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[2026] VSC 121
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Victoria
2026-03-19
Matthews J
Original judgment source is linked above.
[1] ANZ v Hau Thi Nguyen [2026] VSC 31 (Primary Reasons).
[2] This was not in the proper form or made in the usual way by summons and affidavit, however I have treated it as an application that I recuse myself.
[3] This information was obtained from ANZ's ASX page at https://www.asx.com.au/markets/company/ANZ on 13 March 2026.
[4] I performed the following calculation: (32 ÷ 3,014,198,826) × 100 = 1.061641976765868e-6.
[6] Ibid, 350 [29] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
[17] Ibid 296-97 [11] (citations omitted) (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon and Gleeson JJ).
[18] The proceeding was S ECI 2022 03352 Trajkovski, Steven vs Secretary of the Department of Transport.
[19] I note that I was an associate judge at the time of that interlocutory hearing.
[20] This order was also annexed to the document that Mr Trajkovski attached to the email he sent to my Chambers on 2 March 2026.
[21] I note that this affidavit was not referred to at all during the trial and is not mentioned in the Primary Reasons.
[22] See Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), ss 41(1), 42(1), and 42(4).
[24] The Court's discretion in relation to costs arises from s 24 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic).
[26] Ibid [10] (Maxwell P, Redlich JA, Forrest AJA).
[28] Chen v Kevin McNamara & Son, [8] (Redlich JA), [1] (Maxwell P), [22] (Robson AJA) (citations omitted).
[29] See eg, Gomba Holdings (UK) Ltd v Minories Finance Ltd (No 2) [1993] Ch 171; Raffoul v Fresh 2 U Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 374 (Sifris J); St George Bank Limited v Irani & Ors [2008] VSC 98 (Whelan J).
[30] Taree Pty Ltd v Bob Jane Corporation Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 228, [40] (Vickery J).
[31] Default Event is defined in clause 7.1 of the Mortgage to mean where the defendant does not pay any part of the Secured Money on time. Secured Money is further defined in clause 2.2 of the Mortgage to mean all money that the defendant owes to ANZ.
[32] See Gino Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Australia, 5th ed, 2021) 555 [15.40], and the citations cited therein.
[33] I do not know if the date of the mediation referred to at paragraph 3 of the defendant's submission is correct, but I note that in July 2024 there was a judicial mediation of the proceeding conducted pursuant to orders made by Steffensen AsJ on 25 June 2024. If the mediation referred to at paragraph 3 of the defendant's submission was a judicial mediation, then there is a further reason for me to take no account of it: s 67 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 provides that no evidence shall be admitted at the hearing of any proceeding of anything said or done by any person in the course of the conduct of a judicial mediation unless the court otherwise orders, having regard to the interests of justice and fairness. No such order has been made here.
ANZ Bank
Nguyen
COSTS - Costs of proceeding following judgment in favour of plaintiff - Plaintiff has contractual entitlements to costs on an indemnity basis for the costs of enforcing loan agreement and mortgage - Court will generally award indemnity costs in such circumstances - Court still retains its discretion as to costs orders - Costs ordered on indemnity basis save for costs of a summary judgment application which enjoyed only partial success - Chen v Kevin McNamara & Son Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] VSCA 229 applied.
COURTS AND JUDGES - Recusal - Whether a reasonable apprehension of bias - Application that trial judge recuse herself from determining costs - Trial judge had previously presided at an interlocutory hearing in an unrelated proceeding in which defendant's husband was a party - Application refused - Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 applied.
(1) The purpose of a costs order is compensatory, not punitive. The High Court has held that the purpose of a costs order is to compensate the person in whose favour it is made, not to punish the person against whom the order is made: Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; (2019) 265 CLR 164 at [25]; Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534.
(2) The defendant is self-represented. She has no lawyer. She has incurred no legal costs. She has no legal bill. A costs order against a self-represented defendant who has incurred no legal costs, to compensate a plaintiff who chose to litigate rather than accept the defendant's offer to pay the principal, is not compensatory. It is punitive. The High Court says that is not what costs are for.
(3) The defendant offered to pay $263,000 - the full principal less $35,000 already paid - at mediation in March 2024. The plaintiff refused and demanded in excess of $600,000. The plaintiff chose trial over settlement. The costs the plaintiff now seeks are the direct consequence of the plaintiff's own commercial decision to reject a reasonable offer and pursue possession of a property worth $1.3 million rather than accept repayment of the debt.
(4) A costs order in these proceedings would operate as a further mechanism for the acquisition of the defendant's property. The constitutional protection against acquisition of property other than on just terms is not confined to direct government compulsory acquisition. It extends to any process by which property is taken from one party and transferred to another through the instrumentality of state power. A costs order made on forged documents, against a defendant who offered to pay, in favour of a bank whose own agent fabricated the loan application, is not acquisition on just terms.
(5) Section 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution provides that the Commonwealth shall not acquire property except on just terms. This protection has been held by the High Court to extend to choses in action and accrued rights: ; Duffy, 'Statutory Choses in Action as Protected Property under of the ' establishes that accrued private statutory rights are constitutionally protected property. The defendant's right to her home, her $200,000 contribution, and her counterclaim are all property that cannot be acquired except on just terms.
(2021) 273 CLR 289
(2000) 205 CLR 337
(2019) 265 CLR 164
(1990) 170 CLR 534
(1994) 179 CLR 297
(6) The defendant's property is the foundation upon which these proceedings rest. The plaintiff advanced $298,000 and seeks to acquire a property worth $1.3 million. The defendant contributed $200,000 of her own funds. She paid $35,000 in interest. She has offered to repay the principal. She is still working and earning. A costs order in these circumstances does not compensate the plaintiff. It completes the acquisition.
(7) The financial system exists because society sustains it. Citizens work, earn, deposit money into banks, purchase property, and comply with their obligations. The system functions because the people who drive it trust that the law will protect what they build. When the courts, instead of protecting the people who sustain the system, become the instrument by which their property is taken from them on the basis of forged documents and fabricated applications - the system forfeits the trust upon which it depends. A costs order against the defendant in these proceedings would confirm that the court's process has been used not to do justice, but to complete a transaction that should never have occurred.
(8) For these reasons, the defendant does not consent to any costs order in favour of the plaintiff.