Pirani & Pirani (No 8) [2026] FedCFamC1F 169 (18 March 2026)

1. The schedule below sets out a complete list of the parties to the litigation identifying those that participated, those that discontinued, those that filed a submitting notice and those that failed to participate at all.
   • Applicant - Ms Pirani - Wife.
   • First respondent - Mr Pirani - Husband.
   • Second respondent - B Pty Ltd (ACN [...])
   • Third respondent - C Pty Ltd (ACN [...]) - no attendance at the final hearing.
   • Fourth respondent - D1 Pty Ltd (ACN [...]) - filed a submitting notice.
   • Fifth respondent - D2 PTY LTD (ACN [...]).
   • Sixth respondent - E Pty Ltd (ACN [...]).
   • Seventh respondent - Ms OO/AO Lawyers -previous lawyer for the wife.
   • Eighth respondent - AF Pty Ltd (ACN [...]) - previous lawyer for the wife.
   • Ninth respondent - Mr AH.
   • Tenth respondent - AJ Pty Ltd - no attendance at the final hearing.
   • Eleventh respondent - AL Limited - no attendance at the final hearing.
   • Twelfth respondent - AK Pty Ltd - filed a submitting notice.
   • Thirteenth respondent - AM Pty Ltd - discontinued proceedings.
   • Fourteenth respondent - ZZ Pty Ltd (ACN [...]) - previous lawyer for the wife.
   • Fifteenth respondent - AN Pty Ltd (ACN [...]).
2. Of the respondents who engaged with the proceedings (that is, excluding those who have filed a notice of discontinuance, a submitting notice or otherwise failed to participate) the principal protagonists were B Pty Ltd (second respondent), D2 Pty Ltd (fifth respondent) and E Pty Ltd (sixth respondent). These were subject to the same liquidator and were commonly represented. Together they will be described as the liquidator. The liquidator's claim was primarily prosecuted for B Pty Ltd.
3. The ninth protagonist was Mr AH who had personally loaned monies to the husband prior to the failure of the husband's businesses, with such monies being secured against the former matrimonial home located at Suburb G, New South Wales ("the [Suburb G] property").
4. The claims pursued by the liquidator in these proceedings related to director's loans made by B Pty Ltd to the husband that were secured by mortgage upon the Suburb G property. The liquidator accepted that the priority for this mortgage fell behind both that of a mortgage held by Westpac and the mortgage held by Mr AH (as described below). By the time of the trial the Suburb G property had been sold, with the proceeds, after the payment of relevant expenses and of the mortgages held by Westpac and by Mr AH, in the order of $3.9 million, being held pending further order.
5. Despite the husband, by means of his initial response document, apparently accepting such claims in general terms, and despite the husband reiterating that acceptance in his final amended response, when the wife formally accepted B Pty Ltd's claims during the trial the husband repudiated such position, noting that previously he had challenged the mortgage and the quantum of the loans. Ultimately, he was not permitted to challenge the presence of the mortgage due to the manner of his conduct of the proceedings and his failure to plead such a challenge. He, however, contested the level of indebtedness secured by the mortgage, while the wife accepted the quantum claimed by the liquidator, which was of the order of $11,211,703.[1] Significantly, this debt would more than extinguish the remaining funds obtained from the sale of the Suburb G property.
6. By consent, Mr AH's claim against Suburb G was recognised by the other impacted parties, as was his priority over them. Accordingly consent orders were made during the proceedings which will be reflected in the determination of the pool of property set out later in the judgment.
7. Those orders will mean that Westpac is paid from the proceeds of Suburb G, then Mr AH. The balance of those funds is then the subject of the, lately contentious, claim by the liquidator.
8. The balance of the active protagonists was made up of lawyers and/or law firms associated with the wife. These were constituted by a Ms OO and in her stead the firm AO Lawyers (the seventh respondent), and the corporate entity through which that entity practiced, AN Pty Ltd (the fifteenth respondent), who although are separate parties will be referred to together as Ms OO. The other two law firms were the AF Pty Ltd (the eighth respondent) and ZZ Pty Ltd (the fourteenth respondent).
9. Each of the law firms were engaged in the litigation for the purpose of either securing or receiving purported legal fees owed to them by the wife.

1. The wife sought in her Minute of Orders provided to the Court on 3 June 2025 the following orders:

Proceeds of sale of [Suburb G]

1. That any remaining balance of the proceeds of sale of the Former Matrimonial Home located at [F Street] [Suburb G], NSW, [...], ("Former Matrimonial Home") be paid to the Applicant Wife as she so directs.

[D1 Pty Ltd] (ACN [...]

1. That within 7 days from the date of these orders the husband is to do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to transfer his shareholding in [D1 Pty Ltd] to the wife.

2. From the date of such transfer pursuant to the preceding order, the husband must indemnify the wife and forever thereafter keep her indemnified in respect of all or any liability of him in respect of the said company or any of them, the said loan accounts or any of them including any liability of the party to the Commissioner of Taxation howsoever such liability arises.

[B Pty Ltd] (ACN [...])

1. That within 7 days from the date of these orders the husband is to do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to transfer his shareholding in [B Pty Ltd] to the wife.

2. From the date of such transfer pursuant to the preceding order, the husband must indemnify the wife and forever thereafter keep her indemnified in respect of all or any liability of him in respect of the said company or any of them, the said loan accounts or any of them including any liability of the party to the Commissioner of Taxation howsoever such liability arises.

[C Pty Ltd] (ACN [...])

1. That within 7 days from the date of these orders the husband is to do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to transfer his shareholding in [C Pty Ltd] to the wife.

2. From the date of such transfer pursuant to the preceding order, the husband must indemnify the wife and forever thereafter keep her indemnified in respect of all or any liability of him in respect of the said company or any of them, the said loan accounts or any of them including any liability of the party to the Commissioner of Taxation howsoever such liability arises.

[D2 Pty Ltd] (ACN [...])

1. That within 7 days from the date of these orders the husband is to do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary to transfer his shareholding in [D2 Pty Ltd] to the wife.

2. From the date of such transfer pursuant to the preceding order, the husband must indemnify the wife and forever thereafter keep her indemnified in respect of all or any liability of him in respect of the said company or any of them, the said loan accounts or any of them including any liability of the party to the Commissioner of Taxation howsoever such liability arises.

Jewellery and Applications of the seventh and fifteenth Respondent

1. That within fourteen (14) days from the date of these orders, the seventh respondent [Ms OO] is to do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary and as required to direct [AB Pty Ltd] to release the jewellery held by them to the Applicant wife.

2. A declaration that the seventh respondent and fifteenth respondent [AN Pty Ltd] trading as [AO Lawyers], have no right, title or interest in the jewellery held by [AB Pty Ltd]

3. That the wife retain all her rights, title and control of the Jewellery held by [AB Pty Ltd] to the exclusion of any other person.

4. That the respondent [Ms OO] pay any costs or fees incurred by [AB Pty Ltd] in holding and/or releasing the Jewellery.

5. That the respondent [Ms OO] and/or [AN Pty Ltd] trading as [AO Lawyers] pay the costs of the Applicant Wife relating to any and all applications made by them or on their behalf on an indemnity basis.

6. That all outstanding Applications in a Proceeding filed by the seventh Respondent [Ms OO] and/or [AN Pty Ltd] trading as [AO Lawyers] be otherwise dismissed.

[ZZ Lawyers]

1. That [ZZ Lawyers] pay the wife's costs of and incidental to their applications on an indemnity basis.

2. That otherwise all applications filed by [ZZ Lawyers] be otherwise dismissed.

[AF Lawyers]

1. That [AF Lawyers] pay the wife's costs of and incidental to their applications on an indemnity basis.

2. That otherwise all applications filed by [AF Lawyers] be otherwise dismissed.

[Suburb J] property

1. That within twenty-one (21) days from the date of these orders, [D1 Pty Ltd] ACN [...], being the fourth respondent, do all acts and things and sign all documents, as necessary, to discharge the mortgage held against the property located at [QQ Street] [Suburb J] NSW [...], being all that land contained in the folio identifier, [...].

2. A declaration that [D1 Pty Ltd] ACN [...], has no right, or interest in the property located at [QQ Street] [Suburb J] NSW [...], being all that land contained in the folio identifier, [...].

3. A declaration that the Applicant Wife holds the [Suburb J] property on trust for her Mother.

4. In the alternative to the preceding order, that the wife be declared the sole owner and retain all her rights title and interest in the [Suburb J] property to the exclusion of any other party.

Properties in [Country P]

1. That the Husband retain all of his legal rights, title and interest in the properties located:

   1. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

   2. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

   3. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

   4. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

   5. That within fourteen (14) days from the date of these orders, the First Respondent, [Mr Pirani], is to do all acts and things and sign all documents, as necessary, to transfer, at his expense, all of his rights, title and interest to the Applicant, [Ms Pirani], in the following properties:

      1. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

      2. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

      3. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P].

      4. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

      5. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

      6. Land registration number [...], [Town AP], [City AQ], [Country P];

      7. Land registration number [...], [Town AR], [City AS], [Country P];

      8. Land registration number [...], [Town AT], [City AS], [Country P];

      9. Land registration number [...], [Town AT], [City AS], [Country P];

      10. Land registration number [...], [Town AU], [City AS], [Country P];

      11. Land registration number [...], [Town AU], [City AS], [Country P]; and

      12. Land registration number [...], [Town AV], [Region AW], [Country P].

Money held by NSW Crime Commission

1. A declaration that the monies held by NSW Crime Commission, if and when they are released, is property of the Applicant Wife and the Applicant Wife shall have exclusive possession and control of any such money if so released.

Other

1. The First Respondent is to indemnify the wife and keep the wife indemnified in respect of all liabilities, claims, demands, suits and penalties of whatsoever kind, including but not limited to any taxation liabilities, associated with any property, asset, company, business, trust or financial resource or liability standing, in which the Husband is or was a director, trustee or shareholder of, as at the date of these orders or prior to the date of these orders.

2. Unless otherwise specified in these orders:

   1. Each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all other property and chattels of whatsoever nature and kind in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders and that for this purpose bank accounts are deemed to be in the possession of the person whose name appears on the banks' record thereof, insurance policies are deemed to be in the possession of the beneficiary thereof and superannuation entitlements are deemed to be in the possession of the person who is named as the worker whose age or working future provides the conditions for payment out of such entitlements.

   2. Each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders.

   3. In the event that either party fails, refuses or neglects to execute any deed, document or instrument necessary to give effect to these orders, then pursuant to s106A, a Registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia is hereby appointed to execute all deeds, documents and instruments in the name of the defaulting party and to do all such acts and things necessary to give validity and operation to such deeds, documents and instruments.

   4. Any other orders this Honourable Court sees fit.

1. The husband's position and orders sought in the proceedings changed substantially over the course of the proceedings. At times the position and orders sought were confusing or contradictory, sometimes in support of the wife and at other times rejecting her claims. The various positions and orders sought are set out below.
2. In the husband's response on 29 June 2023, he sought video calls with the children, agreed to both spousal maintenance and child support orders, and for the Suburb G property to be sold with the balance of proceeds paid to him. He also sought that as an interim order $150,000 be paid to the wife's solicitors for legal fees.
3. On 24 October 2023, the husband sought the application of the seventh respondent be dismissed, and for the jewellery to be provided to the wife, with restraints on dealing with it.
4. On 5 March 2024, the husband sought the children be placed on the Airport Watchlist, no longer sought orders for child support and spousal maintenance, and sought that the balance of proceeds from the Suburb G property be split evenly between the husband and the wife.
5. On 22 July 2024, the husband sought the Court determine the various claims on the Suburb G proceeds, and for the parties to participate in mediation in that regard.
6. On 21 October 2024, the husband sought shared custody of the children upon a return to Australia, challenged various alleged debts and mortgages owed, sought that the legal fees claimed by the seventh and eighth respondents be assessed and paid by the wife, and agreed to payments in relation to the Westpac and H Pty Ltd (no H Pty Ltd mortgage was identified in the proceedings) mortgages, and the debt owed to the ninth respondent.
7. On 28 February 2025, the husband sought that an order for $150,000 of partial property settlement to the wife and $450,000 of litigation funding to the wife be set aside. These orders were never met by the husband. He also sought the proceeds for the sale of various properties be determined according to final orders, and for the proceeds from sale of the jewellery be divided.
8. On 6 March 2025, the husband sought division of the proceeds of sale of the Suburb J and Suburb G properties. In relation to Suburb G, he sought the proceeds be entirely paid to himself, and for Suburb J, that the proceeds be split between the husband and the wife. He sought an order that the proceeds of the jewellery be split 50/50 between the husband and the wife.
9. In the husband's final orders sought, he sought that the Suburb G and Suburb J properties be sold and split such that 50 per cent of the proceeds be paid to him. He also sought that the jewellery held by the wife be divided between the parties, that the wife pay her costs, that the wife's assets be disclosed and divided between the parties, and for further disclosure from the wife.
10. Ultimately, the husband sought in his written closing submissions emailed to the court on 2 June 2025 the following orders:

That the property known as [QQ Street], [Suburb J], NSW be sold by judicial sale.

That the property known as [F Street], [Suburb G], NSW was sold and the proceeds added to the matrimonial pool.

That 50% of the net proceeds from the sale of both properties (after costs and liabilities) be paid to the First Respondent.

That the Wife pay her own legal costs personally, or that they be assessed under the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW).

That all jewellery purchased by the Husband during the marriage and retained by the Wife be declared matrimonial property.

That all bank accounts, investment funds, and financial holdings in the Wife's name, accrued during the marriage, be disclosed and included in the asset pool.

That the Wife disclose all current bank balances and provide financial statements from the date of separation to present.

1. The second respondent's Case Outline Document filed 12 March 2025 indicated an intent to file a Minute of Order "at the commencement of the final hearing when it is established if the applicant and or the respondent will file any evidence".
2. The Minute of Order was ultimately contained within the closing submissions handed up during the course of the final hearing, marked as Exhibit R2-4. The orders sought relief only against the husband, being that Order 14 made on 7 June 2023 preventing B Pty Ltd from demanding payment be discharged, that the husband pay to the second respondent the sum of $9,590,724 by way of repayment of monies plus interest, and for the enforcement of a mortgage held over the Suburb G property.

C Pty Ltd (the third respondent) [No appearance at hearing]

1. In the third respondent's response to final orders filed 14 March 2025, it sought that the applicant's amended application filed 5 March 2025 be dismissed. It was also sought that Order 14 of the Orders made on 7 June 2023 be discharged, that the first respondent repay money owed to the second respondent and if contravention occurs that the second respondent be entitled to enforce a mortgage held to procure payment. Costs were also sought on an indemnity basis.

1. The fourth respondent, D1 Pty Ltd ACN [...], filed a submitting notice on 1 August 2024 and sought to submit to any order the Court may make in the proceedings and to be heard on the question of costs.

Ms OO/AO Lawyers (the seventh respondent) and AN Pty Ltd (the fifteenth respondent)

1. The seventh respondent sought a range of orders to assist with the recovery of alleged fees owed.
2. Per their Amended Case Outline filed 3 June 2025, the seventh and fifteenth respondents together sought orders for restraints on other parties from dealing with the jewellery held by the seventh respondent, restraints on other parties from causing payment to be made to the wife prior to the payments allegedly owed to the seventh and fifteenth respondents, a declaration for a lien over assets or property held or entitled to the wife, and costs. In the alternative, they sought a lump sum payment of $855,573.00. They also sought orders relating to the dealing with the jewellery and related proceeds, and ancillary costs.

1. The eighth respondent sought a suite of orders, contained within their Amended Minute of Order dated 4 June 2025. These orders included a declaration that the eighth respondent is entitled to a lien over assets or property of the wife, for the amount of professional costs and disbursements allegedly owing, a declaration that this lien has priority ranking above the other lawyers' claims, a declaration that the professional costs and disbursements allegedly owing were secured by an equitable charge over the Suburb J property, a declaration that the fourteenth respondent was on notice of the eighth respondent's security over the Suburb J property, restraints upon parties from causing payment or transfer of assets or property to the wife prior to payment to the eighth respondent, an enforcement of Order 6 of the orders made on 7 July 2023. Orders were also sought for costs.
2. At hearing of this matter, the question of relief being sought in the form of a mortgage in respect of the jewellery was raised. Ultimately, the eighth respondent was not permitted to pursue that ground of relief, where it was not sought in a timely fashion.

1. The ninth respondent, in his Outline of Case document filed 12 March 2025, sought orders to secure a (purported) $2 million loan repayment plus interest, a declaration that he is entitled to recover this amount from the sale of the Suburb G property, and dismissal of various claims sought by the wife (including relief sought against the ninth respondent). He also sought costs.

1. The twelfth respondent filed a submitting notice on 28 February 2025 and sought to submit to any order the Court may make in the proceeding. It did not want to be heard on the question of costs.

1. The fourteenth respondent sought to rely upon the orders sought in its amended application, which was purportedly filed on 7 March 2025. For reasons unknown at the time of the hearing, the application was rejected for filing, although it appeared to have been served upon all parties. To remedy this, it was marked as Exhibit R14-6 in the proceedings.
2. The orders sought were for a declaration of entitlement to a lien over the assets and/or property of the applicant wife up to the amount of $466,168.95 plus interest allegedly owing, an order restraining other parties from causing payment or transfer of asset or property to the wife prior to payment of the amount allegedly owing to the fourteenth respondent, that various orders sought by the applicant wife be dismissed, a declaration that the debt owing is secured by a charge over the Suburb J property, orders relating to the sale of the Suburb J property and related mortgage, various ancillary orders and costs.

1. All parties sought to rely on material filed otherwise than in compliance with directions. The parties orally identified which material they sought to rely upon at the commencement of the final hearing.

(1) Amended Amended Application filed 5 March 2025;

(2) Affidavit of wife filed 13 March 2025;

(3) Affidavit of Mr AX filed 7 March 2025;

(4) Points of Claim document filed 7 March 2025; and

(5) Points of Defence to the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 9th and 14th respondents respectively, filed 7 March 2025.

1. At the commencement of the final hearing the husband sought to rely upon a series of documents. These documents, except for his affidavit filed 17 March 2025, had not been uploaded or lodged on the court file.

(1) Response to an Application in a Proceeding dated 21 October 2024;

(2) Affidavit of husband filed 17 March 2025; and

(3) Application in a Proceeding dated 6 March 2025.

Second respondent, fifth respondent and sixth respondent

1. The second, fifth, and sixth respondent were commonly represented and relied upon:

(1) Points of Claim filed 25 October 2024;

(2) Statement of Particulars filed 29 November 2024;

(3) Affidavit of Mr NN filed 19 December 2024;

(4) Affidavit of Ms AY filed 4 March 2025;

(5) Affidavit of Ms AY filed 18 March 2025;

(6) Response to Further Amended Initiating Application filed 14 March 2025; and

(7) Amended Points of Defence to Applicant's Points of Claim filed 18 March 2025.

1. The seventh and fifteenth respondent relied upon:

(1) Application in a Proceeding filed 17 August 2023;

(2) Application in a Proceeding filed 19 February 2025;

(3) Affidavit of Ms OO filed 9 March 2025;

(4) Application in a Proceeding filed 11 March 2025;

(5) Application in a Proceeding filed 13 March 2025;

(6) Affidavit of Ms OO filed 13 March 2025;

(7) Affidavit of Ms OO filed 27 February 2025;

(8) Affidavit of Mr AZ filed 14 August 2024;

(9) Amended Response to Amended Amended Application in a proceeding filed 12 March 2025; and

(10) Case Outline Document filed 18 March 2025.

(1) Case Outline Document filed 17 March 2025;

(2) Response to Initiating Application filed 17 March 2025; and

(3) Affidavit of Mr BA filed 17 March 2025.

(1) Amended Response to Final Orders filed 12 March 2025;

(2) Points of Defence to Points of Claim of applicant wife filed 12 March 2025;

(3) Points of Claim filed 28 October 2024;

(4) Affidavit of Mr AH filed 12 March 2025;

(5) Affidavit of Ms BC filed 12 March 2025;

(6) Affidavit of Mr BD filed 12 March 2025; and

(7) Outline of Case Document filed 12 March 2025.

(1) Amended Application filed 7 March 2025;

(2) Points of Claim filed 10 December 2024;

(3) Response to the applicant wife's application filed 14 March 2025;

(4) Points of Defence to wife's Points of Claim filed 13 March 2025;

(5) Affidavit of Ms BE filed 15 November 2024;

(6) Affidavit of Ms BE filed 7 March 2025;

(7) Affidavit of Ms BE filed 17 March 2025;

(8) Submitting Notice filed 5 March 2025; and

(9) Case outline filed 14 March 2025.

1. The applicant wife, Ms Pirani, born in 1987, and respondent husband, Mr Pirani, born in 1968, commenced a relationship in 2007, married in 2013 and separated in mid-February 2023. There are three children of the marriage, X, born in 2013, Y, born in 2015 and Z, born in 2018 ("the children"). When together the parties lived a lavish, expensive lifestyle, exemplified by the husband's purchase of luxury Motor Vehicle 1 for the wife in 2019.
2. In early 2009, B Pty Ltd, a property development company, was formed by the husband. The wife says she commenced working at B Pty Ltd when it started as a secretary but received no income, however the husband paid for her expenses and college or university fees.
3. In 2012 the husband purchased a property in Suburb PP (the wife says for her[2]) and they commenced living together in approximately 2012.
4. From about 2012 to 2013 the wife commenced receiving income from her employment at B Pty Ltd.
5. The parties married in Australia in 2013. The wife says the marriage was not registered in Country P. Although Ms OO had been requested to register the marriage in Country P, the husband discontinued the process.[3] This was in a context where the husband had previously been married and entered into a property settlement with his previous wife in Australia. However, it was further contended that his marriage to his previous wife has not been dissolved in Country P.
6. In 2016 the property at F Street, Suburb G in New South Wales ("the [Suburb G] property") was purchased in the husband's sole name. In 2016 the existing home was demolished, and a new home was constructed. The wife describes heavy involvement in the building of the new home.
7. The wife says that by about 2017 she was receiving income of about $10,000 per month, being monies that she applied for the wellbeing of the family, including for the purchase of furniture and household items. The wife describes that she also attended to the cooking and cleaning of the home when not working.
8. The parties moved into the Suburb G home in 2018.
9. The children were attending at KK School Suburb BB and LL School up until the commencement of proceedings.
10. The parties purchased a home for the wife's parents to live in, in early 2020 in Suburb J ("the [Suburb J] property").[4]
11. The parties travelled to Country P in late 2022, with the wife and the children returning to Australia in early 2023 so the children could commence the new school year. The husband remained in Country P. The children have remained in the wife's sole care since then.
12. The parties separated shortly after the wife's return to Australia. The wife commenced proceedings in June 2023, then obtaining urgent ex parte orders against the husband.
13. The wife describes that since separation the husband has ceased to pay for the children's school fees, resulting in them being withdrawn from their previous schools and enrolled in another school.
14. In February 2023 the family home was raided by the NSW Police who seized a sum of money that has since been forfeited to the NSW Crime Commission.
15. The wife's income ceased in about April 2023, and around this time her access to the husband's debit card ceased. Shortly prior to her access to the card ending, she withdrew $50,000 from that account.
16. In about April 2023 the wife's luxury Motor Vehicle 1 was repossessed by B Pty Ltd from a shopping centre while she and the children were inside the shopping centre, eating. In May 2023 the wife was provided with another vehicle.
17. Similarly, some time after separation, in mid-2024, the husband caused the wife to be locked out of the former family home, evicting her through the use of security staff. In addition to the above, the wife contends that she has been subjected to other family violence, in the form of threats, coercion and physical violence, in causing the wife to be followed by private investigators, and in the form of financial coercion following separation. Little, if any, attention was given to these matters at trial, and not sufficient to determine that the wife's contributions were rendered significantly more arduous.
18. The husband was permitted to participate in these proceedings by video link. He shows no sign of ever returning to Australia following the demise of his business interests as illustrated by the involvement of liquidators in these proceedings. As a part of the liquidation process, the liquidators have identified substantial claims on the husband's business interests and estimate a shortfall of not less than $300,000,000.[5]

1. The final hearing in this matter started prior to the commencement of the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth).
2. The foundation for the exercise of the powers to adjust the property interests of the parties pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") is that it must be just and equitable, both to adjust the property interests at all (Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108)[6] and to adjust them in a particular manner (Bevan v Bevan (2013) 49 Fam LR 387).[7]
3. The necessary first step in consideration of whether it is just and equitable to make an order is to identify "according to ordinary common law and equitable principles the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in the property".[8]
4. This first step constitutes the primary area of complexity and controversy in this case, in particular in determining the manner in which the parties' interests in the real property and the jewellery are the subject of interests held by the various third parties.
5. Section 79 further requires that the contributions of the parties are to be given consideration.
6. In Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154; [2012] 50 Fam LR 244 the Full Court said that:[9]

the requirements of the section are met by approaching the assessment of contributions holistically and by analysing the nature, form, characteristics and origin of the property currently comprising that to which s 79 applies, and, in turn, analysing the nature, form and extent of the contributions (of all types) contemplated by s 79). That task is also undertaken by reference to the nature and form of the particular marriage partnership manifested by the particular circumstances of this particular marriage. Is it, for example, a relationship, as Deane J put it in Mallett at 640-641 '...where the parties have adopted the attitude that their marriage constituted a practical union of both lives and property..." or is it, for example, a union where parties lived very separate domestic and financial lives?

1. This requires that "[a]ny and all such contributions, whether or not they sound in, or are directly linked to, the property available for distribution, should be considered and assessed together with the nature, form and extent of all other contributions of all types contemplated otherwise by s 79(4)".[10]
2. As part of that consideration:[11]

s 79(4) specifically requires the Court to take into account contributions made to the welfare of the family (and substantively and "...not in any merely token way..."; see, Mallett v Mallett [1984] HCA 21; (1984) 156 CLR 605 at 636 per Wilson J) notwithstanding that those contributions may not be, or cannot be seen to be, directly linked to the available property at trial, or any increase or decrease in the value of the property.

1. Again, in Dickons it was noted that the assessment of contributions did not necessitate the identification of a causal link between the contribution and the property but, adopting In the Marriage of Aleksovski [1996] FamCAFC 111; (1996) FLC 92-705 ("Alekovski")[12], described that:[13]

the s 79 discretion involves as a necessary requirement that "... trial Judges weigh and assess the contributions of all kinds and from all sources made by each of the parties throughout the period of their cohabitation and then translate such an assessment into a percentage of the overall property of the parties or provide for a transfer of property in specie in accordance with that assessment."

1. In Aleksovski, Kay J explained that "[w]hat is important is to somehow give a reasonable value to all of the elements that go to making up the entirety of the marriage relationship".[14]
2. In this case it appears that the husband's focus was largely upon his previously extensive property development interests. The wife, who had worked for him held, it appears, primary responsibility in respect of the care of the children. Both undertook such with professional support as may be expected to have been available to them in accordance with their apparent wealth. The wife further took responsibility for coordinating their combined charitable efforts.
3. A significant aspect of this case is that the parties have together ridden the highs, and now separately, the lows of the property development exploits of the husband. For a period they together enjoyed an lavish lifestyle, featuring a luxury home, significant expenditure on consumables and personal interests, private schooling for children and perhaps best exemplified by the husband's notorious gifting of an exotic car to the wife (although not, as it turns out, a true gifting, as the vehicle was later repossessed by his company).
4. As will become apparent, what primarily remains is liability that can never be met, the publicly displayed wealth of the parties being a hollow artifice.
5. As well as the established liabilities as set out below, it will become apparent that there are also contingent liabilities. Of greatest significance are the contingent liabilities of the wife in respect of extensive legal fees.
6. While it will be necessary, to the extent that the evidence allows it, to have regard to the practical impact of the wife's legal liabilities on her actual circumstances under any order made in these proceedings, as a general proposition, as described by the Full Court in NHC v RCH [2004] FamCA 633 at [55], the liability a party has for the payment of legal fees is not a matter to be taken into account in ascertaining the pool of property. As observed by Kay J in In the Marriage of Farnell [1995] FamCA 140; (1995) 128 FLR 374, to take such a matter into account in determining the pool of property places a costs burden upon the other party in a manner that sits ill with the approach to costs set out a s 117 (now s 114UB) of the Act.
7. The court is further to give consideration to the matters set out at s 75(2) of the Family Law Act. In this case, the ongoing care for the children that will be undertaken by the wife, with little if any prospect of support from the father is such a matter. Not only may it be anticipated that the wife will carry the practical burden of that care for a significant period of time, but the prospect of the wife receiving financial support from the husband appears dubious at best, as illustrated by the children's removal from private schooling following the husband's absenting of himself from Australia to Country P.

1. The dominant issue in this case is establishing the content of the pool of the property of the parties and the interests that those assets are subject to. There are various creditors' claims, mortgages and other securities against the property.
2. The key items of property can be identified as follows:

(a) Proceeds of the sale of the Suburb G property;

(b) B Group;

(c) D1 Pty Ltd;

(d) QQ Street, Suburb J;

(e) Jewellery held by Ms OO; and

(f) The husband's properties in Country P.

1. Although the wife referred to the husband's superannuation by her case outline document, no evidence was offered as to the existence of any superannuation interest.
2. A considerable focus of the trial was as to debts owed by the husband and wife, and their impact upon the property identified above.

1. The first key item of property was the parties' former home (or rather, the proceeds from its sale) in Suburb G, New South Wales, being a home held in the husband's name. That home was subject to a first mortgage held in favour of Westpac Banking which all parties recognise as the pre-eminent claim upon that property. Secondly, the ninth respondent Mr AH secured a loan to the husband in the sum of $2.8 million by way of a mortgage against that property. Although this was contentious at the commencement of the trial, during the trial the relevant parties entered into consent orders recognising Mr AH's interest in the sum of $2.8 million as following that of Westpac Banking Corporations, but preceding any other creditors in relation to the Suburb G property. The third claim against that property comes from B Pty Ltd who asserts that various directors loans made to the husband by B Pty Ltd are secured by mortgage against the Suburb G property. This is a claim that is formally recognised by the wife but disputed by the husband in circumstances which will be set out further below.
2. The balance of the proceeds, after the payment of the Westpac and Mr AH mortgages, is (uncontentiously) approximately $3.9 million.[15]

1. The next asset of significance is an item of real estate held at Suburb J, New South Wales, registered in the wife's name. The wife asserts that she holds the property on trust for her mother, who occupies the property. That proposition was the subject of direct challenge.
2. The wife describes that the property was purchased for her parents in early 2020, but that her father has since passed away.
3. The wife says that there were discussions between herself, the husband and her mother, where her mother asked for help to have her own home, saying that she only had $40,000 as a deposit. By her affidavit, the wife says that she understands that although the husband did not want to take money from her mother, he did, at her insistence. How this came to be understood remained unclear. She says that the husband told her mother that "[t]his house will always be for you and you don't have to pay anything for it".[16] The wife says that the husband gave her the $40,000 in cash, which was later seized as described below.
4. She asserts that her mother would often save $2,000 to $5,000 and give it to the husband, adding up to a further $30,000 that was also held in the home and seized. The wife did not explain how she came to know of the asserted transactions with the husband. The wife did not call her mother to give any evidence about the Suburb J property. The wife described that she retained monies from her mother in a particular luxury bag that was seized by the NSW police. She says that she told the Crimes Commission both that the money was for her mother, and also that it was her mother's way of paying for the deposit, toward her mother's promise to keep paying money toward the property. Ultimately this money formed part of that which was forfeited to the Commission.
5. That property is subject to a registered mortgage held by D1 Pty Ltd, who filed a submitting appearance. In her affidavit filed 13 March 2025 the wife said that "[D1 Pty Ltd] holds a mortgage over the property at [QQ Street], [Suburb J]".[17]
6. The wife, during the trial of the matter, sought for the first time to contest that mortgage. Given the late stage at which she identified this challenge, and that she had not placed D1 Pty Ltd on notice of the change in relief that she sought in relation to which they had filed their submitting notice, she was not permitted to mount such a challenge.
7. Any debt associated with that mortgage has not been identified or proven. At best the mortgage document acknowledges, at Exhibit A2, a sum of $875,000 or such other sum agreed upon by the Mortgagor and the Mortgagee. What the actual sum might be remained a mystery. Significant confusion emerged from the document as on its face it indicated that the sum was owed by D1 Pty Ltd to the wife rather than the other way around. No evidence was adduced as to the actual sum, beyond an assertion made by the husband on reading the mortgage document. There is no good reason to place any credence upon assertions made by the husband.
8. The husband further asserted that monies given to the wife would be rent, generally denying the wife's account. He further asserted that he conducted renovations on the property, to create a granny flat. He asserted that he had paid the rates on the property until "the day I flee to [Country P]" subsequently asserting this meant "fly". Again, no credence can be placed on the husband's assertions.
9. The contentious issue then was whether the property is merely held on trust by the wife for her mother.
10. Unlike her Amended Amended Initiating Application, in her outline of case document the wife did not pursue this claim. By her proposed balance sheet the wife conceded a value of $1 million. By her case outline document the wife did not dispute the presence of a mortgage, but alleged it was entered into as a transaction to defeat her claim, a matter not pursued at trial.
11. In final submissions the wife asserted that $70,000 of the $250,000 taken by the NSW Crimes Commission was her money, paid to her by her parents as a repayment of a loan for the Suburb J property, further asserting that she holds the property on constructive trust for her parents.
12. In the submissions the contention was that the wife's mother paid between $70,000 and $90,000 in ongoing payments, where the purchase price was $800,000.
13. I am unable to accept the wife's account that she holds the property on trust for her parents. It is a claim made inconsistently by her. It is a claim made on sparse evidence, and wholly reliant even to that degree upon the wife. Despite the wife's assertion that there are others who could support the account, including her mother and other relatives, she called none to support her contention. It can only be inferred that they would not have assisted the wife's case in this respect. While some money appears to have been paid to the wife, in a sum of perhaps $70,000 by the wife's mother, I remain unclear as to on what basis this may have occurred.
14. The Suburb J property, registered in the wife's name, is one in relation to which the wife holds the beneficial interest.

1. The third item of property was a sum of $250,000 cash seized by the New South Wales police force from the Suburb G property in 2023 and, as at the commencement of the trial, the subject of a notice served by the New South Wales Crimes Commission. Although the wife initially sought that this be declared to be her monies, by the completion of the trial the wife and husband adopted the common position that the monies were now forfeited (the wife having apparently received a notice to that effect) and should no longer be considered to be a part of the pool of property.

1. The next item of property is jewellery currently held in AB Pty Ltd by Ms OO, being jewellery purchased for the wife by the husband during the relationship and accordingly, subject to any other claims, jewellery owned by the wife. The wife estimates that the total value of the jewellery is approximately $702,000[18] (although in her Case Outline Document she asserted a worth of $800,000), identifying a number of specific items and assigning a specific value to each. At its best this constitutes, in the event that the wife is to retain the jewellery, an admission against interest.
2. Although there was a claim by the husband that the wife has other jewellery, this claim was not sufficiently supported to result in a finding of such jewellery.

1. The next item is a collection of real property held by the husband in Country P. By his financial statement of 29 June 2023, the husband identified the following items of real property as held by him:

(a) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(b) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(c) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(d) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(e) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(f) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(g) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(h) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(i) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(j) Land registration number [...], Town AP, City AQ, Country P

(k) Land registration number [...], Town AR, City AS, Country P

(l) Land registration number [...], Town AT, City AS, Country P

(m) Land registration number [...], Town AT, City AS, Country P

(n) Land registration number [...], Town AU, City AS, Country P

(o) Land registration number [...], Town AU, City AS, Country P; and

(p) Land registration number [...], Town AV, Region AW, Country P.

1. No cogent evidence as to the nature of these properties was given, and no expert evidence as to the value of such property was adduced. It may be observed that the husband disclosed no significant information about the items of property. By his affidavit the husband contended that the properties had been given to him by his elderly father, and further that, on the basis that Country P is a warzone, the properties would, collectively, "be lucky to get AUD50,000." At its best, if the husband is to retain such, his estimate of value forms an admission against interest. Although the wife offered her opinion that the properties in Country P are worth AUD5,000,000, she did not offer proof of such a value at trial.
2. Before moving further through the evidence it is appropriate to make some observations about the husband's evidence. Neither the limited affidavit evidence filed by him, nor the manner and content of his oral evidence gave any confidence that he could be relied upon, at all, in the absence of supportive evidence. He was evasive, combative and gave the strong impression that he made up the evidence as he went along. He failed to provide adequate disclosure, at times asserting that various matters, such as his holdings in Country P, were not the business of the Court. He made assertions that received no support in his limited affidavit evidence.
3. In his affidavit, describing the lack of value of the properties, he asserted that he was "happy to transfer half of the properties in [Country P]" to the wife.[19] He did not specify how the half would be determined, it perhaps being of little significance given his description of their collective value. In his oral evidence he asserted that only some had come from his father, and displayed that his assertion in his affidavit that he was "happy" to transfer half to the wife was disingenuous, his contention being that the Country P properties have nothing to do with this court.

1. The second respondent, B Pty Ltd, was one of approximately 80 companies forming a part of the B Group, controlled by the husband as director and owned by the husband, either directly or indirectly, as the shareholder. Those corporate entities are each the subject of administration.
2. In general terms, the B Group was involved in the purchase, sale and development of real estate. Corporate entities were created for each project, and finances obtained by loans guaranteed and secured by the other corporate entities within the group.
3. B Pty Ltd is significant in these proceedings, both as the central component of the matrimonial property and, in liquidation, as a creditor of the husband with mortgage security over the Suburb G property.
4. The debts asserted as owed by B Pty Ltd would result in B Pty Ltd being of no residual value in these proceedings.
5. The debt claimed by B Pty Ltd against the Suburb G proceeds would result in that property having no residual value in these proceedings.
6. The circumstances of the B Group and subsequent appointment of administrators are set out in the affidavit of Ms AY. Mr BF and Ms AY were appointed as administrators of B Pty Ltd, D2 Pty Ltd and E Pty Ltd (the second, fifth and sixth respondents to these proceedings respectively) on 7 July 2023. On 14 July 2023, they were appointed administrators of 65 further related companies.
7. On 14 July 2023 the balance of B Group, being a further seven companies, were placed in liquidation, albeit separately administered.
8. On 16 April 2024, 55 of the entities administered by Ms AY and Mr BF executed deeds of company arrangement. A further two entities entered into liquidation.
9. On 25 February 2025, they were then appointed liquidators of B Group (excluding those otherwise administered, and excluding eight companies in the group that had not yet entered liquidation but were subject to deeds of company arrangement pending liquidation). It is in liquidation that B Pty Ltd seeks relief in these proceedings.
10. The shortfall in meeting the debts of B Group is anticipated to exceed $300 million. The liquidators do not anticipate any significant return to unsecured creditors. By his affidavit the husband conceded that the loans in respect of B Pty Ltd exceeded the assets of B Pty Ltd.
11. Although the three entities, B Pty Ltd, D2 Pty Ltd and E Pty Ltd were all joined to the proceedings, relief was ultimately only pursued by B Pty Ltd, and ultimately only in relation to the husband's contest as to the quantum of debt owed by him to B Pty Ltd and secured against the Suburb G property.
12. Ms AY identified that as part of the liquidation process, the accounts of B Pty Ltd were reconciled to the end of 2023. This was described as a necessary step to identify the dealings within B Group. As part of that process the loan account maintained by B Pty Ltd in respect of the husband was also brought up to date. The liquidators had access to the accounting system, computer server, emails and hard copy documents maintained by B Pty Ltd.
13. It was the indebtedness in relation to this loan account that was the subject of contest in the proceedings, the loan account being secured by a mortgage held by B Pty Ltd over the Suburb G property. The wife did not ultimately contest B Pty Ltd's claim in relation to the Suburb G property.
14. The first relevant loan agreement was entered into by the husband and B Pty Ltd on 28 April 2023 and recorded the then principal amount of $2,308,798. It provided for further borrowings to take place during the term of the agreement to be deemed as loaned pursuant to the agreement. An interest rate of ten per cent was stipulated, and the loans were then secured by a charge over the Suburb G property.
15. On 10 May 2023, several months prior to the appointment of the administrators, the husband and B Pty Ltd varied the agreement to increase the principal sum to $3,255,583.
16. Although the liquidators identified that at various times the husband has alleged that the loan agreements were fraudulent, in the face of detailed evidence supporting the proposition that the husband entered into the agreements, the husband mounted no coherent challenge to the veracity of the agreement documents.
17. B Pty Ltd placed a caveat on the Suburb G title on 29 April 2023 in reliance upon the charge created by the loan document. On 10 May 2023 a mortgage was placed on the title per the May 2023 agreement.
18. It should be observed that, by his trial affidavit the husband made no effective contest of any of these matters. He adduced no evidence to establish that the loan amounts asserted by the liquidator were incorrect. He mounted no effective challenge to the evidence of the liquidator, including as to the liquidators declining to account the loans as reduced by dividends or by payments from the husband's salary due to lack of substantiation as set out later. He, however, complained during the proceedings that the amount was not correct.
19. The liquidator described that, prior to their appointment the husband took monies from the B Pty Ltd bank account for personal use, with such recorded on the books of B Pty Ltd as a loan account.
20. As at the appointment of the liquidators on 7 July 2023 the B Pty Ltd accounts recorded an outstanding debt of $6,599,707.18. The ledgers, which were produced, support the existence of outstanding director's loans in that sum. However, Ms AY explains that analysis by comparison of the ledgers to the books and records of B Pty Ltd show total director's borrowings by the husband in the sum of $7,994,381.27.
21. This included significant payments of an ostensibly personal nature to the husband, including criminal lawyer's fees for himself and his daughter, school fees, tax for his daughter, tax for himself, deposit for the Suburb G property, and mortgage payments toward the Suburb G property. At the end of the financial year, the company would declare (by recording entries) dividends paid to the husband which would, if genuine, reduce the amount he owed to B Pty Ltd with respect to the loan account.
22. The liquidator undertook a reconciliation in respect of the borrowings that included borrowings from related entities. A number of entries (which would have otherwise served to reduce the debt owed by the husband) were identified by the liquidators as excluded by them in reaching a conclusion as to the indebtedness. Of greatest significance was the exclusion of purported payments of dividends allocated to the husband to the loan account, and the crediting against the loan account of salary allocations. This last aspect appeared to be the primary focus of the husband's complaints as to the calculation of the indebtedness.
23. The liquidator identifies that the loan account ledgers recorded that from 1 January 2020, a total of $4,414,914.67 was credited against the loan accounts in favour of the husband and described as dividend distributions.[20] The liquidator has not reckoned this amount to reduce the loan accounts of the husband on the basis that no profit was earned in the relevant years to enable a dividend to be paid. That is, the crediting of those amounts as a dividend is fundamentally inconsistent with the company accounts.
24. The loan ledgers were conceded to record credits in the form of salary allocations to the husband, totalling $575,048.55. These, too, were not taken by the liquidator to reduce the indebtedness on the basis that there was a lack of information to substantiate the payments.
25. As noted above these appeared to be the focus of the husband's claims that he did not owe monies to B Pty Ltd. In support of this claim he referred in his submissions to tax payments made. The liquidator identified that a number of tax payments were included on the loan ledger for both the husband and his daughter from his previous marriage. It remained unclear how the payment of tax by the husband, the payment of which resulted in increased loans to meet the tax liability, established that salary or dividends had in reality been paid to reduce the debt. Perhaps what was being suggested was that the payment of tax established the veracity of the claims. However, at least in relation to the purported dividends, such did not counter the proposition raised by the liquidators that there were no profits available to be distributed, and the payment of the tax did not establish otherwise.
26. While the payment of taxes could support the proposition that salaries were paid, no adequate substantiation was made by the husband to establish that the loans were so reduced.
27. Similarly, debits recorded in the loan ledgers in relation to fringe benefit taxes in the sum of $983,061.25 were not taken into account as they were lacking substantiation.
28. Again, on the basis of a lack of supporting information, a purported debt in relation to the Suburb J property was not included.
29. However, various substantiated credits to the loan account were applied to reduce the loan amount.
30. The reconciliation also captured payments made by related entities to the benefit of the husband. These were included in the indebtedness to B Pty Ltd as they formed loans from the related entity to B Pty Ltd, then loans to the husband within the accounts of B Pty Ltd and, accordingly, loans within the scope of the loan agreement between the husband and B Pty Ltd, being loan amounts secured by mortgage against the Suburb G property.
31. The reconciliation of the loan account, as set out above, then led to a total greater than that initially seen in the accounts, of $7,994,381.27.
32. Written submissions for the second, fifth and sixth respondents were provided to the Court, dated 20 March 2025. These submissions were exhibited as Exhibit R2-4. The effect of these submissions was to provide a final quantum for the loan between B Pty Ltd and the husband, which amounted to $11,211,703 inclusive of interest as provided for by the loan agreement entered into by the husband with B Pty Ltd. However, at the hearing of this matter, that amount was reduced to $9,590,724, on the basis explained below.
33. The difference between the two amounts provided by B Pty Ltd was the result of a concession as to the date from which interest should be calculated. It is contained within the schedule annexed to the written submissions. The larger amount was calculated by adding interest to debts from when they were incurred. Rather, the smaller number (which B Pty Ltd sought to rely upon at the hearing) calculates interest only from when the husband acknowledged it was payable in the loan agreement until 20 March 2025.
34. In the context of the failure of the husband to mount any meaningful or substantive challenge to it, the evidence of the liquidator as to the indebtedness of the husband to B Pty Ltd, as secured against the Suburb G proceeds should be accepted.
35. The effect of this conclusion is that Suburb G no longer constitutes a substantive asset for distribution between the parties, the remaining balance being insufficient to meet the secured indebtedness of $9,590,724.

1. The husband is the sole shareholder and director of D1 Pty Ltd, part of B Group. The entity is currently under external administration with receivers and managers appointed. Its sole asset is the mortgage in relation to the Suburb J property. Exhibit A2 is a Mortgage Form lodged with the Office of the Registrar General purportedly executed on 3 April 2020 (but dated 9 April 2020) for a principal sum of $875,000 or another sum as agreed over land title reference [...] (the Suburb J property). As identified above, there was insufficient evidence to establish any quantum of indebtedness associated with this mortgage.

1. In his financial statement filed 29 June 2023 the husband deposed to $0 worth of superannuation assets. The husband did not discuss any superannuation interests in his affidavit or other evidence. In her Outline of Case Document attempted to file 18 March 2025, the wife lists two super funds in which she suggests the husband holds balances totalling approximately $54,039. There was no evidence adduced to support these assertions.

1. The three sets of solicitors make claims that the wife owes legal costs to them, and as to corresponding rights of enforcement attaching to the property interests to be held by the wife.
2. To secure these amounts AF Pty Ltd (the eight respondent) and ZZ Pty Ltd (fourteenth respondent) rely both upon a charge purportedly created by the costs agreement entered into by the wife and then upon a claim of a fruits of litigation lien. Ms OO (seventh and fifteenth respondent) relies upon a possessory lien and a fruits of litigation lien as security for her claim.
3. They claim that pursuant to a costs agreement the wife owes a sum in accordance with the invoices presented by each practice.
4. As to AF Pty Ltd and ZZ Pty Ltd, although the wife accepts that there are monies owing, the wife does not accept the asserted sums as representing the proper amounts. As to Ms OO, the wife disputes any amount owing and, in particular, whether Ms OO was retained as the wife's legal representative.
5. Each of the claims made by the solicitors relies then at first upon the validity of the costs agreements.

1. Each practice relies upon a purported Costs Agreement that, pursuant to s 184 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 NSW ("the Uniform Law") may, subject to that law, be enforceable as any other contract.
2. The costs agreements are governed by Division 4 of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law, which provides that the agreement must be written, or evidenced in writing, and that it may be accepted by conduct. Section 184 of the Uniform Law provides that:

Subject to this Law, a costs agreement may be enforced in the same way as any other contract.

1. The foundational provision in relation to legal costs is at s 172 which emphasises that costs must be proportionate, reasonably incurred, and reasonable in amount. It further sets out the role of a costs agreement in determining whether the costs are reasonable. It is in the following terms:

172 Legal costs must be fair and reasonable

(1) A law practice must, in charging legal costs, charge costs that are no more than fair and reasonable in all the circumstances and that in particular are -

(a) proportionately and reasonably incurred; and

(b) proportionate and reasonable in amount.

(2) In considering whether legal costs satisfy subsection (1), regard must be had to whether the legal costs reasonably reflect -

(a) the level of skill, experience, specialisation and seniority of the lawyers concerned; and

(b) the level of complexity, novelty or difficulty of the issues involved, and the extent to which the matter involved a matter of public interest; and

(c) the labour and responsibility involved; and

(d) the circumstances in acting on the matter, including (for example) any or all of the following -

(i) the urgency of the matter;

(ii) the time spent on the matter;

(iii) the time when business was transacted in the matter;

(iv) the place where business was transacted in the matter;

(v) the number and importance of any documents involved; and

(e) the quality of the work done; and

(f) the retainer and the instructions (express or implied) given in the matter.

(3) In considering whether legal costs are fair and reasonable, regard must also be had to whether the legal costs conform to any applicable requirements of this Part, the Uniform Rules and any fixed costs legislative provisions.

(4) A costs agreement is prima facie evidence that legal costs disclosed in the agreement are fair and reasonable if -

(a) the provisions of Division 3 relating to costs disclosure have been complied with; and

(b) the costs agreement does not contravene, and was not entered into in contravention of, any provision of Division 4.

1. In addition to being proportionate, s 174 requires prompt disclosure as to the basis for costs to be calculated and an estimate of total legal costs. The estimate forms part of an ongoing obligation of the legal practice to update advice where there are significant changes, including as to the expected total costs. Section 174 further requires disclosure of other matters including as to dispute resolution and imposes a requirement on the practice to "take all reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the client has understood and given consent to he proposed course of action for the conduct of the matter and the proposed costs".
2. Section 178 provides that contravention of the disclosure obligations renders a costs agreement void, defers liability to pay costs until they are assessed, and prohibits the commencement or maintenance of proceedings to recover costs until the assessment or dispute has been resolved by the local authority. Further the contravention may constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
3. Those consequences are subject to modification pursuant to the Legal Profession Uniform General Rules 2015 ("the LPUGR"). The LPUGR relevantly provide that:

72A Non-compliance with disclosure obligations - disapplication of section 178(1) and (2) of the Uniform Law

(1) This rule applies where a law practice has contravened the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law in relation to a particular matter.

(2) Section 178(1) and (2) of the Uniform Law do not apply in relation to the law practice (so far as they would otherwise apply to the matter concerned) in circumstances where the relevant authority, a costs assessor, a court or a tribunal is satisfied that -

(a) the law practice took reasonable steps to comply with the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law before becoming aware of the contravention, and

(b) the law practice, no later than 14 days after the date on which it became aware of the contravention, rectified the contravention, as far as practicable, by providing the client with the necessary information required to be disclosed under Division 3 of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law (including, where relevant, an estimate or revised estimate of the costs), and

(c) the contravention was not substantial and it would not be reasonable to expect that the client would have made a different decision in any relevant respect.

(3) Subrule (2)(b) applies even though the information or estimate is not provided at the times required by the disclosure obligations of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law.

1. Division 5 of Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law deals with billing. Section 192 provides that:

192 Notification of client's rights

A law practice must ensure that a bill includes or is accompanied by a written statement setting out -

(a) the avenues that are open to the client in the event of a dispute in relation to legal costs; and

(b) any time limits that apply to the taking of any action referred to in paragraph (a).

1. Section 194 places a restriction on commencing proceedings to cover legal costs, in circumstances where the requirements of s 192 (and other sections of the Uniform Law and Rules) have not been complied with.
2. Section 194 is in the following terms:

194 Restriction on commencing proceedings to recover legal costs

(1) A law practice must not commence legal proceedings to recover legal costs from a person unless a bill has been given for the legal costs and the bill complies with the requirements of this Law and the Uniform Rules.

(2) A law practice must not commence legal proceedings to recover legal costs from a person who has been given a bill until -

(a) where the legal costs are the subject of a costs dispute before the designated local regulatory authority - the authority has closed or resolved the dispute; and

(b) at least 30 days after the later of -

(i) the date on which the person is given the bill; or

(ii) the date on which the person receives an itemised bill following a request made in accordance with section 187.

1. If any of the bills of costs are found to be non-compliant with s 192, the issue then arises as to the effect that s 194 has on the proceedings. As observed by the NSW Supreme Court in Frontier Law Group Pty Ltd v Barkman [2016] NSWSC 1542 at [39], "it seems impossible for the solicitor to be able to establish a right to commence these legal proceedings, unless a memorandum of costs is tendered, which, on its face, complies with the law and the Uniform Law". This was considered in the Local Court case of Hodges v Sathyanparamatheva [2019] NSWLC 8, where a failure to go further than merely stating that avenues to dispute a bill of costs existed was held in non-compliance with s 192. As a result, the proceedings to recover costs in that matter was dismissed. Rule 72A, which provides exceptions for other breaches of the Uniform Law, does not apply to such a case.

1. AF Pty Ltd sought declaratory relief as to their security over the Suburb J property. AF Pty Ltd sought no quantification of the debt associated with the security.
2. The affidavit of Mr BA identifies that the wife first attended upon him on 24 April 2023, in the company of Ms OO. Mr BA asserts that during this meeting he provided an estimate of costs and disbursements, of approximately $1 million, if not more, to final hearing. A further estimate of $1.5 million, excluding disbursements was given at that meeting by Special Counsel, Ms BG. Instructions were then given by the wife to commence proceedings on an urgent basis in relation to both property and parenting. The wife was asked to deposit $10,000 into the AF Pty Ltd trust account, which was done on 26 April 2023. On that day a fee disclosure from Mr BH SC was provided to the wife. Further instructions were taken from the wife the following day, and circumstances of urgency were identified.
3. On 6 May 2023 a draft court document was provided to the wife, along with advice that the provision of a Costs Agreement was delayed due to the urgency of instructions, and a further estimate was given, amending the earlier estimate, replacing it with the sum of $3.5 million.
4. On or about 8 May 2023 the wife was provided with a fee disclosure document from Mr BJ of counsel.
5. On 10 May 2023 the wife was provided with a costs agreement from AF Pty Ltd. The agreement was explained, along with the option to obtain independent legal advice. The wife executed the document.
6. Further work was undertaken, and interim orders were obtained on 7 June 2023, and further relief on 7 July 2023.
7. A further costs agreement was provided to the wife on 5 August 2023, which was executed by the wife on 15 August 2023.
8. On 29 August 2023 the wife instructed AF Pty Ltd to suspend work, and then terminated the retainer on or about 7 September 2023.
9. On 20 September 2023 AF Pty Ltd served on ZZ Pty Ltd (who were the wife's subsequent lawyers) notice in respect of a claimed lien, and a provided proposed deed to secure outstanding fees.
10. On 13 September 2024 AF Pty Ltd applied to join these proceedings.
11. Seven tax invoices were issued by AF Pty Ltd to the wife between 30 June 2023 and 13 October 2023, totalling $854,111.15.

The wife's specific complaint regarding AF Pty Ltd

1. The wife resisted AF Pty Ltd's claim on the basis of failure to comply with obligations imposed by s 174, which deals with prompt disclosure of the basis of charging, an estimate of fees, and an obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the client has understood and given consent to the proposed course of action and the proposed costs.
2. Having initially consulted them on or about 24 April 2023, a costs agreement was not provided for another two weeks. The wife asserts that this did not meet the requirement of the Uniform Law that a costs agreement be provided as soon as practicable. As a result, she contends that the agreement is void and an assessment of costs would be required to be pursued potentially in another jurisdiction.

1. AF Pty Ltd asserts that the estimates and fee agreement were provided as soon as practicable in accordance with s 174 of the Uniform Law. At the first consultation estimates were provided, then updated with the provision of a costs agreement about two weeks after initial instructions had been taken. AF Pty Ltd contends that this meets the requirement.
2. The explanation for the delay was the undertaking of urgent work. By the description contained in the affidavit of Mr BA it can be concluded that the wife was facing circumstances that required urgent and complex work both in and out of regular business hours.
3. It can be seen that estimates were promptly provided, and then promptly updated, that identified the high level of anticipated expense associated with the case.
4. The key issue is the provision of the costs agreement that identified the basis of the charging, the ability to negotiate the terms, along with information regarding itemisation, bills and disputes.
5. What is required is that such be provided as soon as practicable. What is also required by s 174(3) of the Uniform Law is the obligation to be satisfied of a client's understanding. This is an essential aspect of the scheme set out at s 174. What is required are circumstances that permit informed consent on the part of the client. This shapes the understanding of "practicable" at s 174(1).
6. The circumstances of each case will determine what is "as soon as practicable after instructions are initially given." Here the urgency and intensity of the work being undertaken is proffered as circumstances rendering a gap of 16 days between the taking of initial instructions and the provision of the agreement. During that time, it appears, much work was undertaken and significant legal costs incurred by the wife. Two barristers were consulted who promptly provided fee disclosure documents that were provided to the wife.
7. The urgency and intensity of the work perhaps explain why attention was not given immediately to the costs agreements. It does not establish, however, a lack of practicability in the period prior to the provision of the agreement.
8. Although prompt estimates were provided, it should not be concluded that, as soon as practicable after instructions were initially given, AF Pty Ltd provided the wife with information disclosing the basis on which legal costs would be calculated, or the associated necessary information as set out at s 174(2), including as to the ability to negotiate a costs agreement, to negotiate the billing method, or to dispute costs via a regulatory agency.
9. This renders AF Pty Ltd in breach of the s 174 obligations.
10. The consequence is that, pursuant to s 178, the costs agreement is void and there is no requirement to pay legal costs until assessment or resolution of a costs dispute by the local authority. Further, AF Pty Ltd is restrained from commencing or maintaining proceedings for the recovery of costs. This result is, however, subject to the operation of Rule 72A of the LPUGR, which is set out above.
11. As identified above, Rule 72A outlines that in certain circumstances a failure to meet the requirements Part 4.3 of the Uniform Law as it relates to costs disclosure does not attract the serious consequences imposed by s 178.
12. There are three conjunctive limbs to Rule 72A. They are the requirement to have taken reasonable steps to comply before becoming aware of the contravention, correction within 14 days of becoming aware of the contravention, and that the contravention was not substantial and that it would not be reasonable to expect that the client would have made a different decision in any relevant respect. The proof of these matters lies with the law practice.
13. As to the first limb, the steps that were taken were:

(a) providing costs estimates;

(b) providing counsel's fee disclosures; and

(c) advising that the costs agreement was delayed.

1. That these constituted reasonable steps was not addressed. The above steps addressed in part the requirements of a costs agreement, and may be seen as steps that partially ensured that the wife was equipped with the information necessary to determine whether she would engage the law practice. However, the information was also significantly deficient for that purpose. It was not shown to encompass advice to the wife as to the manner of charging, or of other matters to be contained in the costs disclosure. The identified steps fell short of what was reasonable.
2. As to the second limb, a costs disclosure agreement was provided to the wife to rectify the deficit within such a period.
3. As to the third limb, it may be accepted that the delay beyond "as soon as practicable" was not substantial, leaving the issue as to whether it would not be reasonable to expect that the wife would have taken a different decision. Again, this was a matter not addressed. Perhaps the urgency and intensity of the circumstances may speak to such a result, but they do not automatically do so.
4. AF Pty Ltd has not established that the Rule 72A exemption applies.
5. The result then is the application of s 178, resulting in the fee agreement being void, a requirement for assessment, a prohibition on the commencement of proceedings for the recovery of costs prior to assessment, and a potential issue of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.
6. The consequence is that the charge on the Suburb J property, reliant as it is upon the costs agreement, does not exist.
7. The issue then as to the litigation being able to proceed for declaratory relief in respect of a lien relies upon the scope of s 178(1)(c), which is discussed in greater detail below in relation to the claims made by ZZ Pty Ltd.

1. ZZ Pty Ltd's claim for relief is set out in an Amended Application in a Proceeding, purportedly filed on 7 March 2025, but not then accepted for filing.
2. Leave was granted to ZZ Pty Ltd to file the Amended Application in court as identifying the relief sought (Exhibit R14-6). That relief relevantly included declaratory relief as to a lien over the wife's property, and declaratory relief as to an equitable charge over the Suburb J property.
3. ZZ Pty Ltd's primary claims were for summary judgment in its favour in the sum of $466,168.95 and interest, that such be secured by equitable charge upon the Suburb J property, that the Suburb J property be sold and that the claim of ZZ Pty Ltd have priority over all other claims upon that property. ZZ Pty Ltd sought to then be excused from the balance of the proceedings. ZZ Pty Ltd's claim was not dealt with summarily at the commencement of the hearing.
4. ZZ Pty Ltd pleads, and the wife concedes, that the wife commenced instructing ZZ Pty Ltd on or around 24 August 2023.
5. The wife was sent the costs disclosure and agreement on 5 September 2023. She accepts that she entered into the costs agreement. ZZ Pty Ltd asserts that the agreement was dated 12 September 2023 but accepts that the disclosure and agreement were sent again on 14 November 2023, and that a copy signed by the wife was not returned until 10 July 2024.
6. ZZ Pty Ltd ceased acting for the wife on 17 September 2024.
7. The wife accepts that a term of the agreement was the granting of a charge over real property owned by the wife, however, the wife denies that ZZ Pty Ltd holds a charge over the Suburb J property.

The wife's specific complaint in relation to ZZ Pty Ltd

1. The wife does not pursue a timeliness complaint in respect of being provided with a fee agreement, despite a difference of only a few days as compared with AF Pty Ltd. Rather, she first complains that the costs agreements did not provide estimates as required by the Uniform Law. In particular she asserts that they did not provide an estimate of total legal costs, nor provide a break down as to how it would be calculated in terms of the days or work undertaken in respect of each individual step.
2. ZZ Pty Ltd asserts that the costs agreement gave a comprehensive estimate of legal costs and provided the relevant notice of dispute mechanisms. ZZ Pty Ltd identifies two estimates given in respect of costs, one being on 5 September 2023, for a limited time period of 30 days at $220,000, and then on 12 September 2023, a more comprehensive estimate for the duration of the proceedings, dependent upon what stage they may resolve, but culminating in an estimate if the matter resolved following a final hearing of $5 million.
3. Exhibit R14-1 is the costs agreement provided to the wife on 12 September 2023. It sets out the charge rates of the various personnel to be engaged with the case, the manner in which time charging would be conducted, particular specific costs, along with estimates as to the anticipated costs of the proceedings varying in accordance with the stage at which the proceedings might be resolved.
4. By this ZZ Pty Ltd correctly contends that s 174 of the Uniform Law was complied with and the wife's first complaint is without merit.
5. The wife accepts that she was rendered invoices on 25 October 2023 of $43,017.90 and 17 September 2024 of $423,151.05.
6. The wife did not challenge ZZ Pty Ltd's contention as to the work undertaken by them.
7. Accepting that such work was undertaken would lead to prima facie acceptance that, if the costs agreement and the invoices are compliant, the quantum of what is asserted by ZZ Pty Ltd marks out fair and reasonable legal fees owed by the wife.
8. Within the fee agreement, as ultimately executed by the wife, the wife granted a charge over any real property owned by her to ZZ Pty Ltd and consented to ZZ Pty Ltd lodging a caveat in support of such.
9. The wife secondly complains that the invoices rendered failed to comply with s 194 of the Uniform Law, by their failure to include on the invoice the avenues open to negotiate or to dispute costs.
10. ZZ Pty Ltd concedes that the invoices themselves did not contain notices advising the wife of avenues available in the event of a costs dispute.

1. Exhibits R14-2 and R14-3 are the invoices rendered by ZZ Pty Ltd to the wife. Neither contain a notification of the wife's rights as required by s 192 of the Uniform Law. As identified above, s 194 of the Uniform Law places a restriction on proceedings. On its face, s 194 prevents ZZ Pty Ltd from commencing proceedings for the recovery of costs.
2. ZZ Pty Ltd submits that as a respondent they have not relevantly commenced proceedings. ZZ Pty Ltd reasonably accepted that a cross-claim may be regarded as proceedings, depending upon context. The context here is that ZZ Pty Ltd has initiated an intervention in these proceedings directed to the recovery of legal costs. Despite not being the architects of the original application that was directed to the adjustment of property rights between the parties to the marriage, their joinder and application insofar as it is directed to the recovery of legal costs meets the description at s 194 of commencing proceedings. ZZ Pty Ltd's application is, subject to other arguments, caught by s 194.
3. An issue then arises as to what is covered by the term "proceedings to recover legal costs." There are four elements of the claim made by ZZ Pty Ltd in this litigation. One is as to a liability of the wife to ZZ Pty Ltd in the sum of $466,168.95 plus interest. The second is as to security in relation to the wife's liability to them (to whatever degree) in the form of a charge in ZZ Pty Ltd's favour on the Suburb J property. The third is as to the priority to be accorded to that charge, focussing upon competing claims for priority between ZZ Pty Ltd and AF Pty Ltd. The fourth is as to security in relation to the wife's liability to them (to whatever degree) in the form of a fruits of action lien against proceeds received by the wife in this matter.
4. The scope of the prohibition depends on the terms of the legislation. Legislative provisions are to be construed in their legislative context and consistently with their legislative purpose. Here the purpose of the provision falls within an integrated scheme for regulating lawyers and costs agreements, ensuring appropriate protections to clients, and rendering the resolution of costs disputes between lawyer and client efficient and fair. Section 194(1) requires strict compliance with the requirement to give particular notice to a client prior to commencing proceedings to recover costs.
5. It is a restriction that catches ZZ Pty Ltd's claim for the recovery of $466,168.95 plus interest.
6. Whether it forms a restriction on proceedings that establish security and/or priority of security is a different question.
7. The privative nature of the provision points to a construction that resolves ambiguity in favour of access to court.
8. Although the issue of security is closely related to the recovery of costs, establishing security is distinct from recovery, relating to the capacity to recover rather than the recovery itself.
9. Establishing the presence of a security does not establish an entitlement in respect of costs. Circumstances where it is necessary to commence proceedings to establish the security even where the liability for costs has not yet been established may be readily envisaged, this case forming an example of such, seen not only in the application by ZZ Pty Ltd, but also in the application by AF Pty Ltd.
10. Section 194 should not be construed to restrict ZZ Pty Ltd's (or AF Pty Ltd's) application insofar as it relates to security. It, if applicable to these proceedings, does prevent the application insofar as it relates to the recovery of $466,168.95 plus interest.
11. The next issue pursued by ZZ Pty Ltd is as to whether the NSW state enactment embodied in s 194 of the Uniform Law has application in these federal proceedings. If ZZ Pty Ltd is correct in its contention that it does not, there is no bar to ZZ Pty Ltd's claim not only as to security, but also as to the debt itself.
12. That is an issue governed by s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ('the Judiciary Act') which is in the following terms:

The laws of each State or Territory, including the laws relating to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory in all cases to which they are applicable.

1. In Rizeq v Western Australia [2017] HCA 23; (2017) 262 CLR 1 ("Rizeq") the plurality described the interaction of State law and the exercise by a court of federal jurisdiction, and the work of s 79 of the Judiciary Act in the following compact manner (at [103]):

Within the limits of State legislative capacity, State laws apply in federal jurisdiction as valid State laws unless and to the extent that they are rendered invalid by reason of inconsistency with Commonwealth laws. What State laws relevantly cannot do within the limits of State legislative capacity is govern the exercise by a court of federal jurisdiction. A State law can determine neither the powers that a court has in the exercise of federal jurisdiction nor how or in what circumstances those powers are to be exercised. A State law cannot in that sense "bind" a court in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and that is the sense in which that word is used in s 79 of the Judiciary Act. The operation of s 79 is limited to making the text of the State laws of that nature apply as Commonwealth law to bind a court in the exercise of federal jurisdiction.

1. In the determination of this matter, as well as applying the Family Law Act, the court applies State laws that "form part of the single composite body of federal and non-federal law that is applicable"[21] in order to resolve the rights and liabilities of the parties.
2. Insofar as the State law is directed to the rights and liabilities of the parties, for example, in respect of their rights and liabilities conferred by the Uniform Law, the State law has direct operation.
3. To the extent that the Uniform Law, as State law, purports to determine how a court will exercise federal jurisdiction, including in relation to the matters governed by the Uniform Law, it cannot directly do so. That work is done by s 79 of the Judiciary Act. At [87] the plurality in Rizeq described:

"Characteristically an exercise of jurisdiction is attended by an exercise of power". By making State laws that are "binding" on courts also binding on courts exercising federal jurisdiction, s 79 of the Judiciary Act takes the text of State laws conferring or governing powers that State courts have when exercising State jurisdiction and applies that text as Commonwealth law to confer or govern powers that State courts and federal courts have when exercising federal jurisdiction.

(Footnote omitted)

1. The effect then, is that s 194 of the Uniform Law only applies because it is adopted by s 79 of the Judiciary Act as a federal law governing the manner of exercise of jurisdiction by this court, subject to either the Constitution or laws of the Commonwealth providing otherwise. This conclusion forecloses a further issue of inconsistency raised by ZZ Pty Ltd in the event that s 194 applies of its own force. It does not.
2. The remaining issue raised by ZZ Pty Ltd is the contention that s 79 of the Family Law Act provides otherwise so as to result in s 79 of the Judiciary Act not picking up s 194 of the Uniform Law.
3. This argument relates to the character of the s 79 Family Law Act proceedings. ZZ Pty Ltd asserts that s 79 of the Family Law Act provides a "comprehensive regime for the determination of matrimonial disputes."
4. The argument is predicated on the proposition that the effect of the application of s 194, even if it does not exclude the determination of the security issue, is to "bifurcate the complete determination of the matrimonial cause".[22] ZZ Pty Ltd submits that s 79 of the Family Law Act is intended to "completely resolve these sorts of disputes and because of that it's a comprehensive regime".[23] ZZ Pty Ltd draws further upon s 81 of the Family Law Act, on the basis that s 81 requires the court to make all such orders as it can in order to completely resolve the dispute. ZZ Pty Ltd points to the unattractive spectre of the quantum of costs issues having to be dealt with in proceedings in another court, and that failure to resolve the extent of the debts associated with the charges upon the Suburb J property would fail to resolve the s 79 Family Law Act dispute.
5. As described by the High Court in Stanford, s 79 of the Family Law Act requires this court to determine the legal and equitable interests held by the parties to the marriage as a first step in determining what if any adjustment of those interests is just and equitable.
6. However, neither ss 79 nor 81 of the Family Law Act are directed to the determination of the rights of third parties. Section 81 is directed to finally determining the financial relationships between the parties to the marriage. Section 79 is directed to the property of the parties to the marriage (or to the property of a party that has vested in a trustee in bankruptcy, or in limited circumstances to the child of a marriage). Third party interests are determined either as between the parties to the marriage, or between the parties to the marriage and the third party, as an incident of such.
7. ZZ Pty Ltd was joined to the proceedings, on ZZ Pty Ltd's application, on the basis that their claim against the wife formed part of a single justiciable controversy with the s 79 Family Law Act proceedings of the parties to the marriage, entwined as it was with the determination of their property interests.
8. It is true that the issue pursued by ZZ Pty Ltd is connected to the s 79 Family Law Act dispute. The manner in which the parties' property is subject, by means of security, to the rights of other parties, forms part of the first step set out in Stanford.
9. However, while identification of the limitations of the parties' property rights and associated loans forms a part of that first step, it is an aspect of the proceedings that frequently does not directly involve the third parties whose securities are at issue.
10. This can be seen in the ordinary course of property proceedings where evidence of debts is adduced without those debts being pursued within the proceedings by a third party. Typical examples of such include evidence of mortgages and associated loans secured against a family home. Typically the determination as between the parties of their property rights does not involve the intervention of the bank in determining those rights as between the parties to the marriage. Similarly, other unsecured debts may also be the subject of evidence adduced in proceedings without the intervention of the creditor.
11. While s 79 proceedings may carry the prospect of trampling upon the rights of a creditor in the process of adjusting property interests between the parties to the marriage, the resolution of a dispute between the parties to the marriage in relation to a particular debt does not, unless the creditor is a party to the proceedings, or accorded the opportunity to be a party to the proceedings, resolve the rights of the creditor. Typically those rights are determined only as between the parties to the marriage on the evidence presented at trial.
12. Fulfilling the requirement of s 79 as described in Stanford does not necessitate that the third party be able to enforce their right in the proceedings in this court. An incapacity on the part of ZZ Pty Ltd to pursue their claims does not defeat the operation of s 79.
13. To the extent that ZZ Pty Ltd contends that it must be able to prosecute its debt claim for the court to resolve the s 79 issue, this is not so.
14. The Commonwealth law does not otherwise provide in a manner that displaces the picking up of the provision in the Uniform Law that restrains ZZ Pty Ltd from commencing enforcement proceedings for its fees.
15. ZZ Pty Ltd is correct to observe that practical difficulty accompanies such an outcome. Not only is there the spectre of further proceedings in another jurisdiction, but the assessment of what is just and equitable between the parties is hampered where there is a lack of clarity as to the quantum of the indebtedness of the wife.
16. In any event, even if there were not such a restriction, despite the evidence adduced in the proceedings, the level of indebtedness to ZZ Pty Ltd is unable to be determined. Given the wife's concessions as to the completion of work by ZZ Pty Ltd, there is an associated debt. However, the reasonableness of the fees were challenged by the wife, and the underlying evidence did not give clarity as to whether the fees charged were in accordance with the fee agreement, depriving ZZ Pty Ltd's assertion of quantum of the benefit accorded by s 172(4) of the Uniform Law that the fees charged are prima facie fair and reasonable.
17. While it may be the case that such is established in other proceedings, it is not established here, resulting in an inability to determine the wife's indebtedness. In the context of the terms of s 79 in relation to this hearing, such does not preclude the court from resolving the s 79 dispute between the husband and the wife.
18. Perhaps in this case the inability to determine the quantum of the wife's debt is of little consequence, relating as it does to the wife's own costs, for which she generally would have responsibility, subject to a successful costs application on her part.
19. What is however established is that ZZ Pty Ltd holds a charge on the Suburb J property, and also, subject to there being fruits of the action, a fruits of action lien in respect of proceeds from these proceedings.
20. A further issue arose of priority, ZZ Pty Ltd asserting priority over the claim by AF Pty Ltd, and over the claim by Ms OO.
21. The first contention by ZZ Pty Ltd is that the charge granted by the fee agreement has priority over any fruits of action lien accrued by Ms OO, as the lien only comes into effect after the charge, crystallising on the judgment being entered. This proposition may be accepted.
22. ZZ Pty Ltd further contends that the charge created by the fee agreement entered into with the wife has priority over the corresponding charge purportedly granted by the wife to AF Pty Ltd in that earlier fee agreement with AF Pty Ltd. Given the fee agreement between the wife and AF Pty Ltd is void, no charge is created for AF Pty Ltd.

1. As identified above, the claim in respect of Ms OO's purported representation of the wife is mounted by Ms OO (the seventh respondent) who works for AO Lawyers and AN Pty Ltd (the fifteenth respondent), being the entity through which Ms OO operates AO Lawyers.
2. The relief sought by Ms OO was directed to a declaration as to a lien over the jewellery, restraints on the handling of the jewellery, that the proceeds from the sale of the jewellery be held on trust pending further order, and costs on an indemnity basis.[24]
3. There was significant controversy in relation to Ms OO's claims, including as to whether Ms OO was retained by the wife at all.
4. Ms OO relied upon a purported fee agreement dated 20 November 2016 (Exhibit R7-1). That fee agreement was not signed by Ms OO.
5. In her affidavit filed 13 March 2025, Ms OO described that she mailed the agreement to the B Pty Ltd office in Suburb PP. Ms OO then became aware that the wife had left for Country P. She did not check with the wife whether she received it.[25]
6. It was uncontroversial that the wife has not executed the purported agreement. The wife denies having received the document.
7. Ms OO was challenged as to whether the document had in fact been sent, responding "I sent it, I sent it, 100 percent, but your client doesn't read. That's her usual story...she doesn't sign documents".[26] This consciousness on the part of Ms OO sits poorly with the obligation cast upon her by the Uniform Law to ensure that a client understands the basis for charging.
8. Ms OO described that, in the various work undertaken by her for the wife, incorporating immigration work (apparently related to either the husband's business or the parties' charity) the wife had never signed a fee agreement.[27]
9. No indication was given by Ms OO that there had been any contact between herself and the wife identifying that the wife had actually received the document or understood its content.
10. Ms OO however asserts that the wife is bound by the terms of the costs agreement because the wife continued to provide instruction following its receipt, with such mode of acceptance set out at section M of the agreement in the following terms:[28]

M. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER

You may accept the Costs Disclosure and Costs Agreement by:

M1 Signing and returning this document to us or:

M2 Continuing to instruct us. Upon acceptance you agree to pay for our services on these terms

1. This effect relies upon two underlying propositions. The first is that it was received by the wife. The second is that the costs agreement is applicable.
2. As to the first, Ms OO has not demonstrated that the wife relevantly received the document. The document, at best, was sent to the husband's business at about the time the wife travelled overseas. Even if it was accepted that the document was sent as described, there can be no satisfaction that the wife received it or was aware of its content.
3. It may also be observed that the disclosure obligations at s 174(3) of the Uniform Law require the following:

Client's consent and understanding If a disclosure is made under subsection (1), the law practice must take all reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the client has understood and given consent to the proposed course of action for the conduct of the matter and the proposed costs.

1. No reasonable steps were identified as having been taken.
2. Secondly, even if the agreement had been entered into by the wife, it would be void.
3. The scope of work to be covered by the purported agreement is unclear, indicating work potentially to be undertaken in the Federal Magistrates Court and Family Court (if necessary) but also in Country P in relation to the husband's divorce there.
4. Importantly, the wife identifies that the purported agreement does not comply with the requirements of the Uniform Law and asserts that it is rendered void by that non-compliance. In particular, the asserted costs agreement contained no estimate as required by s 174 of the Uniform Law.
5. Ms OO asserts that the wife instructed her to perform work in accordance with the costs agreement in Australia and Country P.
6. Exhibit R7-2 purports to be a covering letter addressed to the wife at UU Street, Suburb PP relating to the fee agreement, also dated 20 November 2016, identifying a retainer, for the wife's "Family Matter" yet also for the husband's divorce from his first wife in Country P, and the registration of the husband's and wife's marriage in Country P, along with the registration of the parties' children in Country P.
7. However, absent an estimate, the costs agreement is void pursuant to s 178(1) of the Unform Law and restrains the legal practice, as described earlier, from commencing or maintaining proceedings for the recovery of costs until assessment has taken place.
8. No contention was raised that the voiding effect of the failure to estimate costs is displaced by operation of Rule 72A of the LPUGR. None could reasonably have been raised.
9. As discussed in relation to ZZ Pty Ltd, the relief sought here, insofar as it is limited to the identification of a lien, does not fall foul of the restriction in s 178 of the Uniform Law, restricted as it is to the identification of security rather than the recovery of costs.

1. The first hurdle to be crossed by Ms OO is as to whether she was the wife's lawyer, this matter, somewhat unusually, being contentious.
2. While the wife appeared to accept that she had received some advice from Ms OO, and that she had received support and assistance from Ms OO, she denied that Ms OO did so as her lawyer. Instead, she asserted that Ms OO acted in her capacity as a friend to help the wife and husband "sort out marital issues" by acting "as a mediator or intermediary".[29]
3. Perhaps adding some credence to the wife's claim is that Ms OO accepted that she rendered no invoice to the wife prior to the one currently relied upon by her, despite, on her account, having purportedly acted for the wife for a period of November 2016 to April 2023.
4. While it might be thought that a contest as to whether Ms OO was the wife's lawyer would be readily answerable by Ms OO, Ms OO explained that she was limited in the material that she could provide by reason of her laptop having crashed, resulting in the loss of all emails, but the retention of other files.
5. Further, Ms OO's attempts to tender documents that, on her account, must be protected by privilege, were refused.
6. In that context there was limited evidence produced by Ms OO.
7. Adding further complexity to the issue, the wife contends that if the court finds that there was a solicitor-client relationship, it was one that was conflicted. The wife asserts this conflict arises in circumstances where Ms OO had conducted work for the husband and for B Pty Ltd, Ms OO had undertaken work in respect of the registration of the husband's divorce from his previous wife in Country P, and further that a solicitor-client relationship was inconsistent with particular conduct by Ms OO, as set out below.
8. The nature of Ms OO's dealings with the wife were clouded by the nature of her relationships with both parties to the marriage, and by her conduct. The wife described that Ms OO would say to her "I was the ambassador of peace I am helping a friend".[30] The wife says that she thought that Ms OO was acting as an intermediary as a family friend. It may be noted that whatever Ms OO did as a lawyer for the wife, it did not involve commencing proceedings, which may have lent more clarity to the nature of their relationship.
9. Prior to the end of the relationship Ms OO socialised with the wife and husband, having, for example, invited them both to a dinner party. The wife described Ms OO's regular attendance at the family home for dinner and sheesha. While socialising between a lawyer and client does not itself negative a professional relationship, the social nature of the relationship explains the wife's claims that Ms OO was helping her as a friend. Again, friendship with a lawyer does not of itself negate a professional relationship, but it is a matter apt to cloud the basis of interaction, particularly where the assistance (or at least parts of the assistance) appears non-legal in nature. For example, Ms OO concedes that she liaised with clergy to assist in the resolution of the dispute, further asserting that this was not incorporated in the invoice she ultimately rendered. Ms OO, however, denies that her involvement with the wife was in the realm of mediation.
10. One issue that arose was her collaboration with the husband.
11. Ms OO had previously undertaken work in relation to visas and had been paid for such work by the corporate entities controlled by the husband. Ms OO described that she has acted on instructions from the wife "in numerous Immigration Matters relating to [BK Foundation] of which she was the Director and CEO".[31] Although Ms OO styled these as on the instructions of the wife, it cannot be concluded that Ms OO's retainer was with the wife, rather than with entities controlled by the husband.
12. Ms OO was also heavily involved in legal matters in Country P concerning the husband's earlier marriage and wife and then registration of the husband's and wife's marriage. Although Ms OO styled these proceedings as for the wife, I do not accept such a characterisation. Accepting that the wife may have been interested in the pursuit and outcome of such proceedings, and directly involved in the registration of her own marriage and children, such does not equate to the wife being in a solicitor client relationship with Ms OO insofar as it related to the husband's previous marriage. Rather it is suggestive that Ms OO was engaged in the pursuit of the husband's interests and claims, the pursuit of which were terminated by the husband.
13. Ms OO tendered two documents regarding the progression of the Country P work. Evidently work was undertaken in relation to the Country P matters.
14. Further issues as to collaboration with the husband arose as, during a period in which Ms OO purported to act for the wife, she was involved, in the wife's absence, in a video communication between the husband and one of the parties' children, Y. Ms OO attended the wife's home in her absence, asserting that the mother had consented to her doing so in order to pray with a priest with the children. Whilst there, Ms OO called the husband. She then described Y taking the phone into another part of the house.
15. Part way through the call Ms OO can be seen in the presence of Y. The husband instructed Ms OO to listen to Y "what mummy told him to lie." Y then said that when he attended a therapist that mum made him to say that dad hit her while she was in bed with Y. When the father then asked Y what the truth was and whether he had ever hit the mother, Y replied "I don't know, maybe". The father repeated "do I ever hit your mum" to which Y replied "no" and the father then demanded to know why Y lied and why the mother made her lie and that Y had told him upstairs that the mother was blackmailing him. The father then said, "so you know that mum blackmailing me" to which Y responded "she is." Ms OO then spoke in another language. She said this was in Arabic and was telling the husband to stop. Further comments were then made by the father in another language. The end of the conversation was not produced. Ms OO appeared to be holding the phone that Y was using for at least part of the conversation (Exhibit A3).
16. It was put to Ms OO that this interaction was an attempt by her to obtain evidence to benefit the husband. Ms OO denied this, asserting that she told the father to stop in the Arabic language. No explanation was given as to why Ms OO had called the husband, or given the phone to the child, or participated by her attendance in the egregious cross examination of the child by the father.
17. Ms OO further provided pictures of the wife to the husband. The husband denied that he had sought that Ms OO provide him with photos of the wife. He says that Ms OO provided him with photos to convince him that the wife was at home. Ms OO asserted to the wife that she asked the nanny to tell the wife that the husband was angry with her, accusing the wife of infidelity.
18. Exhibit R7-19 is a file note of 13 May 2023 where Ms OO explains why she sent a picture of the wife to the husband. This appeared to follow discussion between Ms OO and the husband, the husband wanting to know the whereabouts of the wife, and wanting to speak to the wife. The wife had responded that she was having a massage, and Ms OO requested a photo of the person doing the massage. A photo was taken by the maid which Ms OO forwarded to the husband, on the assumption that the wife intended this to occur.
19. More consistent with the work of a lawyer, Ms OO claims to have acted for the wife in "family law matters and negotiations including court proceedings in [Country P]...general advice about her family law matter, custody of her three children, her rights in [Country P], and advice on Binding Financial Agreement(s) and instructing counsel ([Mr AZ]) to provide advice on family law property matters, Caveat, and Binding Financial Agreement, and advice on her Criminal Matter".[32]
20. Ms OO produced material suggestive that she engaged a barrister on behalf of the wife. An affidavit of Mr AZ, barrister, confirmed that, at some unidentified stage, Ms OO approached him for advice regarding the marriage breakdown between the wife and husband. He says that he was introduced to the wife by Ms OO on 7 February 2023, and described to the wife being able to provide advice to her to enable financial support whilst the parties were still on reasonable terms. He describes a single conference with the wife of 4 March 2023.
21. Mr AZ described rendering a number of invoices through April to June 2023, describing none to have been paid by the wife, but that Ms OO made part payment in any event. Mr AZ then offered gratuitous negative opinion as to the wife's character.
22. A further contentious involvement of Ms OO was in relation to the removal of the wife's jewellery from her home into the custody of Ms OO. Ms OO produced file notes from 17 March 2023 of interactions with the wife regarding the husband's causing of the jewellery to be removed from the home, including observing the return of the jewellery, the wife's comments that Ms OO needed to be paid for her work as her lawyer, and Ms OO being given permission by the husband's lawyer to negotiate with him directly. She also described her car being parked in a manner that happened to block the wife from driving to the police station to report the jewellery missing.
23. The husband appeared to concede that he had arranged for the wife's jewellery to be removed from the house, justified by the wife giving her jewellery to her boyfriend. The jewellery was shortly thereafter returned to the wife.
24. Ms OO described that the wife deposited the jewellery with Ms OO saying that she did so to secure Ms OO's costs on 21 April 2023. Ms OO says that the wife was given the only keys to the lockbox, but later Ms OO caused the lockbox to be opened by a locksmith and transferred the jewellery to AB Pty Ltd. Ms OO claims a lien upon the jewellery.
25. The wife says that Ms OO told her that the husband had contacted her to say that he had taken the wife's jewellery and was going to give it to drug dealers. The wife says that she discovered the jewellery gone and threatened that she would call the police. The jewellery was then returned to the wife in the presence of Ms OO and the husband's then lawyer.
26. The wife says that on 21 April 2023 Ms OO recommended that the jewellery be placed into a safe deposit box to prevent the husband from taking it again. Ms OO denied that this incident was an artifice created by her to enable her to possess the jewellery.
27. The wife says that when she asked for the jewellery to be returned on 30 April 2023 Ms OO refused.
28. At Exhibit R7-10 Ms OO produced a file note dated 30 April 2023 of a conversation with the wife where the wife accepted that Ms OO needed to be paid, that the husband should pay those fees, and expressing that the jewellery had been hidden at Ms OO's home to keep it safe, disputing that the jewellery should be held as a ransom for legal fees.
29. Exhibit R7-11 contains communication from the wife to Ms OO of 30 April 2023, where the wife reiterates that the jewellery was retained for safekeeping by Ms OO, that she had learnt from "[Mr BA]" (AF Pty Ltd) of the lien and the intent of Ms OO to use the jewellery as collateral for legal fees. The wife asked Ms OO not to hold the jewellery in such a manner. The wife further expressed her gratitude for Ms OO's "unwavering support" and acknowledged her efforts in working "collaboratively". The wife observed that the "pre-settlement agreement" with the husband was for him to meet Ms OO's fees.
30. Ms OO relied upon particular material to support her status as the wife's lawyer. Exhibit R7-13 contains correspondence form the wife to the husband of 11 April 2023 where the wife asserts that Ms OO will soon send a pre settlement agreement (whatever that might be) to the husband.
31. Exhibit R7-17 is an invoice prepared by Ms OO of 26 April 2023. Although it identifies categories of work purportedly undertaken it ultimately identifies the fee in a merely conclusory manner, in the sum of $495,000 (GST incl). It contains entries such as "any other work as the case may require", "obtaining your future instructions", "obtaining other work as the case may require" which, on their face, appear to relate to work not yet undertaken. It also referred to having attended with the wife on numerous occasions on various legal practitioners, including counsel appearing at the trial for Ms OO, a Mr Foster. It appeared uncontentious that this was false, and that the wife never attended upon that counsel.
32. Exhibit R7-18 is a file note by Ms OO of 5 May 2023 referring to a message sent by the wife saying "as you said : you are my lawyer".
33. Exhibit R7-25 is a file note of 11 May 2023 giving an account of Ms OO's attendance with the priest at the wife's home in her absence. Ms OO described the intervention of the priest advising the wife to resolve the matter on a religious basis rather than through a court.
34. Exhibit R7-24 comprised 47 pages of partial interactions between the wife, the husband and Ms OO spanning March 2020 through to May 2023. Some of the interactions are suggestive of Ms OO functioning as the wife's lawyer rather than as her friend and confidante.
35. It may be accepted that there was a confused relationship between Ms OO and the wife, but a relationship in which Ms OO provided some legal services to the wife, potentially to the husband regarding his divorce in Country P, along with migration work associated with the parties and their corporate entities.
36. Appropriately both parties recognised that solicitors have a fiduciary duty to their clients. That is indeed the case. A fundamental requirement of that duty is that solicitors must avoid being in a position of actual or potential conflict of interest with those of their clients.
37. The key issue raised by the wife is whether Ms OO's conduct with respect to the husband, and in the context of her prior work for B Pty Ltd, was inconsistent with the duty of loyalty that was owed to the wife if in fact Ms OO was her lawyer. That is also an issue that arises in the circumstances of Ms OO's retention of the wife's jewellery.
38. One aspect of that duty of loyalty was described by McClelland J in Badawi & Badawi [2016] FamCA 804 (from [92]):
    1. Appropriately both parties recognised that solicitors have a fiduciary duty to their clients. That is indeed the case. A fundamental requirement of that duty is that solicitors must avoid being in a position of actual or potential conflict of interest with those of their clients.
    2. Once Ms O accepted instructions from the husband, she was in a fiduciary relationship with him.
    3. In Law Society of New South Wales v Harvey [1976] 2 NSWLR 154, the NSW Court of Appeal said at 170-171:

Where there is any conflict between the interest of the client and that of the solicitor, the duty of the solicitor is to act in perfect good faith and to make full disclosure of his interest. It must be a conscientious disclosure of all material circumstances, and everything known to him relating to the proposed transaction which might influence the conduct of the client or anybody from whom he might seek advice. To disclose less than all that is material may positively mislead. Thus for a solicitor merely to disclose that he has an interest, without identifying the interest, may serve only to mislead the client into an enhanced confidence that the solicitor will be in a position better to protect the client's interest. The conflict of interest may, and usually will, be such that it is not proper, or even possible, for the solicitor to continue to act for and advise his client. A solicitor, who deals with his client while remaining his solicitor, undertakes a heavy burden. Where a solicitor discovers that continuing to act for his client will, or may, bring the interests of his client and his own interests into conflict, it will be a rare case where he should not, at least, advise his client to take independent legal advice. It may well happen that the conflict arises fortuitously, and has not been anticipated when the solicitor undertook to act for the client. This circumstance does not alter the duty of the solicitor already referred to.

1. In Howard v Commissioner of Taxation [2014] HCA 21 at [59], Hayne and Crennan JJ summarised a fiduciary obligation to avoid a conflict of interest in the following terms:

It is well established that "[i]t is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position ... is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest and duty conflict". The majority in Pilmar v Duke Group Ltd (in liq) said of this obligation that "the fiduciary is under an obligation, without informed consent, not to promote the personal interests of the fiduciary by making or pursuing a gain in circumstances in which there is 'a conflict or a real or substantial possibility of a conflict' between personal interests of the fiduciary and those to whom the duty of owed".

(References omitted)

1. Similarly, in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 Millett LJ held that:

The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or for the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of the fiduciary obligation. They are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary.

1. The instances illustrating the asserted breach of the duty of loyalty firstly were directed at the previous representation in relation to B Pty Ltd and the associated charity, Ms OO's fees having been met, effectively, by the husband. The representation appears to have related to migration issues. In the absence of something more particular, this prior circumstance does not demonstrate a breach of loyalty inconsistent with Ms OO being the wife's lawyer.
2. The second relates to Ms OO's dealings with the husband, in particular her forwarding of images of the wife to the husband, and her facilitation of and participation in the video call with Y. Whatever criticism may be quite legitimately levelled at Ms OO in respect of these matters, it should not be concluded that they were grounded in Ms OO acting for the benefit of the husband. However ill-advised such conduct might be, it does not go so far as to demonstrate inconsistency with a solicitor-client relationship. Lastly in relation to the husband, a question arises as to the significance of the Country P proceedings. However, without a further exploration of those issues it should not be concluded that Ms OO then acting for the wife against the husband was inconsistent with the pursuit of the husband's divorce in Country P.
3. The third aspect related to Ms OO's retention of the wife's jewellery. As noted above the wife's contention was that Ms OO had manufactured or preyed upon the circumstances in order to retain her jewellery, matters denied by Ms OO. The purported fee agreement of 20 November 2016 is relied upon by Ms OO (Exhibit R7-1). It contained the following provisions to provide security for legal fees from the wife:

W LIEN

Without affecting any lien to which this firm otherwise entitled at law over funds, papers and other property pertaining to you in this firm's possession:

(a) This firm shall be entitled to retain by way of lien any funds, property or papers of yours, which are from time to time in our possession or control, until all costs, disbursements, interest and other moneys due to the firm have been paid; and

(b) This firm shall irrevocably charge all estates or interests in real estate which you, or any company in relation to which you have authority to exercise the power to charge real estate, now have or may hereafter acquire with payment of all moneys that may be or become due to this firm under this costs agreement" (THE "CHARGING CLAUSE").

(c) This firm's lien will continue notwithstanding that we cease to act for you.

1. Given that this purported fee agreement is void, the lien clause will have no effect.
2. However, Ms OO purports to exercise a lien in respect of the jewellery on the basis that it came into her possession. The wife complains that Ms OO took the jewellery into her possession for safekeeping, and now seeks to retain it for another purpose, being security for legal fees.
3. The wife and Ms OO are at odds over whether the wife was on notice of Ms OO's intent to hold the jewellery as security for her fees. Ms OO asserted that the wife said to her "I will deposit this jewellery to secure your costs. I am scared that my husband may steal it as he did before".[33] She describes that the wife also said "He will take the Jewellery and he means it. What about if he does not pay you? I have to secure your costs and my jewellery is the only security for your costs. I will sell the Jewellery to pay your Costs. Please help me keep it in a safe place".[34] Further she says that the wife said "I will ask my husband to pay your costs and if he refuses, I shall sell some jewellery and pay you costs".[35]
4. The wife described that on 21 April 2023, Ms OO asked to meet at BL Bank to place the Jewellery in a safe box at the bank, saying that "[Mr Pirani] will send people to your house to take your belonging. Let's put them in a safe. I will come with you".[36]
5. The wife said that the bank sought a deposit of $30,000.00 to store the jewellery, which the wife could not meet. She described that Ms OO said ''I will take the jewellery and the kids' passports and keep them in the safe box at my house".[37]
6. Importantly, Ms OO also records 2 messages sent by the wife proximate to the removal of the jewellery that sit well with the wife's claim that she was not put on notice by Ms OO that the jewellery was to be held as security, or as the wife describes it "ransom" for the legal fees.
7. Exhibit R7-11, being a transcript of a WhatsApp chat sent from the wife on 30 April 2023, included: '[Mr BA] [the wife's lawyer from AF Pty Ltd] just explain to me that the Lien trust is for you to hold my jewelry [sic] as a ransom for your legal fees'.
8. Exhibit R7-10, being file notes written by Ms OO, again on 30 April 2023, describe a recorded message sent by the wife: "I do not wanna feel that the agreement between me and you that I give you the jewellery to hold them for ransom for my legal fees because that is not fair and that is not what happened. What happened is I was really worried about my jewellery been stolen again, from me so we went to your house and we've hidden it at your house for safety reasons not more than that" [sic].
9. On Ms OO's description, although the jewellery was retained on her premises, she, initially, did not exercise control over such, all keys being given to the wife. That lack of control appears consistent with the jewellery being retained for the purpose of its safekeeping. It was converted into actual control when Ms OO used a locksmith to enable her to take that jewellery into her actual possession.
10. I do not accept that the wife was told that the jewellery was to be held as security for Ms OO's fees. The wife's surprise at such an outcome, discovered from speaking with her subsequent solicitor, is evident. The retention of the jewellery was very much in Ms OO's interest if a possessory lien was to be claimed over it, with such interest conflicting with the interests of the wife.
11. However, even accepting that such conduct is inconsistent with the heavy obligations placed upon a fiduciary does not mean that the conduct negates the relationship of solicitor-client.
12. Overall it may be concluded that a portion of the interactions with, and interventions by Ms OO were not in the nature of work as the wife's lawyer. A number were non-legal in nature. A number in relation to the Country P proceedings were apparently for the benefit of the husband. A number were ill advised, for example her participation in the call with Y, and the interactions regarding the jewellery are not consistent with her obligations to the wife. However, the wife at times made representations that Ms OO was her lawyer and apparently relied upon her as such. At times Ms OO functioned as the wife's lawyer, for example in the retention of counsel. While the solicitor-client aspect of the relationship does not explain the whole of their interactions, it represents a part of their interactions. That is, there was a solicitor-client relationship, although the extent is far from clear. The extent is not illuminated by the rendering of the invoice by Ms OO.

1. Given the void nature of the AF Pty Ltd fee agreement, and the Ms OO fee agreement, the only remaining contractual charge relates to the costs agreement with ZZ Pty Ltd.
2. That fee agreement purports to create a charge in favour of the legal practice, being a charge upon the property of the wife. As identified in respect of building contracts by Mossop M in Adrija Pty Ltd v Mohamed & Ors [2013] ACTSC 120 at [22], "there is no doubt that charging clauses in building contracts can give rise to interests which justify the maintenance of a caveat." Further, the effect of the clause is to be determined by consideration "of the terms of the clause as a whole".[38]
3. In Danthanarayana v GR8 Constructions Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 231, in the context of a building contract that granted a charge upon the land the subject of the work, Foster J adopted the following at [45]:

At p 196, the authors of Sykes and Walker, The Law of Securities, said:

The only actual requirements of the equitable charge seem to be, first, intention; secondly, if over land, the presence of writing; thirdly, the existence of definite ascertainable property, even though future, over which it is contemplated that the charge shall exist; and lastly, in a few exceptional cases the presence of consideration; consideration would not save a purely oral agreement.

1. Here, the contract evidences intention to create a charge, expressed wholly in writing.
2. As to the effect of an equitable charge created by contract, Foster J observed such is created when the property is either expressly or constructively made liable to the discharge of the debt. The right then conferred is to a right of realisation by judicial process, being by the appointment of a receiver or an order for the sale of the property.
3. Accordingly, in that limited sense, ZZ Pty Ltd's rights attach to the property of the wife.

1. The further claims are in relation to liens.
2. In Re Wedgwood: Ex parte Bank of New Zealand [1993] FCA 368; (1993) 116 ALR 153 at [16] Cooper J identified two forms of lien available to a solicitor:

There are two circumstances in which the question of a solicitor's lien may arise...The first is the right of a solicitor to retain property already in his possession until the solicitor is paid the professional costs due to the solicitor in his or her professional capacity...This "retaining" lien extends to money held in the solicitor's bank account on behalf of the client...The second right is one to ask the court to direct that personal property recovered by the solicitor's exertions stand as security for payment of the solicitor's costs

1. Justice Cooper observed that the retaining lien gives the solicitor the right to retain possession of an item, a lien or right that is discharged by payment.
2. Ms OO claims, first, a possessory lien in relation to the jewellery taken into her possession ostensibly for their safe keeping from the husband.
3. The correspondence between the wife and Ms OO reveals that shortly after Ms OO retained the jewellery it became clear to the wife that it was being held as ransom for Ms OO's payment. When Ms OO took the jewellery, she did not identify this matter to the wife, the wife discovering such complication after the fact from AF Pty Ltd.[39] That is, Ms OO did not advise the wife of Ms OO's interest in holding the jewellery. What was represented to the wife as protective of the jewellery had the effect of giving Ms OO the jewellery as security.
4. I do not accept that a possessory lien arises in either of those circumstances. If Ms OO's description is correct, she was not granted possession of the items whilst the wife retained all keys. To take possession, without consent or right does not result in a lien.
5. Even if that is wrong, the possessory lien arises from the solicitor client relationship. As identified above that is a fiduciary relationship that requires a solicitor not to act in conflict of interest. Even if Ms OO's denials that her retention of the jewellery to protect it was an artifice are accepted, the conflict remains. I do not accept that a possessory lien arises in those circumstances.
6. The second form of lien, sometimes known as a fruits of action lien, was described by Campbell J in Firth v Centrelink [2002] NSWSC 564; (2002) 55 NSWLR 451 ("Firth") , adopting as a description of the right what was said by Jordan CJ in Ex Parte Patience; Makinson v The Minister [1940] NSWStRp 11; (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 96, as being an equitable right for a lawyer to be paid from monies to be paid as a result of a judgment in favour of the lawyer's client, where the lawyer acted for the client in those legal proceedings. Justice Campbell identified a number of features of such liens, salient of which are as follows (at [35]):

(a) The right exists over money recovered through obtaining judgment in litigation or by settlement of litigation;

(b) The right exists over money in the solicitor's possession, money in court, or money owed to the client but not paid into court;

(c) The solicitor need not still be acting for the client;

(d) "For the right to arise it must be shown that there is a sufficient causal link between solicitor's exertions and the recovery of the fund of money";

(e) The quantum to which the right attaches is the amount properly owing and, where taxation is required, the right exists prior to the taxation taking place; and

(f) The right exists prior to the court being asked to intervene to protect it, arising immediately on the recovery of monies, or at the time of the making of an order for costs.

1. However, Campbell J observed that his description of liens did not consider "the extent to which such a lien might exist over property other than money, or the extent to which a lien might attach to property which was preserved (rather than recovered) through the efforts of the solicitor".[40]
2. As to this last point, in Carew Counsel Pty Ltd v French [2002] VSCA 1 Winneke P observed at [33] that the " essence of the solicitor's 'particular' or 'non-possessory' costs lien is that the solicitor has been instrumental in recovering the judgment sum (whether by compromise or otherwise) or, put another way, that the monies have been recovered as a result of (the solicitor's) exertions...for the right to arise it must be shown that there is a sufficient causal link between the solicitor's exertions and the recovery of the fund."
3. As to causal link, in Color Point Pty Ltd v Markby's Communication Group Pty Ltd and Ors [1998] FCA 1516 Weinberg J described at [23] that the lien "confers upon the solicitor an equitable interest in the fruits of that litigation, provided that those fruits are gained, at least in part, as a result of the solicitor's exertions on behalf of the client." This appeared to adopt, as extracted by Weinberg J, what had been said by Lehane J in Roam Australia Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [1997] FCA 980 rather than what had been said by Mclelland CJ in Eq in Doyles Construction Lawyers v Harsands Pty Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, 24 December 1996) ("Doyles Construction"). Justice Lehane described as follows:

In each case, in my view, it must be a question whether the requisite causal link is established...on the evidence, to be regarded as brought about (or partially brought about) by the efforts of the solicitors...where solicitors have been actively involved over a considerable period in acting for a party to successful litigation, the conclusion is likely to follow that the solicitors have been instrumental in obtaining the result, or that the result is (at least in part) due to the solicitor's efforts.

1. Chief Justice McLelland in Eq in Doyles Construction proposed a broader approach:

It is unnecessary for Doyles to demonstrate that the settlement came about as the result of specific efforts by them. According to the statement of principle [in Patience] ...it is sufficient to give rise to the equitable right that the settlement resulting in payment came about as a result of the legal proceedings and that the solicitor had acted for the client in those proceedings, this being treated as a sufficient causal link."

1. The approach of Lehane J appears to connect findings and principle more closely than the assumption proposed by McLelland J and should be preferred, as it appears to have been by Weinberg J.
2. Prior to considering the circumstances further, this analysis excludes Ms OO's claim. While the fact that Ms OO's involvement was all pre litigation does not necessarily exclude a claim for a fruits of action lien, it is a factual circumstance that calls for greater clarity in demonstrating a connection to the result of the litigation. Ms OO's evidence does not do so. There is little, if any, reason to consider that Ms OO's involvement assisted the wife in her litigation.
3. Given the holding by AB Pty Ltd was the product of Ms OO's unmeritorious claim upon the jewellery, Ms OO will be responsible for the associated costs of the jewellery's retention there.
4. The claims for a fruits of litigation lien raised by each of AF Pty Ltd and ZZ Pty Ltd also rely on establishing a requisite connection between their efforts and the fruits of the litigation for the wife. Those claims necessarily rely upon the wife receiving, in the relevant sense, fruits. Whether she has done so, and whether a causal link to fruits is established, will be considered in the light of the outcome of the wife's litigation as set out further below.

1. The remnants of the property of the marriage can be described as follows.

1. The Suburb G property proceeds subject to the Westpac mortgage, to the Mr AH mortgage, and to the B Pty Ltd mortgage are nil.
2. The husband asserted that the wife had retained $1.5 to $2 million worth of furniture from the Suburb G property. Neither the value, nor the wife's retention of it was adequately supported by evidence, particularly in circumstances where the husband had the wife and children thrown out of the home, and denied access to it, by security on or about 1 May 2023.[41]

1. This property is held by the wife, registered in her name. The wife holds, despite her assertions otherwise, the beneficial interest in this property as well as the legal title.
2. It is subject to a mortgage registered to D1 Pty Ltd. The sum secured by the mortgage is unidentified.
3. The gross value of the property is contended by the wife to be about $1 million. If retained by her, this assertion may be accepted as an admission against interest by the wife, subject then to a debt established by D1 Pty Ltd. Whether D1 Pty Ltd will be able to establish any debt, where they, as participants in these proceedings, chose not to secure that relief in these proceedings is yet to be seen. While it may well be the case that an Anshun estoppel prevents them from doing so, that is not a matter for this judgment.

1. As identified above, the husband holds numerous properties in Country P.
2. The husband previously, by his response and by his trial affidavit, asserted that he would transfer properties to the wife in Country P. He backtracked from this position in his oral evidence, and in his final Minute of Orders sought. There was almost no evidence as to the worth of the properties in Country P, the husband ascribing little value to them. It may be observed that evidence as to the nature of and manner of acquisition of those properties is peculiarly within the hands of the husband, who, resident in Country P, and with the control of those properties, is also in the best position to advance evidence as to the value of the properties.
3. Although the husband asserted that he is still married to his previous wife in Country P, rather than the wife in these proceedings and that, as a consequence of such, his previous wife has a right to fifty per cent of those properties and the wife has no right, no sufficient evidence to establish such was advanced by the husband, who again, it may be supposed, was well placed to source and to adduce such evidence. In this respect it may be observed that the husband asserted that he was able to provide such evidence "anytime you guys want me to present it" yet it was not produced. [42]
4. The failure to adduce such evidence is consistent with the husband's claims to the court during the hearing that those properties are not a matter for this court.
5. The Country P properties are of indeterminate worth.

1. The wife asserts a value of about $702,000 (or $800,000 per her Outline of Case Document) to the jewellery that is held at AB Pty Ltd.[43]

1. The question that permeates the whole process of property adjustment pursuant to s 79 is one of whether it is just and equitable to make both any adjustment, and to make an adjustment in a particular manner.
2. The parties' relationship commenced and continued in what superficially appeared as significant wealth but which, as is now revealed, was hollow.
3. For all the joint efforts of the parties during their relationship, and despite their prolific spending, lifestyle and acquisitions, all that remains is a narrow property pool, being comprised of the Country P properties, owned by the husband, the Suburb J property and the jewellery, owned by the wife.
4. Real property held in Country P is of an unknown value. That lack of evidence falls at the husband's feet. That is a matter that undermines any claim that the husband might make for an adjustment of other property interest in his favour.
5. Further, the lack of confidence that the properties have any value or that in personam orders directed to the transfer of such properties would ever be met undermine the notion that an order directed to the transfer of that property would be of any benefit to the wife.
6. The wife holds property of a discerned value of about $1.7 million, comprised of the Suburb J property and the jewellery. Although the wife sought a transfer of the shareholdings in various corporate entities to herself, each was conditional upon an indemnity from the husband. The entities held no discernible value (including D1 Pty Ltd, in the absence of identification of the quantum of debt associated with the Suburb J mortgage). Any indemnity from the husband is worthless, and to the extent the wife also sought a general indemnity from the husband, such is not anchored in identification of that which requires indemnification. The wife's application in this respect is without substantive merit.
7. Against the value of the property, the wife owes an unascertained but large amount of money to the various lawyers who have pursued what, when ultimately dug up, is an empty treasure chest. ZZ Pty Ltd holds a charge against the Suburb J property in their favour for their fees, whatever they might be.
8. The wife's holding of the property falls against a background of her significant non-financial contributions to the welfare of the family being made by her both pre, and more substantively post separation. The wife also single handedly holds the responsibility for the care and maintenance of the parties' children, the husband having failed in his responsibility for them, and giving no adequate assurance that he will in the future engage in the financial support of his children.
9. The broad sweep of these circumstances, in the context of what is individually held by the parties, does not lead to a conclusion that it is just and equitable to adjust the parties' property interests at all.
10. Absent that conclusion, no adjustment is available, and the husband's and wife's competing applications fall to be dismissed.
11. The result will be the retention by the wife of the Suburb J property and the jewellery, and by the husband of the Country P properties. No declaratory relief in relation to the husband and wife in relation to the Suburb J or the Country P properties is warranted.
12. That outcome has consequences for the lien-based claims of each of the legal practices.
13. What remains to be considered is whether there is any relevant fruit for the lien to attach to. While on the one hand it could be said that the wife successfully resisted the husband's claim for a property adjustment in his favour, on the other hand, the wife was unsuccessful in securing the object of her application, being an adjustment in her favour. Her claim for such was dismissed. The result of the litigation is that the wife merely retained what was hers, adjustment being refused. She neither obtained property, nor did she recover property, and she obtained no monetary judgment, unlike the circumstances in cases such as Firth. There is no judgment in her favour granting her relief. Under those circumstances I am not satisfied that there is relevant fruit of the litigation upon which a lien attaches, leaving ZZ Pty Ltd and AF Pty Ltd without that aspect of the relief that they seek.
14. That is not to suggest that they do not have an action in debt. They do not, however, have the benefit of a lien.
15. While various parties made various claims as to costs, reasonably, these matters were not prosecuted in the trial, given their connection to the outcome of the trial. Any issues of costs will fall to be determined in the usual manner.

1. A last matter remains. During the proceedings I identified to Ms OO that I was considering her referral to the NSW legal regulator. During the proceedings Ms OO repeatedly sought to adduce evidence of her interactions with the wife that, should her assertion that she was the wife's lawyer be accepted, as it has, meant that she was obliged, unless an exception was identified, to maintain the confidentiality of those communications. No exception was identified. Those actions by Ms OO warrant a referral, and orders will be made to facilitate such, including to afford the regulator with access both to the transcripts and the documents filed by Ms OO.

1. Orders will be made refusing the wife's application for relief, but declaring her right to the jewellery and facilitating its return to her possession.
2. The husband's application for relief will be refused.
3. B Pty Ltd will be granted the relied as ultimately sought by it.
4. Ms OO's application will be dismissed.
5. AF Pty Ltd's application will be dismissed.
6. ZZ Pty Ltd's application will be dismissed but for a declaration that it holds a charge in respect of the Suburb J property.
7. All other extant applications will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding three hundred and seventy-seven (377) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gill.

[1] Second Respondent's Response for Final Orders filed on 14 March 2025.

[2] Wife's affidavit filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 15.

[3] Wife's affidavit filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 16.

[4] Wife's affidavit filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 83.

[5] Affidavit of Ms AY filed 4 March 2025, paragraph 46.

[6] Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52; (2012) 247 CLR 108 per French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, and Bell JJ at [35] ("Stanford").

[7] Bevan v Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116; (2013) 49 Fam LR 387 per Byrant CJ and Thackray J at [86].

[9] Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154; [2012] 50 Fam LR 244 at [21] ("Dickons").

[12] Marriage of Aleksovski [1996] FamCAFC 111; (1996) FLC 92-705 at 83,437 ("Alekovski").

[16] Wife's affidavit filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 83.

[17] Wife's affidavit filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 10.

[18] Wife's affidavit filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 206.

[19] Husband's affidavit filed 16 March 2025, paragraph 14.

[20] Affidavit of Ms AY filed 4 March 2025, paragraph 90(a).

[22] Transcript from 4 June 2025, page 102 lines 13-14.

[23] Transcript from 4 June 2025, page 102 lines 22-23.

[24] Outline of Case Document on behalf of the Seventh Respondent filed 18 March 2025.

[25] Affidavit of Ms OO filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 15.

[26] Transcript from 1 April 2025, page 5 lines 2-3.

[27] Affidavit of Ms OO filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 19.

[29] Affidavit of wife filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 203.

[30] Affidavit of wife filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 225.

[31] Affidavit of Ms OO filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 13.

[32] Affidavit of Ms OO filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 9.

[33] Affidavit of Ms OO filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 156.

[34] Affidavit of Ms OO filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 161(13)(a).

[35] Affidavit of Ms OO field 13 March 2025, paragraph 161(13)(e).

[36] Affidavit of wife filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 213.

[37] Affidavit of wife filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 215.

[38] Adrija Pty Ltd v Mohamed & Ors [2013] ACTSC 120 at [30].

[40] Firth v Centrelink [2002] NSWSC 564; (2002) 55 NSWLR 451 at [43].

[41] Wife's affidavit filed 18 March 2025, paragraph 31.

[42] Transcript from 4 June 2025, page 40 lines 42-43.

[43] Wife's affidavit filed 13 March 2025, paragraph 206.