Pittman & Pittman (No 2) [2026] FedCFamC2F 2 (20 January 2026)

1. The child is to live with the Father.
2. For the purposes of Order 4 of these Orders:

(a) The Mother deliver the child and all his aids, devices and therapeutic needs (including any prescribed medications) to Court Children's Services, Kidszone area on Level 2 of the Adelaide Registry of the Court ("Court Children's Services") on 23 January 2026 at 11:00am ACDT or, if it can be accommodated by Court Children's Services at the Adelaide Registry, on 27 January 2026 at 11:00am ACDT;

(b) Upon compliance with Order 5(a) of these Orders, the Mother and her associates immediately leave the Adelaide Registry and comply with directions given by the Court Child Expert;

(c) Pursuant to s 11F of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Father attend Court Children's Services, Kidszone area on Level 2 of the Adelaide Registry of the Court ("Court Children's Services") to transition the child into his care on 23 January 2026 at 11:30am ACDT or, if it can be accommodated by Court Children's Services at the Adelaide Registry, on 27 January 2026 at 11:00am ACDT; and

(d) A Court Child Expert facilitate the transfer of the child to the Father's care and for that purpose the Father follow all directions of the Child Court Expert.

Time and Communication if the mother continues to reside in South Australia

1. Unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing, the child shall spend time with the Mother on the second weekend in each month, commencing in February 2026, in Sydney for up to three (3) consecutive nights from the conclusion of school or daycare on Friday (or 3:00pm if the child is not attending school or daycare on that day) until the commencement of school or day care on Monday (or 9:00am if the child is not attending school or daycare on that day).
2. Unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing, for the purpose of Order 6 of these Orders:

(a) On days that the child is attending school or day care, changeover is to occur at the child's school or day care;

(b) On days that the child is not attending school or day care, changeover is to occur at McDonalds restaurant located at S Street, Suburb T, NSW;

(c) The Mother shall provide the Father with a copy of her travel tickets and itinerary details at least seven (7) days prior to time commencing in accordance with Order 6 of these Orders; and

(d) The Mother shall be responsible for all costs associated with her travel to spend time with the child.

1. Unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parents, the Father is to facilitate video calls between the child and the Mother each Wednesday and Sunday at 6:00pm NSW time using the WhatsApp app or another agreed platform.
2. For the purposes of Order 8 of these Orders, the Father is to initiate the call to the Mother and if the Mother misses the call, the Mother is to return the call within 15 minutes.
3. If the child is not otherwise in their care on special occasions including but not limited to the child's birthday, Christmas Day, Easter Sunday, Mother's Day and Father's Day, each parent may communicate with the child by video call at 6:00pm using the WhatsApp app or another agreed platform and the parent with care of the child shall facilitate the call.

Time and communication if the mother returns to NSW

1. If the Mother lives within 50 kms of Town U, Orders 6 to 10 of these Orders are suspended and the child spend time with the Mother as follows, unless otherwise agreed in writing:

(a) In week 1: from the conclusion of daycare or school on Friday (or 3:00pm if the child is not attending school or daycare on that day) until the commencement of daycare or school on Monday (or 9:00am if the child is not attending school or daycare on that day);

(b) In week 2: from the conclusion of daycare or school on Wednesday (or 3:00pm if the child is not attending school on that day) until the commencement of daycare or school on Thursday (or 9:00am if the child is not attending school or daycare on that day).

1. Unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing, for the purpose of Order 11 of these Orders:

(a) On days that the child is attending school or day care, changeover is to occur at the child's school or day care;

(b) On non-school days, changeover is to occur at McDonalds restaurant located at S Street, Suburb T, NSW.

1. The parents are to communicate with one another about parenting arrangements for the child using the Appclose parenting application or another agreed application.
2. For the purpose of Order 13 of these Orders, each parent is to bear their own costs (if any) of subscribing to the parenting application.
3. In the event that the child suffers an illness or medical emergency that requires immediate medical attention whilst in either parent's care, that parent will as soon as practicable:

(a) Advise the other parent of the nature of the child's condition, including any diagnosis, treatment and prognosis;

(b) Advise the other parent of the full name and contact details for any health care practitioner or facility the child may attend upon for assessment or treatment;

(c) Authorise the health care practitioner or facility to contact the other parent in relation to the child's diagnosis, treatment and prognosis; and

(d) Provide to the practitioner or facility the other parent's contact telephone number and email address to facilitate the same.

1. For the purposes of communication between the parents, the parents are to keep each other informed of their residential address, email addresses and mobile phone numbers and are to advise one another of any changes to these details within forty eight (48) hours of the change occurring.
2. This Order shall act as an authority for each parent to:

(a) Make all reasonable enquiries of and communicate with the child's medical or health professionals;

(b) Provide a copy of these Orders to the child's school and/or daycare and to any medical and health professionals involved in the child's care;

(c) Attend any school and/or daycare attended by the child and communicate with the school and/or daycare staff;

(d) Receive copies of information from the child's school and/or daycare including information required to undertake home schooling, school reports, photographs and notices usually provided to parents, at their own expense; and

(e) Attend all functions and activities, including extra-curricular activities, to which parents are invited to attend.

1. Pursuant to s 11(1)(b)(i) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth), the Father is permitted to apply for or renew the child's Australian passport, without the consent of the Mother.
2. The child's passport is to be held by the Father.
3. Should the Mother give the Father notice of intention to travel in accordance with Order 24 of these Orders, the Father is to provide the child's passport to the Mother seven (7) days prior to her leaving the country with the child, and the Mother is to return the child's passport to the Father within seven (7) days of her return.
4. In the event the child's passport is required for booking the overseas travel intended by the Mother, then the Father is to provide the passport on receiving a written request to do so from the Mother, and the Mother is to return the passport to the Father within two (2) days.

1. Each parent is permitted to travel interstate with the child at any time when the child is ordinarily living with or spending time with them pursuant to these Orders provided that they notify the other parent in writing at least seven (7) days prior to the date of departure of:

(a) The location to which the child will travel; and

(b) The date and estimated time of the child's return.

1. Subject to the terms of Orders 25 and 26 of these Orders, the Father is permitted to take the child on overseas holidays once in each twelve (12) month period which encroaches on time when the child would usually be living with or spending time with the Mother.
2. Subject to the terms of Orders 25 and 26 of these Orders, the Mother is permitted to take the child on overseas holidays once in each twelve (12) month period which encroaches on time when the child would usually be living with the Father.
3. For the purposes of Orders 23 and 24 of these Orders, and unless otherwise agreed in writing between the parties:

(a) Orders 6 to 11 of these Orders are suspended for the duration of travel;

(b) The total period of travel:

(i) Will not exceed fifteen (15) days unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing;

(ii) Must include the Term 1, Term 2, Term 3 or Term 4 school holiday period; and

(iii) Unless otherwise agreed between the parents, will not encroach on the child's schooling;

(c) The travelling parent must:

(i) Not travel to a country which is not a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction;

(ii) No less than sixty (60) days prior to the intended date of departure, notify the non-travelling parent in writing of the dates of departure and return and the location/s to which the child will travel;

(iii) No less than fourteen (14) days prior to the intended date of departure, provide to the non-travelling parent copies of paid return airline tickets;

(iv) Maintain comprehensive travel insurance for the child for the total period of travel; and

(v) Inform the non-travelling parent of a method by which the child will be contactable for the duration of travel if not by the travelling parent's usual Australian mobile telephone number.

1. Unless otherwise agreed between the parents in writing, when the child is travelling either overseas or interstate, the travelling parent will facilitate the child's communication with the non-travelling parent by initiating communication with the non-travelling parent which, as much as reasonably practicable with respect to time differences, allows the child to communicate via video calls between the child and the non-travelling parent each Wednesday and Sunday at 6:00pm in the time zone in which the child is staying.
2. Subject to notice being provided in accordance with Order 25(c)(ii) of these Orders, each parent is to do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to facilitate the travelling parent's travel with the child.

1. The parties are to each continue to engage with their treating psychologists and/or mental health practitioners for as long as recommended by those practitioners, and must follow treatment plans as advised by such practitioners.

1. Pursuant to s 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and for the personal protection of the child X born in 2022 ("the child"), the parents MR PITTMAN born in 1993 and MS PITTMAN born in 1994 are restrained from:

(a) Using illicit substances or drinking alcohol to excess within a period of 24 hours prior to spending time with the child;

(b) Denigrating the other parent, the other parent's partner, or their extended family in the presence or hearing of the child or permitting the child to remain in the presence of any person doing so;

(c) Discussing these court proceedings with or in the presence or hearing of the child or permitting the child to remain in the presence of any person doing so; and/or

(d) Physically disciplining the child.

1. The Mother pay the Independent Children's Lawyers costs fixed in the sum of $24,000 within sixty (60) days of the date of these Orders.
2. The Father pay the Independent Children's Lawyers costs fixed in the sum of $12,000 within sixty (60) days of the date of these Orders.
3. Any party other than the Independent Children's Lawyer seeking an order for costs in their favour must file and serve the following within twenty-eight (28) days of the date of these Orders:

(a) An Application in a Proceeding particularising the order or orders sought; and

(b) A supporting affidavit limited to ten (10) A4 pages.

1. Pursuant to section 68C of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), a police officer may arrest without warrant if he/she holds reasonable belief that the order for personal protection in Order 29 of these Orders has been breached.
2. Pursuant to ss 65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the particulars of the obligations these Orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these Orders are set out in Attachment A and these particulars are included in these Orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are parenting proceedings between the Applicant Father Mr Pittman ("the father") and the Respondent Mother Ms Pittman ("the mother") concerning their child X born in 2022 ("the child").
2. The proceedings commenced when the father filed an Application for Final Orders on 2 July 2024, citing urgency in circumstances where the mother had unilaterally relocated the child from New South Wales ("NSW") to Adelaide in South Australia.
3. Following a lengthy and involved procedural history, the final hearing took place before me between 2 to 5 September 2025 in Parramatta and on 23 September 2025 in Hobart via audio-visual link.
4. The central issue for the Court to decide is whether the child remains primarily living with the mother in South Australia or should live primarily with the father in NSW.
5. Each party sought an order for sole decision making about major long-term issues for the child. No party sought a coercive order requiring the non-primary carer of the child to relocate to live in the location where the Court ordered the child should live with his primary carer.
6. Other parenting orders to be made based on the parties' respective positions will follow from the central determination or are largely agreed.

1. In addressing the issues and determining what parenting orders are in the best interests of the child, the principles of law are well established. Parenting cases determined after 6 May 2024 are to be determined pursuant to the provisions in Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") as amended by the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth).
2. These provisions require the Court to make parenting orders consistent with the objects in s 60B of the Act and that are in the child's best interests according to the non-exhaustive, non-hierarchical considerations in ss 60B, 60CA and 60CC(1), (2) and (3) of the Act, and the discretionary evaluation of the same.[1]
3. The mother's case was premised on the claim that she moved with the child to Adelaide to escape alleged perpetration of family violence by the father.
4. The Court is required to make parenting orders that promote the safety and welfare of the child.[2] The assessment of risk of harm to a child remains informed by the principles established in MRR & GR [2010] HCA 4, Isles & Nelissen [2021] FedCFamC1F 295 and Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97.
5. The meaning of family violence is provided for in s 4AB of the Act and includes behaviour that coerces or controls. Jurisprudence is evolving in relation to the interpretation of s 4AB of the Act and the meaning of coercion or control. As to the latter, the following legal principles are relevant:

(a) Coercion is defined as "to restrain or constrain by force, law or authority", "to force or compel as to something" and "compel by forceable action";[3]

(b) Control is defined relevantly as "to exercise restraint or direction over" and "to dominate or command";[4]

(c) Although coercion or control is expressed disjunctively in the Act, the concepts are related and form part of an expanded concept of exercising power to restrain another or to cause another to act by force, domination or command;

(d) Where the result of conduct is an exercise of power by force, domination or command, it constitutes coercion or control and amounts to family violence under the Act;[5]

(e) Coercion or control may encompass conduct that is not physical assault or violence, but mere assertion that the conduct is coercive or controlling does not make it so;[6]

(f) Mere disagreement does not automatically equate to family violence and the disagreement must derive from, and be informed by, its form, intensity, context, and impact on a person;[7]

(g) The context in which conduct occurs is relevant to the assessment of whether there has been coercion or control.[8] I also consider the context in which statements are made to be relevant because restraint, direction, or domination by force may be achieved by verbal interaction, including threatening statements; and

(h) Intention on the part of the perpetrator is not a necessary component of family violence, including coercion or control, but the conduct or statements must be designed to dominate or intended to control.[9]

1. The Full Court of Appeal in Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249 ("Pickford") addressed family violence as a consideration which must be taken into account when determining a child's best interests. Members of the Court appeared to broadly agree that family violence as defined by s 4AB of the Act includes violent, threatening or other behaviour which either coerces or controls or which causes a family member to be fearful.
2. Where one parent seeks an order that the child relocate to live in a different location, it is common to refer to the matter as a "relocation case". Despite this, it is established that the Court's overriding task is to make parenting orders about residency and major long-term decision making that are consistent with the best interests of the child.[10]
3. Importantly, in determining what course is in the best interests of the child, the Court cannot hear the issue of relocation discretely from other applications as to with whom the child ought to live. In Taylor & Barker [2007] FamCA 1246 the Court stated:
   1. We agree that when dealing with a case concerning the future living arrangements for a child, and involving a significant change in the geographical place where the child is to live, the preferred approach according to established principle has been not to deal with that change, or relocation, as a separate or discrete issue, but rather as just one of the proposals for the child's future living arrangements, at least in so far as that approach is possible (see U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238; (2002) FLC 93-112 and Bolitho & Cohen [2005] FamCA 458; (2005) FLC 93-224).

1. The father filed an Outline of Case on 29 August 2025 and relied on the following documents:
   • Affidavit of the father filed 15 August 2025, subject to sections which he did not read (Exhibit A1);
   • The father's proof of evidence with annexures dated 2 September 2025 (Exhibit A2);
   • Hair analysis drug test relating to the father for a sample collected 14 August 2025 (Exhibit A3);
   • Financial Statement of the father filed 27 August 2025 (Exhibit A4);
   • Discharge summary for the child for a hospital admission in September 2024 (Exhibit A5);
   • Affidavit of the paternal aunt Ms V ("the paternal aunt") filed 15 August 2025 (Exhibit A6);
   • Annexures to the affidavit of the paternal aunt filed 15 August 2025 (Exhibit A7);
   • Affidavit of the paternal grandmother Mrs Pittman filed 14 August 2025 (Exhibit A8);
   • Annexures to the affidavit of the paternal grandmother filed 14 August 2025 (Exhibit A9);
   • Photographs of the child and the paternal family (Exhibit A10);
   • Affidavit of the father's partner Ms W filed 29 August 2025 (Exhibit A11);
   • Annexures A to X of the affidavit of the father filed 15 August 2025 (Exhibit A12);
   • Two-page text message exchange between the parties dated 13 June 2024 (Exhibit A13);
   • Police records dated February 2024 (Exhibit A14);
   • Emergency department records for the mother dated February 2024 (Exhibit A15);
   • A video recording of the child during a video call with the father (Exhibit A16);
   • South Australia Police record dated July 2024 (Exhibit A17);
   • Ambulance South Australia event chronology dated September 2024 (Exhibit A18);
   • Notes by a hospital social worker dated September 2024 (Exhibit A19);
   • Text exchange between the parties dated 27 to 29 October 2024 (Exhibit A20);
   • Text exchanges between mother and father commencing 28 July 2025 (Exhibit A21);
   • Domain.com.au advertisements for properties for rent within 50km of the father's residence (Exhibit A22);
   • Redacted report of consultant forensic psychologist Dr Y dated 6 March 2025 (Exhibit A23);
   • Summary of the mother's Centrelink payments (Exhibit A24); and
   • Email from P Daycare Centre to the mother dated 2 September 2024 (Exhibit A25).
2. The mother filed an Outline of Case on 30 August 2025 and relied on the following documents:
   • Affidavit of the maternal grandfather's partner Ms Z filed 1 September 2025 (Exhibit R1);
   • South Australia Ambulance Service Patient Clinical Record for the child dated September 2024 (Exhibit R2);
   • Drug and alcohol counselling notes for the father dated 12 July 2024 to 4 October 2024 (Exhibit R3);
   • Letter from Dr AA at G Medical Centre in respect of the child dated 28 October 2024 (Exhibit R4);
   • BB Centre session notes in respect of the mother dated 12 February 2024 (Exhibit R5);
   • Diagnostic Assessment Report from H Clinic in respect of the child dated 17 March 2025 (Exhibit R6);
   • Referral letter for the father from Dr CC to psychotherapist Ms DD dated 6 March 2024 (Exhibit R7);
   • Affidavit of the mother filed 26 August 2025, subject to the parts which have been struck out (Exhibit R8);
   • Annexures to the affidavit of the mother filed 26 August 2025, subject to the parts which have been struck out (Exhibit R9);
   • Hair analysis drug test relating to the mother for a sample collected 8 August 2024 (Exhibit R10);
   • Letter from physiotherapists Ms EE and Ms FF, undated (Exhibit R11);
   • N Centre Occupational Therapy Assessment Report for the child dated 23 September 2024 (Exhibit R12);
   • Electroencephalography (EEG) Report for the child dated 20 October 2024 (Exhibit R13);
   • Department of Child Protection South Australia s 91B Response Report dated 16 December 2024 (Exhibit R14);
   • L Centre Physiotherapy Report Summary for the child dated 31 January 2025 (Exhibit R15);
   • H Clinic Multidisciplinary Diagnostic Assessment Report for the child dated 17 March 2025 (Exhibit R16);
   • Letter from O Clinic regarding the child's diagnosis and presenting issues dated 11 May 2023 (Exhibit R17);
   • BB Centre Domestic Violence Safety Assessment Tool dated 12 February 2024 (Exhibit R18);
   • Email from Q Centre dated 27 June 2024 regarding an appointment for the child (Exhibit R19);
   • Financial Statement of the mother filed 25 August 2025 (Exhibit R20);
   • Affidavit of the ICL filed 15 August 2025, including all annexures (Exhibit R21);
   • National Disability Insurance Scheme ("NDIS") plan for the child dated 14 August 2024 (Exhibit R22);
   • Payslips for the father dated 26 July 2025 and 28 August 2025 (Exhibit R23);
   • Counselling notes of clinical psychologist Ms R in respect of the mother (Exhibit R24);
   • Affidavit of the maternal grandmother Ms GG ("the maternal grandmother") filed 19 August 2025 (Exhibit R25);
   • Affidavit of the maternal grandfather Mr HH ("the maternal grandfather") filed 18 August 2025 (Exhibit R26);
3. The ICL filed an Outline Case on 30 August 2025 and relied on the following documents:
   • Letter from G Medical Centre dated 4 July 2025 (Exhibit ICL1);
   • Annexure A to the affidavit of ICL dated 28 August 2025, being a physiotherapy report (Exhibit ICL2);
   • Attendance note of Dr PP regarding the father dated 26 February 2024 (Exhibit ICL3);
   • Affidavit of ICL filed 15 August 2025, including annexed speech pathology report (Exhibit ICL4);
   • Email chain between the mother and Ms R titled 'Psychiatrist Report' dated 15 to 19 May 2025 (Exhibit ICL5);
   • Letter to the Court dated 14 November 2024 and a summary of departmental information regarding Mr QQ from the Department for Child Protection South Australia (Exhibit ICL6);
   • RR Centre Record (Exhibit ICL7);
   • Receipt of attendance for Hair Follicle Test for the mother on 13 August 2025 (Exhibit ICL8);
   • Counselling notes of Ms R in respect of the mother dated 11 February 2025 (Exhibit ICL9);
   • Email exchanges between the mother's solicitor and developmental psychologist Ms B dated 4 September 2025 (Exhibit ICL10);
   • Email enquiry and responses regarding Ms B dated 10 September 2025 (Exhibit ICL11);
   • Email enquiry and responses regarding paediatrician Dr E dated 10 September 2025 (Exhibit ICL12);
   • Email enquiry and responses regarding paediatrician Dr F dated 10 September 2025 (Exhibit ICL13);
   • Curriculum vitae for social worker Ms C (Exhibit ICL14);
   • Documents in Annexure A to the Orders made 11 September 2025 and index (Exhibit ICL15); and
   • The redacted Family Report dated 23 April 2025 ("the Family Report") authored by Court Child Expert Ms SS ("the CCE") (Exhibit ICL16).

1. The evidence of the parties and their witnesses in chief and under cross-examination, along with the extensive documents before the Court, reveal that the following facts are either agreed or not in dispute:

(a) The father is aged 32 years and is a tradesperson. He presently resides in Town U, NSW, in a separate residence located on the property owned by the paternal grandmother and her partner;

(b) The father has repartnered with Ms W, but they do not reside together;

(c) The mother is aged 31 years and is not working outside the home. She presently resides with the child in Adelaide, South Australia, with the maternal grandfather and his partner;

(d) The mother repartnered with Mr QQ during the course of these proceedings, however that relationship has ended;

(e) The maternal grandmother resides in City TT, NSW, and the mother's brothers also reside in NSW;

(f) The paternal extended family, including the paternal grandmother, all reside in NSW;

(g) The parties commenced cohabitation in 2016 and married in 2020;

(h) The parties finally separated in mid-2024, but they disagree about the precise date. They are not divorced at the time of the hearing;

(i) The child was born prematurely in 2022 and experienced seizures within hours of his birth. He was transferred to UU Hospital for specialist treatment and was diagnosed as having suffered a stroke;

(j) The child has significant and extensive medical diagnoses, including cerebral palsy, autism, and global developmental delay;

(k) The child is presently engaged with a number of therapists in South Australia and was engaged in therapy in NSW prior to relocating. He will require ongoing therapy into the future;

(l) Both parties used illicit substances and alcohol during the relationship, but the extent and impact of this is somewhat disputed by each of them;

(m) In February 2024, the mother was admitted to hospital due to an episode of psychosis after police attended the parties' residence in Town VV in Region WW;

(n) On about May 2024, there was an altercation between the parties while they were attending a wedding in Region XX. While the parties are in dispute as to the precise details, they agree that there was an argument in the car while travelling which continued once they reached their accommodation;

(o) On about May 2024, the father engaged in self-harm after the mother confronted him about his alleged infidelity. The parties agree that this incident occurred, but they dispute the precise details of the incident, including whether the mother incited self-harm by the father;

(p) In May 2024, the mother travelled with the child to South Australia. The father was aware that they were travelling, and both parties state that it was not intended as a permanent move at that time;

(q) In June 2024, without notifying the father in advance, the mother and child returned to Adelaide to reside with the maternal grandfather and his partner. They have not returned to reside in NSW;

(r) On 30 August 2024, a Senior Judicial Registrar ("SJR") conducted an interim hearing in these proceedings and made interim orders that the mother return the child to reside in NSW by 20 September 2024;

(s) In September 2024, the child was admitted to hospital in South Australia by ambulance. He was diagnosed as having experienced a tonic clonic seizure;

(t) In September 2024, the father and the paternal aunt travelled to South Australia and attended the hospital to which the child had been taken by ambulance;

(u) On 2 October 2024, the mother filed an Application for Review seeking a review of the order made 30 August 2024 that she return the child to NSW and she also filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking a stay of the same order;

(v) On 4 October 2024, the SJR stayed the orders requiring the mother to return the child to NSW pending determination of the Application for Review;

(w) After a period of prolix interlocutory proceedings and case management, the Application for Review was listed before me on 28 May 2025 for hearing and determination. On 13 June 2025, I delivered oral reasons for judgment and made orders allowing the review and I discharged the order for the mother to return the child to NSW. I also made interim orders for the child to have unsupervised time with the father in South Australia and listed the proceedings for final hearing;

(x) The father has travelled to Adelaide to spend time with the child on the following occasions, in accordance with various interim orders made by the Court:

(i) September 2024 while the child was in hospital;

(ii) 25 September 2024;

(iii) 28 October 2024;

(iv) 8-10 April 2025 at the time of the Family Report Interviews;

(v) 20-22 June 2025;

(vi) 11-13 July 2025; and

(vii) 1-3 August 2025;

(y) The child also spent time with the father in NSW during the Christmas period in 2024; and

(z) The mother has stated that she will not return to NSW to live if the Court makes orders that the child return to NSW.

1. The Outline of Case filed on the father's behalf does not explicitly address the considerations set out in s 60CC of the Act which the Court must take into account for the purpose of determining whether it is in the child's best interests to return to live in NSW with the father.
2. It can be discerned from the Outline of Case and the oral submissions in closing made by Counsel for the father that he relies on the contention that the mother's relocation of the child's residence to Adelaide without the father's knowledge or consent, delay in filing a review application, and seeking a stay of the interim orders demonstrate that the mother will cause emotional harm to the child or risk of such harm by:

(a) Not supporting a meaningful relationship between the child and father or between the child and the extended paternal family; and

(b) Not including the father in major or long-term decision making.

1. Further, he contends that although a return to reside in NSW will cause some disruption to the child, it will not cause harm or risk of harm as the treatment and therapeutic supports the child requires can be replicated in NSW. In addition, he contends that it will also ensure the child has unconditional and loving relationships with the father, the paternal extended family, the maternal grandmother, and other members of the maternal family who reside in NSW, which will be of great benefit to the child's wellbeing.
2. In essence, the father submits that his proposal for the child to return to reside in NSW with him is in the child's best interests. This is because, if the child remains in Adelaide, he will be harmed due to:
   • The mother's lack of insight about the importance of the child's relationships with father and the paternal family; and
   • Inability to maintain a relationship with the father as he cannot sustain meeting the financial cost of regular travel from NSW to South Australia.
3. The father contends that the views of the CCE should be accepted and that they fully support his contentions.
4. The mother's Outline of Case addresses the considerations s 60CC of the Act in more detail. Her Counsel expanded on those, and the ultimate contention is that it is in the child's best interests to remain living with the mother in the maternal grandfather's home in Adelaide.
5. In particular, she relies on the following considerations and contentions:

(a) The father has perpetrated family violence towards her and in the presence of the child, which poses risk of physical and emotional harm to the child and has impacted on her mental health;

(b) It was necessary to remove herself and the child from family violence, inconsistent care, and exposure to alcohol and drug abuse by the father, in order to protect the child's safety;

(c) She has actively engaged the child with occupational therapy, physiotherapy, speech therapy, and dieticians in South Australia. She is following recommendations for ongoing and upcoming treatments.[11] This demonstrates a good capacity to meet the particular needs of the child, given his diagnoses;

(d) She is able to make major long-term decisions for the child, she involves the father in the child's therapies, and is able to communicate about those with the father;

(e) Collaboration between parents and professionals is required to meet the child's needs, but the paternal family has been inconsistent with care and collaboration. This poses a risk to the child if he were to live with the father; and

(f) The orders she seeks should be made as they focus on protecting the child from violence and substance abuse while ensuring he receives optimum and consistent care to support his development.

THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT ABOUT DISPUTED CONSIDERATIONS

1. As both parties were cross-examined at length, the Court had a good opportunity to assess their candour. Both Counsel for the ICL and the Counsel for the father made closing submissions impugning the credit of the mother. It is permissible for a judge to use demeanour and contradictions or inconsistencies in a witness's evidence when making factual findings.[12] Both parties admit that there were times leading up to the relationship breakdown when they were influenced by illicit substances and that causes me to be cautious about the reliability of their evidence. It is safer to look to third-party accounts and objective documentary evidence to resolve relevant key disputed facts.
2. However, where the mother's evidence contradicts that of the father and there is no objective evidence to assist in resolving the conflict, I prefer the father's evidence in part for the reasons submitted by Counsel for the ICL and because the mother has engaged in greater impression management by selectively presenting information to the Court and reformulating likely events. For example:
   • Stating parts of her evidence in chief were "her truth" or "a truth" when challenged and forced to make concessions that she had not been accurate in her affidavit;
   • Claiming she had not reported sexual assault by the father to BB Centre because of embarrassment as the maternal grandfather was present, when the maternal grandfather stated he was not, which I accept;
   • By solely attributing her mental health symptoms to the father's alleged family violence and neglecting to inform her clinical psychologist Ms R about PTSD symptoms she experienced from the time of the child's birth, when this prior history was relevant to the cause of her mental health symptoms;
   • Maintaining that the father had perpetrated family violence towards her for a number of years during the relationship, including sexual abuse, but stating otherwise when she gave contemporaneous reports to the social worker at YY Hospital, her father, and in turn BB Centre in February 2024;[13]
   • Diminishing the seriousness of her condition during the incident in February 2024 and seeking to convey that she voluntarily attended YY Hospital when, in fact, ambulance officers who attended on her exercised s 20 of the Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) to involuntarily transport the mother to the hospital, where she was presenting with erratic and paranoid thoughts.[14]
3. The father presented genuinely and mostly made appropriate concessions readily, even when they were damaging to his case. The way he made concessions about family violence was genuine and he demonstrated remorse and acknowledgement that the conduct was harmful or hurtful to the mother. By contrast, despite the mother also making admissions about family violence, albeit more reluctantly, she demonstrated no remorse and was defensive. She deflected responsibility solely to the father.
4. The paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt were cross-examined and their evidence was not strongly challenged except in relation to whether they had assisted with the care of the child, could do so in the future, and regarding the events surrounding the child's hospitalisation in September 2024.
5. Despite the cross-examination, they maintained their evidence in chief. While they demonstrated a cautious attitude towards the mother, consistent with the views of the CCE discussed below, they did not demonstrate a resentment for the mother. Instead, they were concerned with the welfare and happiness of the child.
6. In the paternal aunt's evidence, she frankly conceded having reservations about whether the child's hospitalisation in September 2024 was genuine or for strategic reasons. This is understandable because, unlike the father, she has not had the benefit of access to the hospital and ambulance records. I do not consider it reflects a malevolence towards the mother but rather protectiveness for the father regarding the impact on him and the family of the removal of the child from NSW.
7. The evidence of the maternal grandfather was only challenged to a limited degree. Overall, the evidence reflects difficulties within the parties' marriage commenced from early 2024 and, not surprisingly, his evidence relies on the mother's accounts to him. Otherwise, I accept, because it was not challenged, his evidence about the support and assistance he provided to the mother between early 2024 and when the mother moved with the child to Adelaide. However, it is apparent that he is absent from the home in Adelaide for four days a week, and also that his partner is absent for four days a fortnight and that she works full time in the other week. The result of this is that the support he actually provides is less than initially portrayed.
8. The maternal grandfather was less critical of the father than the maternal grandmother was and his evidence appeared to be more balanced.
9. The maternal grandmother's evidence in chief was not strongly challenged, however she impressed as protective and partial of the mother. It also included inferential opinions or conclusions to which I give little weight. Importantly, through cross-examination, it was demonstrated that she had been very involved in assisting the parents care for the child and that the child had a very close bond with her until the mother relocated with him. Now, she has only spent limited time with him due to distance and the cost of travel.
10. Consistent with other evidence, the maternal grandmother places the mother's difficulties with the father as occurring from early 2024. The disparagement of the father's character was not challenged, but I reject her evidence that the father does not love the child or show affection towards him because it is entirely inconsistent with other evidence, the CCE's observations, and the genuine comfort and affection displayed in photographs before the Court.
11. The evidence contained in the affidavit of the maternal grandfather's partner was received unchallenged. It is essentially corroborative of the maternal grandfather's evidence about the support they provide to the mother, but it is of limited value to determining the case in light of the evidence which the maternal grandfather gave.

FAMILY VIOLENCE, ARRANGEMENTS FOR SAFETY AND OTHER IMPACTS ON WELL-BEING[15]

1. I find that the father perpetrated family violence because at various points of his evidence he conceded the following and that his actions caused the mother to feel afraid:
   • He called the mother offensive names during arguments, including "cunt", "bitch", "slut", and "piece of shit";
   • He threw objects in the presence of the mother, which he conceded may have caused her to be fearful for her safety;
   • On 5 February 2024, he physically restrained the mother in a "tight hug" when she attempted to leave the property;
   • In 2019, he punched a wall, which caused damage;
   • In June 2024, he said to the mother words to the effect, "If we keep this up, one of us will die";
   • When staying at an Airbnb property in April 2021, he put his hand over the mother's mouth to make her "be quiet and calm down";
   • On two occasions, he self-harmed in the presence of the mother by cutting himself with a blade. On one of these occasions, the child was also present; and
   • In early February 2024, during an argument, the father abruptly stopped the car in which the parties were travelling by engaging the handbrake. The child was in the car at the time.
2. The mother first raised allegations that the father had sexually abused her when she spoke with the CCE.[16] She did not report any sexual abuse during her attendance at YY Hospital in February 2024. From the content of the hospital record, I infer that she was explicitly asked about whether there had been physical abuse and said there had not been. When the mother engaged with the BB Centre for family violence support, she reported specific forms of physical abuse, but not sexual abuse.
3. The mother claimed during cross-examination that she was not ready to disclose her alleged sexual abuse by the father until it was mentioned to the CCE. The mother's particularised allegations of sexual assault contained within her trial affidavit are very serious and date from 2021, but there is no independent corroborative evidence of them.[17] Reputable publications of which judges of this Court are aware identify that victims of family violence, including intimate sexual abuse, may not disclose them for various reasons and I take this into account.[18] However, having carefully considered the allegations, they do not appear to be reliable for the following reasons:

(a) On direct enquiry to the mother at YY Hospital and when identifying family violence to the BB Centre in early 2024, the mother did not mention sexual abuse;

(b) The mother's explanation that she was embarrassed to disclose it to BB Centre because her father was present is undermined because I accept his evidence that he was not;

(c) The mother's evidence is that it mostly occurred when both parties used drugs,[19] meaning that recollection and cognition about what occurred were likely impaired;

(d) The mother can frame events as "her truth" or "a truth"; and

(e) The civil standard of proof applies in parenting proceedings, but the Briginshaw principles are applicable due to the seriousness of the allegation. [20]

1. I also accept the submission on behalf of the ICL[21] that the unsatisfactory aspects of the mother's evidence render the opinion of Ms R about the alleged sexual abuse by the father to have no value as corroboration. I also reject the mother's evidence that she was not ready to disclose her allegations of sexual abuse to Ms R until June 2025.
2. Weighing all the evidence concerning the mother's allegations of sexual abuse and for the reasons stated at [40] to [42] of these reasons, I am not persuaded to the requisite standard that it occurred as she alleges. However, I do not discount the possibility that it did. Regardless, the parties' permanent separation and the respectful nature of their relationship, as observed by the CCE and reflected in the mother's evidence, renders the risk of such conduct in the future negligible. It does not weigh materially in relation to the risk of harm to the child in the father's care looking forward.[22]
3. I am satisfied that the mother perpetrated family violence because, when cross-examined, she admitted the following:
   • Verbal slurs and abuse of the father;
   • Punching and hitting the father, qualified with the statement that it was in attempts to defend herself;
   • Pushing the father;
   • Punching a hole in the wall and throwing things, in reference to her "becoming the angry one" in the presence of the father and/or the child.
4. The parties agreed that the father had self-harmed in May 2024 in the presence of the mother when they fought after the mother alleged that the father was unfaithful due to a message she found on his mobile phone.. Either parties' account of what occurred is indicative of extreme heightened emotions and I prefer the father's account of this event. This incident coincided with the father having been away from the home and it is entirely plausible that as a person with impulsive personality, as she conceded, that the mother would behave in the manner the father describes upon finding the message, being explosive, spiteful and encouraging him to self-harm. The father's account is also consistent with the mother's admission to the CCE that she "became the angry one".[23]
5. The mother's evidence about the incident in June 2024 which she describes in her affidavit filed 26 August 2025 at [104] was selective, and through cross-examination it was demonstrated that the mother became violent and assaulted Ms ZZ. This was in response to a verbal slur about the child by Ms ZZ. Nonetheless, the violence the mother admitted reflects impulsivity and capacity to be violent and cause harm.
6. The father impressed as genuinely impacted by the mother's conduct and statements which coerced or instigated self-harm in May 2024. The mother's conduct during this incident constitutes violent and coercive conduct amounting to family violence.
7. While the father was frank, open, and remorseful when making concessions about his conduct amounting to family violence, the mother was not in respect of her family violence conduct.
8. Regrettably, each party behaved far from commendably towards one another in the period prior to separation. I accept that there was a power and size imbalance between the parties, as the father conceded, which contributed to the mother's fear of the father during the admitted acts of family violence. I also appreciate that the context of the mother's conduct may in part have been to protect herself or in retaliation, but that was not the case when she encouraged the father to self-harm, behaviour which is highly concerning in relation to what harm the mother is capable of inciting.

1. Based on the mother's evidence under cross-examination in respect of the views of Dr Y, which were admitted into evidence in a redacted report,[24] the mother had pre-existing anxiety and PTSD symptoms related to the circumstances of the child's traumatic birth. This was not disclosed to her treating psychologist Ms R. When cross-examined, Ms R was firm that the symptoms of PTSD could be triggered by different factors or causes and, by inference, are distinguishable. This evidence was given to defend the opinion that the mother's mental health difficulties were entirely attributable to the father's family violence.
2. I give the opinion of Ms R about this less weight because she is not an independent expert and, in any event, because there has been no family violence since the parties separation it is less likely to explain the mother's mental health symptoms presently. It is also implausible that the father's family violence triggers the mother's symptoms of PTSD given her statements to the CCE.
3. Furthermore, the risk of family violence between the parties in the future is extremely low and, accordingly, do not trigger impairing symptoms. Ms R acknowledged this when she stated that the mother's capacity to care for the child was not impaired and that she could facilitate in-person changeovers.
4. The significance of Dr Y's opinion, based on what the mother stated to him as truth, is that the mother has not been frank in giving her mental health history to Ms R. This impugns the value of Ms R's evidence.
5. Ultimately, the evidence establishes that the mother has mental health symptoms, the cause of which are likely multi-factorial, but any risk of psychological harm to the mother in the future is unlikely to be because of family violence perpetrated by the father.
6. Noting the information in the father's psychological records and the father's own evidence, I find that the father used drugs and experienced mental health symptoms proximate to and following the breakdown of the relationship. I accept that there is some risk of the father relapsing into illicit substance use as it is he who had access to these during the relationship given his statement to his psychotherapist.[25] There is also some risk of the father abusing alcohol as a maladaptive coping mechanism.
7. I find that the drug test results and oral testimony before the Court demonstrate that both parties have ceased using illicit drugs and there is no evidence such conduct continues. The father's engagement in drug and alcohol counselling promotes his abstinence and protects against misuse.
8. However, the fact that the father is in a stable and healthy personal relationship with his partner and has engaged in psychological counselling satisfies me that the risk of relapse is very low for both alcohol and illicit substances. The support of his close-knit family will also deter the father from relapse and I am satisfied they would act to ensure the child was safe, in the event of relapse.
9. There was no real contest between the parties about each party having some ongoing and modest mental health symptoms and that each party is seeking adequate treatment for the same. I am satisfied that, while treated, neither party's symptoms materially diminish their parenting capacity.
10. These conclusions are also supported by the unchallenged evidence that there have been largely uneventful visits and interactions between the mother and father since mid-2024. Indeed, the mother told the CCE that she did not hold concerns for her safety in the presence of the father and she has also spent time with him alone.[26]

PARENTING CAPACITY OF EACH PARENT AND RELATED ABILITY TO MEET THE CHILD'S NEEDS[27]

1. The child will soon be four years old. During his first year, I find that the mother was his primary carer, but the mother's own evidence in chief and that of the maternal grandmother support the father's evidence that he too was involved in assisting with care after the mother returned to work following maternity leave. Before and after the mother returned to work, the grandparents, particularly the maternal grandmother, assisted with the child's care.
2. Once the mother moved with the child to Adelaide, she became the primary carer assisted by the maternal grandfather as of necessity because the father remained living in NSW and the mother had acted without his consent.
3. The evidence does not bear out the implied criticisms made of the mother concerning failure or delay in engaging the child with necessary supports and treatment in Adelaide. The volumes of medical records and reports in evidence establish that soon after moving to Adelaide, the mother arranged transfer of information from the NSW treating practitioners, and for the child to attend consultations with a paediatrician, physiotherapist, speech therapist, dietician, and occupational therapist. In March 2025, a full assessment was undertaken by Ms B, leading to a formal autism diagnosis. Also, the mother's evidence of regular home exercises and therapy was not disputed. Relevantly, the child's previous paediatrician Dr E was not concerned about the treatment and therapy with which the mother had engaged the child in Adelaide.
4. The evidence of the CCE is particularly relevant to the capacity of the mother to meet the child's emotional, psychological and developmental needs. She was of the view that the mother fails to recognise the importance of the child having a meaningful relationship with the father and paternal family, such as the one from which he previously benefited.
5. Despite vigorous cross-examination by Counsel for the mother, the CCE maintained her views, and I accept them. The criticism of the CCE's qualifications and experience were unjustified, particularly because she confined herself to opinions within her field of expertise and properly declined to address those beyond it. In summary, the CCE's views were as follows:

(a) The father and paternal family have had a loving and close relationship with the child, who has particularly enjoyed playing with his cousin AB. The paternal family is close-knit, supportive and regularly gathers for family events in which the child previously engaged;

(b) The child would likely have experienced confusion when removed from the environment and connections in NSW, given his young age and limited language skills;

(c) Neither parent has continued any abusive or intimidating behaviour towards the other post-separation, and neither were afraid of the other;[28]

(d) Even if the Court accepts the mother's allegation of family violence perpetrated by the father, it would not be unsafe or distressing for the mother to return to NSW with the child;[29]

(e) Both parents were able, to some extent, to recognise the impact their substance use had on their capacity to parent the child in the past and how it may have impacted on the child;[30]

(f) The father acknowledged the importance of the child maintaining a relationship with the mother, while the mother minimised the importance of the child's relationship with the father and the paternal family;[31]

(g) The relationships of the child with the father and paternal family members is important to his sense of belonging and identity, especially given their previous closeness and the social difficulties which he may encounter as a result of his medical conditions;

(h) The mother has engaged the child in appropriate medical supports in South Australia, and the CCE has no concerns about the father's capacity or willingness to appropriately support the child's medical needs;[32]

(i) It is in the child's best interests for the parents to jointly make decisions for him, and during the assessments they were able to communicate respectfully and did not present as afraid. The dynamic between them was not so adversarial that they would not be able to effectively coparent;

(j) In the context of the child's hospitalisation in Adelaide in September 2024, the paternal family, including the father, spoke sympathetically about the mother and did not express resentment towards her; and

(k) The mother presented as having difficulty separating the child's needs from her own.

1. The CCE observed that the child was happy, relaxed, and engaged with the father, the paternal grandmother, and the paternal aunt. He also showed signs of comfort and affection with them. Ultimately, the CCE recommended that:
   • The child live with the mother in NSW and spend overnight time with the father at least once a week, and in the event that the mother does not relocate to NSW with the child, she supports the child living with the father in NSW;[33] and
   • The parents share decision-making responsibilities for the child and are both involved in his medical and allied health care.[34]
2. Because I accept the totality of the CCE's views, I find that the mother has demonstrated very limited understanding of the child's emotional, psychological, and developmental needs by removing him from NSW and thereby preventing or obstructing regular interactions and communications between the child, the father, the paternal family, and even her own family members in NSW. Prior to this, I am satisfied that the child benefited from spending regular and meaningful time with the maternal grandmother and the paternal extended family, at least up until about February 2024.
3. I am also satisfied that the paternal grandmother, paternal aunt, and other paternal family assisted in caring for the child from time to time, that they spent family time with him, and that they expressed love, support and protection for him. This was of benefit to the child.
4. The mother's evidence under cross-examination about the Tik Tok post[35] was unimpressive. I am satisfied it is likely that the mother was referring to both the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt when she stated "2 down, 1 to go", reflective of the mother's unjustified spiteful attitude towards the paternal family. It is indicative of the unjustified distain that the mother holds for the paternal family, and it is likely that she will not speak positively of the paternal family to the child and will prevent or not encourage communication and time between them.
5. I find that while in the mother's care in Adelaide, the child has had very limited socialisation with his peers as his time has been spent almost exclusively with the mother and with the maternal grandfather and his partner when they are not at work. This likely has adversely impacted on the child's development and well-being.
6. I accept that the father was considerably involved in caring for the child during the relationship, despite the mother's evidence, because of the level of knowledge and understanding his evidence displayed about the child's needs. The love and bond he has with the child manifested genuinely and strongly during giving evidence, consistent with the observations of the CCE. Had the father been minimally involved with the child, it is unlikely that the child's presentation would have been as it was during the interviews for the Family Report.
7. Further, I accept the father's evidence about the enquiries he has made and arrangements that can be put in place in NSW to provide treatment and therapy to the child. However, it is apparent that the father will need to rely on the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt to a degree to facilitate those appointments as the father stated he intends to continue to work as a tradesperson.
8. I do not accept that the father will always be able to take leave from his employment to attend to appointments and to meet all the child's needs. He will need help, even though I accept that he will have some flexibility from his employer. If living in NSW with the father, the child would attend childcare and school for several hours on days during the week, but not infrequently the father will have to call on his family members to take the child to and from childcare or school, to provide early morning care, and to provide transport to and engagement with treatment or therapy. The father is in a relationship with Ms W, but it is unlikely she will be available to be a regular co-carer as she works full-time and does not reside with the father.
9. Having heard the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt give evidence, I do not accept the criticisms of them made by the mother or by Counsel for the mother during his submissions. I accept as genuine and real their intent and capacity to assist the father in meeting the child's physical, emotional, and treatment needs. The paternal family is close-knit, has great experience in parenting and raising children, and they cooperate and support one another. I find that they are highly motivated to be available to assist with care and appointments because of their love for and bond with the child.
10. The arrangement the father proposes to meet the child's needs has not yet been tested, but it is notable that the arrangement is not dissimilar to the type of co-operative care arrangement the parents had previously with the maternal grandmother, which by all accounts was satisfactory to all.
11. Based on the above factual findings, I accept that the father has capacity to meet the child's physical, developmental and emotional needs in concert with his family. Nevertheless, if this proves unmanageable, I accept the father's evidence during cross-examination that he would give up his employment to be a full-time carer, and that he would be capable in that role.

BENEFIT TO THE CHILD OF RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER PARENT AND THEIR EXTENDED FAMILY, INCLUDING ABILITY TO PROMOTE THE SAME[36]

1. The benefit to the child of a relationship with each parent was the subject of the CCE's evidence and was not particularly challenged and I accept it.[37]
2. The mother maintained throughout these proceedings, until her Counsel's closing submissions, that the father's time with the child should be supervised, despite giving evidence that she:
   • Is not now fearful of the father;
   • Has communicated with him since separation without real difficulty;
   • Told the CCE that she had no concern about being in the presence of the father;
   • Spent time with the father and child alone in December 2024;
   • Requested that the father travel to Adelaide in July 2024 as she "could really do with a familiar face";[38]
   • Requested that the father travel to Adelaide to assist her with the care of the child in January 2025;[39] and
   • Has been able to comply with the orders for the child to spend time with the father without supervision since the orders made on 13 June 2025.
3. The incongruity between the mother's evidence and her prosecution of orders for supervised time demonstrates either a lack of insight as to the importance of the child's relationship with the father or deliberate interference with their once meaningful, loving, and bonded relationship. The evidence also impugns the veracity of the mother's claims that she was forced or justified in relocating unilaterally because of family violence.
4. Furthermore, despite the mother's allegations of family violence and attribution of her symptoms of PTSD or anxiety to that experience, on the basis of what the mother told Dr Y and the contents of his report, it is clear that the cause of her symptoms is multifactorial. However, the mother unfairly sought to attribute entire blame to the father until her evidence was discredited by cross-examination.
5. I accept that the mother experiences mental health symptoms, including anxiety, but based on the opinion of her treating psychologist Ms R, I am satisfied that the mother is able to tolerate her symptoms and that they do not interfere with her capacity to care for the child or facilitate time between the child and the father. The fact that the mother did not agree to more liberal arrangements for the child to spend time with the father and that she has maintained her case for supervised time until her Counsel's closing submissions, renders entirely true the views of the CCE that the mother does not appreciate the importance of the child's relationship with the father. Although Counsel for the mother had provided a minute of final orders sought providing for the father's time to be supervised,[40] during closing submissions he abandoned seeking an order for supervision. From this, I reasonably infer that the mother concedes that the father is not an unacceptable risk to the child.
6. I have accepted the evidence of the paternal grandmother and the paternal aunt that their family had a loving and close bond with the child and that they assisted with the care of the child prior to separation. This is a view also assessed by the CCE, whose evidence was persuasive. The mother's evidence lacked any acknowledgement of a positive contribution by the paternal family to the child's welfare and care. Rather, it demonstrated criticism, spite, and resistance to their involvement in the care of the child, and she has consistently acted to exclude them. While Counsel for the mother sought to justify the mother's attitude towards the paternal family by suggesting that they had been critical and unsupportive of the mother, there is no probative evidence making good this submission for the following reasons.
7. The mother's attitude appears to be founded on an erroneous belief or fear that the paternal family were seeking to permanently remove the child from her care either after the incident in February 2024 or, alternatively, that they were conspiring to remove the child from her care around the time of the child's admission to hospital in September 2025.
8. This attitude is unreasonable and not objectively made out on the evidence because:
   • The father and his family were justified in being initially concerned about the mother's presentation and symptoms in February 2024. Taking a short time to be satisfied that the child would be safe in the mother's care was reasonable. Notably, the father returned the child to her primary care on 15 February 2024;
   • The mother had unilaterally removed the child from NSW in June 2024, reasonably causing a breach of the father's trust; and
   • While the conduct of the father's sister Ms AC and her communications with police at the time of the child's hospital admission in September 2024 were not helpful, I am satisfied that neither the father or the paternal aunt acted in a way to threaten to remove or harm the child or to threaten harm to the mother.
9. The social worker and hospital records establish that the father and paternal family were naturally concerned to understand what had happened to the child and to obtain information about his condition, but I am not persuaded that they acted inappropriately, given that they were not advised at the time that the mother did not intend to comply with the interim orders made on 30 August 2024 for her to return the child to NSW and was instead going to file an Application for Review.
10. The mother and/or her solicitors were less than reasonably transparent at the time of the hospital admission and the father not unreasonably believed that the child would be returning to NSW pursuant to the interim orders. Naturally, this led to expected communications that then passed between the parties' lawyers about the child returning with the father if he was well enough to travel. The tone of correspondence sent by the solicitor for the father to the solicitor for the mother[41] was unhelpfully aggressive and did not serve to deescalate the situation.
11. Subsequently, the paternal family have harboured suspicion and lack of trust about the mother's conduct, including because the hearing of the Application for Review and its finalisation was delayed.
12. No satisfactory explanation has been provided by the mother about why she did not engage with the father or why she did not seek to reach agreement about parenting arrangements for the child before unilaterally moving to South Australia. Further, she has not satisfactorily explained why she did not first apply for parenting orders, given that she returned to NSW before permanently relocating.
13. In the context of the parties' mutual situational family violence, drug use and the mother's mental health, in part due to the child's traumatic birth, I do not accept that the father's family violence or the mother's perception of the paternal family's attitude towards the mother justified unilateral removal of the child interstate, particularly in the absence of evidence of the child being affected adversely by family violence. In addition, it was open to the mother to seek a family violence order for her protection based on the allegations she has since made against the father. I refer to the evidence of the CCE at [64(b)], [64(c)], and [64(h)] of these reasons, further noting the CCE's opinion that the mother's relocation arose out of her own convenience in respect of housing and financial matters rather than safety concerns.[42] I agree and, in circumstances where the mother was living with the child in the parties' rental property, because the father had vacated it, she had suitable housing. Further, she would have been in receipt of child support.
14. In June 2024, the mother abruptly ceased the child's engagement in day care in NSW and had not engaged him in day care or play group in Adelaide where he could have socialised with other children. The move to Adelaide also severed socialisation with the paternal family, including the child's cousins. This is indicative of a lack of understanding on the mother's part of the importance of socialisation with family and peers, as is highlighted by the views of both the CCE and Dr E which I accept.
15. Although the mother has facilitated some time with the father and his family, it has been solely on her terms and limited because of the geographical distance she has caused by removing the child to Adelaide. I accept the father's evidence about the cost of exercising time with the child in Adelaide as it was not challenged. It demonstrates, and I find, that the cost of spending time with the child has varied based on flight availability and price, but amounts to an average of around $1,000 to $1,200 a month, assuming visits were to occur once per month. Ms W gave evidence that she had paid for some of the expenses related to the father spending time with the child, such as accommodation and car hire. There is no quantification of these necessary costs related to facilitating the father's time in Adelaide and I reasonably infer that the assistance Ms W is likely to provide in this regard is not endless, particularly because she has lent the father a significant amount, which she and the father have agreed must be repaid.
16. The father has a surplus of income over expenditure on the assumption that he does not make any repayments in reduction of the amounts he borrowed for legal fees from Ms W, his brother, or his sister. That surplus would cover the cost of one monthly visit to Adelaide to spend time with the child, but does not really allow for the costs Ms W has been meeting for trips and does not give capacity to the father to repay his liabilities.
17. The submission by Counsel for the mother that she has not refused requests for time and so the limited time the child has spent with the father is of his choice due to prioritising work and recreational commitments is disingenuous. It ignores the costs, time, and distance barriers created to facilitating the child's time with the father, caused because the mother unilaterally relocating with the child to Adelaide. Further, the submission ignores the chronology of events and orders that bound each party in these proceedings. Namely, that:

(a) On 31 July 2024, an interim order for communication between the father and child;

(b) On 30 August 2024 interim orders for the child to return to NSW and live with the father;

(c) On 4 October 2024, a stay of the interim orders made 30 August 2024, but made no provision for the father's time with the child;

(d) The mother was communicating about return to NSW and reconciling with the father in late 2024 and travelled to NSW in December 2024;

(e) That due to the prolix manner in which the proceedings were conducted by the mother and conducted by the Court, there were no orders for the father to spend time with the father until I made orders on 13 June 2025; and

(f) Since the interim orders of 13 June 2025 were made, the father had availed himself of time with the child pursuant to those orders, except for the last visit before the defended hearing in late August 2025.

1. Implicit in Counsel's submission referred to at [92] of these reasons was cross-examination of the father in relation to his cricket activities. It was submitted in closing that the father would continue to play cricket and therefore prioritised it over his relationship with the child. This submission is not persuasive because the father did not concede that he would, in fact, play cricket but was merely considering it. Further, given the support of the extended paternal family to the father, it is reasonably foreseeable that if the father does play cricket they will assist with care and indeed are likely to include the child in cricket-related activities,[43] which based on the CCE's evidence will provide benefits from engagement in recreational activities and socialisation.
2. The father has demonstrated commitment and prioritisation of his relationship with the child by maintaining these proceedings and consistently seeking an order for the child to be returned to NSW. To do so he has had to incur hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal costs, for which he is indebted, including having to make weekly payments to his lawyer. I accept his evidence under cross-examination that he has exhausted his finances, because even though his Financial Statement filed 27 August 2025 shows a surplus of income over expenditure, it does not include the repayments he stated he was required to make towards paying his lawyer for continued representation, which I infer he meant for the defended hearing. The mother has demonstrated an impaired capacity to meet the development, emotional, and psychological needs of the child by consistently failing to appreciate the impact of limiting the child's time with the father and with the paternal and maternal extended family, with whom he had a loving, meaningful and bonded relationship. The mother has unreasonably and consistently diminished or rejected the qualified views of the CCE as expressed in the Family Report at [76] and summarised at [64] of these reasons.
3. For all the reasons at [66], [68], [77]-[78], [87], and [94] of these reasons, I conclude that the mother has limited capacity to promote the child's relationship with the father and the extended paternal family. This will adversely impact upon the child based on the views of the CCE, which I have accepted.
4. Because I am persuaded by the views of the CCE, I am satisfied that the father has good capacity and willingness to facilitate time between the child and the mother if the child lives with him. Given his attitude towards the mother demonstrated during cross-examination, I am satisfied he would positively promote the child's relationship with the mother and facilitate time in accordance with court orders, whether the mother resides in Adelaide or NSW, because:
   • He speaks positively about the mother's care of the child;
   • He appreciates the importance of the mother's relationship with the child; and
   • He returned the child to the mother's primary care after the events in February 2024.

THE IMPACT ON THE CHILD OF RETURN TO NSW TO LIVE WITH THE FATHER[44]

1. As I have found that the mother has engaged the child in treatment and therapy and that she has provided a good level of care for the child in Adelaide, it is logical and demonstrated by the evidence of Dr E that a change in primary care will likely involve some level of disruption to the child's treatment, therapy, and day-to-day routine.
2. If the child returns to NSW, accepting the views of Dr E and the CCE, the expected disruption to treatment and therapies can be mitigated through effective care coordination with treatment and therapy providers and those persons involved in day-to-day care.[45]
3. Dr E's evidence provides the Court with confidence in concluding that, from a medical and therapeutic perspective, there is a low risk of a negative impact on the child's care due to relocation back to NSW provided that there is proper planning, engagement with previous treaters and providers, and transfer of NDIS funding. Indeed, the experience and result of the move to Adelaide bears this out.
4. I accept the evidence of Dr E that it is commonplace for children's specialist care, along with their medical and allied health supports, to be transferred effectively when a child changes residence.
5. I am persuaded by the evidence of Dr E that the risk of harm or negative impact on the child, whether physically or emotionally, due to a change in medical and therapeutic care is difficult to predict. Specifically, he stated:[46]

...I think that it is very difficult, potentially impossible, to predict what sort - what - the kind of disruption that will occur and the magnitude of that disruption. But again, I would come back to the point that, again, there is no in-principle reason why that disruption to medical care cannot be effectively managed, in particular between what I take to be are analogous medical and other health services in metropolitan areas of Australia.

1. Drawing upon the evidence of Dr E, I infer that there is no material difference in the quality and availability of treatment for children with autism between Adelaide and Sydney, which are both metropolitan areas of Australia.
2. The treatments and therapies in which the mother engaged the child in Adelaide were similar to those that the child had been undertaking and with which he would have progressed had he remained in NSW. With careful coordination, I am satisfied that there is unlikely to be any actual harm to the child whether physically or emotionally if he returned to NSW and resumed treatment there. There is a theoretical risk of harm if proper coordination of care does not occur, which I assess to be low because I am persuaded by the evidence of the father that he has thought through what is required and will ensure that he and his family arrange and coordinate the changes in treatment and therapy, and that he will ensure the sharing of records from Adelaide to the previous providers in NSW, including involving Dr E.
3. The impact on the child of a change in primary carer is a relevant consideration because the mother has steadfastly maintained during these proceedings that if the Court ordered that the child return to NSW, she would not personally relocate back.
4. The expert evidence of Dr E during cross-examination by Counsel for the mother addressed the potential impacts on the child of a change in primary carer. In summary it was as follows:
   • He agreed that a young child's relationship with their primary caregiver forms the foundation for trust, reciprocity, and relational capacity;
   • He accepted that changing a young child's primary caregiver can undermine their developing sense of security. This may cause confusion, displacement, loss, developmental regression, or psychological/emotional disturbance;
   • He agreed that these risks are amplified for a child diagnosed with autism;
   • He stated that children with autism generally have reduced adaptability to change, a strong need for routine and predictability, increased sensitivity to changes in schedule, environment, or sensory input, and greater difficulty with cognitive flexibility and tolerance of uncertainty.
5. When giving the above evidence, Dr E repeatedly emphasised that autism is heterogeneous, and the degree to which these statements apply can vary between children.
6. When asked whether similar risks apply to cerebral palsy, Dr E said it depended on the individual child and the specific nature of their autism and cerebral palsy. He clarified that cerebral palsy primarily affects motor function and posture, and its interaction with autism varies.
7. Dr E agreed with the following propositions, but emphasised that they were general and vary amongst children:
   • Structured, predictable care routines are particularly beneficial to children with autism;
   • Variability in weekly schedules can acutely affect children of this age with autism;
   • Children with autism commonly experience persistent sleep difficulties;
   • Poor sleep worsens daytime behaviour, emotional regulation, learning, and relational functioning;
   • Stable and consistent bedtime routines are especially important;
   • That ongoing psychological therapy for behaviour management and emotional dysregulation was commonly required for children with level 3 autism.
8. Importantly, Dr E stated that he had no concerns about either parent's capacity to care for the child during the period he was his treating paediatrician. He would not be drawn on their future capacity to care for the child as he had not engaged with them or the child recently. In response to a question from Counsel for the father, he said that, based on his engagement with the father during the child's last appointment with him, he did not hold any concerns in respect of the father's insight into the child's medical needs or his capacity to meet them, and he accepted that it was reassuring that the CCE drew the same conclusion.[47]
9. As I accept the evidence of Dr E in its entirety, I find that the change in primary carer may have some psychological or emotional impact on the child as it will involve a considerable change for the child. However, I infer from the evidence of Dr E that this impact is likely to be mitigated by the child being loved, cared for, and supported by the father and his extended family, by reestablishment of treatment and therapy, and by the implementation of positive social, educational and psychological supports which the father proposes to engage. It is also likely that the impact will be temporary. The evidence does not permit findings on the balance of probabilities about the extent of negative impacts if they arise, but the child has adjusted relatively well to the change in his care, and his living and other arrangements in the past and is likely to do so again, given the level of care and attention that I have found can be provided by the father in NSW.
10. Stating the obvious, any potential negative impacts on the child of a return to NSW could be completely avoided if the mother reconsidered and returned to NSW, should the Court order the child's return there. I find that the mother has not completely excluded this possibility, despite her evidence to the Court, because on 11 February 2025 she told Ms R that she wanted to move back to Sydney to be closer to her mother. The mother admitted having said this to Ms R when cross-examined.

DETERMINATION OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

1. In view of the findings and reasoning at [39] to [59] of these reasons, family violence, dangerous drug use and excess alcohol consumption occurred during a discrete period from around late 2023/January 2024 to separation in May 2024.
2. Based on the earlier findings, I accept the submissions of Counsel for the ICL and Counsel for the father that the family violence by each party occurred in the context of the parties' using drugs from late 2023, as I have rejected the mother's evidence of the father perpetrating family violence earlier in the relationship. This conclusion is also consistent with the mother's reports to the Department of Child Protection South Australia, tendered in the mother's case.[48]
3. I am also satisfied that the father has reduced his alcohol use and is engaging in psychological supports. Accordingly, I am satisfied that his alcohol use or mental health symptoms do not pose a material risk to either the mother or the child in the future.
4. Similarly, my findings demonstrate that there is no significant risk of harm to the child because of family violence or illicit substance use by the mother. However, her impulsivity, her capacity to be spiteful, and her lack of insight cause me to assess that there is some future risk of the child being exposed to the type of conflict and violence that occurred in the maternal grandfather's home in June 2024 when she reacted violently towards Ms ZZ.
5. Should the child continue to live with the mother, due to her failures to engage the child in social and peer activities while in Adelaide, there is some risk of harm to the child developmentally, emotionally and psychologically. This is particularly so because the mother's mental health symptoms have affected her motivation at times.
6. In view of the findings and reasons at [95] of these reasons, the mother lacks understanding or willingness to promote a relationship between the child and the paternal family. As stated by the CCE, this is recognised as capable of causing harm to the child, being in the adverse impact on the child's sense of security, sense of belonging, sense of identity, and his ability to form relationships as an adult. He may experience grief and loss at not having experienced those paternal relationships in his childhood, and may even feel as though the paternal family abandoned him.
7. Based on the findings and reasons at [62] and [71]-[75] of these reasons, each parent has and is capable of meeting the child's medical/therapeutic and physical needs. In the father's case, in the future this will be with assistance from his extended family. The assistance and support the Court has found that the paternal family will provide are essentially equivalent to those the mother has had in Adelaide. That is because it was made clear through cross-examination of the paternal grandfather that he and his partner are away from the home for significant periods due to the nature of their work, leaving the mother during those periods to cope with the high demands of meeting the child's needs alone with few social supports.
8. There is some risk that the mother's mental health symptoms will impact on her care of the child in the future when she is left to care for the needs of the child alone during frequent absences of the maternal grandfather and his partner. The vague reference to the mother having made friends in Adelaide was unconvincing, particularly in light of her messages to the father asking for his support in 2024.[49]
9. The father will have a greater number of family members, and indeed the maternal family members, to call on for assistance and support with care and meeting the child's needs. All of these persons are capable of and will likely cooperate with each other as needed to ensure the child is given good care.
10. Stating the obvious, the developmental, psychological, and emotional needs of the child would optimally be met if the parties resided in relative proximity and demonstrated a willingness to effectively co-parent and share the responsibilities of raising the child and meeting his needs. I am satisfied that the father has demonstrated a willingness to do so, but the mother has not. Electronic communications and short visits weeks apart are inadequate to satisfy the maintenance and promotion of the child's well-being and relationship with the non-resident parent, especially due to the child's diagnoses and age.
11. Regrettably, the mother's actions in removing the child from the proximity of their usual home, extended family on both the maternal and paternal side, usual friends and support and along with her unwillingness to return to NSW deprives the child of opportunity to maximise his developmental, social, emotional and psychological needs.
12. It is likely that the mother's decision to relocate to Adelaide was impulsive and due to spite towards the father and paternal family. She likely also saw financial advantage in living in the maternal grandfather's home at no cost and thus not needing to be in employment to support herself and the child. The latter are only somewhat relevant considerations, because she had accommodation in the former matrimonial rental property and assistance with care of the child available to her in NSW. Her action showed complete disregard for the importance to the child of the benefits derived from continuing frequent and significant time with the father and the paternal family to preserve the positive relationships and benefits they provided to the child. Ultimately, I agree with the CCE that the mother's action was due to her inability to separate the child's needs from her own.
13. The mother's case was critical of the father for not moving to Adelaide so that he could spend more time with the child or for failing to take more opportunities to spend more time with the child there. I have rejected that criticism for reasons given at [92] and [94]-[95] of these reasons.
14. In any event, I accept the submission made on behalf of the ICL and the father that a move by the father to Adelaide or more frequent visits there, would not provide the child with benefit from relationships with the many extended family members on both sides and would require the father to leave his current employment and leave his relationship with his partner. The mother is not in a relationship and had no real connection to South Australia prior to mid-2024. I consider she has greater mobility than the father, particularly because she is not employed and because the maternal grandfather will likely continue to provide financial and other support to the mother whether she resides in Adelaide or NSW, given his concession that he would do so and based on his past conduct.
15. The fact is that the majority of the significant persons in the child's life on both the maternal and paternal side are in NSW. Only the maternal grandfather and his partner are in Adelaide and historically the mother has not had a meaningful relationship with them.[50]
16. Counsel for the mother forcefully submitted that the child would be harmed by separation from the mother as his primary carer if the Court ordered that the child return to live in NSW with the father. Based on the findings elsewhere in these reasons, it is highly unlikely the child would be physically harmed or that his conditions would materially regress if the Court made an order for him to live with the father because I am satisfied that the father and his family would attend to the child's physical, daily, social and medical/therapeutic needs, which can be equally met in NSW. Further, the possible adverse emotional or psychological impacts due to change of primary carer are somewhat difficult to predict. They may eventuate, but will likely be mitigated and temporary for the reasons at [110] and [111] or be completely avoided if the mother returned to live in NSW.
17. In the Court's assessment, the likely psychological and emotional harm in the longer term to the child if he remains residing with the mother is greater than the potential and temporary harm that may be expected from the child no longer residing with the mother in Adelaide.
18. In view of the child's diagnoses and the findings about the mother's impulsivity, demonstrated spite, mental health vulnerability, and lack of insight, the Court does not accept that it is in his best interests to reside primarily with the mother and spend essentially one weekend each month with the father.
19. Although I give weight to the findings of family violence, for the reasons given family violence within the relationship is not determinative of the child's best interests, particularly in the context in which it occurred and because it is highly unlikely to occur in the future. Rather, the strength of the relationships that the child has had with each parent and their extended families, the availability of equivalent treatment and therapy for the child in NSW, and the Court's confidence in the parenting capacity of the father weigh in favour of an order for the child to return to NSW. Further, the mother's impulsivity, spitefulness and mental health vulnerability cause considerable concern for the welfare of the child if he remains living in her primary care.
20. While the mother has ensured that the child's medical and therapeutic needs have been met and she has provided a good level of day-to-day care, she has not promoted his developmental, emotional and psychological needs to the extent that would most benefit the child. She has obstructed the child's relationship with the father without sufficient justification and continues to fail to recognise the importance of the child's relationship with the father and the paternal and maternal extended family.
21. The father, assisted by his extended family, has a good capacity to provide for all of the child's needs and understands the importance of the child's relationship with the mother and will promote that positively and facilitate reasonable time and communication regardless of where the mother resides, whereas the same cannot be said of the mother.
22. Any possible disruption to the child's treatment and therapy can be entirely avoided by implementing the planning and coordination recommended by Dr E. For the reasons at [109] and [110] of these reasons, I am satisfied the father will attend to this. Furthermore, should there be some disruption, it will likely be temporary and minimal, as is borne out by the apparent stability and satisfactory transfer of treatment and therapy that occurred when the mother relocated to Adelaide.
23. As the mother has maintained that she will not return to NSW, there will necessarily need to be an order that the child live with the father. The mother's unwillingness to return to NSW, where she has primarily lived in the past and made a life and friends for years, demonstrates that she continues to prioritise her own financial needs and current preferences or that she seeks to undermine the father's role in the child's life, contrary to the child's best interests.
24. The change in primary care may have some impact on the child from a psychological and emotional perspective based on the findings and reasoning at [127], the extent of which cannot be reliably predicted and has not been demonstrated to be so significant that it outweighs other considerations weighing in favour of the child being returned to NSW.
25. Based on the foregoing reasons, the relevant considerations which inform the child's best interests are in favour of the child being returned to live with the father in NSW, in summary because:
    • The parents each have a bond and loving relationship with the child, despite the mother being the child's primary carer since mid-2024;
    • The risk of harm to the child arising because of family violence is very low in either parents' care, although of greater concern in the mother's care due to her impulsivity and mental health symptoms;
    • Each parent has a good capacity to care for the child's physical needs and ensure that he has recommended treatment and therapy, but the father has better capacity to meet his emotional and psychological needs;
    • The child will benefit from continuation and promotion of relationships with his extended family on both sides in NSW; and
    • The father has limited ability to regularly travel for the purpose of spending time with the child due to his longstanding ties to NSW, but the mother has the freedom to travel often and regularly to ensure that the child benefits from continuing the relationship with her.
26. The father's evidence demonstrated that the child's day-to-day needs, such as bedding, toys, and clothes, are already available at the paternal grandmother's property where he will reside with the child. I am satisfied that he will be able to quickly set in train the action and communications to link in with medical and allied health providers, but the mother will need to make the child's favourite comfort items, usual therapeutic aids, and medications available at the handover of care. The Court will make orders to provide for this.
27. To give effect to the order that will be made for the child to live with the father, there will be an order for the mother to deliver the child to the Adelaide Registry of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia for a handover of the child and his comfort items, usual therapeutic aids and any prescriptions or medications.
28. On the basis that the mother remains in Adelaide, because she has freedom to travel, there will be orders for the mother to spend weekend time with the child at a minimum monthly and maximum fortnightly in NSW.
29. In the alternative and allowing for the event that the mother returns to NSW in the context that she has contemplated this as a possibility to be closer to the maternal grandmother, the Court will make orders for greater sharing of care of the child on condition that the mother lives within 50kms of the father's residence. Doing so is in the child's best interests as it should avoid future proceedings should this arise. The alternative orders will provide for a fortnightly care and time arrangement for the child, such that he lives with the father for nine nights a fortnight and with the mother for the other five nights. As this is significantly more time that proposed by the father,[51] I will take brief submissions about this proposed order, particularly because the mother did not seek alternate orders.[52]
30. To limit or avoid any possible conflict at changeovers, it is preferable that they occur at childcare or school, but the orders should allow for the circumstances when changeovers occur on non-childcare or school days. The Court will make orders accordingly.
31. The terms of the orders sought by the ICL and father about international travel provided no effective or practical capacity for the mother to spend time overseas with the child. In a general sense it is beneficial and in the best interests of a child to undertake activities that would have ordinarily been undertaken during the currency of their parent's relationship. In most intact families, children are able to travel overseas with their parents. The benefit to children of being able to travel overseas are wide and many, and include such things as allowing an understanding of the world and other cultures. It is important that the child is afforded the opportunity to experience this with each of his parents. As the ICL and father contemplated permitting travel overseas, there will be an order permitting each parent to do so once per year for no longer than 14 days, subject to conditions.
32. The findings about family violence in this case did not warrant the unilateral relocation of the child to Adelaide. This is particularly so because I am satisfied that the mother would have continued to receive regular assistance and support from the maternal grandfather in NSW, given his evidence, and because the mother had available to her support from her mother and siblings, based on the maternal grandmother's evidence.
33. Each party has satisfied the Court that use of illicit substances and alcohol no longer pose material risk. Despite this, the parties agree that orders should be made restraining the parties from use of illicit substances or drinking alcohol to excess when caring for the child and within a period prior to being in contact with the child.
34. During the defended hearing, the parties gave less attention to the issue of major long-term decision-making for the child. The mother's evidence and case was that there should be an order for her to have sole decision-making authority relating to the child's health and education and that the parties should have joint decision-making authority relating to culture and religion. When cross-examined, the mother conceded that she had not consulted or informed the father beforehand about:
    • Unenrolling the child from P Daycare Centre in NSW;
    • Enrolling the child at AD Childcare in South Australia for 2026;
    • The child missing two dietician appointments in South Australia, and the date and time for the dietician appointment.
35. Her evidence displayed an avoidant attitude to including the father in these issues. Despite seeking an order for sole decision-making on the pretext that the child would live with her, she did not agree with an order for the father to have sole decision-making about major long-term issues should the Court order that the child live with the father.
36. Counsel for the ICL made a pertinent and persuasive submission about this issue. She submitted:[53]

In terms of decision-making responsibility, my submission is that, if the child is to be living with the father and spending only limited time with the mother, then it is the father who should have sole decision-making responsibility, subject to an obligation to consult with the mother and consider her views, as set out in my minutes. [The child's] unique health and developmental issues are such that it is important for both parents to be aware of those needs and the decisions that are to be made about him, and that's echoed by [Dr E]'s evidence this morning. And, while the court child expert did not see any evidence of an inability on the part of the parents to co-parent or make decisions jointly at the time of her assessment, my submission is that it is apparent from, certainly, the oral evidence and trial affidavit of the mother that she's unwilling to co-parent with the father.

1. The parties have conducted themselves safely since separation and have been able to spend time together, manage changeovers, and communicate politely about the child's treatments and appointments. However, restraining orders concerning non-denigration and exposure to family violence will serve as an incentive to the parties to ensure their interactions remain respectful and safe. As such, as an order will promote safety and well-being of the child and parties, an order of that nature will be made.
2. As each parent's psychological symptoms may pose future risk to the child, it is in the child's best interests that they continue with engagement in psychological supports and there will be an order requiring this.

1. For all the reasons given, I make orders as foreshadowed for the child to live with the father in NSW. There will also be alternative orders for the child's time with the mother should she also return to NSW. Otherwise, the child will spend somewhat more time with the mother than proposed by the father and the ICL.
2. A list of authorities was provided by Counsel or solicitor for the mother to my Chambers, but no reference was made to that list at all and as such it is not possible to discern the purpose of which, if any, they were relied upon. In these circumstances, I do not address the authorities in these reasons. Similarly, Counsel for the mother tendered numerous documents during her case without making submissions about the relevance of them, not having put them to the father or asked his client about them. Many of these related to uncontroversial facts about the child's diagnosis, treatment and therapy and although they are not specifically discussed in these reasons, they have been considered. Where the contents of a tendered document was not the subject of cross-examination or the purpose of reliance on the document was not identified, it is not possible to assign weight to the evidence.
3. At the close of the defended hearing, an oral application for costs was made on behalf of the ICL. Counsel for the ICL relied on the Costs Notice filed 22 September 2025 which particularised the costs in accordance with the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) and claimed them in total at $39,374.83. Counsel sought an order in terms that each party pay 50 per cent of those costs.
4. Oral submissions were made in respect of the ICL's application for costs by all parties, albeit that they were brief. Counsel for the father opposed the order on the basis that the father had modest means and no capacity to satisfy an order for costs. She also submitted that the costs of the ICL were greater than what they needed to be because of the conduct of the mother in the case. Counsel for the mother merely submitted that she did not have the means to pay.
5. The statutory provisions in Part XIVC of the Act provide for the making of costs orders. These provisions essentially conform with the provisions that previously related to costs before commencement of the Family Law Amendment Act 2024.
6. It remains the case that ordinarily proceedings are conducted on the basis that each party bear their own costs.[54] Nevertheless, the Court has a power to award costs against a party and may do so if it is of the opinion that the circumstances justify doing so.[55]
7. In deciding whether circumstances justify exercise of power to make a costs order, the Court is required to take into account the non-exhaustive considerations in s 114UB(3) of the Act and, in the circumstances of this case because the application is made by the ICL, s 114UBC of the Act.
8. Addressing the considerations in s 114UB(2) of the Act, I find as follows on the evidence before the Court:

(a) The father has some surplus income over his expenses disclosed in the Financial Statement filed 27 August 2025. As the child will be living with him, that surplus will not be required to meet the costs of travel to Adelaide in the future. Further, the father has an interest in the $120,000 in trust from sale of the parties' investment property;

(b) The mother does not disclose a surplus of income over expenses in her Financial Statement filed 25 August 2025, but does identify her interest in the funds in the trust account referred to at [157(a)] of these reasons;

(c) The father has had access to borrowed funds to meet his legal expenses and the mother has also apparently borrowed funds from her father for that purpose;[56]

(d) Neither the father nor mother are in receipt of legal aid funding;

(e) The mother has prolonged these proceedings, made late applications, made numerous interlocutory proceedings, and ignored the expert opinion of the CCE which the Court has ultimately accepted.

(f) The mother made multiple applications to seek further expert evidence about the child's medical conditions when that was not in dispute, causing the ICL to incur additional costs.

1. In view of the above findings, I accept that the parties do not have great means, but they do have some means and resources. They also have not seen fit to reach agreement about the parenting orders that should be made. The mother has engaged in conduct which has increased the ICL's costs unnecessarily.
2. I am satisfied that, although the ICL was funded by legal aid, the circumstances justify an order that the ICL's costs, which I fix in the sum of $36,000, be paid two thirds by the mother and one third by the father.
3. The following applications for costs were reserved to the final hearing:
   • The costs of the father, the paternal aunt, and the ICL for the review hearing before Judge Myers on 4 November 2024; and
   • The costs of the father and the paternal aunt in respect of the hearing on 1 August 2025 before me to determine the Application in a Proceeding filed 18 July 2025 by the mother.
4. As no submissions were made in relation to the reserved costs at the defended hearing, I will hear from the parties about whether they are pursued and, if so, make appropriate directions in relation to hearing them.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and sixty-one (161) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Taglieri.

[1] Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth), Schedule 1, Part 1 and Part 2; and Aldridge & Keaton [2009] FamCAFC 229; (2009) 235 FLR 450.

[2] Section 60B, s 60CA and s 60CC(2)(a) of the Act; Pickford & Pickford [2024] FedCFamC1A 249.

[3] Olivier & Olivier [2020] FamCA 639 at [46].

[4] Olivier & Olivier [2020] FamCA 639 at [47].

[5] Olivier & Olivier [2020] FamCA 639 at [50].

[6] Olivier & Olivier [2020] FamCA 639 at [51].

[7] Olivier & Olivier [2020] FamCA 639 at [52].

[8] Carter & Wilson [2023] FedCFamC1A 9 at [10].

[9] Carter & Wilson [2023] FedCFamC1A 9 at [80] per Bennett J.

[10] See A & A: Relocation Approach [2000] FamCA 751; (2000) FLC 93-035; and Taylor & Barker [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) FLC 93-345.

[12] Danton & Lancaster [2024] FedCFamC2F 1045 at [30]- [31], citing with approval Carlson & Fluvium [2012] FamCA 32 at [165]; Lennon & Sanil [2020] FamCAFC 109 at [20].

[15] Sections 60CC(2) and 60CC(2A) of the Act.

[17] Affidavit of the mother filed 26 August 2025 at [48]-[50].

[18] Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic Violence Bench Book (2024), ch 5.1.

[19] For example, see the affidavit of the mother filed 26 August 2025 at [48] and [50].

[20] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 ; s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Ragni & Carrera [2025] FedCFamC1F 394.

[21] Citing Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30 at [49].

[22] Noting the reasoning in Isles & Nelissen [2022] FedCFamC1A 97.

[26] Family Report at [28] and [72].

[27] Sections 60CC(2)(c) and (d) of the Act.

[35] Affidavit of the father filed 15 August 2025 at Annexure H.

[36] Sections 60CC(2)(d) and (e) of the Act.

[38] Affidavit of the father filed 15 August 2025 at Annexure S; Transcript of the evidence of the mother dated 4 September 2025 on page 49 at line 17 to page 50 at line 21.

[39] Affidavit of the mother filed 26 August 2025 at [166].

[43] Affidavit of the father filed 15 August 2025 at [42] and [44]-[46].

[45] Transcript of the evidence of Dr E dated 23 September 2025 on page 26 at lines 19-22.

[46] Transcript of the evidence of Dr E dated 23 September 2025 on page 26 at lines 39-44.

[47] Transcript of the evidence of Dr E dated 23 September 2025 on page 14 at lines 5-35.

[48] Exhibit R14 at page 3 under the heading 'Domestic Violence'.

[51] See order sought at paragraph 7 of Further Amended Initiating Application filed 8 August 2025.

[53] Transcript of closing submissions dated 23 September 2025 on page 9 at lines 32 to 42.

[56] Financial Statement of the mother filed 25 August 2025 at Park K Question 54.