X at that time. And of course, there have been two further months since then for X to adapt. Further, that information shows X was slowly adapting to the significant changes X has had to endure when returned to the Father after the Mother had taken X to Australia, quite improperly, for near-on two years before she was returned to the Father - - at the Mother's choice - without the Mother being present or involved. So, is it any wonder that this child was exhibiting distress?
7. In my view, the deterioration in the child's presentation was entirely expected, given the Mother's view that she would not accompany X back to Belgium - of course the Mother did, eventually, return to Belgium and involved herself heavily in the Belgian Court process.
8. I am not satisfied that the deterioration in the child's presentation amounts to a significant change of circumstances.
9. Nor do I find that X not being returned to the Father as strictly ordered by Williams J, but rather to the foster family under the supervision of the Belgian Court, amounts to a significant change of circumstances.
10. The essence of the orders of Williams J was to have X returned to Belgium, and I know that because if one looks at her orders made 19 July 2024, the order is that X be returned to Belgium and that the respondent be at liberty to accompany X to Belgium.
11. The means of facilitating that return was via the Father, because the Father had to travel to Australia to retrieve X, when the Mother did not comply with the return order, and a warrant had to be executed. Again, the Mother had a choice in that regard.
12. I do not accept that there has been a significant change of circumstances, because the Father was the person who was ordered to receive X when in fact the foster parents now look after her.
13. In any event, the Father was the person, as I understand it, who collected X and took her back to Belgium. So, in that way, he did strictly comply with the return order but then subjected himself quite appropriately to the orders of the Belgian Court - which were made back in July 2024.
14. I am not satisfied that there has been a significant change of circumstances. But even if those matters raised by the Mother had given rise to a significant change of circumstances, I am not satisfied that it is in the best interest of this child there to be a recovery order issued to have that child returned to State M.
15. And the reasons are obvious, as such an order would fly in the face of an order made by Williams J after a significant period of litigation up to 11 February 2025. It would fly in the face of an order made most recently by a Belgian Court in May 2025, proceedings to which the Mother involved herself, but then chose to disengage from, and to an order which the Mother knows she can appeal if she so desires to do so.
16. Further, there is a real impracticability about issuing a recovery order. To require police officers from State M or the Australian Federal Police to travel to Belgium to retrieve the child, contrary to an existing Belgian order, and then, at considerable expense, have that child returned to Australia, is frankly fanciful.
17. Next, I do not have any information that would suggest that this child is not currently in safe and secure circumstances in Belgium, and I have assurance about that because of the Belgian order made in May 2025 which confirmed the child's existing arrangements. There still is a supervision arrangement in place. So, in terms of X being at risk, I am satisfied that the child's safety is promoted by virtue of there being that ongoing supervision, whilst also X is in the primary care of the Father's parents, who are the child's foster carers, whilst X is re-establishing her relationship with the Father.
18. That relationship has been re-establishing since February 2025, some five months. And there seem to be green shoots of hope in the report that I have read. Notwithstanding the regression of the child, X is slowly - was at least in April 2025 - adapting to her change of living arrangements.
19. To require X to be uplifted from her current settled certain circumstances and to be placed on a plane back to State M, only for the Father then to re-invoke proceedings in Australia and/or Belgium, and involve this child in further litigation, and potentially then having X once again placed on a plane back to the Father, could cause untold damage to the child. The Mother is concerned about regression, but X's regression is not going to improve if that type of disruption occurs.
20. It is clearly in the best interest of X for the Court in Belgium, which seems to me to be most appropriately dealing with the parenting arrangements for her, to deal with the child's parenting arrangements and for her situation to be continued to be monitored and dealt with by the City S Family and Juvenile Court.

1. This Court is not equipped to deal with a child who lives in another country, and any orders I make are very unlikely to be enforced by the Belgian Court in any event, particularly if they were to fly in the face of orders made in the Belgian Court as recently as May 2025 - which could be appealed if the Mother chose to do so, but has not.
2. For all those reasons, even if there was a significant change of circumstances, I am not satisfied that it is in the child's best interest for the order made by Williams J to be reconsidered, even if I was able to reconsider it, given that the Mother did not file an appeal.
3. For all those reasons, for those very many reasons stated, it is clear and obvious that the Mother's applications, and there are many of them filed, and I have listed them, must all be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and three (103) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Turnbull.

[1] Mother's Application for Final Orders 26 May 2025.

[2] Order of Judge Turnbull in Whiting & Bandy (Federal Circuit and Family court of Australia (Division 2) LNC387/2025, 20 June 2025).

[3] Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; 147 CLR 589.