Plaintiff v Defendant

Supreme Court of Victoria|2007-05-17|Before: HANSEN J

The application is hopeless and it must be, and is, dismissed."

37 On about 19 July 2002 the defendant and Ms Walter applied to the Court of Appeal for a rehearing of the grand jury application. The application was not accepted by the Registry on the basis that Master Dowling came to the view that there were no significant differences between the present material and the material previously relied on.

38 On 14 August 2002 the defendant and Ms Walter attempted to file an application in the High Court Registry for a Writ of Mandamus, naming the "Supreme Court of Victoria, Full Court" as the respondent. Alternatively, the applicants sought special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal. The application was not accepted by the Registry, the Senior Registrar stating that the matter was not within the High Court's jurisdiction as the Justices of the Court of Appeal were not officers of the Commonwealth and were not exercising federal jurisdiction in considering the grand jury application.

39 In March 2004 the defendant attempted to file a further application for a grand jury against Master Wheeler. Master Cain, Registrar of the Court of Appeal, refused to accept the application on the basis that the prerequisites in s 354 were not satisfied. Then, in May 2004 the defendant sought to file a further eight applications to summon a grand jury, against five Justices of Appeal, Master Cain, the Victorian Director and the Governor-General. In his affidavit attached to the applications but apparently only in support of the application against Master Cain, the defendant stated in essence that the charge of attempting to pervert the course of justice emanated from Master Cain's repeated refusals to accept for filing applications for a grand jury hearing. He added "I have stated on a number of occasions that the common sense solution concerning this issue is a 'Trial of the issue', but, common sense has not prevailed, accordingly the charges have been laid".

40 Counsel for the defendant told me during argument that the defendant had issued over 40 grand jury applications which were not deposed to in the affidavit of the plaintiff's solicitor. Counsel stated that the applications were filed in January 2007 - following the orders of the Chief Magistrate on 15 December 2006 striking out the criminal charges referred to earlier - although some may have been filed earlier. These applications include three applications against the plaintiff.

41 Mr Shaw and his sons commenced this proceeding by writ and indorsement of claim filed in the Supreme Court on 16 September 1999. I refer to Mr Shaw and his sons as "the plaintiffs" in the context of discussing this proceeding. On the day of filing the writ, the plaintiffs also filed a summons with an affidavit of Mr Shaw in support, seeking orders similar to those sought in the writ. In essence, the plaintiffs sought permanent and interlocutory injunctions restraining the defendant from commencing work, placing padlocks on, or doing any act which would interfere with the plaintiffs' access and right to quiet enjoyment of a farming property known as Bambra Park. The defendant was purchaser of the land under a contract yet to be completed, and was purporting to exercise rights against the plaintiffs under a sharefarming agreement between the plaintiffs and the vendor, pursuant to a power of attorney granted to the purchaser by the vendor. In his affidavit, after referring to having received a letter from the defendant's solicitors, Harwood Andrews, making specific demands in relation to the sharefarming agreement, Mr Shaw deposed that:

"My reply to this letter was immediate, but, at no time did I acknowledge the purchase of the property to be legal. On that basis I ignored the demands of the letter.

My first reply to Harwood Andrews of Geelong was based on two specific backgrounds, these being Biblical and Constitutional."

The remaining five pages of the affidavit provided details of these biblical and constitutional matters, alleging the influence of Freemasonry on the judiciary and that "Our Victorian Parliament has broken the law since its birth and continues to break the law today" with the result that the transfer of Bambra Park to the defendant was invalid. The defendant filed a summons seeking judgment or a permanent stay under r 23.01 as the proceeding was an abuse of process, did not disclose a cause of action, and was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious.

42 On 8 October 1999, Warren J (as her Honour then was) refused the injunction sought by the plaintiffs, stating that she could not be satisfied on the evidence that there was a serious question to be tried, and that in any event the discretion would not be exercised in the plaintiffs' favour as they were "arguably in default of the terms of the sharefarming agreement and which default has led it appears to the agreement being properly terminated". As to the defendant's summons, her Honour said that the plaintiffs' case appeared extremely weak but "could not be described at this point as hopeless, an abuse of process or vexatious", thus her Honour adjourned the summons to be heard by a Master on a date to be fixed.

43 The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal from the decision of Warren J. On 29 October 1999, Brooking and Buchanan JJA stated that as the proposed appeal was from an order refusing an injunction, leave to appeal was not required, but as the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired, the plaintiffs required an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. Their Honours refused to extend time, stating that:

"We need not summarise the unusual basis of the proposed appeal. It appears from the draft notice of appeal and from the affidavits of Mr Shaw and the numerous exhibits. We have in the course of argument tried to explain to him that the matters which he wishes to agitate are really contrary to a large body of cases which are binding upon us, and that in those circumstances we cannot form the view that the appeal which he wishes to bring would have some prospect of success."

44 The proceeding is yet to go to trial, but there have been numerous interlocutory hearings and orders, and applications for leave to appeal therefrom, between 2000 and 2007. Without going into all the details, I note the following. The plaintiffs filed a statement of claim, which was struck out with orders that a further statement of claim not be filed without leave. The plaintiffs have sought such leave, on more than one occasion, with affidavits in support referring to matters of Freemasonry, religion and constitutional validity. On 7 September 2004, Master Kings dismissed with indemnity costs the plaintiffs' application for leave to file and serve an amended statement of claim, which amendments included the joining of Harwood Andrews and the State of Victoria as defendants. The Master concluded that the proposed amended statement of claim contained "narrative and assertions" and did not disclose a cause of action against the defendant or Harwood Andrews. Further, the application to join the State of Victoria, on the basis that it had "created a tort against the Plaintiffs by permitting Masonic corruption of Commonwealth Judicial Officers and Courts", was unrelated to the underlying dispute about the sharefarming agreement and power of attorney.

45 On 20 September 2004 Smith J dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal from the decision of Master Kings. His Honour said that the proposed amended statement of claim "falls well short of what is needed before any leave could be given" and that "on the last occasion the Master explained the sorts of problems that existed and some specific ones as well, but nothing has been done to address them. The appeal, in my view, had to fail and therefore costs orders should be on an indemnity basis". On 19 November 2004, the Court of Appeal (Phillips JA with Gillard AJA agreeing) refused the plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal out of time from the order of Smith J, but refused to award costs against the plaintiffs on an indemnity basis. Phillips JA observed that:

"[I]n none of the material that I have seen did the applicants attempt to canvass the matters that were described by Master Kings as possible justification for the action taken by the new owner leading to the ejection of the applicants from Bambra Park. In the circumstances, one can have no confidence at all that, even in relation to the share farming agreement, the applicants have a case fit for trial. That is subject to any case that may hereafter be raised in relation to the powers of attorney because, as I have said, no case has yet been articulated - or articulated sufficiently - in relation to those powers."

46 On 22 July 2005, the plaintiffs filed a summons returnable in the Practice Court to stay four costs orders made in favour of the defendant at earlier hearings. When the matter came before Mandie J on 1 August 2005, his Honour ordered that Mr Shaw's affidavit be removed from the file as it was argumentative and did not comply with the rules. His Honour adjourned the matter to allow Mr Shaw to file an affidavit in proper form, and the matter returned to court on 23 August 2005, when Whelan J dismissed the Plaintiffs' summons. In the meantime, on 9 August 2005 Master Bruce had taxed and allowed the defendant's costs from the earlier hearings at $26,466.60. Also, on 15 August 2005 the plaintiffs sought leave to appeal from the order of Mandie J, stating, among other things, in a document entitled "draft grounds of appeal" that "The serious indictable issues discovered and involve relating to the Laws of the State of Victoria were unlawfully ignored by Justice Mandie". On 9 September 2005 the Court of Appeal (Maxwell P and Nettle JA) refused leave to appeal from the order of Mandie J and ordered costs on a solicitor-client basis.

47 On 7 October 2005, the plaintiffs sought special leave to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal to the High Court. The "Application for Special Leave" document contains 44 grounds of appeal, running over 16 pages. The grounds are not limited to the Court of Appeal decision, but include that "All cost orders in this matter have been obtained by fraud, in particular Master Evans (Freemason) and Master Kings" and numerous allegations as to unlawful oaths, Freemasonry and constitutional matters. On 3 August 2006, Kirby J dismissed the application for special leave, noting that the proposed appeal was "premised on the notion that the judges involved in the applicants' litigation acted illegally by virtue of some Masonic oath or obligation. There was no foundation for such assertion or complaint". His Honour concluded that "there are no prospects of success of any appeal to this Court".

48 Meanwhile, on 17 November 2005 the defendant had filed a summons seeking an order permanently staying the proceeding. It appears that the summons was adjourned, pending the determination of the plaintiffs' application for special leave, and was subsequently adjourned again. The summons remains alive, the last step being that, on 29 March 2007 (the day after I heard argument in the present application) Master Efthim decided, in light of the present application by the Attorney-General, to adjourn the summons to 11 September 2007, reserving costs and granting liberty to apply.

49 Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant had brought a large number of criminal prosecutions in which he made essentially the same allegations of treason or misprision of treason against numerous public officials, and in all cases the charges were struck out on the basis that the relevant Director had taken over and discontinued the charges. By reason of that fact, the nature of the charges, the circumstances in which they were laid, and the material provided by the defendant in support of them, it can be inferred that each and every charge was plainly untenable and doomed to fail.

50 As to Shaw v Fragapane, counsel conceded that the proceeding was not vexatious when it was before Warren J in 1999, but contended that the subsequent history of the case demonstrated that it had been infected by the defendant's contentions as to a Masonic conspiracy and illegality of the constitution, such that the Court could have no confidence that the case would be pursued in a way which did not involve an abuse of process. Counsel further submitted that Mr Shaw's unsuccessful application to join Harwood Andrews and the State of Victoria as defendants to the action is correctly characterised as the institution of a proceeding (against those parties) for the purposes of s 21, and that such proceeding was vexatious.

51 After referring to the authorities, counsel submitted that the defendant had habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings. Each was doomed to fail and without any proper legal foundation. It was clear from the evidence that the defendant "has issued proceedings automatically and regardless of the fate that his earlier proceedings had met". The defendant has done this "whenever he comes across a person, judicial officer or public official who makes an adverse finding or decision and it is his knee jerk response to matters". The stubborn persistence of the defendant was apparent from the fact that he continued to institute proceedings making the same basic allegations even after a bench of five judges of the Court of Appeal concluded that his contentions were untenable. And he persisted in instituting criminal proceedings even after the plaintiff filed the originating motion on 28 November 2006 seeking the present relief.

52 Counsel for the defendant did not dispute the factual matters deposed to in the plaintiff's affidavits. Rather, he focused on the conclusions and inferences that should be drawn from that material. He referred to the fact that the defendant was self-represented, and had largely prepared his own paperwork, until two months before this hearing. Noting that, having taken over the criminal proceedings instituted by the defendant, the relevant Director had not lead any evidence, he said that Mr Shaw is concerned that the person deciding not to prosecute the charges is, in some cases, the very person charged, namely the Director of Public Prosecutions. Counsel said that when a Magistrate will not proceed with a charge which is serious, the defendant had proceeded to issue a grand jury application and that it is then the function of the Court to call a grand jury, not to go into the evidence of it, but to have the matter before a grand jury. If the grand jury did not indict, that would be the end of the matter. If the grand jury did indict, then the matter would go before a jury of 12 who would decide the matter. Counsel stated:

"What Mr Shaw wants to do is to have these matters aired and the simplest way to get rid of this man who is a farmer is to have the matters heard before a jury and if the charges have no substance, if they are hopeless, if they lack merit as my learned friend puts it, the jury will see this quite clearly. Charges will be dismissed, the defendants will be free to go and Mr Shaw will go back to his farming activities, but until that day happens he is concerned."

53 Counsel next addressed the Western Australian legislation, referred to at [22] above, and Mr Shaw's argument in his affidavit that Western Australia has either been turned into a republic or, to use the words of counsel, has become a "non-entity land mass that is not a monarchy, not a republic, and by purporting to change the Constitution of Australia, no longer part of Australia". Counsel said that Mr Shaw's submission is that, following the rejection of an Australian Republic in 1999, "those who were determined to have a Republic said, well, what we'll do is we'll become a republic anyway but we won't tell anyone what we're doing. What we will do is, we'll just slowly delete the Queen and we'll remove coats of arms from buildings. We might even change the flag somewhere along the way, and one of these days people will wake up and, lo and behold, they will have a French style republic and without a single shot being fired. That is why Mr Shaw wants these matters to go to a grand jury". Counsel said that Mr Shaw's submission is that this republic agenda is driven by the Masonic order - although not all republicans are masons - and the legislation passed in Western Australia is a manifestation of that agenda. Essentially, Western Australia is the forerunner in this movement, but the State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General have gone along with it.

54 Counsel then submitted that the present case was an inter se matter within the meaning of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). He referred to ss 17, 18 and 22 of that Act, and submitted that in light of those provisions, and the nature of the matters raised, the case should, indeed must, be referred to the High Court.

"(1) In any matter pending in the High Court, not being a matter in which the High Court has exclusive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of a State shall be invested with federal jurisdiction to hear and determine any applications which may be made to a Justice of the High Court sitting in Chambers.

(2) Such jurisdiction may be exercised by a single Judge of the Supreme Court sitting in Chambers, and the order of the Judge shall have the effect of an order of a Justice of the High Court sitting in Chambers."

"Any Justice of the High Court sitting alone, whether in Court or in Chambers, may state any case or reserve any question for the consideration of a Full Court, or may direct any case or question to be argued before a Full Court, and a Full Court shall thereupon have power to hear and determine the case or question."

"Applications to the High Court for a certificate that a question as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of the Commonwealth and those of any State or States, or as to the limits inter se of the Constitutional powers of any two or more States, which has been decided by the High Court, is one which ought to be determined by the Queen in Council, shall be heard and determined by a Full Court consisting of not less than three Justices."

56 In essence, the matter which counsel submitted should go before the High Court is the allegation that Western Australia has fractured, or attempted to fracture, the Commonwealth Constitution, and that the Commonwealth and Victorian Attorneys-General have concurred in that course.

57 Finally, counsel emphasised that there are in effect two sets of proceedings before the Court. First, the constitutional issues which should go before the High Court, and secondly, the question of a grand jury, in respect of which it was inappropriate that the Attorney-General, himself a respondent to three applications for a grand jury, had brought an application to have Mr Shaw declared a vexatious litigant. By doing so, the plaintiff had effectively thwarted the grand jury process the defendant had brought against him. Further, on a grand jury application the Attorney-General should not have put forward evidence through the affidavits of his solicitor, as to do so was to enter into the evidence, whereas in a grand jury application factual matters are entirely for the grand jury.

58 I have already referred to the relevant legal principles and do not repeat them. I have regard to all the authorities referred to me, and all of the submissions of counsel. I am conscious of the fact, emphasised by both counsel, that the order sought by the plaintiff is of a most serious nature, and one not lightly to be made, as the effect is to prevent the defendant from bringing legal proceedings without first obtaining leave to do so. That said, however, the jurisdiction to so order is conferred by s 21, the requirements of which are said by the plaintiff to be satisfied.

59 I make the following observations concerning the legal proceedings brought by the defendant. The defendant has brought a large number of criminal prosecutions in which he has made a range of the most serious allegations, including treason and perverting the course of justice, against numerous public officials. In all cases the charges have been struck out on the basis that the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions took over and withdrew the charges. I accept that by the nature of the charges, the circumstances in which they were laid, and the material provided by the defendant in support of them, it can be inferred that each charge was untenable and doomed to fail. In this sense, the proceedings were vexatious legal proceedings instituted without any reasonable ground. As to whether they were instituted habitually and persistently, I note that while not an invariable rule, there does emerge from the material a pattern whereby the defendant has brought criminal proceedings against those persons who have made decisions adverse to him. For example, upon taking over and discontinuing criminal prosecutions, both the Victorian and Commonwealth Directors of Public Prosecutions were themselves charged. After refusing the defendant's grand jury application, the five members of the Court of Appeal were charged with criminal offences. And, after refusing to accept for filing an application for a grand jury, Master Cain was charged with criminal offences. These are just a few examples. And although there was some variation in the wording of the defendant's allegations against those he charged, the substance of his allegations remained the same, namely their complicity in indictable offences relating to a Freemason conspiracy and/or constitutional improprieties.

60 I turn now to the proceedings in which the defendant sought to challenge determinations of the Magistrates' Court in relation to traffic offences. In essence the defendant alleged that the law under which he was charged was invalid because the Victorian constitution was invalid. He also raised allegations of a Freemason conspiracy. In each case the defendant's proceeding was dismissed or struck out. The material demonstrates that these proceedings, instituted over at least six years, were vexatious and had no prospect of success.

61 I now turn to the applications to summon a grand jury. This category is particularly significant, as it is apparent, both from an overview of the legal proceedings instituted by the defendant generally, and from what his counsel said during argument, that the defendant ultimately seeks to place before a grand jury his allegations that:

(a) a Freemason conspiracy has corrupted the judiciary and the court process in Victoria;

(b) there is currently an illegal conspiracy, already commenced in Western Australia, to fracture the Commonwealth of Australia and create a republic in its place; and

62 Relevantly, s 354 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) gives the Full Court a discretion to order that a grand jury be summoned "Upon the application of any person supported by an affidavit disclosing an indictable offence and either that the same has been committed by some body corporate or that a court has declined or refused to commit or hold to bail the alleged offender or that no presentment was made against him at the court at which the trial would in due course have taken place, or upon the application of the Director of Public Prosecutions". The defendant has relied on this provision to seek to summon a grand jury on numerous occasions and against numerous individuals. However, as the Court of Appeal found in 2001, the defendant's material failed to show that Freemasons administer or take oaths proscribed by s 316 of the Crimes Act. Further, their Honours considered that there was no reason for supposing that the papers ever would or ever could be put in a state which would warrant the summoning of a grand jury. In my view, although the form of some of the allegations may have changed since 2001, the substance of the allegations remains the same. And while the defendant has repeatedly asserted that a whole range of indictable offences have been committed by all manner of people, he has not adduced any cogent evidence to substantiate such claims. In short, he has not provided an affidavit disclosing any indictable offence, which means that he has repeatedly failed to satisfy s 354 at the threshold. In my view, the allegations he wishes to place before a grand jury are untenable. Even so, and after being told of that position by the Court of Appeal in 2001, the defendant has habitually and persistently sought to file grand jury applications.

63 I now turn to consider Shaw v Fragapane. As counsel for the plaintiff correctly conceded, the proceeding was not vexatious when commenced. Although Warren J described the plaintiffs' prospects of success as "extremely weak", her Honour considered that the case was not so hopeless as to warrant summary dismissal. Has the proceeding, however, since become vexatious in the sense that it has been infected, as counsel submitted, with the allegations of a Freemason conspiracy? It is clear that the plaintiffs in Shaw v Fragapane have made a range of untenable allegations in their pleadings. Indeed, eight years after commencing the proceeding, and despite being afforded many opportunities to file a statement of claim, the plaintiffs have not yet delivered a pleading that identifies the real issues in the case - that is to say the sharefarming agreement and, as Phillips JA pointed out, the question of the power of attorney, if the plaintiffs are minded to pursue that matter, which has not yet been developed at all. Rather, the plaintiffs' pleadings have contained little more than assertion. They are unintelligible and untenable. The history of the matter set out above illustrates that, rather than make a concerted effort to address the shortcomings of their pleadings by repleading their case in a way which identifies the real issues, the plaintiffs have persisted in making the same, or similar, allegations in their pleadings. Further, they have wasted years trying to appeal from adverse interlocutory decisions - on incidental matters such as the staying of costs orders, and an order that a clearly inadmissible affidavit be removed from the file but without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to file a proper affidavit - and in doing so have raised grounds of appeal that clearly have no prospect of success. And even if they were successful in their appeals, they would still have to go back to the start and replead their case. In short, the plaintiffs have conducted the proceeding in a vexatious manner. However, the fact remains that the plaintiffs require leave to file further pleadings. While it may be doubted whether appropriate pleadings will ever be filed, and the defendant may well be successful in its adjourned application to have the proceeding permanently stayed, it nevertheless cannot be said at the moment that the plaintiffs' case, assuming it be properly pleaded, is hopeless. In my view, it cannot be said then that Shaw v Fragapane is a vexatious proceeding instituted without any reasonable ground.

64 That raises the question of whether the plaintiffs' unsuccessful attempt to join Harwood Andrews and the State of Victoria as defendants can be characterised as the plaintiffs having instituted a vexatious legal proceeding for the purpose of s 21. In my view, although the plaintiffs' application to join the parties was doomed to fail and put the proposed defendants to unnecessary trouble and expense, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs thereby instituted a vexatious legal proceeding. Rule 9.11(3)(a) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 provides that when an order is made adding or substituting a persons as a defendant, the proceeding against the new defendant commences upon the amendment of the filed originating process, required by r 9.11(1) and 9.11(2), which is taken to occur when a copy of the amended originating process is filed. In this case, as the application to join the defendants was rejected, there was never any filing of an amended originating process, and thus no proceeding was commenced against Harwood Andrews and the State of Victoria. It might be said that the word "instituted" is wider in scope than "commenced", but I am nevertheless of the view that the plaintiffs' unsuccessful attempt to institute a proceeding is not the institution of a proceeding for the purposes of s 21.

65 I should also say that I reject the submission by counsel for the defendant that Mr Shaw's allegation as to a conspiracy to fracture the Commonwealth is a matter which should be referred to the High Court. The allegation is barely intelligible. There is no evidence to support it at all, but even if there was there was no properly identified inter se question nor an identification as to what matter was pending in the High Court such as would invest this Court with the jurisdiction of the High Court. I also reject counsel's submission that the Attorney-General, being a respondent to a grand jury application, acted improperly in bringing the present application and having evidence lead through his solicitor's affidavits. That was entirely appropriate. The evidence led in the affidavit went to the nature of the legal proceedings brought by the defendant, for the purpose of demonstrating that they were vexatious proceedings. It was not led as evidence to rebut the defendant's grand jury case against the plaintiff himself. Further, there is nothing to suggest that the plaintiff has brought the present application for an improper purpose such as thwarting the defendant's grand jury application against him, rather than properly pursuing the remedy available to him under s 21. The same applies to the defendant's complaint that it is inappropriate that the Victorian and Commonwealth Directors of Public Prosecutions take over and withdraw charges brought against themselves. That is to say, there is no suggestion that they withdrew the charges for an improper purpose unrelated to their statutory discretion to take over and conduct proceedings.

66 Viewing the matter overall, I am of the opinion that the defendant has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings, without any reasonable ground. The allegations made by the defendant are of the most serious nature, yet completely lacking in substance. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to declare that the defendant is a vexatious litigant and, subject to one exception, to order that he not commence or continue any legal proceeding (whether civil or criminal) in the Court, an inferior court or any tribunal constituted or presided over by a person who is an Australian lawyer, without leave of the Court. The exception is that, subject to further order, the defendant may continue the Shaw v Fragapane proceeding which I have not characterised as a vexatious proceeding.

Table "A": Table of Proceedings alleged to be vexatious instituted by

Criminal Proceedings instituted in the Magistrates' Court

Master Charles Wheeler, Master of the Supreme Court

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s316(2)(a)(ii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) (b) and (c)

Master Charles Wheeler, Master of the Supreme Court

John Spence Winneke, President of the Court of Appeal

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s93

Justice Robert Brooking, Justice of Appeal of the Supreme Court

Justice Stephen Pendrill Charles, Justice of Appeal of the Supreme Court

Justice Peter Buchanan, Justice of Appeal of the Supreme Court

Justice Alex Chernov, Justice of Appeal of the Supreme Court

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 321M

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 326(1)

John Evans, stated to be Grand Master of the United Grand Lodge of Victoria, Freemasonry Victoria

various charges under Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)

Various charges under Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

Justice Ian Callinan, Justice of the High Court of Australia

Various charges under Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

*Struck out: each charge ordered to be 'struck out' on the basis that the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions had taken over the prosecution and withdrawn the charge.

** Paragraph numbers refer to the paragraphs in the affidavit affirmed by Natalie Joanna Blok on 28 November 2006.

***Exhibit numbers refer to the exhibits exhibited to the affidavit affirmed by Natalie Joanna Blok on 28 November 2006.

Civil Proceedings instituted in the Magistrates' Court

Application to appeal decisions of Magistrates' Court refusing to revoke orders

appeal of decision of Magistrates' Court refusing to revoke enforcement orders

application for leave to appeal out of time refused; appeal dismissed 29/8/01

Appeal from order striking out charges against David Ward

** Paragraph numbers refer to the paragraphs in the affidavit affirmed by Natalie Joanna Blok on 28 November 2006.

***Exhibit numbers refer to the exhibits exhibited to the affidavit affirmed by Natalie Joanna Blok on 28 November 2006.

Proceedings instituted in the Supreme Court/Court of Appeal

Appeal of decision of Magistrates' Court under s92 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Vic)

Appeal under s92 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Vic)

Appeal out of time/application for leave to appeal decision Magistrates' Court under s92 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Vic)

Application for leave to appeal dismissed; applicant pay the respondent's costs of the proceeding 22/10/01

Appeal from Magistrates' Court decision under s92 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Vic)

Appeal from orders made by Master Evans on 1 May 2002

Application for leave to appeal an order of the Magistrates' Court or application for rehearing

No orders made as proceeding not initiated in proper form

Application by writ for interlocutory and permanent injunctions in relation to a farming agreement

Multiple interlocutory proceedings including applications for leave to appeal to Court of Appeal and application for Special Leave to Appeal to the High Court.

Winneke P, Brooking, Charles, Buchanan & Chernov JJ

Application for re-hearing of application for grand jury

application to join Harwood Andrews Lawyers and State of Victoria as defendants

Application for leave to Appeal Order of Mandie J made 1/8/05 (NJB- 133)

** Paragraph numbers refer to the paragraphs in the affidavit affirmed by Natalie Joanna Blok on 28 November 2006.

***Exhibit numbers refer to the exhibits exhibited to the affidavit affirmed by Natalie Joanna Blok on 28 November 2006.

AMENDED - Table "B": Table of Proceedings alleged to be vexatious instituted by Brian William Shaw in Victoria

Criminal Proceedings instituted in the Magistrates' Court in November and December 2006

Mr McGinty (Attorney-General for the State of Western Australia)