Plaintiffs v Defendants

1. In Vella v The State of Western Australia[6] ('Vella') the Western Australian Court of Appeal, in dealing with an application made in almost precisely the same terms, stated:

The appointment of a coram of interstate judges, indeed, of any judge, to the Supreme Court is not within the power of the judicial arm of government. It is exclusively a matter for the Governor to decide. A judge of the Supreme Court of another State or Territory is certainly eligible to be appointed as an acting judge of this court, but such qualified persons must also be appointed by the Governor of Western Australia. Section 11 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) makes no attempt to prescribe the procedures to be followed or the criteria to be applied in making such appointments, except insofar as s 11(2) requires the Governor to be satisfied that, for any reason, the conduct of the Supreme Court requires the appointment of an acting judge, and that appointment must be made by commission under the Public Seal of the State. In all other respects, s 11 leaves it open to the Governor, and those responsible for advising him or her, to adopt such procedures as may be considered appropriate. This is a consequence of the different constitutional roles performed by the Judiciary and the Executive, in accordance with the doctrine of the separation of powers, at least to the extent to which the doctrine applies in this State.[7]

1. In Victoria, the same constitutional arrangements apply. Section 75B of the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) deals with the eligibility and appointment of judges of this Court. Judges of this Court are appointed by the Governor by commission with the advice of the Executive Council.
2. In response to the Court's email of 28 October 2025 (referred to above), the Plaintiffs wrote by email, initially indicating that they maintained that the Court had jurisdiction to make the orders as sought, but that in any event, the Court was empowered to make declarations in a form which would cure any jurisdictional deficiency. They sought leave to amend the summons to pursue the alternative formulation.
3. When the hearing resumed, one of the Plaintiffs, Mr Kuksal, conceded that the Court had no jurisdiction to make an order in the form originally sought in the summons.[8]
4. It is of note that Mr Kuksal informed the Court that he had been previously aware of the decision in Vella, despite having pursued orders in a form which he then accepted could not be made.
5. Ms Xu, on the other hand, maintained that the Court could make the orders sought by the Plaintiffs as originally framed. She said that the facts in this case departed from those in Vella because in Victoria there are interstate judges already appointed to the Supreme Court of Victoria and, as such, the constitutional issues raised in Vella do not arise. Ms Xu's submission does not grapple with the form of the order sought. This Court has no power to appoint judges. By subsequent correspondence to the Court on 3 November 2025, the Plaintiffs advised that Ms Xu also sought to amend the summons in the way proposed by Mr Kuksal, apparently abandoning her submission that the Court had jurisdiction to make the orders as originally sought.
6. For the same reasons as those given by the Court in Vella, the orders as sought by the Plaintiffs in its summons of 8 October 2025 cannot be made.

1. In their correspondence to the Court on 28 October 2025, the Plaintiffs sought leave to amend the summons by substituting for para [2], that the Court:

Declare the utility and appropriateness of the appointment of an interstate judge in the proceedings S ECI 2022 04808 and S ECI 2023 00183, to serve the interests of justice and maintain public confidence in the administration of the Court's affairs.

1. The Court informed the parties in writing on 28 October 2025 that it would consider any application to amend the summons in the course of the hearing.
2. During the course of the argument, the Plaintiffs orally advanced further iterations of the proposed amendment to the summons. Mr Kuksal finally settled on the form of order which he sought, being that the Court declare that:

... it is in the interests of the appearance of justice being done, it is appropriate that an interstate judge determine the following issues in proceedings S ECI 2022 04808 and S ECI 2023 00183:

(i) Justice Judd perverted or attempt to pervert the course of justice in the Olney and Mioch proceedings in the Magistrates' Court or otherwise acted in contravention of her Honour's duties as a prosecutor.

(ii) Justice Gorton's obstruction of the plaintiff's applications and evidence and/or his Honour's failure to make appropriate findings against the VLSB, contributed to the oppression and vilification of the plaintiffs in connection with the Mioch and Olney proceedings.

(iii) Mr Ratcliffe and/or other members of the registry, failed to perform the duties of their office in connection with the judicial review and other proceedings arising from the Mioch and Olney matters, such that the plaintiffs were unfairly disadvantaged in presenting cases before the court, and presenting their applications before the court.[9]

1. Ms Xu embraces Mr Kuksal's final reformulation of the proposed order.
2. The Plaintiffs were given leave to make submissions addressing the reformulated form of orders to address the jurisdictional problem which was conceded by Mr Kuksal.
3. During the course of the hearing, the Plaintiffs submitted that these revised orders cured the jurisdictional issues identified in Vella because, it was said, the Court has inherent jurisdiction to make declarations. The Plaintiffs say, in effect, that once the jurisdiction to make declarations is accepted, it is a matter of discretion whether the declarations should be made, and they seek to be heard further, to call evidence and make further submissions as to whether the discretion to make the declarations should be exercised.
4. There is no doubt that the Court has inherent power to make declarations, but the substance of the declarations sought here would have the effect of disqualifying all judges of the Court. Taken at their highest, the declarations sought by the Plaintiffs are premised upon a fundamental misconception, which when corrected, renders the proposed amendment incapable of salvaging the Plaintiffs application.

The revised form of relief does not improve the Plaintiffs' application

1. The final form of the proposed amended orders merely particularises why the Plaintiffs seek the appointment of an interstate judge. As formulated in the revised form, the application cannot succeed.
2. The argument the Plaintiffs make in this proceeding was made in similar terms to, and rejected by, the Court in Vella. There the Court said that insofar as the application before it was to disqualify all judges of the court on the basis of an apprehension of institutional bias, the application could not succeed. Such an application goes to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine a matter. That jurisdiction is not conferred on all members of the Court, but only on the member of the Court constituted by the judge listed to hear the matter. Only that judge carries the institutional duty and jurisdiction to hear and determine the proceeding, and not the other judges of the Court.[10]
3. The Plaintiffs' application, whether framed in its original form or as later revised, does not engage with the threshold test for the disqualification of a judge on the ground of apprehended bias, which must be made against the judge charged with hearing the matter.
4. To succeed in an application for disqualification, it must be established that a fair‑minded observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question that is required to be determined.[11] The Plaintiffs must identify an interest that the decision-maker has in the litigation before them and a logical connection between that interest and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.[12] Central to the application of the test is whether the apprehension of bias is reasonable, as opposed to fanciful or speculative.[13]

The Plaintiffs have not identified a proper basis for disqualification

1. The Plaintiffs made extensive oral submissions outlining the basis upon which they say an interstate judge should be appointed in explaining how the declarations they sought could be made. All of that material is directed to the findings which underpin the relief sought by the Plaintiffs as stated by them in revised form on 29 October 2025.
2. The Plaintiffs submitted that each of the matters which they say I may be called upon to decide will involve allegations of bias, corruption or misconduct made against another judge of this Court, and will require that I consider making findings of misconduct or, at least, reaching different conclusions to those reached in earlier proceedings by that judge. The Plaintiffs also contend that the Prothonotary of this Court has, in substance, engaged in a targeted attempt, in concert with a judge, to prevent or impede the Plaintiffs from prosecuting various applications before that other judge. It is important to observe that none of the decisions made by Gorton J have yet been the subject of an appeal. Similarly, the complaints made against the Prothonotary arising from its refusal to permit the Plaintiffs to file applications and documents, or bring on applications, were not reviewed by a judge, as provided for in the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2025 (Vic) (the 'Rules'),[14] or otherwise the subject of appeals in their own right.
3. The Plaintiffs also complain that, in the context of criminal charges laid in the Magistrates' Court, the conduct of prosecutors was, in summary: unethical, unlawful, misleading and infected by various corrupt behaviour. There is at present no evidence that the then Director of Public Prosecutions ('DPP') (who is now a member of this Court) was personally involved in those prosecutions. Rather, the conduct of the prosecutors with the carriage of those cases can, at present, only be constructively attributable to the then DPP.
4. In their oral submissions, the Plaintiffs argued that they were not framing their application as one of bias. Rather, they said that the appearance of justice being done was in the public interest and their application was directed to that broader concern. The Plaintiffs referred me to authority on the meaning and importance of the public interest,[15] from which they formulated their argument. The Plaintiffs submitted that the matters raised by them as to the conduct of the Prothonotary and judicial officers of this Court are relevant matters of public interest going to the perception of the fair-minded observer.[16]
5. The Plaintiffs also submitted that the allegations of corruption they make had been widely publicised[17] and that the Plaintiffs had experienced anguish arising from the conduct of the judges concerned. They say that this personal anguish was a matter of public interest which ought to be taken into account in their application[18] and that granting the application would serve the purpose of both appeasing the Plaintiffs and conveniently removing unnecessary friction in the conduct of the proceedings.[19]
6. The Plaintiffs argue that the test of apprehended bias is an objective one, concerned with what a hypothetical observer might think, and that the test is directed to preserving public confidence in the administration of justice. They say that for their cases to be decided impartially, findings against Gorton J and Judd J will need to be made.[20]
7. The Plaintiffs propose to rely upon a large number of academic articles and videos which they invited me to consider which were directed to the psychological nature of conscious and subconscious bias, which they say affects judicial decision-making. The essence of the submission is that academic research supports their contention that, at least subconsciously, it would be a difficult thing for any judge of this Court to reach findings in relation to a fellow member of the Court of the kind they say are to be made. The Plaintiffs argue that a fair-minded observer should be taken to know of psychological studies and articles[21] directed to the biases of judges.
8. In effect, the Plaintiffs submit that all judges of this Court (of which I am merely one) have an interest in protecting their judicial colleagues from criticism, giving rise to a fear that they would be prepared to deviate from the course of deciding the Plaintiffs' cases on their merits, and in doing so, breach their own oath of office which imposes on them a duty to decide cases before them impartially.
9. There is an interesting question as to whether, even if such a situation were to have arisen, the doctrine of necessity would operate as an exception to the bias rule,[22] but I need not consider that question in this case because the Plaintiffs' submission is misconceived. The Plaintiffs' submission disregards the personal oath, taken individually, by each judge upon appointment.
10. In Vella, the Court said that a fair-minded observer would understand that it is the duty of any judge to decide the matter brought to them fairly, fearlessly and independently, without regard to the fact that the performance of that duty may require the judge to scrutinise the conduct of a fellow judicial officer. Kirby P neatly encapsulated the matter in Rajski v Powell:

[T]he aspiration of the neutral application of the law and the achievement of justice according to law, requires of judges that, when dealing with a claim brought against a judicial colleague, they should be vigilant to uphold the lawful rights of litigants. This approach must regularly be taken, particularly in appellate courts, which are not unaccustomed to hearing allegations of error of fact and law, excess of jurisdiction and even bias on the part of judicial officers.[23]

1. The real question on this application is not whether I should disqualify myself merely because I am a member of a court against which an allegation of institutional bias is made but, rather, whether there is any basis upon which a reasonable person might think that I have any interest in the matters I am asked to decide which might lead me to decide the case other than in accordance with their merits. In the reformulation of the relief that they seek, the Plaintiffs have raised no matter which would give a reasonable person any cause to think that I might not be able to do so.
2. Assuming the Plaintiffs' case at its highest, even as reformulated by the Plaintiffs to seek declarations or findings, the relief sought rises no higher than a claim of 'institutional bias' arising from the conduct of two judges and what is said to be the involvement of the Prothonotary.
3. At various times throughout the course of the hearing, the Plaintiffs made clear that they made no submission to the effect that I was affected by specific bias, or that there was any factual basis specific to me that would found a reasonable apprehension that I might not bring an impartial mind to bear in the determination of their matters, other than the potential influence of institutional bias operating upon my subconscious.[24]
4. The only extent to which it is suggested that a reasonable person might think that I might not bring an impartial mind to the determination of the Plaintiffs' claims presupposes that scrutinising allegations about the conduct of judicial colleagues is something unusual to the judicial function, and sufficient on its own to displace fidelity to the oath of judicial office. That is not a basis on its own for disqualification.
5. As the revised form of relief cannot succeed, there is no reason to permit the Plaintiffs to file an amended summons. The application for leave to amend the summons can be dismissed on the basis that the amendments serve no purpose.

Application for leave to make further submissions and produce more materials is denied

1. On 3 November 2025, the Plaintiffs wrote to the Court, without leave, requesting an opportunity to put on more material and make further unsolicited submissions.
2. I have read, but not taken into account, the further submissions contained in para [A] of the letter. Paragraph [B] proceeds under the heading 'Critical authorities that the Plaintiffs feel duty bound to raise with the Court'. The ensuing 15 paragraphs purport to explain the basis of the application. The Plaintiffs sought leave to put on further submissions to:

(a) clarify the application of principles elucidated in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission[25] and the other authorities that the Plaintiffs say they have identified as being relevant to the determination of the jurisdictional question; and

(b) cover the subject of knowledge attributed to the reasonable observer and how they reconcile matters in cases involving subconscious bias, imputed bias and subliminal pressures influencing a judge's conduct.

1. The application for leave is denied.
2. The application is one which seeks to reopen submissions and evidence after I had reserved my decision on the question of the appointment of an interstate judge. The Plaintiffs had an adequate opportunity to formulate their application for the appointment of an interstate judge. The Plaintiffs failed to comply with orders of this Court requiring them to file written submissions, authorities and evidence upon which they sought to rely. Despite that failure, they were given the opportunity to advance their application orally. At the commencement of the hearing, they set out 21 affidavits upon which they sought to rely and listed numerous authorities to which they said they would refer. The material totalled many thousands of pages, such that it was necessary to adjourn the matter for a day to review the material. Upon the resumption of the matter, Mr Kuksal conceded that the orders as sought in the summons could not be made, and sought to amend the summons to seek declarations instead. The Plaintiffs had full control over the terms in which their application was originally framed. Despite being aware of the decision in Vella, and the obstacles to their application that it sets out, the Plaintiffs persisted with the form of the orders as sought in the summons until Mr Kuksal, on the second day of the hearing, sought to amend the summons. Ms Xu came to the same view finally on 3 November 2025 but at the hearing, she maintained that the order as originally framed could be made. In all those circumstances, any application to reopen submissions would need to be advanced on a compelling basis.
3. The Plaintiffs' letter seeking leave to file additional material fails to establish a sufficient basis for doing so. The letter elusively and nebulously refers to authorities that the Plaintiffs say they feel bound to bring to the Court's attention, but which traverse matters which were the subject of the application and should have been addressed in the hearing.
4. In the end, however, the application for leave to put on more submissions and authorities is rejected because, I am satisfied that further submissions would not lead to any different conclusion.
5. The fundamental difficulty with the Plaintiffs' application as originally formulated could not be cured by further submissions. A single judge could not, by order, declaration or otherwise, in effect disqualify all judges of the Court. As the Plaintiffs' case makes no other submission directed to the propriety of me continuing to hear their cases, the application fails. I am satisfied that a further round of submissions and authorities would, in this instance, be fruitless.

1. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' application, as framed in para [2] of its summons of 8 October 2025, is dismissed.
2. The Plaintiffs' attempt to reframe para [2] must also fail because the premise of the Plaintiffs' reformulation, taken at its highest, cannot succeed. Accordingly, leave to file an amended summons seeking relief in those terms is denied.

Evidence filed in support of the Plaintiffs' application - the Flitner Affidavit

1. The Plaintiffs filed a large volume of material directed to establishing the basis for their application that an interstate judge should be appointed. The filing of the material was irregular in a number of respects, but despite that fact, with one exception, the responding parties did not object to the evidence. I have reviewed that material, but have approached this matter on the basis that the question before me should be approached on the basis that the Plaintiffs' application should be taken at its highest. I have reached my conclusions on the basis that the findings the Plaintiffs say should be made can be made. Having done so, it has been unnecessary to make any factual findings about any of the matters alleged by the Plaintiffs at this stage.
2. Amongst the vast amount of affidavit material relied upon by the Plaintiffs include allegations made against employees of the Victorian Legal Service Board ('VLSB') contained in the affidavit of Mr Flitner dated 21 July 2025, which was exhibited to the affidavit of Ms Xu dated 6 October 2025 ('Flitner allegations'). The Commissioner and the VLSB objected on the basis that the allegations were irrelevant to the Plaintiffs' application for the appointment of an interstate judge. The content of the Flitner affidavit to which objection was taken was disseminated in a variety of documents upon which the Plaintiffs purported to rely in this application, most of which appear as exhibits to the affidavit of Ms Xu. The allegations also appear and are recounted in the:

(a) Notice of a constitutional issue served under r 19.02 of the Rules, and in the notices to the various Attorneys-General of the states and territories.

(b) In submissions filed in this Court in relation to the suppression application.

(c) In other documents attached to correspondence which was sent by the Plaintiffs to the Court, but not filed.

1. A full list of the places in which the allegations have been deployed in the context of the Plaintiffs' application for the appointment of an interstate judge was furnished by the VLSB.[26] Objection is taken to the allegations made in all of that material, on the basis that none of it is relevant the Plaintiffs' application.
2. In the proceedings before me, the Plaintiffs rely on the Flitner affidavit in support of their application for the appointment of an interstate judge. At its highest, the content of the Flitner affidavit goes to the conduct of another judge of this Court in a different proceeding. The Flitner affidavit was produced in support of an application for a stay of final orders and costs orders made by Gorton J in November 2024 and February 2025 respectively.[27] The application for a stay did not proceed before Gorton J, or at all. It seems to be alleged that Gorton J decided not to list the stay for the reason that he sought to suppress the content of the allegations to protect the reputation of the VLSB and members of broader legal community.
3. Despite having not commenced an appeal from the decision of Gorton J, the Plaintiff says that in the proceedings before me, any judge of this Court would be called upon to make findings about Gorton J's conduct, which, in turn, might give rise to a concern in the mind of a reasonable person that no other judge of this Court could decide the matter impartially.
4. In truth, none of the evidence to which objection is taken is directed to anything beyond an attempt to establish institutional bias, which, for the reasons I have already stated, cannot found an application for my disqualification on its own. No allegation that Mr Flitner makes against the VLSB is relevant to the Plaintiffs' application for the appointment of an interstate judge, or an application for recusal seeking to disqualify me from hearing the matter.
5. There is nothing about the content of the Flitner affidavit which is directly relevant to the question whether a reasonable person might think that there is a connection between the allegations made by Mr Flitner giving rise to a concern that I might decide the Plaintiffs' case other than according to its merits.
6. In addition to being irrelevant, the content of the Flitner affidavit, and in particular the passages of the affidavit and the other material to which objection was taken by the Commissioner and the VLSB, is also highly personal, scandalous and potentially embarrassing to the reputations of those persons referred to in that material.
7. For those reasons, allowing the material to remain as part of the record of the Court would amount to an abuse of the Court's process.
8. Accordingly, I will make orders, pursuant to r 27.07 of the Rules, that the specific allegations to which objection is taken, and the Flitner affidavit in its entirety, be struck out, along with the documents and other materials promulgating the allegations contained in the Flitner affidavit. I will also make orders striking out those passages of Ms Xu's affidavit of 6 October 2025 which recite the Flitner allegations or refer to the Flitner affidavit, and any exhibits to her affidavit which recites or refers to those documents.
9. On 13 October 2025, the Plaintiffs purported to file a notice of a constitutional matter under r 19.02 of the Rules, in the context of their application for the appointment of an interstate judge. On the face of the notice, no matter contained in the notice arises under the Constitution or involves interpretation within the meaning of s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The notice filed by the Plaintiffs recites the substance of the Flitner allegations in the broader context of the Plaintiffs' application for the appointment of an interstate judge to hear the Plaintiffs' cases. The notice restates the Plaintiffs' complaints against the VLSB, the Commissioner for Legal Services and judges of this Court, none of which involve a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. The document is an abuse of process in and of itself. As the document also contains the Flitner allegations, which I have held to be scandalous, I will also make an order striking that document out.
10. Further, on 17 October 2025 the Plaintiffs filed a document entitled 'Plaintiffs submissions Ahead of Hearing on 17.10.25 (16.10.25)'. The document repeats the Flitner allegations and then appends documents, including the whole of the Flitner affidavit, which had already been filed as an appendix to the affidavit of Ms Xu on 6 October 2025. Whatever the purpose of the repetition of the content and exhibits already filed, they served no purpose in the hearing on the suppression orders, and merely record allegations which I have found to be scandalous as well as irrelevant. Accordingly, I will make orders removing that document from the Court file.

1. Having determined that there is no basis upon which I should recuse myself, the following matters remain for determination in the proceedings before me:

(a) Applications for summary judgment and dismissal of the Plaintiffs' three proceedings brought by the State of Victoria, the VLSB and the Victorian Commissioner for Legal Services. Their applications were originally listed for hearing on 27 October 2025 but deferred until the outcome of the Plaintiffs' application for the appointment of an interstate judge; and

(b) The Plaintiffs' various applications for orders in their summonses of 8 October 2025 and 23 October 2025, which remain outstanding pending the Plaintiffs' application for the appointment of an interstate judge.

1. Separately, I will make orders in each of the Plaintiffs' proceedings bringing them on for hearing in the near future.

1. Accordingly, I will make orders giving effect to this ruling.
2. The orders will also invite the parties to make submissions on costs, limited to no more than 5 pages.

INDEPENDENT BROAD-BASED ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION

[1] Mr Silver appeared on 27 October 2025, and was replaced by Mr Barr on 29 October 2025.

[2] Ms Cananzi appeared on 27 October 2025, and was replaced by Ms Isobel on 29 October 2025.

[3] On 23 November 2022 the Plaintiffs commenced S ECI 2022 04808. On 23 December 2022 they commenced S ECI 2022 05407 and 20 January 2023 they commenced S ECI 2023 00183.

[4] Kuksal v State of Victoria [2023] VSC 625, [3] (Ginnane J). The stay extended to all aspects of the various proceedings except for those parts which involved applications for judicial review of decisions of the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission, which proceeded to hearing and were determined by Quigley J in S ECI 2022 04808: Kuksal v State of Victoria & Ors [2025] VSC 72.

[5] Kuksal v State of Victoria & Ors (Ruling on Suppression Application and Case Management) [2025] VSC 663, [17].

[6] [2024] WASCA 48.

[7] Ibid, 13 [35] (The Court) (citations omitted).

[8] Transcript of Proceedings, Kuksal v State of Victoria & Ors (Supreme Court of Victoria, S ECI 2022 04808; S ECI 2022 05407; S ECI 2023 00183, Finanzio J, 29 October 2025) 446-447 ('Transcript').

[10] Vella [2024] WASCA 48, [38] (The Court). See Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 17(1).

[11] Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488, 492 [11] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also QYFM v The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 15; (2023) 279 CLR 148, 163 [37] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J), 238 [274] (Jagot J); Ebner v Offıcial Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337, 344 [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135 ('Isbester').

[12] Isbester [2015] HCA 20; (2015) 255 CLR 135, 146 [21] (Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ).

[13] R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546,

[14] Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2025 (Vic) r 28.03(5). See, for example, Thorpe v Prothonotary & Anor [2024] VSC 360.

[15] For example see Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] VicRp 6; [1991] 1 VR 63 and Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2008] HCA 37.

[22] Metropolitan Fire & Emergency Service Board v Churchill [1998] VSC 51, [143]-[161] (Gillard J).

[23] Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522, 532, cited with approval in Re The State of Western Australia;

Ex parte Vella [No 2] [2012] WASCA 272, [15] (The Court); and Vella [2024] WASCA 48, [40] (The Court).

[24] Transcript 417, 429 [3], 455 [15]-[16].

[25] [2006] HCA 44.

[27] Transcript 372; Kuksal v Victorian Legal Services Board [2024] VSC 732; Kuksal v Victorian Legal Services Board (Costs) [2025] VSC 48.