Pomella v Odrzywolkska

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. These are the reasons for judgment delivered ex tempore on 14 November 2025, revised from transcript only to include extracts of cited documents and to make corrections of typographical errors or minor maters to reflect the intention of the Court.
2. This is an interim application filed on 13 October 2025 by the applicant bankrupt seeking interim orders pending the final hearing of this proceeding on 19 and 20 February 2026. The applicant seeks to restrain the Trustee in bankruptcy appointed to her bankrupt estate from taking various steps.
3. In the interim application, the applicant sought ten different orders:

(1) That the respondent be restrained from selling, transferring, reletting, vacating or otherwise dealing with any property registered in the name of "Maria Pomella" without the applicant's written consent or leave of the Court.

(2) That the respondent cease using the name "Maria Pomella" and act only in the name specified in the sequestration order, which was "Maria Michelle Pomella", until authority is proven.

(3) That the rent from Ray Street, Blyth Street and Brunswick Street properties be preserved and used only for mortgage and essential outgoings.

(4) That the respondent pay overdue monthly interest to Bentworth Pty Ltd and Phillip Abraham Goldfarb from rents held and provide proof to the applicant.

(5) That the respondent file and serve a full account of all estate funds and disbursed since 12 September 2024 within seven days.

(6) That the applicant be authorised to manage and collect rent for the Brunswick Street property until the respondent proves lawful authority.

(7) That the respondent, within seven days, state in writing whether the Condello Lawyers legal malpractice claim vests in the estate and identify the statutory basis (if any).

(8) That the respondent revoke the income contribution assessment issued on about 6 October 2024 and make a fresh assessment under s 139W of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) based on the applicant's current income ($330.00 per fortnight) and dependants.

(9) That pending reassessment, the respondent be restrained from enforcing or collecting any further contributions.

(10) That the respondent release sufficient funds from rent income for the applicant's ordinary living and dependant care expenses until further order.

1. Those interim orders were sought pending the hearing of an application for annulment of the bankruptcy.
2. Since the original sequestration orders in 2024, there was an application to set aside or review the sequestration order made by a Registrar. That application for review was dealt with by Judge Taglieri in early 2025. The applicant's submissions that the sequestration order was made in respect of the wrong person or wrong persons was abandoned. Since that decision, the applicant debtor has applied to the Federal Court to appeal the decision of her Honour. I am informed that an application in respect of an extension of time is pending and that the appeal from those orders is also pending in the Federal Court.
3. The orders which the applicant seeks today are, in effect, mandatory injunctions preventing the respondent Trustee from exercising powers, which the Trustee is required to exercise pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and Bankruptcy Regulations 2021 (Cth). In such circumstances where a mandatory injunction is sought, the applicant needs to establish and persuade the Court that there is a reasonably strong prospect of success in respect of the application for annulment and that the balance of convenience favours the granting of injunctions to preserve the status quo. I am not satisfied at this point in time that the application for annulment is sufficiently strong to warrant mandatory injunctions preventing the trustee from exercising statutory obligations in respect of the estate.
4. I express no view as to the ultimate merits of that application for annulment, but at this point in time, it would be inappropriate for me to express any view about the strength of that application in circumstances where an application to set aside the sequestration order has already been considered by this Court and rejected. I am also not satisfied that the balance of convenience and the interests of justice, support the orders which are now sought by the applicant.
5. Prior to the hearing of the interim application, the applicant sent to my chambers proposed minutes of orders on 13 November 2025. In those proposed orders, the applicant sought four separate orders, which were modifications of the orders sought in the interim application referred to at [3] above. The first of those orders was that, in respect of concurrent proceedings, in the Federal Court, the orders sought were that "the timetable in this proceeding not be delayed or otherwise affected by the Federal Court of Appeal VID 1468 of 2025 and that both matters proceed concurrently pending further order of the Court".
6. Upon exploring with the applicant the nature of the relief sought, it became apparent that her concern was that the progress of her application for annulment before this Court not be prejudiced by the progress of her appeal to the Federal Court in respect of Judge Taglieri's orders.
7. The application for annulment of the bankruptcy will be heard by this Court on 19 and 20 February 2026, and directions for the conduct of that proceeding and the filing of affidavit evidence have been made. There is nothing pending in the Federal Court which would necessarily interfere with this proceeding being dealt within in the ordinary course and nor do I propose to make any orders that would prejudice the Federal Court hearing that appeal or the process of the Court in considering that appeal.
8. Therefore, the need for the orders which the applicant now seeks seem futile or nugatory and it would be unnecessary to make orders to that effect. Orders 2 and 3 in the proposed orders relate to restraining the Trustee from taking particular action in respect of the bankrupt estate. Order 4 was in respect of clarification by the Court that the applicant's professional negligence claim against Condello Lawyers is contended to be personal and not part of the bankrupt estate and that the respondent Trustee is not to take steps in relation to that claim pending further order of the Court.
9. Having explored the applicant's evidence in relation to that personal claim, it is apparent that no present action is threatened by the Trustee in relation to the claims made by the applicant against her former lawyers, and it is not proposed that any step be taken to compromise those proceedings at this point in time or at any point in time between now and the proposed hearing. Accordingly, the relief sought in relation to those personal claims, if they be personal claims, seems to be premature and not necessary in the interests of justice to be made at this point in time.
10. The other orders which are sought in the proposed orders, are to restrain the Trustee in relation to the exercise of her powers as Trustee over the bankrupt estate of the applicant. The Trustee has filed an affidavit affirmed on 13 November 2025 in which the Trustee has candidly explained the steps taken by her in relation to this bankrupt estate since her appointment. I have also heard from Ms Warren, the solicitor for the Trustee, in relation to the current status of the bankrupt estate, which is that there are approximately four properties (the subject of the estate) two of which are mortgaged to the National Australia Bank as a secured creditor and that the National Australia Bank has obtained judgments for possession and other judgments in relation to their interests as mortgagee, which are currently being held in abeyance pending complaint to the Australian Financial Complaints Authority. No steps apparently are being taken in relation to those mortgaged properties by the mortgagee at this point in time, and the Trustee continues to accumulate rental income from those properties pending the determination of the creditors of the estate.
11. In relation to the other two properties, no steps have been taken or are threatened by the Trustee in relation to the sale or further encumbrance of those two properties, and in relation to one of those properties, which is a unit 109 at 500 Brunswick Street, Fitzroy, those premises have been rented pursuant to a lease which is bearing a rental of $750.00 per week. The affidavit of the Trustee affirmed 13 November 2025 also explains various other aspects of the applicant's concerns regarding the management of this bankruptcy, and I am satisfied by that evidence that there is no need to prevent the Trustee from further pursuing her statutory obligations or the administration of this estate at this point in time.
12. The injunctions which are sought in [2] of the proposed orders are wide in breadth and seek in effect to prevent the Trustee from taking any steps to preserve assets for the benefit of the ongoing creditors of the estate. In my opinion, the interests of justice and the balance of convenience do not favour the status quo being altered, in that the Trustee will continue to exercise her powers and rights as she sees fit in accordance with statutory obligations, and there is no immediate need, pending the hearing, for urgent action to change what appears to be an otherwise orderly exercise of powers in, what appear to be somewhat difficult circumstances. The interim orders of the kind sought in the proposed orders will not be made.
13. In relation to the rental income from the apartment 496-500 Brunswick Street, Fitzroy North, the dispute about that property appears to be that it stood vacant for some months after the previous tenant vacated the property. The applicant complains that it was not leased by the Trustee in an orderly fashion and further, that the market rental obtained by the Trustee when it was relet was inadequate.
14. Ms Warren, on behalf of the Trustee, has explained, and it is confirmed by the affidavit of the Trustee, that the figure of $750.00 per week was a market rental reached after consultation with agents who set the market rental at between $580.00 per week and $780.00 per week. The property was advertised and then rented within a week of being placed on the market. There was only one interested tenant. The applicant claims that the rent should be a higher figure, and she does so based upon information she obtained from the internet and various real estate sites but does not have any independent expert evidence to suggest that the market rental of $750.00 per week is inadequate or grossly inadequate and in breach of the Trustee's duty. Given the amount involved and the pending hearing, I do not believe that the balance of convenience is in favour of disrupting the flow of funds to the Trustee for the purposes of meeting future or other creditors when they are known.
15. The applicant claims that her personal circumstances have been compromised as a result of the diversion of rental income by the Trustee, but I am not satisfied that her personal situation is such that orders of a mandatory kind need be made pending the hearing and determination of this dispute and the annulment application in February of next year.
16. In the circumstances, and given that it is an isolated issue which involves a differential of approximately $110.00 per week as to the appropriate rent, I am not inclined to make mandatory orders for the diversion of rental, given that that would be in effect granting the applicant partial relief in respect of her annulment application.
17. In the overall circumstances of this case, and given the volume of material which has been presented by the applicant, which is vast and varied and often irrelevant, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate at this point in time to make orders of the kind now sought.

1. The interim application filed 13 October 2025 be dismissed;
2. The costs of the interim application dated 13 October 2025 be reserved; and
3. Liberty to apply.

I certify that the preceding twenty-three (23) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Corbett.