Pinney & Pinney (No 7) [2025] FedCFamC1F 935 (19 December 2025)

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Pinney & Pinney has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are enforcement proceedings in which Ms Pinney is the Applicant and Mr Pinney is the Respondent. They concern the enforcement of final child support departure orders made by McClelland DCJ on 19 May 2023 and varied pursuant to the "slip rule" on 30 June 2023 ("the Final Orders"), and the enforcement of a costs order made by a Senior Judicial Registrar on 20 August 2024 ("the costs order").
2. Ms Pinney commenced these proceedings by filing an Application - Enforcement on 14 May 2025. She filed a Further Amended Application - Enforcement on 23 September 2025 ("the Enforcement Application"). This is the second enforcement application filed by Ms Pinney. The first was determined on 20 August 2024 and resulted in the making of a costs order against Mr Pinney.
3. Separately today I have handed down judgment in parenting proceedings between the parties. The parties have four children: W, aged 14, X, aged 12, Y, aged 10 and Z, aged six. It is for their financial support that the relevant Final Orders were made.
4. The Enforcement Application was listed on the first day of the final hearing in the parenting proceedings, and heard by me on that day. Mr Pinney was self-represented, notwithstanding the existence of an order pursuant to s 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), meaning that he was not able personally to cross-examine Ms Pinney. That order meant that he was eligible to receive assistance pursuant to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme. Mr Pinney did not avail himself of that assistance. In any case, it is not likely that the Court would have been assisted by the cross-examination of Ms Pinney in the enforcement proceedings. Mr Pinney was cross-examined by a solicitor advocate for Ms Pinney.
5. Ms Pinney had different solicitors on the record in the enforcement and parenting proceedings, and a solicitor advocate and counsel respectively for the two sets of proceedings. That was consistent with the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 ("the Rules"), which require that a party only have one address for service "for each application filed" (r 2.25(2)). The parenting and enforcement applications are different applications.
6. Ms Pinney relied on an affidavit filed on 14 May 2025. Mr Pinney relied on an affidavit filed on 23 October 2025, and a Financial Statement sworn on 18 June 2025 but not filed in Court until 21 October 2025.
7. The parties were able to reach agreement in relation to certain sums of money which Mr Pinney agreed that he owed Ms Pinney, and I made orders by consent giving effect to that agreement on 1 December 2025. The only remaining issues in dispute are:

(1) What sum is owed by Mr Pinney to Ms Pinney in respect of the children's agreed extra-curricular activities which Mr Pinney was ordered to pay by way of child support departure orders made 30 June 2023?

(2) Should the Court make an order pursuant to s 114(3) of the Act restraining Mr Pinney from leaving Australia until he has paid the sums which this Court has declared are owed by him?

1. Mr Pinney agreed that he owed Ms Pinney the sum of $2,016.69, being the costs of the children's sporting activities. In dispute was the sum of $1,706.83, being the costs of the children's skill drill training activities.
2. The relevant order provides that the husband shall pay "100 per cent of costs of extracurricular activities for the children that have been agreed to in writing between the parties in advance of enrolment". I was taken to no evidence that Mr Pinney had agreed in writing, and in advance of their enrolment, to the children's participation in skill drill training. It was conceded on behalf of Ms Pinney that there is no such evidence. I am therefore not satisfied that Mr Pinney owes the sum of $1,706.83 in respect of skill drill expenses.
3. Mr Pinney agreed that he owed the sum of $2,016.69, and I make an enforcement order declaring that sum is owed by him to Ms Pinney.

**SHOULD MR PINNEY BE RESTRAINED FROM LEAVING AUSTRALIA?

1. The Court has declared that Mr Pinney owes Ms Pinney sums totalling over $100,000. Ms Pinney seeks an order that he be restrained from leaving Australia until he has paid that money to her. The money is owed pursuant to the Final Orders and the costs order. Monies pursuant to the costs order were due to be paid on 20 November 2024. The other sums relate to W's 2025 school fees, and other sums for the children's expenses not paid since the making of the Final Orders.
2. The property pool available for division between the parties at the final financial hearing was approximately $10 million. Deputy Chief Justice McClelland made orders dividing that property as to 62 per cent to Ms Pinney and 38 per cent to Mr Pinney. In deciding what adjustment there should be for s 75(2) factors (as they were then), McClelland DCJ took into account, to Mr Pinney's credit, that he would pay private school fees for the children.
3. In July 2024, Mr Pinney had savings of approximately $2.4 million in AR Bank Account. He now deposes that he has no property (apart from superannuation) and no income and owes close to $300,000. He gave evidence, however, that he did receive between $4,000 and $5,000 in casual "income" in September and October of this year. Mr Pinney deposed that he had resigned from his highly remunerative executive employment in the financial industry in 2023.
4. The reasons for Mr Pinney now being in this financial position are completely opaque. His Financial Statement contained only the disclosure that he had sold a house, had received "2.4m[illion] - legal fees and other costs outstanding". His affidavit was silent about how he had disposed of $2.4 million between July 2024 and June 2025 (when he swore his Financial Statement).
5. Mr Pinney gave evidence under cross-examination that he had debts to pay from the lump sum that he received, and that he had expended some funds on legal fees and "other costs". He gave evidence that he had put between $60,000 and $85,000 into his "business". He gave evidence that he had a 40 per cent stake in another business registered in City N, but that that was "sweat equity" and that the business was not worth anything. He did not provide any further evidence accounting for how it is that he has spent $2.4 million in 12 months.
6. In addition to the $2.4 million, he gave evidence that he had received approximately $80,000 from the sale of a boat in October 2024 but did not apply that to his obligations under the relevant orders, notwithstanding that the costs order had been made in August 2024, requiring payment by November 2024. He also gave evidence that he had paid a deposit on a property in Country AT, but the purchase did not complete and he received the deposit of $85,000 back. He did not account for how he had spent that money.
7. Mr Pinney has travelled overseas on a number of occasions over 2024 and 2025 - both for business and for holidays.
8. As to his current and future plans, Mr Pinney deposes:

Over the last 2.5 years I have developed a [...] trading IP. I have a master's degree in [...]. I have and continue to make efforts to sell or lease this IP. One meeting I took was in [Country AS] this year. It is necessary for me to have the ability to travel if necessary to raise capital for this IP. Any funds received from this would immediately be used to clear my court ordered debts. I continue to liaise with interest offshore parties.

1. Section 72D of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth) grants to the Child Support Registrar the power to make a departure prohibition order where a person has "persistently and without reasonable grounds failed to pay" child support debts arising from a "registrable maintenance liability" and where certain conditions are met. A "registrable maintenance liability" is a liability to pay a periodic amount of child maintenance. The obligations created under the Final Orders are not liabilities to pay periodic amounts, and so a departure prohibition order cannot be made by the Child Support Registrar.
2. Ms Pinney therefore seeks that this Court make an equivalent order pursuant to the broad power in s 114(3) of the Act. That sub-section provides that:

A court exercising jurisdiction under this Act in proceedings other than proceedings to which subsection (1) applies may grant an injunction, by interlocutory order or otherwise (including an injunction in aid of the enforcement of a decree), in any case in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to do so and either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate.

1. These are enforcement proceedings and so that sub-section is engaged.
2. I was taken by the solicitor advocate for Ms Pinney to two Full Court authorities which deal with the power of the Court to make orders restraining travel outside of Australia pursuant to s 114(3). It is uncontroversial that the Court has that power. In Brown & Brown [2007] FamCA 151; (2007) FLC 93-316 the Full Court observed at [195] that:

The use of s 114(3) to found injunctions restraining freedom of international movement in financial cases has not received direct scrutiny by the Full Court of this Court. However, that the power exists for such restrictions was at least impliedly accepted in the single Judge Decisions of Anstis and Anstis and Anor (No 1) (2000) FLC 93-013 and B & B [2003] Fam CA 36 and the decisions of the Full Courts in Ejje and Ejje [2002] FamCA 1003; (2003) FLC 93-129 and in Khademollah [2000] FamCA 1045; (2000) FLC 93-050, a case where the High Court rejected an application for special leave ...

1. In Rahman & Rahman [2013] FamCAFC 162, the Full Court considered and dismissed an appeal from a trial judge's decision to restrain the husband from leaving the jurisdiction where the trial judge had found that the husband had transferred the totality of the parties' assets overseas and that he still had access to those funds. The trial judge considered that it was "just and convenient" to restrain the husband from enjoying the benefits of the money removed from Australia and which would thwart the effect of the order for payment of some of those funds to the wife. In a separate judgment, Murphy J referred to the need to balance a person's right to freedom of movement against "a competing principle relating to the likelihood that the party applying for the order will be denied a remedy if the respondent's freedom to leave the jurisdiction is not restrained" at [57].
2. I need to be persuaded that it is "just and convenient" to make the injunction sought by Ms Pinney. I also need to be satisfied that the order is being made "in aid of the enforcement of a decree". This I take to mean that there is no scope for the use of such an injunction to punish the other party, nor simply to reflect the Court's condemnation of their conduct. Contempt proceedings serve that function.
3. Rather, at least on the facts of this case, I would have to be satisfied either that:
   • If the injunction is made, it is more likely that Mr Pinney will pay the money which he owes than if it is not made; or
   • If Mr Pinney is not restrained, he will either abscond or dispose of money which could otherwise be used to meet his obligations, thus defeating the orders which have been made.
4. I would need to weigh those matters with Mr Pinney's right of freedom of movement and other relevant factors. Plainly, an order restraining a person's freedom of movement is not one which should be made lightly.
5. Notwithstanding Mr Pinney's lack of disclosure and the principle which follows - being that I do not need to be "unduly cautious" in making factual findings in favour of Ms Pinney (Weir & Weir [1992] FamCA 69; (1993) FLC 92-338) - I am not satisfied that Mr Pinney still has funds from which he could pay the money which he owes Ms Pinney. He has admitted that he owes significant funds to Ms Pinney and has deposed that he will make the payments when he can. I infer that he knows that he faces the prospect that Ms Pinney will apply for a bankruptcy notice now that this Court has declared that he owes her a significant amount of money, and that will have serious consequences for his future conduct of his business operations and also involve a degree of retrospective investigation into his financial affairs. It appears to me more likely that Mr Pinney would pay Ms Pinney if he could, and that he has simply squandered the funds which he had in 2024. That explains his failure to pay now. Now that there is an order declaring that he owes the sum he does to Ms Pinney, and a risk of bankruptcy, he is likely to make the payment if and when he receives the funds to do so. Making the injunction will therefore not make it more likely that he will pay Ms Pinney. I am satisfied that he does not represent a "flight risk", given his children and family live here and he has never lived anywhere else.
6. Given those findings, I am not satisfied that it is "just and convenient" to make the injunction sought, and I decline to make it.

I certify that the preceding twenty-eight (28) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Behrens.