1. Subsections 131D(1) and (3) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (the ART Act) provide that a person whose interests are affected by an ART social services decision may apply to the Tribunal for a second review of the decision and that this includes a decision that had been affirmed by the Tribunal at first review.
2. An "ART social services decision" is defined at section 131C of the ART Act to include a reviewable decision made under the Social Security Act 1991 (the Social Security Act). The first review decision, to raise and recover a newstart allowance debt, is a reviewable decision made under the Social Security Act.
3. Subsection 131J(1) of the ART Act states that, despite a contrary intention in any other law, an application for second review must be made within the time prescribed under section 18. Section 18 of the ART Act states that an application to the Tribunal for review of a decision must be made within the period prescribed by the Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 (the Rules) and that the Rules must not prescribe a period ending before the day that is 28 days after the day the decision is made. Subsection 5(3) of the Rules provides for a 28-day period after the day an applicant is given notice of a decision. The effect of these provisions is that an applicant has a 28-day period after being given notice of a first review decision to make an application for second review to the Tribunal (The Tribunal notes that section 29 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, in force at the time the first review AAT decision was made, also provided for a 28-day time frame for making a second review application).
4. Prior to consideration of whether it is proper to grant an extension of time, the Tribunal first turned to whether and when the Applicant was given notice of the AAT first review decision.
5. As discussed with the parties at the hearing, the Tribunal had access to the case management system that dealt with the first review matter. At the time of making the application to the AAT, the Applicant provided details of his home address to the AAT (the first address). On 13 May 2021, the Applicant is recorded as having contacted the AAT to request that all correspondence, including the notice of decision, be sent to him at another address (the second address). On the same date, an hour after the request was made to send notice of the decision to the second address, the notice of decision was sent to the first address.
6. The Applicant has consistently claimed he had not received notice of the AAT's decision. He gave evidence at the hearing that he did not recall nominating the second address to the AAT, that the second address is his grandparents' address and that the first address was his home address as of May 2021. He asserted, however, that despite the notice of decision being sent to his home address, he had not received the correspondence sent by the AAT.
7. The Respondent submitted at hearing that, given the letter was sent to the Applicant's home address, any concerns the Tribunal should have about notice being given to the Applicant should fall away. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant had contacted the AAT and requested the decision be sent to him, and that this demonstrated the Applicant was engaged in the process and was aware a decision was to be made by the Tribunal.
8. Section 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (the Acts Interpretation Act) states as follows:

(1) Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression "serve" or the expression "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting the document as a letter and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.

(2) This section does not affect the operation of section 160 of the Evidence Act 1995 .

1. Section 160 of the Evidence Act 1995 sets out the presumption that a postal article sent to a person at a specified address is received at the address on the seventh working day after having been posted. It does not otherwise displace the deemed effective service requirements in section 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act.
2. The records accessed by the Tribunal for the purposes of the extension of time application, and discussed with the parties at the hearing, indicate that the Applicant nominated one address (the second address) as the address for receiving the notice of decision shortly prior to the Tribunal sending the notice of decision to another address formerly advised to the Tribunal (the first address). While the Applicant acknowledged residing at the first address at the relevant time, in circumstances where the AAT did not send notice of the decision to the address nominated by the Applicant for the purposes of receiving correspondence from the AAT, the Tribunal cannot be satisfied that service was properly effected within the meaning of section 29 of the Acts Interpretation Act. Given this, the Tribunal was not satisfied that notice of the decision was given to the Applicant on 13 May 2021 or that it was given to the Applicant at the correct address nominated by him on any subsequent date. The Tribunal has concluded that, as notice of the decision was not properly given to the Applicant, no extension of time is required in this matter.
3. Section 101 of the ART Act provides for dismissal in circumstances where, in part, where the Tribunal is satisfied an application is lacking in substance. The Tribunal finds that this provision most closely aligns with the findings of the Tribunal, as set out above, on the basis that no extension of time application was required in this matter. The Tribunal has therefore decided to dismiss the application for an extension of time under paragraph 101(1)(a) of the ART Act.
4. The Tribunal notes for the information of the parties that, had it decided otherwise about the notice of decision having been served on the Applicant, it would have been minded to grant the extension of time in circumstances where the alleged debt has been calculated using the Applicant's partner's annual income as advised by the Australian Taxation Office and averaged over various fortnights. In circumstances where such a practice has been found to be illegal, the Tribunal would have placed significant weight on the possible merits of the application and on the public interest in the Tribunal having oversight of the debt calculation method in this matter.
5. As the Tribunal has determined that no extension of time is required, the Tribunal will proceed to list the matter for hearing to determine the substantive issue before it.

The Tribunal dismisses the extension of time application on the basis that an extension of time is not required.