Police Commissioner for the State Central Authority of South Australia & Bartosz [2025] FedCFamC1F 722 | Case summary

Police Commissioner for the State Central Authority of South Australia & Bartosz [2025] FedCFamC1F 722 | Case summary | Zoe

[26]

The Regulations require that applications for return of children, when it is alleged that they have been wrongfully removed/retained from their habitual residence, are dealt with expeditiously and as quickly as proper consideration of each matter permits (reg 15(2)).
In De L v Director General, NSW Department of Community Services (1996) 187 CLR 640, the High Court of Australia cautioned against the need for expedition resulting in insufficient hearing of issues in dispute. Some disputes are appropriate for summary determination and others require cross-examination.
In this case, the mother was cross-examined by counsel for the State Central Authority, and the father was cross-examined by counsel for the mother. Both parents were cross-examined by counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL"). The Hague Report writer, Ms C was cross examined by all three counsel and the mother's witness, Ms E was cross examined by counsel for the State Central Authority and counsel for the ICL.
The State Central Authority asserts the child has been wrongfully retained in Australia, in accordance with regs 16(1) and (1A), on the following basis:
1. the application was made within one year of the child's retention;
2. the child is under the age of 16;
3. the child was habitually resident in the United Kingdom as at the date of retention in Australia;
4. the requesting parent, the father, has rights of custody in relation to the child, which he was exercising immediately prior to the child's retention; and
5. the retention of the child was in breach of the father's rights of custody.
The mother conceded the jurisdictional facts, and a Statement of Agreed Facts dated 1 September 2025 was provided to the court. The statement was signed by the solicitors for the State Central Authority and the mother and by counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer. All three counsel agreed the mother's retention of X in Australia in January 2025 was wrongful.
Notwithstanding that concession, the mother opposed the application for return and relied on two regulatory exceptions to return, namely:
1. there is a grave risk that returning the child to the United Kingdom would expose him to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation (reg 16(3)(b)).
2. the child objects to being returned, the child's objection shows a strength of feeling beyond the mere expression of a preference or of ordinary wishes, and the child has attained an age, and a degree of maturity, at which it is appropriate to take account of his or her views (reg 16(3)(c)).

[65]

The requesting father, Mr B was cross examined by counsel for both the mother and the Independent Children's Lawyer. He impressed as a considered and forthcoming witness who made appropriate concessions. He answered questions directly and his answers did not attempt to prevaricate or deflect.
The paternal grandmother, Ms G was not required for cross examination, and I accept her evidence as unchallenged.
Ms O, the father's former partner was not required personally to adopt her statement, nor was she required for cross examination.
The respondent mother, Ms Bartosz , was cross-examined by counsel for both the State Central Authority and the Independent Children's Lawyer. The mother was an unimpressive witness who was frequently evasive and refused to answer the question posed to her. The court was required to remind her on numerous occasions to answer the question directly. She frequently gave a long answer that did not correlate to the question and attempted to deflect responsibility for all adverse events to the father and his actions. She also professed to being unable to answer questions because of her alleged trauma.
Even at the conclusion of her cross examination, there was no satisfactory answer why she had failed to actively participate in the proceedings in the United Kingdom in both 2018, when she had engaged lawyers and again in 2019, when she eventually responded to a CAFCASS (Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service) worker. Nor did she explain why she had not taken any steps in the intervening 5 plus years between April 2019 and December 2024, when X travelled to Australia, to take action in the UK courts, if she perceived the children were at risk of harm in the father's care during that time, when she had married her therapist husband in November 2018 and had his emotional support since at least that time.
The mother's evidence was replete with inconsistencies, including her statements to the CACFASS worker in 2019 that she had no concerns for the children's care in the father's household, as referred to in the reasons of the UK court[2] when she now maintains there would be a grave risk of harm to X to be returned to his care. Similarly, her criticism of the father's lack of care for D, including failing to seek medical attention for her worms and urinary issues, is entirely inconsistent with her agreement for D to return to the UK in 2023 and again in September 2023 for the child to ostensibly return permanently to the UK. Her explanation that D's international movements were driven by D taking charge of her own schooling, was unconvincing and disingenuous. I consider the mother's oral evidence was substantially permeated by her desire to blame the father, rather than to accept the reality of what transpired, which was that she left the children in the UK in 2019 to assume her new life with her husband in Australia.
I am also troubled by the mother's denials to the effect that she has not discussed in detail with X these proceedings or that the father is not denigrated in her household. That flies in the face of X's comments to Ms C at paragraph 12 of the Hague Report and his suggestion that Ms C interview D because she could tell the report writer many things about the father and the paternal grandfather.
For these reasons, where the mother's evidence differs from the father's, I treat her evidence with caution and prefer the father's evidence.
Ms E was also cross-examined by counsel for both the State Central Authority and the Independent Children's Lawyer. Ms E is a friend of the parents' 17-year-old daughter, D, who currently appears to be estranged from her father and lives with the mother and her new husband, Mr U in South Australia. Ms E swore an affidavit which was filed on 26 August 2025. She deposes to having lived next door to the paternal grandparents and being aware of friction and tension in the paternal family, as well as deposing to flawed conduct on the part of the father, including drug use and D and her being offered magic mushrooms by the father at a music festival. Despite her assertions about the unsatisfactory behaviour of the paternal grandparents and the father, she did not explain whether she had informed her own parents of these allegations, prior to enjoying a holiday in Country V with the paternal family at their expense.
During cross examination she appeared overly self-assured and ready to attack the father and paternal family, despite conceding some of the events emphatically described by her were not personally observed by her, but rather her knowledge was based on what D had told her. Such an example is the allegations of lack of food in the home of the paternal grandparents.
Ms E conceded because some of the statements in her affidavit pertained to events when she was under 12 years of age, she could be mistaken and that her description of the paternal grandfather as a large man was not correct. She also agreed D had asked her to provide the affidavit and D had told her what to say, including to mention in the affidavit the allegations against the father pertaining to his alleged conduct at the festival. She denied D had told her what to say or that she had sworn an affidavit in accordance with D's wishes.
I was left with the impression Ms E had discussed the contents of the proposed affidavit with D and I am able to reasonably infer, she had been guided and influenced by D. I consider her recollections of events, which occurred when she was much younger and over the years she lived next door, have been embellished and exaggerated to suit D's narrative. Ms E did so from a misguided sense of loyalty to D and an attempt to help her friend, in the context of D's obvious desire to support her mother and her estrangement from her father. I do not place significant weight on the evidence of Ms E and consider it somewhat misguided to involve a young woman, who has just turned 18 or so, in the proceeding before the court.
The maternal grandmother, Ms J was not required for cross examination, and I accept her evidence as unchallenged.
In this matter, a reg 26 report was ordered and prepared by Ms C on 30 July 2025. Ms C was cross-examined by all three counsel. Both the Hague Report and her oral evidence were considered, insightful, and logical. She presented as a competent professional witness; I accept her opinion and attach significant weight to her evidence. Her evidence is discussed in detail throughout these reasons.

[72]

...

... On its face reg 16(3)(b) presents no difficult question of construction and it is not ambiguous. The burden of proof is plainly imposed on the person who opposes return. What must be established is clearly identified: that there is a grave risk that the return of the child would expose the child to certain types of harm or otherwise place the child in "an intolerable situation". That requires some prediction, based on the evidence, of what may happen if the child is returned. In a case where the person opposing return raises the exception, a court cannot avoid making that prediction by repeating that it is not for the courts of the country to which a child has been removed or retained to inquire into the best interests of the child. The exception requires courts to make the kind of inquiry and prediction that will inevitably involve some consideration of the interests of the child."

Necessarily there will seldom be any certainty about the prediction. It is essential, however, to observe that certainty is not required: what is required is persuasion that there is a risk which warrants the qualitative description "grave". Leaving aside the reference to "intolerable situation", and confining attention to harm, the risk that is relevant is not limited to harm that will actually occur, it extends to a risk that the return would expose the child to harm.

Because what is to be established is a grave risk of exposure to future harm, it may well be true to say that a court will not be persuaded of that without some clear and compelling evidence. The bare assertion, by the person opposing return, of fears for the child may well not be sufficient to persuade the court that there is a real risk of exposure to harm.

These considerations, however, do not warrant a conclusion that reg 16(3)(b) is to be given a "narrow" rather than a "broad" construction. There is, in these circumstances, no evident choice to be made between a "narrow" and "broad" construction of the regulation. If that is what is meant by saying that it is to be given a "narrow construction" it must be rejected. The exception is to be given the meaning its words require.

That is not to say, however, that reg 16(3)(b) will find frequent application. It is well-nigh inevitable that a child, taken from one country to another without the agreement of one parent, will suffer disruption, uncertainty and anxiety. That disruption, uncertainty and anxiety will recur, and may well be magnified, by having to return to the country of habitual residence. Regulation 16(3)(b) and Art 13(b) of the Convention intend to refer to more than this kind of result when they speak of a grave risk to the child of exposure to physical or psychological harm on return.

[80]

As referred to above, the mother asserts she was a victim of insidious family violence perpetrated by the father, both physical and coercive. The mother's allegations against the father are referred to at paragraphs 8.2 and 14 of her affidavit and occurred prior to final separation in July 2017. The father initially denied all allegations, but during cross examination by counsel for the ICL, he conceded that requiring the mother to spend time in the UK with the children, whilst offering to pay for her flights and accommodation, could be construed as coercive. Despite that concession, I do not necessarily consider the father's insistence on time between the children and the mother occurring in the UK, as coercive. That is so in light of the father's concerns the mother would attempt to distance the children from him and overhold them in Australia, which is ultimately what has occurred. Offering to pay her travel costs to the UK is not coercive. During cross examination by counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer, the father conceded recent offensive emails he had sent to the mother, were sent in anger.
The mother did not adduce any independent or objective evidence, such as medical evidence to substantiate the injuries she claimed to have sustained from the father's sexual violence towards her.[4] When asked during cross examination, she was unable to say how the father perpetrated financial control over her, when she had an independent income.
Exhibit A-13 is a CAFCASS report dated 14 February 2019, which was obtained by the UK court for the father's proceedings in April 2019, to vary the previous parenting final consent orders made in July 2018. The report comprehensively refers to the mother's complaints about the father's care of the children, which are similar to the allegations in her affidavit.
Whilst the mother chose not to fully participate in the April 2019 proceedings, the CAFCASS report records both that the CAFCASS officer obtained information from the mother and her then complaints about the father. Exhibit A-6 is the order of the Family Court at Town W dated [...] April 2019 and the reasons for judgement.
The preamble to orders of [...] April 2019 refer to:
1. The Respondent Mother not being present but having spoken to Ms Y of CAFCASS by telephone immediately prior to the hearing;
2. The court having heard from Ms Y of CAFCASS; and
3. Orders being made subject to satisfactory checks being completed with the Region Q Council.
Exhibit A-25 is a letter dated 14 March 2025 from the Region Q Council stating there are no concerns regarding the parenting of X by the father.
The reasons of the UK Family Court state:

[82]

I can infer from the orders made by the UK Family Court and the reasons for judgement, that the court was satisfied, notwithstanding the mother's alleged concerns which were communicated to CAFCASS and which were before the court, that it was proper for orders to be made placing both children in the father's care and there was no risk of harm, let alone a grave risk, to the children in so doing. In the intervening five or so years since those orders, the mother did not make any application to the Courts for the children to be placed in her care, and she remained resident in Australia with her husband.
I observe the events referred to at paragraph 20 of the affidavit of the maternal grandmother allegedly occurred in January 2019, prior to the court orders and the CAFCASS report and were not referred to in the CAFCASS report. I therefore place little weight on that allegation.
In that context, it is disingenuous to now assert the father's alleged past conduct towards the mother poses a grave risk of harm or intolerable situation to X, if he were to return to the UK. As correctly identified in the mother's case outline, it is the risk to be faced by the child upon return, not the parent, see: TB v JB (Abduction: grave risk of harm) [2001] 2 FLR 515 at [44]. There was no suggestion the mother would leave Australia and assume residency in the UK.
As to the allegations of family violence between the father and the paternal grandfather, and between the paternal grandparents, the mother relies on the evidence of third parties, specifically Ms E and possibly D's accounts of her life in the father's household. Ms E agreed during cross examination her recollection of events which occurred when she was much younger may involve a mischaracterisation of what she observed. I otherwise refer to my earlier comments about Ms E.
During cross examination, the father denied any such violence between him and the paternal grandparents, although he properly conceded there were sometimes arguments in the household of the paternal grandparents, as would be likely in many households. The paternal grandmother denied any such arguments in her affidavit and was not required for cross examination.[6] The father also provided a credible explanation of the altercation between D and the paternal grandfather and the father's reaction to that was appropriate. In any event, the father now lives in Region H, several hours from the home of the paternal grandparents, as did X before he was retained in Australia and I do not accept this allegation poses a grave risk of harm or intolerable situation for X.
Exhibits R-7 and R-8 are videos of X ostensibly taken by D, after a wobbly tooth was pulled out by the paternal grandfather. There was no provenance or temporal context provided about the videos, although it is apparent X was considerably younger than 10 years old and was clearly upset, but not to the extent as suggested by the mother. This incident cannot be categorised as posing a grave risk of harm to the child.

[83]

As to the allegations of the father's drug use, the father was candid about his historical use of drugs but denied current use, as alleged by Ms E. The mother's allegation of the father's drug use is referred to in the CAFCASS report, which records the mother reporting the father's alleged history of drug misuse and the mother's belief he would take drugs around the children. Despite the allegations of the mother, Ms Y recorded in the report the mother had no concerns about the safety of the children in the father's care and she believes his care of them to be adequate. These alleged concerns were before the court in April 2019.
Ms E made florid allegations about the father's alleged current drug use and in particular his conduct at a music festival, Where he allegedly offered magic mushrooms to Ms E and to D. Despite Ms E's certainty, I consider her allegations about the father's alleged drug use must be viewed with the utmost caution and in the context of her close alignment with D and D's clear involvement in the preparation of her affidavit, as conceded by Ms E. I do not accept the veracity of the allegation made by X to the report writer, that his father had offered him magic mushrooms in the car one day because of the vague assertions and his reference to D having informed him of that fact since his arrival in Australia.
Exhibit R-4 is an extract from Facebook about the festival, which took place in 2023. Counsel for the mother urged me to accept the festival effectively condoned the use of psychedelic plant-based drugs, because of the reference in the post. I am unable to make any such definitive finding because of the lack of provenance behind the exhibit, and even if the imputation the festival condoned the use of psychedelic plant-based drugs was to be accepted, it does not demonstrate the father used any drugs, or in fact offered them to D and Ms E. It is also difficult to reconcile how Ms E's parents would have readily allowed her to go to the festival under the guardianship of the father if it was accepted and known that this festival condoned the use of psychedelic plant-based drugs.
The allegation of the maternal grandmother about the father's alleged use of plant-based drugs and disappearance at retreats are vague and have no temporal context. Because the maternal grandmother filed an affidavit in support of the mother, I can infer the maternal grandmother is aligned with her daughter.
I accept the submission of counsel for the State Central Authority there is insufficient evidence, to conclude that the father would pose a risk of harm to X because of his alleged drug use, let alone a grave risk or intolerable situation. I also find the UK court was aware of the mother's allegations in 2019 when orders were made for the children to live with the father. I am also cognisant the mother, despite those allegations, has continued to live in Australia since 2019 and has failed to institute any proceedings seeking the children live with her, despite her evidence that she is now much stronger emotionally and if X were to be returned to the UK, she would have the fortitude and emotional strength to conduct parenting proceedings in the UK to seek X's return to Australia.

[92]

The final consideration relied upon by the mother was the significant impact a return to the UK would have on X's mental health. The mother's counsel submitted the primary grave risk posed for X, if a return order were made, would be to his psychological and emotional wellbeing and possibly also to his physical wellbeing.
Counsel for the mother relied upon two emails purportedly sent by X to the ICL on the first day of the hearing, as demonstrative of X's current distress and strained mental health.[14] She also relied upon the mother's evidence X had said similar things to both his counsellor, Ms R, who provided a report,[15] and his teacher.
Exhibit R-3 is an email purportedly sent by X to the Independent Children's Lawyer at 8.19 am on 1 September 2025, the first day of the trial.
Exhibit ICL-1 is an email purportedly sent by X to the Independent Children's Lawyer at 1.50 pm on the same day.
According to the mother, X's mental health is strained to such a degree he has engaged in recent threats of harm and suicide. The mother's counsel submitted the emails should be accepted as what they purport to be, that is communication from a child in distress, and there is no basis to speculate that X is not the author. For the reasons below, I reject that proposition.
There was no objective evidence adduced by the mother about whether X was the author of the emails, or if he had written the emails, whether he had done so independently and of his own volition. When asked by me if X was at school on the first day of the trial, the mother said it was a pupil free day and X was at home with both D and her husband. The mother denied telling X a court hearing was underway on the relevant day, but rather she had told him she was at a legal meeting. I discuss below the influence of the mother and her household on X.
Curiously, during the afternoon it was brought to my attention that an additional participant had joined the electronic meeting, with the moniker "Observer". The Observer was asked twice to identify their self, and told if they failed to do so, they would be removed from the electronic trial. All parties consented to that approach. The Observer failed to turn on their camera and identify themself and was removed from the meeting. Later in the afternoon another participant with the moniker "[Ms BB]" was observed in the waiting room. When asked, none of the counsel were able to identify Ms BB and Ms BB was not admitted to the electronic hearing. In the context of my findings about whether X has been influenced, as discussed below and the attempt by the Observer and "[Ms BB]" to participate in the electronic trial, I have significant reservations about whether X was the author of the emails, and if he were, whether he was encouraged and influenced to write them by others. I am also troubled about the identity of the observer and or Ms BB.
Turning to the purported threat of self-harm made by X to Ms R, X first consulted Ms R on [...] August 2025 at the instigation of his mother. He attended two further sessions on [...] August and [...] August 2025, and the report is dated 28 August 2025. According to the mother's evidence, X threated self-harm on [...] August 2025, the day prior to the report. According to the mother, although Ms R alerted her to the threat and supposedly made a notification, Ms R chose not to refer to the alleged threat in her report. Neither does the report identify that X is suffering any acute emotional or psychological distress.
The mother was present during some of X's sessions and the report was obtained by the mother without any explanation of the instructions or request to Ms R to provide a report In that context, I do not accept that Ms R intentionally omitted any reference to such a serious matter as threatened self-harm. It is inconceivable a report from a professional witness obtained by one party, the mother, in order to support and bolster her case would omit such a salient fact. As invited by counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer, I find that no such comment or threat was made by X to Ms R. I do not accept the mother's evidence to the contrary.
Counsel for the mother further submitted X's current behaviour towards his father was indicative of a child in extreme emotional and psychological distress and the court should infer that if he were returned to the UK his previous care arrangements, that is lengthy absences by the father, would continue and exacerbate his current mental health crisis. The mother considers the father has been neglectful of the child's emotional wellbeing and has failed to prioritise his needs and a return would place the child at grave risk of further harm to his damaged mental health and possibly acting out his threats.
Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer submitted, and I accept that because X had previously made similar threats to self harm, in the context of wanting his father to return home, X's threats of self-harm may be considered a technique used by the child rather than a serious threat. That proposition is unequivocally supported by X's comments to Ms C about his threats to self-harm in text messages with his father where Ms C notes:

[94]

Absent objective independent expert evidence about X's mental health, counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer submitted the court should have regard to the text messages between X and his father, in December 2024, and the circumstances surrounding X's visit to Australia.
The text messages between X and the father of 30 December 2024 are a conversation between the father and X about extending X's time in Australia. The father suggested X stay for an additional 30 days, with a return date of 30 January 2025. In response X suggested a further 20 days, asked the father to tell his mother he had to return for school and requested his father to now stop texting or they will find out.
I am able to find from that text exchange, that X did not then want to stay with the mother for longer than a further 20 days, his relationship with the father was loving and unremarkable and he did not have any concerns or fear about returning to the UK. It does not seem likely that X was experiencing emotional distress at that time.
However, shortly thereafter, the mother advised the father she would retain the child. Counsel for the ICL submitted and I accept, I could find that X was under pressure from both the mother and D to thereafter remain in Australia. The mother failed to adduce any evidence or satisfactorily explain why X's attitude changed so dramatically in the intervening two weeks.
I am not satisfied X's mental health and emotional wellbeing would significantly deteriorate to the extent promulgated by the mother, so that a return to the UK would pose a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to X or result in an intolerable situation. According to the father, he has already arranged counselling for X in the UK to assist him in the event a return order is made. I am also satisfied the father will arrange appropriate protective measures to ameliorate any distress X may experience upon return.
It is inevitable that a child taken from or retained in one country to another without the agreement of one parent will suffer disruption, uncertainty and anxiety and that disruption, uncertainty and anxiety will recur, and may well be magnified, by having to return to the country of habitual residence. However, as articulated by Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in in DP at [45], reg 16(3)(b) is intended to refer to more than that kind of result when it speaks to grave risk to the child of exposure to physical or psychological harm or intolerable situation on return.
In conclusion, the evidence relied upon by the mother, individually and cumulatively, does not enable me to make findings there is a grave risk of harm, a risk that the child will be exposed to that harm ( DP at [42]) or that the level of any predicted risk to X, either physically or psychologically, has reached a degree of seriousness that it can be categorised as grave, nor to find the situation upon his return would be intolerable. There is no clear and compelling evidence to that effect. The mother has failed to satisfy me that if X were returned to the UK the risk to X would be "intolerable ... extreme and compelling" (per Kirby J in DP at [ 132 ]), or that the risk of physical or psychological harm is substantial or weighty a was held in Gsponer v Director General, Department of Community Services (Vic) [1988] FamCA 21; (1989) FLC 92-001 ("Gsponer"), or the degree of psychological harm would be substantial to a level comparable to an intolerable situation as was held in Director General of the Department of Family and Community Services & Davis (1990) FLC 92- 182 and Gsponer .
I find that the mother has not made out this regulatory exception to the required standard and this exception must fail.
I now turn to the child's objection.

[97]

As observe by Strum J in Department of Communities and Justice and Hays [2022] FedCFamC1F 752 at [394], Bennett J considered and adopted these principles from the judgment of Ward LJ in Re T (Abduction: Child's Objections to Return) [2000] 2 FLR 192 (UK) and Balcombe LJ in Re S (A Minor) (Abduction: Custody Rights) [1993] Fam 242 (UK), principles of which were generally cited with approval by the Full Court in Colak & Viduka [2016] FamCAFC 79; (2016) FLC 93-707 (May, Aldridge & Cronin JJ).
The mother's case is that X has an ardent objection to return to the UK and his views have been clearly stated to Ms C and noted in the Hague report. Both the State Central Authority and the Independent Children's Lawyer did not dispute X had expressed objection to return. However, it is contended by the State Central Authority and the ICL, that X's views and objection have been influenced and distorted by either the mother or D, or both, and it is unclear whether the objection is really to return to the UK or a desire to spend more time with his mother, as identified by Ms C. Contrary to the mother's assertions as to X's maturity, both the State Central Authority and the ICL contended X has not attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take into account his views.
Turning now to consider whether X has been influenced or encouraged by his mother or D to articulate his objection to return.
As to X's expressed objection to return, the mother relied upon her own evidence at paragraphs 100 and 101 of her Form2A affidavit dated 25 July 2025 and that of the Hague report writer, Ms C. The mother deposed to X telling her he does not want to go back to the UK. During cross examination, she steadfastly said she had not discussed the legal proceedings with X and by inference had not directly influenced his views.
In her Hague report, Ms C identified X as objecting to return and made the following statements in the Hague report:
- At the start of the interview before the report writer could explain the purpose, [X] began talking and wished to inform the report writer of his preference to stay in Australia and stated at a fast rate "he's not listening to me. He's not letting me stay with my mum and I never saw her to (sic) five years;[17]
- [X] presented as a child with a narrative that he wanted to divest himself of. On a couple of occasions when the prospect of returning to then UK was raised with him, his eyes appeared to well up with tears.;[18]
- When asked about the prospect of returning to [the United Kingdom] [X] said he did not know what he would do, but he might "run away, find a police station and complain";[19]
- When asked if there was anything he wished the Judiciary to know he stated "I want to stay with my Mum. If they could help me with that, that'd be brilliant".[20]
I accept that X has expressed that he wishes to remain in Australia, but that is not the end of the enquiry. I must consider whether X has attained sufficient maturity for his views to be taken into account and whether in reaching those views, X has been influenced by some other person.
Turning now to deal with whether X's views have been influenced by some other person.
In the Hague Family Report, Ms C refers to X's lack of ambivalence and polarised views as follows:
- He expressed fixed negative views about [Mr B], which was in contrast to his narrative about [Ms Bartosz] which was wholly positive. He was unable to recall one positive memory or use any positive words to describe [Mr B]. In contrast he was able to describe [Ms Bartosz] as caring, loving and supportive;[21]
- Whilst he denied missing his father, or anyone in the paternal family or England based maternal family he later reported that he would want to spend time with [Mr B] if he [Mr B] allowed him to remain in Australia with [Ms Bartosz]. He would not be prepared to travel to the United Kingdom to spend time with [Mr B] if he is permitted to remain in Australia.[22]
At paragraph 12 of the Hague report, Ms C referred to X's comments about his reconnection with his sister, D and in particular that X had asked her to interview his sister because she (D) could tell her many things about the father and paternal grandfather and that D does not like the father. X further reported to Ms C that D had told him about the court proceedings and had told him to tell the truth. Ms C noted that she gained the impression X had been finding comfort in reconnecting with his sister, but there also appeared to be the possibility that D's view of the father, were impacting on X.[23]
Ms C observed at paragraph 14, that X's demeanour whilst describing allegedly distressing events in the father's household, was incongruent with the events. Ms C said he was not distressed when recalling these incidents and described them in a matter of fact way.
During cross examination, Ms C reiterated her concerns about his polarised views and said it would be difficult to ascertain whether X could see things from other's perspectives, because of his polarised view.
The lack of ambivalence exhibited by X about his family and life in the UK, as identified by Ms C leads me to the conclusion the intensity of X's expressed objection is entirely disproportionate to his lived experience in the UK.
It is also noteworthy that the child's views have altered dramatically since spending extended time in the maternal household. In their text messages of 30 December 2024 (in the context of X's wish to spend some extra time with his mother in Australia), X said to his father he did not want to stay with his mother for a further 30 day period, until 30 January 2025, as had been offered by the father. The following exchange occurred between them:

[99]

At that time X obviously had a loving and close relationship with his father and did not wish to remain spending prolonged time with his with his mother, let alone wanting to remain living with her in Australia. Thereafter, the text messages between them continued until 6 February 2025, despite the mother advising the father via text on 3 January 2025 that X would not be returned to the UK on 9 January 2025, as had previously been arranged. Exhibit A-9 and A-10 are letters between the parents lawyers dated 6 January 2025 and 7 January 2025, which make clear that the mother would not return X to the father's care.
The mother did not provide a fulsome account of the events in early January 2025 and in particular what precipitated X's volte-face. Indeed, her evidence in this regard was vague and entirely unsatisfactory. I can infer from the list of X's asserted grievances disclosed to the mother upon his arrival in Australia, as referred to in paragraph 91 of her affidavit, that there were obviously discussions between the mother and X which focused on the alleged negative aspects of the child's life in the UK.
It is highly improbable X, a vulnerable ten-year-old who had not spent face to face time with his mother since 2019, and who has been subjected to a conflictual parenting relationship, would not have been influenced by members of his mother's household, whilst living with them. The mother's disdain and possible hatred for the father is apparent from both the tone of her affidavit and the florid allegations therein, as well as her conduct during cross examination. I do not accept her disingenuous denials of having frankly discussed the legal proceedings with X. It may be readily inferred the mother harbours a deep resentment towards the father and blames him for her own past failure to initiate measures for her to spend time with X. I am satisfied the mother, despite her attempts to portray herself as a victim of the father, would likely be incapable of keeping her views to herself, or at the very least X would be sufficiently perceptive to well understand his mother's view of his father. According to Ms C, and I accept, being caught in the crossfire of parental conflict and mutual dislike, could lead to the child adopting polarised views of his parents, in order to provide some modicum of psychological safety and security. I am able to conclude and so find that the mother has influenced X's current views.
Similarly, it is relatively easy to infer, and I so find, that D has successfully influenced X against the father and possible resumption of his life in the UK, whilst they have both lived in their mother's household. That is because D has demonstrated her current professed dislike of her father, X's comments to Ms C, referred to above and D's involvement in the preparation of Ms E's evidence. It would be naïve to accept, in the context of the recent sibling reunion, the age disparity between them and D's current apathy towards the father, that she would not have attempted to persuade X of her point of view, and that X in his vulnerability, would have been highly receptive to that persuasion.
After considering the relevant evidence, for the reasons expressed above, I find that X's views have been influenced by both the mother and D.
Turning now to X's level of maturity.
Ms C addressed X's level of maturity in the Hague report and was also cross examined about this issue. In her report she concluded at paragraph 23:

Police Commissioner for the State Central Authority of South Australia & Bartosz [2025] FedCFamC1F 722 (21 October 2025)

At a glance

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Judgment (140 paragraphs)

Legislation Cited (3)

Cases Cited (3)