Plaintiff v Defendants

1 By application made by summons filed 24 September 2025, the plaintiff, Donnybrook Land Development Pty Ltd as trustee for the Donnybrook Development Trust, applied for a freezing order pursuant to ord 37A of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure Rules) 2025 (Vic) against the first defendant, Donnybrook Nominees Pty Ltd as trustee for the Donnybrook Nominees Investment Unit Trust and the second defendant, its sole director Paras Abrol (collectively, 'the defendants').

2 The summons sought a freezing order which in form largely corresponded to that commonly made and set out in form 37AA, save that paragraph 6(a) of the proposed order read 'You must direct your solicitors that $8,000,000 to be received in the PEXA workspace for the settlement of the acquisition of 780 Donnybrook Road be paid into a Controlled Monies Account to earn interest to be opened in the names of Donnybrook Nominees Pty Ltd (ACN 648 480 728) as trustee for the Donnybrook Nominees Investment Unit Trust and Donnybrook Land Development Pty Ltd (ACN 676 448 794) as trustee of the Donnybrook Land Unit Trust and not to be removed or in any way disposed of, dealt with or diminish the value of this amount pending further order of the Court.'

3 The reference to the PEXA workspace for the settlement of the acquisition of 780 Donnybrook Road, Donnybrook ('the land') is a reference to the settlement of a contract for the sale of the land between the first defendant as vendor and the plaintiff as purchaser which was scheduled for and occurred on 29 September 2025.

4 At the first return of the summons on 25 September 2025, the application resolved on an interim basis upon an undertaking provided by the defendants that upon settlement of the contract of sale, the first defendant would irrevocably direct its solicitors, Frenkel Partners, to hold the amount of $5 million in a controlled money account to be established by that firm ('the Controlled Monies') and not to deal with those moneys without giving at least two weeks' notice in writing to the plaintiff of its intent to do so. The plaintiff provided a cross undertaking as to damages in the usual form.

5 Upon those undertakings, the further hearing of the summons was adjourned to 14 November 2025.

6 By notice given 12 November 2025, the first defendant gave notice of its intention to otherwise deal with the Controlled Monies, upon the expiration of two weeks' notice.

7 In the result, the application for the freezing order proceeded on 14 November 2025. The order sought is similar to that originally sought save that it now refers to $5 million and specifies that the first defendant must 'continue to hold the amount of $5,000,000' and that this amount is 'not to be removed or in any way disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value pending further order of the Court'.

8 The legal principles, as summarised by the Court of Appeal in Rozenblit v Vainer,[1] as recently set out by Nichols J in SK Developments (Aust) Pty Ltd v Vansan Construction Pty Ltd[2] were not in dispute and are set out below (footnotes omitted):

(a) A freezing order by its very nature is a drastic remedy which will not be granted lightly. A court must exercise a high degree of caution before taking a step which will interfere with a party's capacity to deal with his or her assets.

(b) The rationale for freezing orders is to prevent the frustration of the court's processes and ensure the effective exercise of the jurisdiction invoked, or, in the case of a non‑party, to prevent interference with the administration of justice. Conversely, a freezing order is not designed to provide security for the applicant's claim. It is solely directed to preserving assets from being dissipated, thereby frustrating court processes. A freezing order is not to be used to circumvent insolvency laws.

(c) The applicant bears the onus of satisfying the court that the order should be made, in the amount the subject of the order.

(d) An applicant must establish that there is a 'good arguable case' against the defendant, and there is a danger that the prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied as a result of the defendant's actions in dealing with assets. It must be shown that there is a reasonable possibility, not necessarily more than 50 percent chance, that assets may be disposed of or dealt with or diminished in value if an order is not made.

(e) The exercise of the power is discretionary. Accordingly, other considerations including the balance of convenience may bear upon the court's decision. However, the balance of convenience favouring the making of the order is not a distinct requirement.

(f) The value of the assets covered by a freezing order should not exceed the likely maximum amount of the applicant's claim, including interest and costs.

(g) As a condition of a freezing order it will ordinarily be appropriate to require the applicant to give undertakings to the court, including the usual undertakings as to damages, supported if necessary by the provision of security.

9 The defendants were content to proceed for the purposes of the application on the basis that the plaintiff had established a 'good arguable case' against the first defendant and that the quantum of the claim is such as would support a freezing order in the sum of $5 million which equates to the Controlled Monies. That concession was made solely for the purpose of the freezing order application and without prejudice to the defendants' position as to the merits of the claim more generally or its quantum.

10 On that basis the subject matter of the claim can be stated in general terms. The plaintiff complains that the defendants engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Vic) comprising half truths and non-disclosures in relation to the construction of a recycled water main on the land purchased by the plaintiff from the first defendant pursuant to the contract of sale. The half truths are said to comprise information in a vendor's statement provided by the first defendant to the plaintiff on or about 11 July 2024 that the land was subject to certain drainage and water easements, and a proposed recycled water main and associated easement in accordance with plans attached to the vendor's statement and necessarily by obvious inference, that the proposed recycled water main was not yet constructed.

11 The non-disclosures relied upon were to the effect that the proposed recycled water main had in fact been constructed in the period from 9 May 2022 and 23 June 2022. Relevantly, the plaintiff does not allege that any part of the cause of action constituted dishonest or sharp practice such as would be relevant with respect to the jurisdictional requirement in relation to the making of a freezing order that the plaintiff must establish a reasonable possibility that the first defendant will dissipate the Controlled Monies unless a freezing order is made and if so whether that reasonable possibility is a relevant danger of dissipation for the purposes of the freezing order.

12 Given the concessions, the critical issue is whether the plaintiff has established the danger that a prospective judgment in the proceeding will be partly or wholly unsatisfied as a result of the first defendant's actions in either removing assets or disposing or dealing with them so as to diminish their value.

13 In support of the application, the plaintiff relied upon four affidavits, that of Ms Alisha Hill sworn 23 September 2025, those of Mr Sid Khurana affirmed 24 September 2025 ('Khurana Affidavit') and 24 October 2025, and that of Stephen Matthew Apperly sworn 22 October 2025. The defendants relied upon the affidavits of Ms Melissa Kincaid sworn 10 November 2025 ('Kincaid Affidavit') and 11 November 2025.

14 In support of its submission that the plaintiff had not established the requisite danger of disposal or diminution, the first defendant emphasised that the purpose of the jurisdiction is to facilitate the prospective enforcement of a monetary judgment by preventing assets against which the judgment could potentially be enforced from being unjustifiably dealt with in such a way that insufficient assets are available to meet the judgment.[3] Relatedly, the first defendant emphasised that it is no part of the purpose of such an order to provide security for the plaintiff's judgment or prospective judgment, nor to stop the first defendant from sliding into insolvency.[4]

15 Against that background, the first defendant asserted that the evidence relied upon as to the asserted risk of dissipation was scant comprising only the evidence contained in paragraph 85 of the Khurana Affidavit, viz:

The plaintiff is concerned with the following in regard to the dissipation of settlement funds:

(a) the first defendant appears to have been established and a unit trust created for the sole purpose of this transaction;

(b) the first defendant does not appear to engage in any course of trade or business;

(c) as the plaintiff has not been provided with the Unit Trust Deed of which the first defendant is the trustee, nor any disclosure been made to the plaintiff of the identity of the unitholders of that unit trust deed, there is uncertainty as to where the monies paid at settlement may be disbursed and to whom and whether there is any intention of the first or second defendant or those unitholders to meet any compensation or costs order that may be made by the Court;

(d) the first and second defendant appear to have no assets and will be unable to meet any order in the plaintiff's favour.

16 The plaintiff acknowledges that it does not seek to rely on inferences arising from the nature of the claims it makes against the defendants. Rather, the plaintiff submitted that the affidavits filed by the defendants indicated that if released from the undertaking, the first defendant intends to pay out the Controlled Monies.

17 First, it relied upon the affidavit of Julia Kantzos dated sworn 25 September 2025 ('Kantzos Affidavit'),[5] where Ms Kantzos said that the first defendant had disbursed the proceeds of both instalments of the deposit prior to receiving notice of the plaintiff's claims in the proceeding. There was no dispute by the first defendant that this had occurred.

18 More significantly, the plaintiff drew attention to paragraph 31 of the Kincaid Affidavit in which she deposed as follows:

I am informed by Mr Abrol and believe that Donnybrook Nominees requires access to the Undertaking Funds to meet the following current business and legal expenses of the first defendant in its capacity as trustee of the Donnybrook Nominees Investment Unit Trust ('Trustee'):

(a) The amount of $2,195,818 which is the GST the Trustee is required to pay by 25 November 2025;

(b) The amount of $791,166.65 being the capital gains tax payable on the capital gain made by the Trustee on the sale of the Property. This amount is payable by the beneficiaries for the financial year ended 30 June 2025, and if such a distribution is not made by the Trustee to the beneficiaries, for the purpose of paying the capital gains tax liability, then the Trustee will automatically become liable for the capital gain tax on the sale of the Property at the rate of 47 cents in the dollar as opposed to 25 cents on the dollar being the current rate of the liability.

(c) The amount of $1,343,537 in legal expenses ('Trustee's Expenses').

19 The legal expenses were then set out in greater detail. For present purposes, it is only necessary to note that that a little over $120,000 comprise fees incurred to the date of the hearing of the application with the balance being future costs. Of that amount, around $45,000 is owed to the first defendant's former solicitors presumably relating to the sale of the land.

20 The Kincaid Affidavit is a little unclear. In respect of the amount of GST required to be paid by 25 November 2025 of $2,195,818, the affidavit appeared inconsistent or at least arguably inconsistent with paragraph 3 of the Kantzos Affidavit sworn 25 September 2025. Ms Kantzos deposed to the effect that the plaintiff (sic) was to receive $4,706,731.08 after payment of GST ($2,180,000). This rather suggests that the $4,706,731.08 is the net figure after allowing for payment of $2,180,000 whereas Ms Kincaid's affidavit suggests that the $5 million currently held following settlement is needed as to $2,195,818 to pay outstanding GST.

21 Further, paragraph 31, sub-paragraph (b) in the Kincaid Affidavit also requires some further explanation, although at the hearing of the application both plaintiff and first defendant accepted that the reference to $791,166.65 comprised tax payable by the beneficiaries calculated at a rate of 25 cents in the dollar based on distribution made by the trustee to the beneficiaries for the financial year dated 30 June 2025. Necessarily this meant there had been a distribution made by the trustee to the beneficiaries for the financial year ended 30 June 2025 of circa $3,164,666.60,[6] hence the tax being in the amount of $791,166.65. The parties also accepted that the affidavit meant to convey that the cash corresponding to the distributions made had not yet been paid out such that the beneficiaries had a vested and indefeasible right to those moneys and therefore an entitlement to call on payment of the funds.

22 Against that background, the plaintiff's apprehension is that the beneficiaries will call on the trustee to pay out the vested and indefeasible right to those funds at least for the purposes of enabling the beneficiaries to pay their tax liability.

23 As noted, this summary of the Kincaid Affidavit was not disputed by the defendants. Rather, they emphasised that the resolution of the trustee to make the distribution had occurred on or about 30 June 2025, well before the first defendant was on notice of the claim now sought to be advanced by the plaintiff, and any payment of the beneficiary's entitlement from the cash held by the trustee constituted nothing more than the payment of a liability (incurred in the ordinary and proper course of business) prior to being on notice of any claim. The first defendant argued therefore that any order that froze the Controlled Monies, would impact on the interests of those third party beneficiaries and that this was a matter relevant to the balance of convenience and justified the refusal of the freezing order.

24 The defendants drew attention to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Western Australia in Duro Felguera Australia Pty Ltd v Trans Global Projects Pty Ltd (in liq)[7] where the Court of Appeal stated the following:

Further, and more importantly for present purposes, there is no basis in the text of ... for a requirement that the respondent to a freezing order application must intend that the relevant conduct will prevent a prospective judgment from being satisfied.

Therefore, if the effect of a dealing is to give rise to a danger that a prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied, then the jurisdictional requirement ... will be satisfied irrespective of the purpose for which the respondent may act. The court is able to protect the exercise of its jurisdiction by preventing its frustration by conduct which is not intentionally directed to that end.

That is not to say that the purpose for which a respondent may enter into a transaction, or the irregular nature of the transaction, will be irrelevant to the exercise of the power to grant a freezing order.

If there is evidence that a respondent intends to act with the purpose of frustrating the satisfaction of a judgment, that will be a powerful discretionary consideration once the court is satisfied of the existence of the danger referred to ...

Further, evidence as to such an intention held by the respondent will be a factor pointing towards the existence of a real or substantial risk that a prospective judgment will be unsatisfied because assets might be dealt with. If the evidence demonstrates that the respondent may act for that purpose then it may readily be inferred that there is a real or substantial risk of the purpose being achieved.

Conversely, when the court exercises its discretion having found the jurisdictional requirement to be satisfied, the absence of any purpose of defeating the court's process or any irregularity in the transaction will be a relevant factor. For example, it is difficult to see how the discretion would be exercised in favour of granting a freezing order where the danger referred to ... arose only because of dealings, such as the payment of normal trading debts, in the ordinary course of trade. In such a case, while the court may be satisfied of the existence of a danger that judgment will be unsatisfied because of such dealings, the court would not exercise its discretion to make a freezing order. It remains the case that a freezing order is not made ... only for the purpose of providing security for judgment or preventing insolvency.

25 Had the anticipated payments been for the payment of a third party debt incurred in the ordinary course of business, the defendants submission would have carried great weight. Even where the payment of such debts exhausts the company's financial resources leading to insolvency, this would not have justified a freezing order.[8] Putting aside the lack of clarity as to the amount owing by the first defendant by way of GST, the payment of the GST debt falls into that category.

26 However, insofar as it concerns the prospective payment of the beneficiary's vested and indefeasible entitlement, the position is more complicated and points in favour of the making of a freezing order.

27 Whilst the plaintiff accepts that there is noting untoward in the making of the distributions to the beneficiaries for the year ending 30 June 2025 and that any payment of cash to the beneficiaries referable to those distributions is not improper in the sense that it is for the purpose of defeating the Court's processes, the plaintiff argues that the focus of the jurisdictional enquiry is whether the effect of the dealing gives rise to the danger that a prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied regardless of the purpose for which the dealing is effected. It rejects the defendants' submission that the dealing must also be 'unjustifiable' arguing that the jurisdictional basis for the making of a freezing order is met where the effect of the proposed dealing is to lead to the risk of a judgment being satisfied. Whilst it accepts that the purpose of the dealing may be relevant to the exercise of the discretion to make an order, it argues, and I accept that it is not a separate requirement enlivening the jurisdiction to make the order.

28 Relevant to the discretion to make the order, the plaintiff submitted that any liability of the first defendant for damages is a liability incurred by the first defendant as trustee of the trust. In respect of such a liability, the first defendant trustee has a right of indemnity out of the assets of the trust in the form of its right to be exonerated from the trust assets, more accurately described as a power of exoneration. The plaintiff submits that this right (or power) has priority over any rights of the beneficiaries to the extent of the trustee's right of indemnity.[9] Accordingly, it submits that if it obtains a judgment against the first defendant and the first defendant is unable to pay the amount, any liquidator would be subrogated to the trustee's right of indemnity. The defendants did not accept this submission but did not develop the basis of its opposition. Whilst it is not necessary for me to conclusively determine the question at this stage, the plaintiff's submission is supported by authority and remains at the very least arguably correct.

29 Absent the making of a freezing order, the plaintiff therefore faces a real risk that the cash presently constituting the Controlled Monies will be paid out from the trust assets to the beneficiaries. The plaintiff would therefore be deprived of the priority which it arguably enjoys with respect to those monies over the beneficiaries. Accordingly, I accept that a freezing order is appropriate.

30 I also accept the plaintiff's submissions to the effect that the asserted prejudice on the part of the beneficiaries in the sense of them being denied the liquid funds necessary to meet any tax liabilities which arise upon the making of the distributions by the trustee to them for the financial year dated 30 June 2025, cannot be accorded weight in circumstances where there has been no evidence led as to the inability of those beneficiaries to meet such liabilities by other means.

31 It follows therefore that the plaintiff has established the requisite danger of disposal or diminution and that there are no discretionary factors which militate against the making of the order. In contrast, the balance of convenience favours the making of the freezing order.

Remaining matters - disclosure orders and exceptions

32 It is necessary to consider some remaining matters, namely the making of disclosure orders against both the first defendant and the second defendant and whether the terms of the order should provide for the 'usual' exceptions with respect to the payment of reasonable legal expenses or dealing with or disposing of assets in the ordinary and proper course of business, including paying business expenses bona fide and properly incurred.

33 The making of asset disclosure orders against the defendants was not addressed in the plaintiff's written or oral submissions, although it was referred to in both the plaintiff's proposed orders sought on 25 September 2025 (provided to the Court by email) and in the proposed orders submitted to Chambers on 14 November 2025 following the hearing on that date. The issue received only passing reference from the defendants, who made no objection at the hearing; although it seems clear enough that the absence of objection related only to the position of the first defendant. The lack of detailed attention was understandable, as the form of order was only provided after the hearing had concluded at the Court's request.[10]

34 A disclosure order is an ancillary order to the making of a freezing order and is made for the purpose of rendering the freezing order effective.[11] Its purposes include aiding enforcement by making it more difficult to disobey, assisting third parties who receive notice of the order, and enabling the order to be framed by reference to a specific asset rather than a maximum-sum order which minimises oppression and unnecessary exposure to the undertaking as to damages. The rationale therefore is explicable in the context of maximum sum orders where such orders are commonly made against the party the subject of the order.

35 The order sought is something of a hybrid. As originally sought, it related to a specific asset (the funds held in a particular account) but other parts of the order as framed appeared to be drafted on the basis that it applied to all assets up to a particular sum and it allowed for standard carve outs for legal expenses and bona fide business expenses albeit that these carve outs related to assets that were not the subject of the specific, or indeed any restraint. The order now sought is more clearly confined to a specific asset being an asset of the first defendant and does not provide for any carve outs. Relatedly, and consistent with that framing, the plaintiff specifically argues that the first defendant should not have any recourse to any part of the specific asset the subject of the order for the purpose of paying its bona fide business expenses or its legal expenses.

36 If that premise is accepted, then there is no basis for a disclosure order in respect of either the first defendant or the second defendant.

37 However, given that I am disposed to incorporate an allowance for payment by the first defendant of legal expenses and bona fide business expenses, for the reasons set out below, I will make a disclosure order against the first defendant.

38 I am not prepared to make such an order against the second defendant. The freezing order is made against an asset of the first defendant not the second defendant. It is not clear why it is necessary for the effectiveness of an order effecting the first defendant's funds for a disclosure order to be made in respect of the second defendant's assets and liabilities. In any case, no submission was made as to why such an order should be made.

39 Turning next to the appropriateness of orders providing for the 'usual' exceptions, it should be noted that they are indeed commonplace, but ordinarily only where the order is an order which applies to all assets up to a maximum sum. They do not necessarily warrant that characterisation where the order is confined to a specific asset.

40 The plaintiff submits that the defendants have not established the onus assertedly borne by them of establishing that they do not have sufficient available assets to meet the costs absent recourse to the frozen funds.

41 Although the defendants disputed that they bore the relevant onus, the case of Plus Recruitment Pty Ltd v Phillips (No 2),[12] quoted with approval in Refuse to Lose Pty Ltd v Kostakis,[13] makes clear that whether a carveout for living, legal or other expenses will be made, and the scope of any such carve out, is ultimately a question of what is just and convenient in the circumstances of the case.

42 That is particularly so where the freezing order is not in respect of all of the person's assets (whether up to a specified limit or otherwise). In a context where only a specific asset is frozen and where the defendant seeks recourse to the frozen asset for the purpose of meeting expenses, a relevant consideration is whether the defendant has sufficient available assets, other than those which are the subject of the freezing order, to meet those costs. Where the freezing order sought is not in respect of all of a person's assets, the defendant does bear the evidential burden in establishing that it does not have sufficient available other assets to meet those costs if a carve out is to be permitted.[14]

43 There is something of a tension between the plaintiff's submissions that the special-purpose nature of the first defendant is such as to be relevant to whether the Court can be satisfied that there is the requisite risk of dissipation on the one hand, and its contention that the defendants have not established the necessary onus of proving that they do not have sufficient resources beyond those held in the controlled monies account such as to enable them to have the benefit of the usual exceptions to the making of a freezing order. As the plaintiff submitted, the defendants have not disputed the contention that the first defendant is a special purpose vehicle with no other assets other than the funds in that account. Indeed, that is the very basis of the plaintiff's application.

44 To take the example of the GST, and putting to one side the uncertainty as to amount, the obvious inference is that the GST is payable by the first defendant as vendor, and that the liability with respect to that payment, whatever its precise amount, arose as part of its ordinary course of business.

45 On that basis, there is no reason why the first defendant should not be permitted to have recourse to its own funds to pay such liability. The quantum of that liability is a separate question. For present purposes, an exception cast in general terms rather than one specifying the particular amount is sufficient. The position can be clarified, and any necessary precision can be achieved, once the first defendant provides the disclosure affidavit. The carve outs may then be able to be cast in more specific terms once this has been produced.

46 In relation to the question of legal expenses, the plaintiff argues that the first defendant is not entitled to have recourse to the Controlled Monies for the purpose of meeting its own legal expenses unless it can establish that the second defendant cannot pay those expenses because the second defendant is also sued. In circumstances where the plaintiff has sued the first defendant, there is no reason why, all other things being equal, the first defendant should not be able to have recourse to its own assets to meet its legitimate expenses, assuming as I do and as the plaintiff submits, that it does not have other assets available elsewhere. There is no requirement or other imperative requiring the first defendant to either borrow moneys from the second defendant or be a 'free rider' whilst the second defendant pays the entirety of the legal costs going forward. In the interim, the order will contain a carve out for the first defendant's reasonable legal expenses permitting them to be paid from the moneys held in the controlled monies account. The arguably problematic reference to 'reasonable' should not be taken to mean the entirety of the legal costs of both defendants, given that the second defendant has also been sued. The order will benefit from refinement upon the provision of the disclosure affidavit by the first defendant.

47 Accordingly, and upon the terms of the undertaking as to damages provided by the plaintiff, the orders proposed to be made are as follows:

1. The defendants' undertakings recorded in paragraph B of 'Other Matters' in the Court's orders made on 25 September 2025 ('the 25 September Orders') are discharged.[15]

2. The first defendant must direct Frenkel Partners to continue to hold the amount of $5 million referred to in 'Other Matters' in the 25 September Orders in a controlled money account ('the Controlled Money Account') and, subject to paragraph 4 hereof, not to remove or in any way dispose of, or deal with, or otherwise diminish in value of the assets held therein pending further order of the Court.

3. By 4:00 pm on 5 December 2025, or such further period as may be agreed by the parties or ordered by the Court, the first defendant must serve on the plaintiff an affidavit containing details of all of its assets in Australia, specifying their value, location and details (including any mortgages, charges or other encumbrances to which they are subject), and the extent of the first defendant's interest in the assets.

4. Subject to further order, nothing in paragraph 2 hereof prevents the first defendant from dealing with the assets in the Controlled Money Account for the purposes of:

(i) payment of its reasonable legal expenses of this proceeding; and

(ii) paying business expenses bona fide and properly incurred before 25 September 2025 (which for the avoidance of doubt, does not include the payment of any amounts due to the beneficiaries arising from the making of any distributions to those beneficiaries).

5. The further hearing of the summons is adjourned to 10:00am on 12 December 2025 for the purpose of specifying the matter set out in paragraph 4 hereof with greater particularity.

6. Insofar as the summons seeks a freezing order against the second defendant, the application is dismissed.

7. Costs reserved.

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DONNYBROOK LAND DEVELOPMENT PTY LTD (ACN 676 448 794) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE DONNYBROOK LAND DEVELOPMENT TRUST

DONNYBROOK NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 648 480 728) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE DONNYBROOK NOMINEES INVESTMENT UNIT TRUST

DONNYBROOK NOMINEES PTY LTD (ACN 648 480 728) AS TRUSTEE FOR THE DONNYBROOK NOMINEES INVESTMENT UNIT TRUST

[1] [2019] VSCA 164, (McLeish and Niall JJA).

[2] [2025] VSC 402, [9].

[3] Convoy Collateral Ltd v Broad Idea International Ltd [2021] UKPC 24; [2022] 2 WLR 703, [84]-[89] ('Broad Idea').

[4] Duro Felguera Australia Pty Ltd v Trans Global Projects Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] WASCA 174; (2018) 53 WAR 201, [44] ('Duro Felguera').

[7] [2018] WASCA 174; (2018) 53 WAR 201, 214 [56]-[61].

[8] As explained in Duro Felguera, in the last sentence of the extracted reasons.

[9] Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20; (2019) 268 CLR 524, 543, 544.

[10] The defendants provided brief submissions by way of comments on the proposed order.

[11] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v AES Services (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSC 527 (Forrest J); Mareva and Anton Piller Orders; Freezing and Search Orders (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, Sydney 2023).

[12] [2019] VSC 611, [46] (Lyons J) ('Plus Recruitment').

[13] [2025] VSC 438 (Connock J).

[14] Plus Recruitment (n 11) [46]-[47].

[15] Being the undertakings offered 25 September 2025.