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1. On 18 June 2026, the plaintiff filed a summons and then a notice of motion. It is the latter that is before me today.

2. The defendants are the New South Wales Minister for the Environment and the Chief Executive of the Office of Environment and Heritage. The second defendant may actually have a different title.

3. The summons is concerned with the cessation of the culling of wild horses, called brumbies, in the Kosciuszko National Park. A number of declarations and orders are sought to bring about this result.

4. The notice of motion is aimed at immediate orders to stop the culling, pending the hearing of the summons. Accordingly, the plaintiff is requesting an interlocutory injunction.

5. The defendants were made aware of the summons and motion yesterday and today. When the matter first came on this morning, I asked the plaintiff to have another attempt to contact the relevant offices of the defendants. My Associate also contacted the Crown Solicitor’s Office but was told that the office had not received instructions.

6. The defendants did, however, later contact the Court and it was agreed that there would be an appearance at 3pm, which has occurred. Mr Sandstrom, who has appeared for the defendants, requested an adjournment of the matter.

7. Two affidavits have been filed in support of the motion:

8. The plaintiff dated 17 June 2026.

9. Ms Marie Matter dated 15 June 2026.

10. The plaintiff describes herself in this way:

“I am a resident of Kogarah, New South Wales, I make this affidavit as a member of the Australian public, a recreational horse rider, a long-standing visitor to Kosciuszko National Park, and a person who has been directly involved in the movement to protect Australia’s wild brumby population since 2018.”

9. Ms Matter is the director and founder of the Australian Baroque Riding Academy. In short, she is an expert on horses including their welfare (both physical and psychological), and their management. Her expertise extends to the “psychological and neurological impacts of aerial culling on horses and humans.”

10. In her affidavit the plaintiff says that on or about 9 June 2026, she became aware that the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (the NPWS) had commenced aerial culling of brumbies in the Kosciuszko National Park. She says that the culling operations have “caused me profound personal distress.” As a result, she has been “unable to function normally” and she has been “in a state of continuous grief and distress.”

11. The plaintiff says that she is not alone in her sentiments, pointing out that more than 220,000 Australians have signed petitions against aerial culling.

12. The plaintiff says these proceedings were commenced as a last resort. She feels the culling operations are unlawful and “because the harm is irreversible, and because no other avenue remains open to me.”

13. The principles (as described in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 at [19] and [65]) to be applied to impose, or not, an interlocutory injunction are well-known and may be described in this way:

14. There must be a ‘prima facie case’ or serious question to be tried.

15. The balance of convenience must lie with the granting of the injunction.

16. Identifying the balance of convenience involves:

17. Assessing the strength of the applicant’s case.

18. Whether irreparable harm will ensue if the injunction is not granted.

19. Whether there has been delay in bringing the application.

20. In addition, it is normally necessary for the applicant to give an undertaking as to damages.

21. However, before examining the application of the principles, the more immediate issue is to identify the plaintiff’s standing to bring the application.

22. The plaintiff is a member of the public bringing the application to alleviate the natural anguish she feels arising from her, again natural, perception of the cruelty being inflicted on the brumby population in the National Park.

23. Although the plaintiff is clearly not alone in her feelings, and, as already stated, has the support of many members of the public, she is nevertheless bringing the application solely as a member of the public. The plaintiff does not identify membership of any particular organisation, nor that she is a representative of any body of persons. She is simply, and I mean no disrespect, an individual person, perhaps like many others, experiencing the anguish of knowing that horses are suffering and being killed.

24. Although the plaintiff says she is “a person who has been directly involved in the movement to protect Australia’s wild brumby population since 2018”, she remains an individual trying to obtain orders to stop the culling.

25. In South East Forest Rescue Inc v Forestry Corporation of New South Wales (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 113, Griffiths AJA, referring to VicForests v Kinglake Friends of the Forest Inc (2021) 66 VR 143; [2021] VSCA 195, said this, from [123]-[126]:

“123. An applicant who attempts to bring civil enforcement proceedings seeking declaratory and/or injunctive relief in respect of unlawful conduct and does not rely on a private right or special damage to establish standing must demonstrate a ‘special interest’ in the subject matter of the proceeding. As expressed in Kinglake at [21], standing in the context of public law ‘depends on the nature and extent of the relationship between the plaintiff and the subject matter of the litigation’.

124. This raises the question of the level of abstraction with which the subject matter of the proceeding should be identified (see Kinglake at [22]). In an environmental context, for example, is it sufficient for the applicant to demonstrate that it has an interest in the protection and preservation of the environment generally or must its interest be associated with the particular decision or conduct which is the subject of the proceeding?

125. Putting to one side cases where the Court is exercising a statutory jurisdiction (which may have an open standing provision or some other statutorily expressed formula for standing) and cases involving what were once described as the prerogative writs (which have their own particular and variable standing rules), the common law standing test based on the need to demonstrate a ‘special interest’ in the subject matter of the proceeding focuses on the relative position of the applicant when compared with the broader population (see Kinglake at [29]).

126. The ‘special interest’ test is not confined to proprietary, business or economic interests. But a ‘mere emotional or intellectual concern’ is insufficient unless the applicant demonstrates that it has taken sufficient, concrete or active steps to effectuate the particular concern (see Kinglake at [76]). The need for the interest to be special or different from those held by ordinary members of the public ‘is not merely a function of the depth of feeling but reflects the nature of the relationship between the person and the subject matter of the litigation’ (see Kinglake at [60(d)]).”

21. Culling in the same park was the subject of litigation in 2024. In Snowy Mountain Bush Users Group Inc v Minister for the Environment [2024] NSWSC 1040, Davies J dismissed a summons for judicial review arising from a decision authorising culling. His Honour considered standing from [95] and applied the special interest test. The plaintiff in the case was described as a group that had, for over twenty years, been interested in the welfare of the national park, that its interest had been acknowledged in parliament and it was described as a “major stakeholder” in the relevant issue. His Honour found “the plaintiff was regarded by the second defendant as an organisation of some significance specifically in relation to the Plan and its proposed amendment” and was satisfied the plaintiff had a special interest.

22. The situation here is very different. In my view the plaintiffs, albeit deep, emotional concern or connection is not sufficient to give her the appropriate standing.

23. The plaintiff did try to persuade me otherwise, pointing out that there is no reason why an individual cannot have standing, and she referred to her direct connection with the matter and cautioned me, in effect, against taking an overly technical approach.

24. The plaintiff’s submissions were made on the basis of her only having had a short time to look at the Snowy Mountains Bush Users Group case to prepare something in response.

25. I am not persuaded that she does have standing, which means that the motion should be dismissed or at least adjourned. I think the latter is the better approach to give the plaintiff an opportunity to consider the standing issue more fully.

26. This is particularly so as the defendants have also not had the opportunity to become involved. I think the appropriate course is for me to stand the motion over until next Wednesday to give the plaintiff the opportunity that she may need, either to seek advice or provide further submissions on standing, and also to give the defendants an opportunity to formulate their position.

27. I note Mr Sandstrom informed the Court that the proper name of the second defendant is the Secretary of The Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water.

Order

28. In respect of the plaintiff’s notice of motion filed on 18 June 2026, the notice of motion is stood over to 24 June 2026

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