Petrescu & Aling [2025] FedCFamC1F 336 (19 May 2025)

1. I have determined that the risks to the child can be ameliorated by limited time being spent between the child and the father on condition that such time is supervised.

1. The father is aged fifty-seven (57) years.[1] He is a self-employed sole trader and deals in various household products.[2] He has a male child with his former wife. That child is aged about fourteen (14) years.
2. The mother is aged twenty-seven (27) years.[3] She is unemployed and suffered from a horrifyingly wicked childhood. The child's maternal grandmother was a drug addict and, on the mother's oral evidence, had consumed with regularity, illicit substances of every description. She worked as a prostitute and exposed the mother and her siblings to such work by inviting men unknown to the children into the family home. As a consequence of her mother's neglect, the mother gave evidence that she was responsible for the care of her siblings. At one juncture, the mother was removed from her mother's care by the Department of Communities and Justice and placed into the care of her maternal grandmother. Her horrific childhood was aptly summarised by a psychologist engaged by the parties as follows:

[The mother] reports cumulative developmental adversity.

...

She was raised by her mother and step-father. She reports that her mother was physically and emotionally abusive to her and that she was sexually abused by her step-father and his friend. Police have informed her of multiple reports received of child endangerment for herself and her siblings during her childhood.[4]

1. The mother met the father for the first time in May 2015 when she commenced working for him in a sales role. At that time, the mother was aged seventeen (17) years. The father was aged forty-seven (47) years.[5] I find that the mother was impoverished in every way at the time that she met the father. She had little clothing, no money and no support from those persons such as her mother who ought to have protected her. It follows that perhaps for the first time in her life, and on meeting the father, the mother considered that she met someone who might provide her with safety and stability. Indeed, the mother says that the father "would take me shopping and spend hundreds of dollars on his preference of clothing for me".[6] She was reliant on the father for her income but says that she wanted to escape from her life in City C and "start a life for myself away from the dysfunction of my childhood".[7] The father agreed under cross-examination by the Independent Children's Lawyer that the mother has "vulnerabilities" given her difficult upbringing.
2. On meeting the father, the mother was immediately thrust into a new world of interstate travel with the father and the father's male colleague. She says, and it is generally conceded by the father, that she was obliged to share hotel rooms with the father and his male colleague, and on the mother's version of events, she was subjected to inappropriate behaviour of a sexual nature by the father including sexual assault. The father denies the mother's allegations of sexual assault.
3. By 2017, the mother had commenced a relationship with the father. However, and as discussed below, the mother says that the father became verbally abusive and stopped paying her any wage. She describes the father as having "complete control of all money".[8] In the mother's relatively short life, and between 2015 and 2020, she had also terminated three pregnancies.
4. The mother fell pregnant again in 2018 and decided to proceed with the pregnancy in circumstances where she felt guilt about her two previous abortions.[9] The mother gave birth to her daughter and the child of these proceedings in 2018.
5. Between the time of the child's birth and about May 2019, the mother largely lived in Sydney on her own whilst the father travelled between Adelaide and Queensland for his business.[10] The mother says that she separated from the father in February 2019 and returned to the City C area where she had spent her formative years.[11] The father says that the parties separated in May 2019 but this difference is immaterial to my determination.[12] On separation, the parties' relationship deteriorated. The mother says that the parties would argue by telephone and that on one occasion, the father said, "You don't know who I am, I am more than capable than you to do anything".[13] The father denies that he made such a threat.
6. At some stage between July and October 2020, the mother travelled on a work trip together with the father and the child. The mother says that she considered this to be an opportunity for the father and the child to spend time together.[14] Regrettably, and on one evening during the trip, the mother became in her words "highly intoxicated". She says that whilst intoxicated, the father had sex with her. Later, the mother says that the father tried to persuade her that such an encounter was consensual. The mother fell pregnant and had an abortion.[15] The father denies that he caused the mother's pregnancy and cites the mother's alleged promiscuity as the basis for his denial.
7. By mid-2021, the mother obtained employment as a support worker in City C. At that time, and when working night shift, she says that the father would sometimes stay at her residence and care for the child.[16] The father says that the arrangements were such that he would spend time with the child for one weekend per fortnight as well as "a visit during the week".[17] This is disputed by the mother who says that the arrangement was less frequent. Whatever the scenario, the arrangement concluded in August 2022.[18]
8. Since August 2022, the child's parenting arrangements have been characterised by dysfunction and conflict between her two parents. Such is the hostility between the child's two parents that a psychologist engaged by the parties expressed grave concern about the psychological harm, which will likely be caused to the child if she is required to move between "enemy camps".[19]
9. It is against this background that the father commenced parenting proceedings on 23 February 2023.

1. By his Amended Initiating Application filed on 29 November 2024, the father promoted an order that the child live with the mother and spend three nights per fortnight with him from the conclusion of school on Thursday until 6.30 pm on Sunday. The father also sought orders for equal shared parental responsibility and a range of ancillary orders in relation to school holidays, special occasions and overseas holidays. The father also sought orders, which:

(a) Injuncted the mother from having her partner at changeovers; and

(b) Required the mother to enrol the child at a school "that is no more than 1.12 hours and 84 km from the father's residence".

1. As discussed below, the injunctive relief sought by the father with respect to who might be permitted to attend at changeovers was in my view a manifestation of the father's obsession with details about the mother's partners and/or sexual encounters. For the reasons discussed below, I find that absent any proper basis for injunctive relief, the application is one, which was designed to control the mother. With respect to the enrolment of the child at a school presumably more convenient to the father, neither his counsel nor his affidavit material identified the reasons why I ought to make such an order.
2. At the time of her closing submissions, the father's counsel advised me that the father sought to amend his application such that he spend time with the child every three weeks. No explanation was provided by the father or his counsel as to the reasons for the father's altered position.
3. For her part, and by her Amended Response to Initiating Application filed on 6 August 2024, the mother did not promote any time between the child and the father. That position changed by the time of Closing Submissions such that the mother promoted an order that the child spend supervised time with the father on four occasions in each year being the last Sundays in February, May, August and November.
4. For her part, the Independent Children's Lawyer promoted orders in the terms sought by the mother. This represented a small variation only from the orders promoted at the commencement of the trial, namely, that the child spend supervised time with the father on four occasions in each year with such time to coincide with school holiday periods.
5. The proceedings also involved a dispute about whether an order ought to be made allocating sole parental responsibility and sole-decision making authority to the mother.

1. On 16 September 2024, the Honourable Justice Riethmuller made directions with respect to the preparation of the competing applications for trial. Pursuant to His Honour's orders, affidavits for the purposes of trial ought to have been filed by 27 January 2025 (in the case of the father) and 10 February 2025 (in the case of the mother). In the face of the parties' failure to comply with His Honour's orders, I made orders on 28 March 2025 permitting the parties to rely upon affidavits, which had previously been filed in these proceedings. I also made an order permitting each of the parties to file a further brief affidavit. The orders were made in circumstances where:

(a) The father's solicitor made an application to withdraw as the father's legal representative. I granted that application on the basis that the father had failed to meet the terms of his solicitor's retainer. Propitiously, the father re-engaged his solicitor prior to the commencement of trial; and

(b) The father made an application to adjourn the trial ten (10) business days prior to the date allocated for its commencement. I dismissed that application having regard to, among other things, the longevity of the proceedings and the demands on the resources of the Court. Further, I considered it to be in the child's interests that the litigation between her parents be brought to an end.

1. As a consequence of orders made by me on 28 March 2025, the father relied on:

(a) An Amended Initiating Application filed on 29 November 2024;

(b) The father's affidavits filed on 23 February 2023, 16 May 2023[20], 28 June 2024 and 4 April 2025; and

(c) Tendered documents.[21]

1. The father also sought to cross-examine a psychologist, Dr E, who prepared a report specifically in relation to the risk presented to the child by the father. That report was dated 15 February 2024. Although the father failed to give notice to the psychologist that he wished to cross-examine her, the psychologist ultimately made herself available for cross-examination by electronic means.
2. For her part, the mother relied on:

(a) An Amended Response to Initiating Application filed on 6 August 2024;

(b) The mother's affidavits filed on 27 March 2023, 12 May 2023, 31 January 2024 and 7 April 2025; and

(c) Tendered documents.[22]

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer relied on a Family Report prepared by a psychologist and clinical expert dated 9 April 2025. She also relied on some tendered documents.[23]
2. At the commencement of the trial, I advised counsel that I would exclude all annexures to each party's Affidavit having regard to r 8.15(3)(e) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth). I advised counsel that annexures to affidavits and documents referred to in tender bundles would not be considered by me until the relevance and probative value of each document was established during any evidence-in-chief and/or cross-examination of the parties.

1. Orders in respect of children are made under Part VII of the Act, where the meaning of a 'parenting order' is defined (s 64B). The Court may make such parenting orders as it thinks proper (s 65D), within the context of the objects of the legislation and the principles which underpin those objects (s 60B).

1. Parental responsibility for children is vested in their parents (s 61C(1)) but that situation only applies whilst ever no order is made to change it (s 61C(3) and s 61D). Parental responsibility is defined to encompass all duties, powers, responsibilities and authority conferred by law upon parents (s 61B).
2. When an order is made allocating parental responsibility for a child or children in relation to "major long-term issues" to more than one person, the order may prescribe whether those persons have joint or sole decision-making authority in relation to all or only specified issues (s 61D(3)). The Act defines "major long-term issues" to include those such as the child's education, religion, culture, health, name, and changed living arrangements (s 4(1)) and defines what "joint decision-making" requires in respect of such issues (s 61DAA). A person allocated with parental responsibility for a child need not be consulted by another person in respect of minor decisions made for the child which fall outside "major long-term issues" (s 61DAB).

1. When making parenting orders, the Court is mandated to regard the child's best interests as the paramount consideration (ss 60CA and 65AA). The Act specifies the criteria which must be considered in arriving at a conclusion as to what is in the child's best interests (s 60CC). The six considerations referred to in s 60CC(2) are non-hierarchical. The Court is obliged to consider:

(a) arrangements that promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect or other harm)

(i) of the child; and

(ii) each person who has care of the child;

(b) any views expressed by the child;

(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;

(d) the capacity of each person who has or will have parental responsibility to provide for the child's needs;

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so; and

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

1. When considering the arrangements, which would promote the safety of the child and each person who has the care of the child, the Court must consider any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child, and any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.
2. Section 60CG imposes a statutory imperative to ensure that a parenting order does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence and empowers the Court to include in the order any safeguards that it considers necessary to promote the safety of those affected by the order.
3. Family violence is defined in s 4AB of the Act and means violent, threatening, or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member) or causes the family member to be fearful. Examples of such behaviour include assault, sexually abusive behaviour, stalking, repeated derogatory taunts, intentional damage or destruction of property, unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet reasonable living expenses of the family member or his or her child, at a time when the family member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support, preventing the family member from making or keeping connection with his or her family or friends, or unlawfully depriving the family member from his or her liberty.
4. Section 4AB(3) and (4) makes it clear that children are to be regarded as exposed to family violence either through direct sensory perception of violent action or such perception of consequences of violent action.
5. As the facts referred to above make plain, this is a case about risk and accordingly the arrangements, which might promote the safety of the child.
6. Where ultimately the Court's focus is on formulating orders which attend to the child's best interests, the Court is required to make findings of fact. The standard of proof is one of "on the balance of probabilities" consistent with s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which provides:

(1) In a civil proceeding, the Court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.[24]

(2) Without limiting the matters that the Court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:

(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and

(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

1. A party making an assertion of fact has an onus to prove that fact on the balance of probabilities although the task for the Court ultimately remains as one of weighing and balancing the probity of evidence towards a determination of the child's best interests.

1. Before considering the evidence and the application of the relevant legal principles, I make the following observations of the parties.
2. There is an age gap of 30 years and five months between the parties. Inevitably, and by reason of their significant age difference, the parties had contrasting views and attitudes towards life.
3. The father attended court well groomed. At all times, he was polite and patient. Although he answered questions in a calm manner, he often asked counsel to rephrase questions when it was unnecessary for him to do so. For example, and when questioned about his dating life, the father asked counsel about his definition of the term "dating". The father appeared to be amused when asked by the mother's counsel about his dating preferences and his behaviour towards a 17-year-old vulnerable female (as the mother was when the parties met in 2015). It was my impression, which was supported by the opinion of the single expert, that the father had no regard "for how his actions might be perceived in terms of social mores, such as him arranging for a young teenager to accompany him on business trips, or him continuing to seek relationships with young women who are 30 years younger than he, as he reported during interviews".[25]
4. It was my observation that the father showed no insight as to how his behaviour towards women generally and his treatment of the mother now affected the mother and her ability to parent their child. This concerned me given that by his own admission, the father had knowledge of the mother's horrific and disadvantaged background. It also became apparent to me that the father did not understand how his behaviour during interactions with the child could have long lasting ramifications for his relationship with the child. For example, and during time spending supervised by a supervision agency, the father told the child that she only had "one dad" and that if she wanted two dads then he would give her "two mums". It was only after the Independent Children's Lawyer expressed concern about this behaviour and challenged the father to understand the mother's perspective, that the penny dropped, and the father conceded that his actions were not child focused. At this point, the father did shed a tear and express his remorse. Regrettably, I have concluded that the father's realisation has come too late.
5. For her part, the mother attended court well dressed. In a manner similar to the father, the mother was polite and patient. I was advised by counsel that during several adjournments, the mother cared for her newly born daughter who was otherwise left in the care of her former partner when court resumed.
6. When cross examined, it was apparent that the mother continues to suffer from the trauma of her childhood and her experiences with the father. She often cried when questioned about her history. As the trial progressed, the mother's stance with respect to time spending between the child and the father softened. Whilst she conceded that it is in the child's interest to spend time with her father, the mother could not break though her fear of the child being exposed to harm in the father's care. I have no doubt that this is due to the family violence, which the mother was exposed to at such a young age and the abuse she suffered at the hands of her own family members. As discussed below, it became apparent to me that the mother's trauma and horrific upbringing combined with her experiences of the father cloud any prospect of the mother having confidence that the child can spend time with the father in a safe manner other than through the auspices of a contact service. For the same reasons, the mother displayed no confidence in her ability to co-parent with the father.

1. These proceedings involve a dispute about whether:

(a) The father presents an unacceptable risk of harm to the child;

(b) If the answer to the above question is in the negative, whether time between the child and the father will cause the mother psychological harm such that her parenting capacity will be detrimentally affected;

(c) Time between the child and her father might be facilitated in a manner, which does not cause the child psychological harm.

1. When determining whether the father presents an unacceptable risk of harm to the child, I must consider:

(a) The dynamic between the parties and the father's behaviour towards the mother in 2015;

(b) The dynamic between the parties as it existed from 2017 when the parties commenced a relationship until 2019 when the parties' separated;

(c) The behaviour of the father in the period subsequent to separation but prior to the commencement of proceedings in February 2023;

(d) The behaviour of the father during supervised time with the child in 2023 and 2025;

(e) Whether the child is able to transition between the parties in a manner, which will not compromise her emotional wellbeing.

1. The mother says that in about May 2015, she commenced working for the father in a sales role. This was denied by the father in his written and oral evidence.[26] At that time, the mother was aged seventeen (17) years. The father was aged forty-seven (47) years.[27] The father's denial that the mother was working for him can be rejected given his advice to the Single Expert[28] and his oral evidence that he would give the mother money, that she was "an assistant to him" and that the mother "did some bits and pieces". In any event, and whether the mother was in the employ of the father or otherwise is in my mind irrelevant. By reference to the mother's childhood as described above and having regard to the mother's oral evidence, I find that the mother was impoverished in every way at the time that she met the father. As discussed above, the mother's oral evidence causes me to conclude that she had little clothing, no money and no support from those persons such as her mother who ought to have protected her. It follows that for the first time in her life, and on meeting the father, the mother probably considered that she met someone who might provide her with safety and stability. She made such a concession under cross-examination. Indeed, the mother says that the father would take her shopping and spend significant sums of money on clothing for her. With respect to the payment of monies to her, the mother says that the father would withhold her pay from her and "portion small amounts to me as I needed it".[29] By his written evidence, the father denied the mother's allegation.[30] Under cross-examination, however, the father did say that he would give the mother "some money". On balance, and for the following reasons, I consider that the mother's version of events ought to be preferred to the father's version:

(a) On the father's own version of events, the mother was doing some work for him; and

(b) The father's evidence was to the effect that he would give the mother "some money". This evidence is also consistent with the mother's assertion that the father would "portion small amounts to me as I needed it" (supra).

1. I infer that the mother tolerated this situation in circumstances where she wanted to escape from her life in City C and "start a life for myself away from the dysfunction of my childhood".[31] Such a desire is for the reasons referred to above understandable.
2. After only a few days of being employed by the father, the mother says that she, the father and a male employee drove to City F in Queensland for the "[...]" show. The father denies that the male was an employee and described him as a contractor. Whatever the scenario, the mother says that she and her fellow travellers stayed in a two-bedroom cabin and that she was asked to share a bedroom (albeit a bedroom that contained two beds) with the male colleague. On one evening, the father offered to swap rooms as a consequence of the mother's complaints about the snoring habits of the male colleague and the fact that she was cold during the previous night. The mother went to the father's bed as suggested by him. Notwithstanding this, the mother says that she woke the following morning to the father "cupping my vagina with his hand".[32] The mother says that she never raised the father's behaviour with him because she did not have the confidence to do so.[33] The father by his written evidence denied the allegation that he sexually assaulted the mother.[34]
3. Soon thereafter, the mother travelled with the father to Region H, Queensland.[35] She says that on the father's suggestion, she shared a one-bedroom apartment with him albeit a bedroom that contained two beds.[36] On that occasion, the mother says that she was woken by the father making efforts to remove her underwear. He was naked and the mother says that she felt the father's fingers "touching the vulva area of my vagina".[37] On resisting the father's advances, the mother says that the father returned to his bed and masturbated.[38] The father denies the allegation.[39]
4. In July 2015, the mother says that she again travelled to Queensland together with the father for the purposes of her employment. The trip was notable for two reasons:

(a) The mother says that the father's male employee asked her to collect drugs, which he had purchased. The father says that it was the mother who wished to purchase drugs, and he expressed disappointment at the time that the mother was engaging in such an activity.[40] Regrettably, the mother says that when collecting the drugs she was exposed to a male who masturbated in her presence. Despite giving written evidence that the mother wished to purchase the drugs, the father's oral evidence was to the effect that he never observed the mother using drugs of any description;

(b) The mother says it was on this occasion that the father first had sex with her.[41] The mother's evidence is that she was "disgusted and grossed out" by the father's conduct. However, the mother says this with respect to her response to the father at the relevant time:

I didn't know what to do. I laid there and let him do it to me. I was alone in the room with [the father]. He was my boss. He was also my provider. He was the one paying for my accommodation and food whilst I was working. I felt like I couldn't say no. I was trapped in a situation. He was in control of me and everything I did.[42]

1. On the morning following the parties' first sexual encounter, the mother says that the following occurred:

I woke to [the father] on top of me naked and he was positioning my body as I laid flat on my stomach. I said to [the father] words to the effect of "I want to sleep" to which [the father] laughed and said words to the effect of "go back to sleep or just lay there". The father proceeded to have sex with me and then left.[43]

1. The father denies the allegation as to sexual assault of the mother.[44] In fact, under cross-examination, the father denied having sexual intercourse with the mother at all.
2. As a consequence of her encounters with the husband, the mother fell pregnant. She says that the father told her to get an abortion. In his oral evidence, the father denied that he knew anything about the mother having an abortion notwithstanding that the mother did so.[45] On this topic, I prefer the mother's evidence. She says that she was "extremely sick" subsequent to the abortion,[46] and in circumstances where she appears to have been working closely with the father, I reject an assertion by the father that he did not know about the mother's predicament.
3. There is insufficient evidence on the balance of probabilities to enable me to find that father sexually assaulted the mother in 2015. Notwithstanding this, and by reference to the facts set out above, I find that the mother was a vulnerable 17-year-old who was placed into a situation where she was obliged to share a bedroom on several occasions with a male colleague and/or the father. She had barely emerged from adolescence. The father was reluctant under cross-examination to acknowledge the inappropriateness of the mother's accommodation arrangements or the inappropriateness of his sexual activity with the mother in circumstances where:

(a) The mother was reliant on the father for income or the provision of monies (however characterised) and accordingly, the father was in a position of power. I accept the mother's evidence that she did not consider she was in a position to resist the father's sexual advances particularly in the context of the mother's disadvantaged circumstances; and

(b) The mother was a vulnerable young female who the father must have known was escaping a life of dysfunction. Such a conclusion can be drawn in circumstances where the male colleague of the father and the father himself were acquaintances of the maternal grandmother through her employment at a brothel in City C.[47] Even if my conclusion about the father's knowledge of the mother's terrible upbringing is erroneous, the father on cross-examination found it difficult to acknowledge that his relationship with the mother started "when [the father] was a mature adult, whereas [the mother] was at an age and developmental stage where she had barely emerged from adolescence".[48] I accept the Single Expert's evidence that by reason of this fact alone, namely, the different developmental stages of the parties, a power imbalance must have existed.[49]

1. The father's inability to acknowledge the fact that a power imbalance between the parties existed is exemplified by the following comments made by the Single Expert:

... [the father] presented as unprepared to acknowledge the potential for such a power imbalance when this was raised by the Single expert during the interviews for this report. On the contrary, he seemed to be intimating that he was more a victim of [the mother's] (alleged) burgeoning sexuality, and that she therefore had at least equal, if not more, responsibility for them entering into an intimate relationship.[50]

1. My impression of the father's evidence on cross-examination was also consistent with the findings of the Single Expert in the following terms:

... [the father] presented as lacking any regard for how his actions may be perceived in terms of social mores, such as him arranging for a young teenager to accompany him on business trips, or him continuing to seek relationships with young women are 30 years younger than he, as he reported during interviews.[51]

1. For her part, Dr E raised concerns about the father's behaviour and expressed a view that the father's behaviour in 2015 "flags his non-normative attitudes about unequal intimate relationships and thus raises valid reasons for proceeding cautiously prior to judicial determination".[52]
2. I accept the opinions of each of the experts, which proved to be maintained under cross-examination.

The relationship between the parties during the period 2017 to 2019

1. In 2017, the father contacted the mother. The mother says that the father declared that he missed her and then offered her a short-term job in City G.[53] Across 2017, the mother says that she was in a relationship with the father. By the end of 2017, the mother says that the father became verbally abusive and stopped paying her any wage. She describes the father as having "complete control of all money".[54] This is denied by the father who says that the mother worked on a casual basis for a company.[55] Whatever the precise circumstances, there is no evidence that the mother had been able to improve her disadvantaged circumstances.
2. In late 2017, the mother aborted another pregnancy.[56] She says that she "wasn't ready to be a mother and I wasn't happy in the relationship".[57] Particularly, the mother says that the father kept her existence a secret from his family and otherwise isolated the mother from her family.[58] The father gave evidence under cross-examination that he simply wanted to keep news of the mother's pregnancy contained until the risk of a miscarriage had passed. Whatever the scenario, the mother had an abortion.
3. The mother fell pregnant again in 2018 and decided to proceed with the pregnancy in circumstances where she felt guilt about her two previous abortions.[59] The mother gave birth to her daughter in 2018. She says that the father asked her to keep the fact of her pregnancy secret, but the mother says that at the time of her second trimester, she confided in her family members as she needed support.[60] The father denies these allegations.[61] However, and given the power imbalance, which existed between the parties, I prefer the mother's version of events. The mother's version of events is also consistent with the father's oral evidence that he was concerned the mother may lose the child and this being so, he wished for the mother to keep the fact of her pregnancy a secret.
4. Following the birth of her daughter, the mother says that she was isolated from her family members. Particularly, she says that the father disapproved of any family members attending at the hospital.[62] She also says that the father isolated her and the child for a period of thirty days.[63] The father accepted that this was so but asserts it is a Country J tradition for a mother and her newborn child to remain away from family members and the public for a period of thirty days after the birth of a child to "reduce the chances of getting infections or illnesses".[64] The father did not lead any evidence in support of such a proposition. Further, and whatever the scenario, I accept that as a mother who was only 20 years of age, the mother would have found it confronting and upsetting to be isolated from her friends and familial support.
5. Between the time of the child's birth and about May 2019, the mother largely lived in Sydney on her own whilst the father travelled between Adelaide and Queensland for his business.[65] The mother separated from the father in February 2019 and returned to the City C area where she had spent her formative years.[66] The father says that the parties separated in May 2019, but this difference is immaterial to my determination.[67] On separation, the parties' relationship deteriorated. The mother says that the parties would argue by telephone and that on one occasion, the father said, "You don't know who I am, I am more than capable than you to do anything".[68] The father denied the evidence in his written and oral evidence.
6. On cross-examination, however, the father did concede that subsequent to May 2019, his relationship with the child was limited in circumstances where he was often working away from Sydney.

Parenting arrangements between 2020 and August 2022, the commencement of proceedings under Part VII of the Act and the obtaining of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order

1. At some stage between July and October 2020, the mother travelled on a work trip together with the father and the child. The mother says that she considered this to be an opportunity for the father and the child to spend time together.[69] Regrettably, and on one evening during the trip, the mother became in her words "highly intoxicated". She says that whilst intoxicated, the father had sex with her and that he did so despite the mother advising the father on many occasions subsequent to the parties' separation in 2019 that she never wished to have a further sexual encounter with the father.[70] The mother says that the following morning, the father having gone to work contacted her by telephone to advise that the parties had sex and that the mother had consented to it.[71] The mother fell pregnant and had an abortion.[72] The father accepts that the mother had an abortion but suggests that the mother was promiscuous and that the mother must have become pregnant as a consequence of a liaison with another man.[73] The father's desire to portray the mother as promiscuous was a theme of the father's written and oral evidence. Whilst the mother's sexual activities are irrelevant to any determination to be made by me pursuant to Part VII of the Act, the father's focus on this topic was distasteful. It highlights the degrading manner in which the father speaks about the mother of his daughter.
2. By mid-2021, the mother was working as a support worker in City C. She says that her shifts would range between days and nights. When working night shift, she says that the father would sometimes stay at her residence and care for the child.[74] The father says that the parenting arrangements were such that he would spend time with the child for one weekend per fortnight as well as "a visit during the week".[75] This is disputed by the mother who says that the arrangement was less frequent. Whatever the scenario, the arrangement came to a conclusion in August 2022.[76] The father says that culpability for such an outcome rests with the mother's partner from whom she has now separated.[77] Tension between the two men was such that the father applied for and obtained an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order against the mother's partner although the grounds for the obtaining of that order were never explored at trial.[78] The father's obsession with the behaviour of the mother's former partner is such that his affidavit filed on 4 April 2025 is largely devoted to an analysis of the behaviour of the mother's former partner as opposed to what should have been his primary focus, namely, the child. The affidavit filed on 4 April 2025 contains 55 paragraphs. Almost all those paragraphs either identify the mother's former partner directly or allude to his conduct under the headings "Further harassment and parent [sic] alienation by and behalf of the mother" and "Further Intimidation and harassment incident". The terms of the affidavit simply highlight the hostility between the two parties. The father's opinion of the mother and her former partner are distilled in three paragraphs of the father's affidavit filed on 4 April 2025:
   1. [The mother and her former partner] are reckless and desperate to exclude me from my child's life. I'm afraid that sooner or later they will use physical violence towards me and anyone in my presence.
   2. I'm raising the concerned [sic] that I will be assaulted leading up to the final hearing, and I'm very worried and scared that [the mother and her partner] will organise more attacks on myself and property during the finalisation of the proceedings.
   3. The patter [sic] is already showing that the escalation is increased with every attack incident. This cannot be tolerated. I urge the court to put a stop to this.
3. The animus between the father and the mother as highlighted by the father's own affidavit causes me to reflect on the opinions expressed by each of the experts that I ought to implement a parenting arrangement, which "minimises transitions and disruptions for the child". Particularly, it was the opinion of Dr E that orders for regular time between the child and her father could have "a paradoxical effect if [the child] were to reject her father in order to escape the stress of moving between enemy camps".[79]
4. For reasons, which will become obvious to a reader of this judgment, I do not need to make any finding about the conduct of the mother's former partner. I have concluded, however, that the father and the mother's former partner have engaged in disrespectful behaviour towards the other of them unnecessarily complicating the mother's life and the life of the child. Regrettably, I came to learn (and it was a matter of concession by counsel during the trial) that the father requested the assistance of Court security to escort him to and from the Court room during the trial on the grounds that the mother's former partner had been intimidating him. Whilst I cannot make any findings about the father's behaviour or indeed the behaviour of the mother's former partner, the spectacle, which unfolded outside my Court room is emblematic of the failure of two men in the mother's life to act in a mature and sensible manner.
5. With respect to the parenting arrangements, which existed between some stage in 2021 and August 2022, the mother says that the arrangements came to an end for several reasons, namely:

(a) The mother says that the father would "walk around my home naked with an erect penis", the inference being that this made the mother uncomfortable.[80] The father denied the allegation in his written evidence[81] and again under cross-examination;

(b) The father was controlling and demonstrated this control by interrogating the mother about her sexual partners and interrogating the mother's neighbours about her life. The father's displeasure that the mother was possibly engaging in sex with third persons was demonstrated by the father telling the mother that she was a "dirty slut" and saying, "don't kiss [the child] I don't know how many dicks you've had in your mouth".[82] The father denied the allegation in his written evidence;[83] and

(c) The mother says that on handover of the child to the father she "would scream and cry hysterically". The mother also says that by about July or August 2022, and subsequent to spending time with the father, the child would "engage in abnormal behaviour". The mother says that such behaviour "included but was not limited to isolating herself in her bedroom, banging her head against a wall, screaming, and crying for at least twenty-four (24) hours following her return".[84] She also says that transitions between the child and the father became difficult.[85] The mother says she was so concerned by the child's presentation that she sought assistance from a child psychologist[86] only to learn that the child was too young to receive psychological intervention. The mother was cross-examined about these matters, and I consider that her evidence on these topics was genuine.

1. Although the father denied the allegations referred to at sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above in his written and oral evidence,[87] I am inclined to prefer the mother's evidence to the evidence of the father. Particularly, such a preference would be consistent with an opinion expressed by the Single Expert in the following terms:

...the manner in which [the father] referred to [the mother] in response to questions by the Single expert about the history of their relationship often conveyed a disrespectful attitude. His use of crude and vulgar terms added to an impression of him trivialising and demeaning the relationship between him and [the mother].[88]

1. My inclination to believe the mother's version of events with respect to the father's behaviour and his use of vulgar language to suggest that the mother is sexually promiscuous is also exemplified by text messages, which the mother says she received from the father in February 2022. By those messages, the father suggested to the mother that:

(a) He could "put his dick" in the mother;

(b) He could knock the mother out such that she be rendered unconscious and thereafter, have intercourse with her.[89]

1. Whilst the father admitted under cross-examination that his behaviour was inappropriate, he sought to trivialise his behaviour by saying that the messages were "taken out of context".[90] The father did not produce any evidence, which might have enabled me to consider the messages in context. However, the text messages were sent at a time when the mother was aged twenty-four (24) years and charged with the care of a three (3) year old child. The father was fifty-four (54) years. The father's text messages are vulgar and threatening and, in my view, the content of the messages support the Single Expert's opinion that the father demeaned the mother and treated her as an object for his sexual satisfaction. The father did not give any evidence during the course of the trial, which might cause me to conclude that the father has reflected on the inappropriateness of his behaviour. Indeed, and under cross-examination, the father sought to justify his behaviour by describing it as "dark humour". I reject that evidence.
2. As a consequence of the cessation of time spending between the child and the father in August 2022, the father commenced parenting proceedings in Division 2 of this Court in February 2023. At that juncture, the father filed an affidavit, which focused only on the perceived failings of the mother and her then partner. Particularly, the father expressed the following opinion:

I am concerned that [the mother] is making attempts to alienate me and frustrate my relationship with [the child].

...

I am concerned that [the mother] is being influenced by her own estranged relationship with her father and is punishing me due to our separation, and the fragmented family structure that we now have.[91]

1. The assertion by the father that the mother was estranged from her father was offensive in circumstances where since birth, the mother has never known her father. The mother gave evidence that her father is a convicted rapist and spent time in gaol during her childhood. Further, and on several occasions during the trial, the father's counsel put propositions to the mother to the effect that because the mother never knew her father, it followed that she placed no importance on the relationship between the child and the father. I assume that such a proposition could only have been put to the mother on the father's instructions. In any event, such a line of questioning in my opinion represents the worst aspects of adversarial litigation in this Court. It was highly offensive and, in my opinion, unnecessary.
2. Finally, and in early 2023, the mother obtained an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order against the father, which order identified the mother and the child as protected persons.[92] The father was arrested for a breach of that order in early 2024 after the mother alleged that the father "rang her several times...that [the father] had abused her and physically threatened to murder and assault her".[93] The father was ultimately released with no charge. Neither party was cross-examined in any detail about these events. Accordingly, and although I am unable to make any finding about the matters alleged by the mother to police and the father's denial of those allegations, I do consider that the facts referred to by me illuminate the toxicity of the parties' relationship and the complete dysfunction of the family unit. It is another factor, which I bring to account when considering the evidence of the two experts to the effect that transitioning between her two parents on a regular basis is likely to cause the child psychological harm.

Conclusion as to the relationship between the parties, consequences of that relationship for this litigation and the father's lack of insight

1. As identified at the outset of this judgment, I hold concerns about the father's lack of insight with respect to his behaviour towards the mother. For example, and when asked by the Single Expert whether he has any regrets about his behaviour, the father responded as follows:

...he said that he regrets that he never stopped trying to please [the mother], including after they separated. As an example, he said that when he came to her home to look after [the child], he would mention that he needed a bed for the night and offer to give her a "root" and that she would tell him she wanted "five roots".[94]

1. The father was cross-examined with respect to this evidence but particularly the words "he never stopped trying to please her". He said he was "lured in" by the mother and treated with contempt. He expressed a view that he ought to have ended the relationship much earlier than he did in circumstances where the tenor of the father's evidence was that he was being "taken for a ride". At no stage, however, did the father express regret about the power imbalance, which undoubtedly existed between the parties by dint of the significant age difference between them. Further, the father seems not to have learned anything because on interview by the Single Expert, the father indicated that he continues "to date women who are younger than he and said that he has been on dates with women who are 20 years or 30 years younger".[95]
2. I have concluded that the father has adopted a disrespectful attitude towards women, and I share Dr E's concern as expressed during cross-examination that:

(a) The father will "continue to disregard and dismiss women"; and

(b) The father has not demonstrated any insight with respect to the fostering of a relationship with the mother who at the time the parties met was "such a young girl".

1. The risk, which the father's behaviour represents to his daughter was aptly summarised by Dr E during her oral evidence as follows:

If His Honour can't find that the father has indicated self-awareness and regret of his judgments, then he will not change and continue to dismiss his daughters wishes.

1. It was for these reasons as well as the father's inappropriate comments during supervised time with his daughter (see below) that Dr E advised me that she did not recommend time between the child and the father.
2. Dr E's views were supported by the Single Expert who said as follows:

There is also a risk that if [the child] spends unsupervised time with [the father], she may be exposed to sexually inappropriate behaviour by her father. [The father's] attitudes about his relationships are worrying and his lack of insight and apparent lack of respect of social mores suggests that [the child] may be exposed to sexually harmful behaviours and attitudes.[96]

1. Neither expert was challenged by the father's counsel with respect to these concerns and I accept the evidence of the experts.
2. The father's lack of insight is also demonstrated by an Interim Application, which he made on 29 November 2024. On that day, the father sought interim orders that the child live with him. At that juncture, the child had not seen her father since September 2023. When asked about the emotional impact on the child in the event that the application had been granted, the father said as follows:

We made that application - the fact that she has been alienated and kept away from me. I think that she would be in a better space being with me...I think she would definitely be better off with me under the current circumstance.

1. In my view, the father's answer demonstrates that despite saying so, he had given no consideration whatsoever to the child's wellbeing when he made the application. The father was similarly unable to explain the dichotomy between his interim order, which sought for the child to live with him and his final order, which promoted an order that the child live with the mother. When asked whether the orders promoted by him would be consistent with the child's emotional security the father said as follows:

I am not a psychologist. All I know is that what is happening to her now is not good. Her mind is twisted and pulled apart - it's not good.

1. The father's inability to reflect on his behaviour and his interactions with the mother between 2019 and 2022 is a matter, which weighs heavily on me. It is important for three reasons:

(a) The father's behaviour towards the mother infects absolutely the mother's preparedness to facilitate a relationship between the child and the father. It is the prism through which the mother now views the father's application for time with the child and it is the prism through which I must now consider the child's best interests;

(b) The father's failure to reflect upon on his behaviour vis-à-vis the mother and his inability to recognise the inappropriateness of that behaviour is a matter, which Dr E and the Single Expert engaged by the parties bring to account when considering the risk, which the father presents to the child. In Dr E's view, the father's lack of social judgment, lack of empathy and lack of respect for boundaries "augurs badly for parental protectiveness overall";

(c) The father's responses suggest "a lack of reflective functioning, which is a key aspect of being a responsible and attuned parent".[97] The absence of such functioning causes me to have significant concern about the child's psychological wellbeing in the father's presence;

(d) Given the father's inability to reflect on the inappropriateness of his behaviour, it is possible that unsupervised time might result in the child "being inappropriately and prematurely exposed to adult sexuality with harmful effects".

1. On cross-examination by counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer, Dr E said as follows with respect to the risks presented by the father:

It would be a bad indication...if the father continued to show disrespectful attitudes towards women, disregard for other people's rights and boundaries, insensitivity; if he continued to dismiss, minimise and deny the harmful effects of his own judgment in starting a relationship with a much younger, vulnerable person.

1. Simply, the father has not persuaded me that he has learned anything from his relationship with the mother. He has not demonstrated that he understands the mother's apprehensions about unsupervised time or why she might be concerned about the same. This being so, I am concerned that unsupervised time between the child and the father may expose the child to a risk of harm.

Supervised time between the child and the father between 2023 and 2025

1. The father commenced parenting proceedings on 23 February 2023. By 18 May 2023, and with the consent of the parties, the Court made an order that the child spend supervised time with the father on a fortnightly basis for up to three hours. Such time commenced on 30 May 2023. At that juncture, the child had not spent any time with the father for a period of about nine (9) months.
2. On 25 July 2023, the mother says that she was parked on a main road waiting for the supervisor of time between the child and the father to advise her that the father had left so that she could go inside the venue and collect the child. The mother says as follows with respect to her interaction with the father:

[The father] stopped his car alongside of my car. My window was up. He was staring straight at me. I tried not to look at him. I glanced sideways and he was mouthing sometime [sic] at me through the window. I don't know what he was saying. He looked so angry. He then drove away.[98]

1. The father denies that he stared at the mother or did anything to intimidate her. However, he says that on the previous occasion of time spending, he sent an email to the supervision service "addressing [the mother's] violation of the directions issued by the...supervisor".[99] Again, the combative nature of the father and the animus, which the parties hold towards the other reinforces my concerns and the concerns of each expert engaged with this family that the mere act of transitioning between her parents places the child in the centre of conflict.
2. On 8 August 2023, the mother consented to the attendance of the paternal aunt together with the father during supervised time.[100] In response to questions about the mother's consent to such an arrangement, the father said he questioned the mother's motives. Such distrust is emblematic of the poor relationship between the parties. Cross-examination of the father with respect to this distrust proceeded as follows:

Mother's counsel: The mother's consent to the paternal aunt coming to the supervised visits was a strategic move to make her look good?

Father: Yes, I question her motives.

Mother's counsel: Do you not trust the mother?

Father: Not 100 percent.

Mother's counsel: How much then?

Father: Only ten percent.

Mother's counsel: Really?

Father: I hope I could.

Mother's counsel: So you don't even trust her, you hope you can?

Father: Yes.

1. The father's distrust of the mother and his focus on matters other than the child's wellbeing and enjoyment of time with him is also exemplified by the following exchange with a supervisor on 25 July 2023:

[The father] sat with Worker for a rest and spoke about skewed gender roles, pushed agendas and child trafficking, amongst other topics, whilst [the child] played with two toddlers. [The father] also brought up [the child] not seeming as present overall in their conversations and video calls as she had been in the past and offered, "Know deep down what it is".[101]

1. The father conceded under cross-examination that his discussion with the worker supervising his time with the child was inappropriate and unnecessary. He also conceded that his time would have been better spent interacting with his daughter than complaining to the supervisor. The fact that the father chose to behave in this manner, however, simply reinforces the concerns expressed by me above. That is, the father has a complete obsession with the behaviour of the mother and the behaviour of the mother's former partner. He was unable even during his limited time with the child to avoid criticism of the mother.
2. Whilst time between the child and her father proceeded well, the father's behaviour during supervised visits causes me some concern. For example, and during a visit on 11 July 2023[102], the father expressed that he was sad when he was unable to speak with the child electronically the previous Saturday and embarked on an enquiry with a four-year-old about the reasons why communication did not occur. Further, and during a supervised visit on 5 September 2023, the father asked the child about a toy given to her by her paternal aunt the week prior. Particularly, the father asked the child the whereabouts of the toy and on at least two occasions asked the child to show the toy to him the following day when he was scheduled to communicate with the child by electronic means. On its face, such a request seems innocuous. However, the request was made in circumstances where the child told the father that her "Mummy put it somewhere" and the father persisted with his request despite the anxiety, which the child would likely suffer if she was unable to locate the toy.[103] During the same supervised session, the child and the father had a discussion about an activity, which the child had undertaken with the mother's partner whom the child referred to as her "other daddy". In response, the father reiterated that he is the child's "real daddy". Later, the report of the contact service records the following:

[The father] then asked [the child] how her scar was and searched for it on her arm until he found it, "Still there". [The child] responded, "I pulled it off. The scab", and [the father] acknowledged, "Looking like it's getting better" before he added, "You know what you should have done? Call dad. Make it better. Anything like this happens, tell dad". [The child] then showed [the father] the remnants of a graze on the bottom of her arm. She explained, "My dad did a timer on me..." until [the father] interrupted her, "He's not your dad, I wasn't there", to which [the child] reasoned, "I call him daddy". [The father] then stated, "His name is...".[104]

1. These exchanges seem innocuous but, in my view, they are demonstrative of the pressure placed on the child by the father despite the child's obvious acknowledgment that the father is her "daddy". My concerns are reflected in the report of the Single Expert who said as follows:

Another concern is [the father's] lack of sensitivity and support towards [the child's] relationships within her current blended family. It is common for a biological parent to find it hurtful when their child refers to another parent as "Dad" (or "Mum"), but [the father] does not appear to consider that, in many circumstances, it is normal for young children to do so.[105]

1. Under cross-examination, the father also conceded that:

(a) The manner in which he spoke about certain food, which the child brought to the supervised session could only have been interpreted by the child as being critical of the mother. He conceded that he is "still learning" and conceded that his comments about the appropriateness of certain food brought by the child probably made the child feel nervous or unsettled;

(b) He ought not have suggested to the child that the mother's newly born child was not her real sister. Particularly, the report of the contact service records that the father said "Thought you had to have the same mum and dad to have a sister. I'm so confused".[106] The father expressed such confusion despite his expressed desire for the child to have a relationship with his male child who is now aged fourteen (14) years. The father's expression of confusion was laced with sarcasm and is an example of his lack of sensitivity towards the child's relationships with her blended family (supra);

(c) The father's conversation with the child in the following terms was not only unnecessary but would have caused the child to be confused:

[The child] spoke about her other daddy as she started to draw, as well as her sister, [sister's name]. [The father] appeared confused and asked, "[Sister's name] is [the daughter of the mother's partner].[107]

1. The father's behaviour during supervised visits is consistent with the mother's evidence under cross-examination by the father's counsel at which time the mother gave evidence that during electronic communication between the child and the father, the latter would ask the child to show him around the house and asked questions such as "who is living at the house?". I accept the mother's evidence that the father did so, and it again highlights:

(a) The father's obsession about the mother and her life; and

(b) The father's focus on matters extraneous to his daughter during the limited time that he was able to spend time and communicate with her.

1. The importance of the extracts referred to above is that despite being under supervision, the father exposed the child to inappropriate comments. Dr E shared this view. Further, it is likely to adopt the words of the Single Expert that the father's comments "would have a negative impact on [the child] and undermine her trust in her relationship with her father".[108] Simply, there is no evidence, which gives me any satisfaction that the father will be able to control his behaviour or the comments, which he makes to the child in the future. The risk to the child is obvious. That is, the father will expose the child to emotionally harmful behaviour and challenge her "dearly held allegiances, including her strong relationship with her mother".[109]
2. On 19 July 2024, a Senior Judicial Registrar made further orders for supervised time between the child and the father. Further orders were made by the Honourable Justice Riethmuller on 16 September 2024 in circumstances where time had not been facilitated between the child and the father pursuant to the earlier orders. I then made further orders in December 2024 in an effort to facilitate time between the child and the father. It will not be surprising to a reader of this judgment to learn that despite the clear terms of my orders, the parties fell into dispute about the date and time of the first occasion of supervised time spending in 2024. Particularly, the mother did not agree to the removal of the child from school for the purposes of supervised time spending.[110] The fact that the parties had such a dispute again highlights the absolute dysfunction between the child's parents.
3. The report of the supervision agency with respect to time between the child and the father on 29 January 2025 is also instructive with respect to the mother's ability to tolerate such time. That occasion was the first occasion on which the child had spent time with her father since 5 September 2023. The report records the following:

When Worker met up with [the child] and [the mother] outside, [the child] expressed that she was nervous and worried about [the father] being rude. She then said that she didn't want to attend contact, as [the father] said mean things to her, like her dad was not her dad and her mum was not her mum. [The mother] offered that she wasn't going to force [the child] to attend contact.[111]

1. When it was suggested by the father's counsel to the mother that she did not feel comfortable, the mother responded by saying words to the effect that she was worried about the supervisor not performing her role adequately and said that she was worried about the child. When giving this evidence, the mother was crying. As discussed below, Dr E expressed an opinion under cross-examination that the mother's anxiety will transfer to the child and that the mother will not be able to persuade the child that she is happy for visits to occur. In my view, the events of 29 January 2025 are an exemplar of Dr E's proposition. I consider that explanation to be one, which is preferred to a conclusion that the child was anxious about spending time with her father particularly in circumstances where at that juncture, the child had not spent any time with the father for a period of over sixteen months.
2. The mother was cross-examined extensively about events of 3 February 2025. On that day, the mother says that the following occurred:

... [the father] waited out of a new venue, the [...] and followed me down the driveway as I arrived. [The father] was meant to be inside the venue 20 minutes (3.40pm) before visit time [of] 4.00pm. [The father] took this opportunity to slowly follow me down the driveway. As I pulled into a bus zone to be close to the exit, [the father] slowed down even more to idle past my car. He gave me a hostile stare and proceeded to park 10 to 15 metres away. I saw him hold up his phone towards my car to take pictures of my car. He got out of his car and continued to give me an intimidating stare.[112]

1. The father denied that the events recounted by the mother are accurate. In any event, cross-examination on this topic was notable not because it is necessary to find whether the father intimidated the mother in the manner alleged but because:

(a) The mother cried during cross-examination on the topic of supervised time and particularly, when Dr E was giving evidence about the child's reaction to such visits;

(b) It again highlights the dysfunction between the parties and the mother's apprehension about facilitating time;

(c) The father's evidence on the topic and the manner in which he instructed his counsel to cross-examine on the topic highlights that the father does not understand the mother's apprehensions, nor does he have any desire to do so.

1. Under cross-examination, the father conceded that there is a risk of the child "being caught up in conflict" between him and the mother at changeovers. Indeed, and as discussed above, the father expresses concern that he will be physically harmed at a changeover. Conflict between the parties is not only confined to changeovers. The mother says that the father has shared videos on his social media, which described the mother as a "dead-beat mum" and referred to the mother as a "mentally ill, narcissist, attention seeker".[113] The father denies the mother's allegations. However, it will not be surprising to a reader of this judgment to learn that the father makes a counter allegation - namely, that the mother "is in breach of Court Orders, as she and [her partner] have continuously posted photographs of [the child] on their respective social media pages".[114]
2. The mother was cross-examined by the father's counsel about the attendance of her former partner at changeovers and was challenged about whether the father called her "a fucking scrag" at a particular changeover. The mother maintained that the father did so and on balance, I conclude that the parties have an inability to act in a civil manner towards each other at changeovers.
3. The following cross-examination by counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer was also instructive:

Counsel for ICL: If she is to spend unsupervised time with you, do you think that she may be exposed to things that unsettle her like a conflict?

Father: Yeah

Counsel for ICL: Can you see the difficulties for [the child] then?

Father: Yes.

...

Counsel for the ICL: It isn't practical - can you understand that - in the interest of [the child] - speaking to [the child's] mother is not practical?

Father: Yeah, I can see where you are going - I'm not going to see my daughter.

Counsel for the ICL: You referred to [the mother] as crazy?

Father: Yes.

Counsel for the ICL: How can you work with her then?

Father: Yeah wow.

1. The inability of the parties to co-operate is also exemplified by the mother's complaint with respect to communication between the child and the father:

[The father] continued to call sometimes up to 20 - 30 times a day, being times not stipulated by Orders. [The father] called at times that suited him, even late at night when it was well past a child's bedtime.[115]

1. At paragraphs 32 and 33 of his affidavit filed on 3 April 2025, the father said as follows:

I'm raising the concerned [sic] that I will be assaulted leading up to the final hearing, and I'm very worried ad scared that [the mother] and [her partner] will organise more attacks on myself and property during the finalisation of the proceedings.

The pattern is already showing that the escalation is increased with every attack incident. This cannot be tolerated. I urge the court to stop this.

1. In support of his concern, the father asserted that all three of his motor vehicles had been damaged during the litigation between the parties. He asserted under cross-examination that the mother and/or her former partner had caused such damage. When he was challenged about such a conclusion and when it was put to him that another person may have damaged his vehicles, the father said, "it would have been organised by her as it always is".
2. By his affidavit filed on 4 April 2025, the father gave evidence that during the course of interviews by the Single Expert on 3 March 2025, he returned to his motor vehicle and found "a nappy full of faeces, which was discarded and wedged between my back door window and window wiper".[116] The father gave written evidence that the mother must have been the culprit because her car was parked two bays away from his motor vehicle. On cross-examination, however, the father conceded that he does not know the make of the mother's motor vehicle or the registration number for the vehicle.
3. On the following day, the father attended for the purposes of observations of interaction with the child. At the conclusion of that time, the father went to his motor vehicle and discovered that the "passenger side front tire [sic] [of his motor vehicle] was flat". He said that he provided police and a security guard at the building where the observations were taking place with a description of the mother's partner despite the fact that there was no evidence that the mother or her partner were involved. When asked whether he made such a report due to prejudice against the mother and her partner, the father said "I suspect him" being a reference to the mother's partner.
4. Under cross-examination, Dr E expressed a view that each of the parties adopt an antagonistic attitude towards the other parent "so [the child] crossing between parents would always be uncomfortable". She also expressed view that:

(a) Neither party is capable of doing anything better;

(b) The father will aggravate as opposed to mitigate the conflict between the parties; and

(c) The child would experience a high risk of harm when moving between her parents.

1. Dr E's conclusion is similar to my own view having listened to the parties' evidence and having observed them. That is, the parties have such a deep animus towards the other that it would be unreasonable to expect the child to transition between the two households. As discussed above, the dysfunction between the two households is exemplified by the father's request that Court security accompany him to and from my Court room.

Will time between the child and the father cause the mother psychological harm such that her parenting capacity will be detrimentally affected?

1. The mother is fearful of her daughter spending time with the father. If the mother's allegations about sexual assault by the father are correct, then there is merit to such fear. As discussed, I have been unable to make any finding on the balance of probabilities to the effect that the father sexually assaulted the mother. Otherwise, I have concluded that the mother's fear of the child spending time with the father is derived from:

(a) Her own experiences as a child;

(b) Her concern that the father had "an inappropriate relationship" with her and that the father might behave in a similar manner towards the child. Her concern is highlighted by a statement in the following terms, which she gave to police in late 2023:

I...had an upbringing that [made] me think that what [the father] spoke about and did to me was normal. It is not until now, as a grown adult and mother that I can appreciate or comprehend that the way he acted was not what should be expected from an adult male in the company of a 17-year-old young female or a boss.[117]

(c) The father's inappropriate and grotesque habit of telling the mother during sex that her "vagina is like a twelve (12) year old's tight pussy".[118] The mother also says that when in public together, the father would make disturbing comments about young girls and say words to the effect "they are young, so their pussies are tight".[119] The father denies the allegation.[120] He also says that it was the mother who would make comments on the genitalia of other women.[121] I find it is likely that each of the mother and the father took part in the vulgar commentary and that they shared in this inappropriate discourse together. However, one of the parties was brought up under horrific circumstances and the other was a mature-aged man who ought to have fostered a secure and healthy environment for the mother rather than perpetuating the concerning behaviours;

(d) The father's insistence that the mother have sex with him when she did not wish to do so including when the mother was falling asleep.[122] The father conceded under cross-examination that he did so;

(e) The mother's allegation that she was encouraged by the father to watch video footage on his mobile telephone, which footage depicted the father "having sex with young girls and pictures of young girls asleep".[123] The father denies the allegation and says that it was the mother who used to show him "explicit pornographic videos";[124] and

(f) The father's violent behaviour towards the mother. On one occasion subsequent to separation, the mother says that the father put her in a "choke lock" with the mother saying "I can't breathe" before being released by the father. The mother says that this was witnessed by the child who implored the father not to hurt her mother.[125] The father suggests that the mother enjoyed wrestling and that choking "was...one of her favourite wrestling holds".[126]

1. In early 2023, the mother attended on New South Wales Police and made reports against the father for sexual assault and family violence.[127]
2. It is against the background of these allegations that the father's counsel suggested to the mother that it was she and not the child who experienced negative emotions when the child spent time with the father. I accept that the mother did so. When challenged about her preparedness to facilitate a relationship between the child and the father, the mother gave the following evidence:

Father's counsel: Does it worry you that [the child] too will grow up without a father figure in her life?

Mother: Yes, I have thought about that. I wanted her to build a relationship with the father in a safe environment. I referred back to the abuse that I had suffered.

Father's counsel: He never physically abused you.

Mother: He did - he sexually abused me.

Father's counsel: You had a child with him?

Mother: Yes, but...

Father's counsel: [The father] was pursuing you in a romantic capacity?

Mother: In some ways - but I gave him the power he wanted.

Father's counsel: You gave him power.

Mother: I was submissive to him.

Father's counsel: You chose to be submissive?

Mother: Submissive (crying).

...

Father's counsel: You knew there was an age difference, and you didn't mind.

Mother: He was a male that I felt powerless against.

1. The mother went on to say that she was seventeen (17) years of age at the time she commenced her interactions with the father, she is afraid of males and still is afraid of males. She cried when she gave that evidence. Later, and when it was put to the mother that she is fearful of the child spending time with the father because her own father is a convicted rapist, the mother said as follows whilst sobbing:

[The father would] walk around and begging to have sex. He has a sexual obsession - enjoys talking about young children. He fantasises about having sex with his daughter and his niece.

1. In response to this evidence, the father's counsel offered the following commentary, namely, that the mother has "a blanket fear...and I don't blame you". To an extent, the father's counsel "hit the nail on the head". The mother has a "blanket fear" of the father and for the reasons discussed below, it is immaterial to my determination whether such fear is grounded in reality or otherwise. As I made clear during the trial, I am required to make an order based on the prism through which the mother's circumstances inform her capacity to parent. Such order should ultimately promote the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.
2. Dr E expressed a view that as a consequence of her childhood, the mother is "oversensitive to any markers of distress in her child and prone to being interpreted that way". She went on to say as follows:

...we cannot expect [the mother] to have the will or motivation to encourage the child to transition safely if she doesn't believe the child is safe. This is the psychological risk.

1. Dr E also expressed a view that the mother's anxiety will transfer to the child and that the mother will not be able to persuade the child that she is happy for visits to occur despite her best efforts to do so. As a consequence, the child will "see her mother as weak and unable to protect her".
2. An example of the mother's oversensitivity is the mother's expressed concern under cross-examination that the father was trying to "bribe" the child with toys during supervised visits in the same way that the father purchased clothing for the mother in the past. By her written material, the mother said as follows:

I became extremely worried that [the father] was buying [the child] toys to begin the same grooming tactics he used with me when I was 17 years old as his new employee. I voiced my concern to [name of supervisor] that it was highly inappropriate that [the father] bring bags and bags of gifts to his first visit, creating the sense that [the child] was enamoured to see him, not just the bags and bags of toys.[128]

1. A further example of the mother's sensitivity is the mother's assertion that when the matter was listed before the Court on 3 December 2024 by way of Microsoft Teams, the father was "glaring" at her.[129] When challenged, the mother said that the father made her feel uncomfortable, and she is "still scared of him". The mother gave evidence that she is attending on a victim services counsellor and conceded that she ought to attend on a psychologist.[130] I also note that the mother cried during a majority of Dr E's evidence with respect to the risks presented by the father to the child.
2. In Keane & Keane [2021] FamCAFC 1; (2021) 62 Fam LR 190 ("Keane") the Full Court confirmed that the task faced by a trial judge is:
   1. ...to analyse carefully the evidence led on behalf of the mother in relation to the impact that allowing the child supervised time with the father would have on her caregiving capacity. For present purposes however it may be accepted that there would need to be very cogent evidence that, to use the language of the Full Court in Marra & Marra, the mother's caregiving capacity would be discernibly impaired by any order that the child have time with the father (see Re Andrew, at 83,201) for such an order not to be made. Ultimately, as the Full Court has consistently observed, the lodestar is the welfare and best interests of the child, which principle now finds statutory expression in s 60CA of the Act: Re Andrew, 83,199.
3. The Full Court in Keane at [75] summarised the authorities relating to the "Re Andrews principle". The impact of a genuinely held belief on the primary caregiver's ability to parent has been expressed in a variety of ways including:
   1. "may so impinge upon her capacity as the primary caregiver of the children" [A & A [1998] FamCA 25; (1998) FLC 92-800];
   2. "her co-parenting capacity would deteriorate and impinge the children's best interests" [Dunst & Dunst [2016] FamCAFC 15 at 81];
   3. "as her likely being unable to continue to function effectively so as to adequately care for the children" [Hollister & Gosselin [2016] FamCA 759 at 193];
   4. "genuine fears of the residential parent about such a risk may so impinge upon the parent's capacity" [Bayer & Imhoff [2010] FamCA 532 at 177];
   5. "where such anxiety is likely to impact adversely on that parents caregiving ability..." [Russell & Russell v Close SA 45 of 1992 an unreported decision of the Full Court];
   6. "have an effect on the custodial parent which will impair to a significant degree the emotional support and for that matter physical support which the custodial parent can render the child" [Grant & Grant (1994) FLC 92-506 at 81-259].
4. In this case, the child needs at least one parent who is stable and can meet their needs. There is no doubt that the mother is the child's primary carer. Save for being the subject of this parenting dispute, the evidence supports a conclusion that the child is happy and stable in her mother's care.
5. The mother's subjective view cannot be overlooked. I accept that she holds a fear that the father is a risk to the child. I accept that such a view is genuine. In the words of the Single Expert, the mother's fear of the father "may be affected by her own trauma history (including a history of child sexual abuse) that would, understandably, raise her anxieties about [the child's] safety".[131] It was my observation that the mother's fear of the father continues unabated. She cried on several occasions during her own evidence and the evidence of the experts. For these reasons, I place weight on the following recommendation of the Single Expert:

It is important that arrangements for [the child] to spend time with her father occur at a sufficient frequency for their relationship to be maintained, without these arrangements infringing upon [the child's] activities with her family in her main base, or being too onerous for [Ms Aling].[132]

(emphasis added)

1. I also agree with the opinion expressed by the Single Expert that it is important to provide assurance to the mother that the child will be safe during time spending with the father and that the best way to provide such assurance would be for time between the child and her father to occur at a contact service.[133] Supervision in such a setting was also supported by Dr E and she expressed a view that such visits will "suffice to maintain [the child's] affectional bond with her father".[134]
2. I reject the submission made by the father's counsel that I am not obliged to consider the effect of any orders made by me on the mother's parenting capacity. Such a submission is against the weight of the authorities referred to above.
3. In circumstances where the mother and the Independent Children's Lawyer promote an order for the child to spend supervised time with the father on an ad infinitum basis, I am mindful of the cautions espoused in Slater & Light (2013) 48 Fam LR 573.[135] Particularly, I am mindful of the following principles developed by the Full Court:

(a) While the protection of the child from harm may be secured by the requirement of supervision, the court should not ignore the effect of spending time with a parent in such an environment may itself have an effect on the child's well-being; and

(b) It is both legitimate and necessary that the court give consideration to:

(i) any recommendations of a Single expert;

(ii) the practical difficulties; and

(iii) the long term effects;

of long-term supervision upon a child (i.e. their best interests).

1. For the reasons discussed above, I find that an order for supervision is warranted. Such an outcome will:

(a) Contain the arrangements between the child and her father and protect the child from the father's lack of respect for boundaries, the likelihood that the father will denigrate the mother and other members of the child's family;

(b) Protect the child from sexually inappropriate behaviour by the father and/or prevent the child from being exposed to sexually harmful behaviours and attitudes (supra);

(c) Protect the child from conflict and dysfunction between her parents; and

(d) Provide the mother with assurance that the child is safe thereby increasing the likelihood that the mother will comply with the orders.

Can time between the child and her father be facilitated in a manner, which does not cause the child psychological harm?

1. The father's application as revised at the time of closing submissions was to the effect that the child spend time with him every three weeks for a period of three nights. Dr E did not support such an outcome. Similarly, the Single Expert by her report expressed the following opinion:

It is apparent that [the child] draws upon her relationship with her mother for support and it is likely that [the child] would experience any prolonged separations from her as distressing and confusing.[136]

1. On cross-examination, the Single Expert clarified her opinion by saying that even daytime periods for say three or four days would be experienced by the child as a "prolonged separation". It follows that if in the opinion of the Single Expert the child cannot cope with time spending arrangements of three or four days then she will be unable to cope with say three consecutive nights as promoted by the father. However, the Single Expert did say that the child ought to be able to cope with "shorter separations". The Single Expert's conclusions are to an extent supported by the events of her interview of the child at which time the child "asked a few times to see her mother and [the mother's] partner".[137] I infer that time spending for a lengthy period of time is likely to be distressing for the child in circumstances where during interviews for the purposes of the Family Report, the child asked to see her mother.
2. Since 17 March 2025, the child has refused to attend supervised time with the father. Dr E in her oral evidence identified that:

...the child already feels uncomfortable going to visits "because she knows her mother does not want it. Forcing [the child] to go to contact can have no good effect on the child.

1. It was Dr E's opinion that in circumstances where the resist/refuse dynamic has commenced, any attempt to enforce contact between the child and the father would be "futile and counterproductive". She further said that any order for unsupervised time will "keep the matter coming back to court" and forcing time spending between the child and the father "may fracture relationships with both parents". The Single Expert agreed with this opinion. Particularly, and prior to the commencement of any time spending regime to be implemented by me, the Single Expert expressed a view that it would be helpful to implement a short moratorium so that the child can be given a respite from the dysfunction, which is occurring at the current time. By her written evidence, the Single Expert said as follows:

It would also be in [the child's] interests to be allowed a break from the current pattern of her arriving for an arrangement with her father and then being responsible for declining such contact. It would be better if there could be a pause in arrangements, such as for two to three months...[138]

1. The Single Expert did not alter this recommendation under cross-examination. Her oral and written evidence on the topic was persuasive and I accept it.
2. I have found above that supervision is warranted. In addition to the reasons set out above, I have considered Dr E's evidence that given the conflict between the parties, nothing less than limited time in a tight, controlled process will protect the child from psychological harm. There was another factor, which in Dr E's opinion mandated a consideration of no time or supervised time only, namely, the father's lack of parental empathy. She said that the father's lack of parental empathy, his "lack of respect for people's boundaries" and the likelihood that he will denigrate the mother and other members of the child's family means that the father presents a risk to the child. She further suggested that by his behaviour, the father would place the child in a position of "loyalty conflict". Dr E was unequivocal in her opinion that the father by his conduct is likely to cause the child psychological harm.
3. Dr E's view about the need for supervised time was supported by the Single Expert who said that "if there are no checks and balances on [the father's] behaviour" then a vulnerable person such as the child will be at risk of harm.[139] I am persuaded by the evidence given by the two experts.
4. With respect to the frequency of time spending arrangements, the Single Expert said that it "would not be helpful" for the child to "continue what is happening at the moment", namely, have the child attend for supervised time only to resist spending time with her father. She also expressed a view that time, which occurs more than once every six to eight weeks as recommended by her, will be harmful to the child. That opinion was supported by Dr E who suggested that time on between four and eight occasions each year might minimise the risk of psychological harm to the child.
5. It was suggested by the father's counsel to the Single Expert that more frequent time between the child and the father might ameliorate the child's susceptibility to be influenced by her mother. That proposition was rejected by the Single Expert on the basis that the child will be significantly influenced by her mother in any event by mere dint of the mother's role as the child's primary carer. Further, the expert by her written evidence said as follows:

It is also understandable and natural for a young child, such as [child's name], to be susceptible to influence by a close attachment figure, such as [the mother]. [The child] seemed conscious of some of her mother's opinions about [the father] and [the child] indicated an awareness of unfavourable comparisons with [the mother's partner].[140]

1. With respect to the supervised time, Dr E expressed a view that it would be sensible to order a minimum number of occasions between the father and the child, which the mother can tolerate and accordingly, support. By her oral evidence, Dr E suggested that between four and eight times per annum might be appropriate. This reflected her written evidence wherein Dr E expressed the following opinion:

If the Court should find that [the father] does not pose a risk of harm to [the child], an arrangement should be sought which minimises transitions and disruptions for the child. It is difficult to envisage any arrangements for smoothly progressing [the father's] time. Orders for fortnightly contact could have a paradoxical effect if [the child] were to reject her father in order to escape the stress of moving between enemy camps. A better outcome might be achieved by fewer, longer visits...[141]

1. This opinion was supported by the Single Expert who by her written evidence said that if the child "was indeed struggling with being separated from [the mother], this would have a negative impact on [the child's] enjoyment of her time with [the father] and stymy the development if [sic] her relationship with him".[142] She suggested that four occasions each year would be an appropriate number of visits between the child and the father and that more frequent time might create difficulty.
2. For these reasons, I propose to adopt the proposal of the Independent Children's Lawyer to the effect that the child spend time with the father on four occasions in each calendar year. I accept the evidence of the Single Expert that such time ought not occur during school holiday periods as the child might then identify school holiday periods as being a time of her mother's distress. This being so, I will adopt the proposal of the mother to the effect that the child spend time with her father on the last Sunday in February, May, August and November in each year.
3. In terms of location, counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer recommended that time occur at the contact service operated by B Family Services. Neither party made submissions in opposition to such a proposal and accordingly, I will make an order for supervised time to occur at that location.

Section 60CC(2)(a) - The arrangements that would promote the safety of the child and each person who has care of the child

1. I have set out above my findings. I have concluded that to ensure the child's safety it is appropriate to proceed cautiously. When arriving at this conclusion, I bring to account:

(a) The views expressed by Dr E in relation to the father's non-normative attitudes about unequal intimate relationships;[143]

(b) The opinion expressed by Dr E to the effect that regular time between the child and her father could have "a paradoxical effect if [the child] were to reject her father in order to escape the stress of moving between enemy camps";[144]

(c) The psychological harm, which would be caused to the child if I make an order requiring the child to transition between her two parents on a regular basis;

(d) The father's disrespectful attitude towards the mother but particularly, his demeaning of the mother and his treatment of the mother as an object for his sexual satisfaction;

(e) The father's failure to reflect on the inappropriateness of his behaviour vis-à-vis the mother;

(f) The conclusions of Dr E to the effect that the father lacks social judgment, empathy and respect for boundaries. As discussed, Dr E expressed concern that this "augurs badly for parental protectiveness overall";

(g) The pressure placed on the child by the father during supervised visits;

(h) The father's exposure of the child to inappropriate comments;

(i) The likelihood that the father will expose the child to emotionally harmful behaviour and undermine the child's trust in her mother;

(j) The dysfunction and animus between the parties; and

(k) The mother's apprehension about facilitating time between the child and the father.

1. Simply, the evidence summarised throughout this Judgment causes me to conclude that the risks presented by the father cannot be tolerated absent supervision of his time with the child.

Section 60CC(2)(b) - any views expressed by the child

1. At the time of interview by the Single Expert, the child was six (6) years of age. On interview, the child said as follows:

(a) Her "biggest worry" is the father; and

(b) She does not want to leave her mother, the mother's then partner or her sibling.[145]

1. The Single Expert described the child as being "assertive" with respect to her concerns about the father suggesting that he was "rude" and had made comments about her relationship with other family members.[146]
2. The Single Expert said that it was difficult to obtain a view from the child about her wishes regarding spending time with the father and "she seemed unwilling to admit to having positive responses to [the father] when she was observed with him" for the purposes of the Family Report.[147] Notwithstanding this, the child said that she "sort of"[148] enjoyed her time with the father and expressed enthusiasm about the prospect of an interaction with her father for the purposes of observation.[149]
3. Whatever the child's view, the Single Expert considered that she was "too young and developmentally immature to be able to provide cogent and informed views about her parenting arrangements and relationships".[150] This being so, I agree that limited weight can be placed upon the child's views.

Section 60CC(2)(c) - The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child

1. I agree with the opinion expressed by the Single Expert that the child is young and vulnerable and relies on her mother for her basic needs.[151] She was reported to be progressing well academically and socially and enjoys a close relationship with her mother, her mother's former partner and sibling.[152] I consider it to be to the mother's credit that she appears to have adopted positive parenting practices and values for the child despite her own horrific childhood.
2. Contrary to submissions made by the father's counsel, the evidence supports a finding that unsupervised time between the child and the father may expose her to a risk of harm. Further, I have found that unsupervised time is likely to compromise the mother's emotional wellbeing and negatively impact on her parenting capacity. Such an outcome is not in the child's best interests.
3. I was not addressed with respect to the cultural needs of the child save and except I know that the father has a Country J background. Absent any particular cultural issue being brought to my attention, I find that the mother will adequately address the cultural needs of the child. Even if this finding is erroneous, the child will by reason of the orders to be made by me, maintain a connection with her father and accordingly, any culture of significance to her.

Section 60CC(2)(d) - The capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs

1. I have concluded that the father has a significantly compromised capacity to provide for the needs of the child but particularly, the child's emotional needs.
2. In contrast, and discussed above, it was the opinion of the Single Expert that the mother has in the face of adversity, developed positive parenting practices.
3. I find that on balance, the child's best interests will be served by making an order that the child continue to live with the mother and spend supervised time with the father. I am concerned that to do otherwise will be to compromise the child's emotional wellbeing.

Section 60CC(2)(e) - The benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so

1. The Orders, which I will make will allow the child the benefit of maintaining a relationship with each parent. With respect to the father, the Orders will allow the child the benefit of a relationship in a safe and structured environment.
2. For the reasons discussed above, I find that the child will not obtain any benefit from spending unsupervised time with her father and in fact, if unsupervised time were to commence, I would be very concerned about the deleterious effect on the child and the mother.
3. As discussed above, I find that it is in the child's best interests to spend time with her father on four occasions each year. I am concerned that more frequent time will:

(a) place pressure on the child by requiring her to transition between two parents who have a hostile and dysfunctional relationship; and

(b) compromise the ability of the child to feel secure and stable within the mother's household.

Section 60CC(1)(b) and s 60CC(3) - Right to enjoy Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture

1. These sections do not fall for consideration given the factual background of these proceedings because the child is not an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child.

Section 60CC(2)(f) - Anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child

1. No other consideration was addressed by the mother, the father or the Independent Children's Lawyer.

1. The father's oral evidence with respect to his knowledge of the child's welfare and development was that he does not know where the child attends at school, that he has "not been involved" and "I don't know anything mate". This was despite the fact that the father had been provided with the child's school records as part of the mother's tender book prepared for trial. It appears that he had not read them by the time of his cross-examination.
2. On cross-examination, the father conceded that:

(a) The mother is the child's primary carer and that it would be "catastrophic to disturb that relationship";

(b) There is very little evidence before the Court, which might cause me to conclude that he and the mother have the ability to jointly care for the child.

1. The father's own evidence was supported by the Single Expert who expressed the following opinion with respect to the allocation of parental responsibility:

In terms of parental responsibility, it is not considered feasible for [the father] and [the mother] to liaise about [the child's] upbringing and aspects of her long-term care. Under the scenarios proposed by either parent, and with that recommended by the Single expert, [the mother] will continue to be [the child's] main carer, and it would be more practical and manageable if [the mother] holds sole parental responsibility and if she is not obliged to communicate with [the father] and seek his views.[153]

1. For these reasons and given my findings as to the hostility and absolute dysfunction between the parties, I reject the submission made by the father's counsel that communication issues between the parties would be remedied by the making of an order to the effect that the parties communicate by way of a "communication app".
2. By dint of the orders I will make, the mother will continue to be the child's primary carer. Further, and in circumstances where I have considered it necessary to limit the child's time with her father to four occasions per annum, it will be the mother who shall be responsible for making relevant decisions for the child.
3. The evidence supports a finding that it is in the child's best interests for the mother to hold parental responsibility.

Attendance of paternal family members during supervised time

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer and the mother promote an order that subject to any contrary policy of B Family Services, the father be permitted to bring other family members to supervised time spending with the child. The father's counsel did not address the proposal.
2. I consider it to be in the child's best interests to maintain a connection with her paternal family and this being so, I will make an order in the terms promoted by the Independent Children's Lawyer and the mother.

Arrangements on the child attaining 13 years of age

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer promotes an order that on attaining thirteen (13) years of age, the father be at liberty to spend time with the child as may be agreed between the parties in writing and in accordance with the child's wishes. I did not receive any submissions with respect to that proposal. I assume it is derived from the report of the Single Expert wherein she speculates that contact centres "often stipulate an upper age limit for providing supervised arrangements for children".[154] I have no evidence, to support such a proposition. In any event, I do not consider it to be in the child's best interests to make an order, which is likely to place her at the centre of conflict between her parents as soon as she attains thirteen (13) years of age.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer seeks an order that the father be restrained from providing gifts to the child during supervised time. She did, however, promote an order that the father be at liberty to send letters, cards and/or gifts to the child on special occasions. Such an order was supported by the mother.
2. Although counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer did not make a specific submission, I infer that the genesis of the application was the mother's concern as expressed during cross-examination that the father was trying to "bribe" the child with toys during supervised visits. By her affidavit filed on 7 April 2025, the mother also said as follows with respect to a supervised visit, which occurred on 29 January 2025:

At the end of the visit, [the child] was excited as she was given 7 bags full of toys. I became extremely worried that [the father] was buying [the child] toys to begin the same grooming tactics he used with me when I was 17 years old as his new employee.[155]

1. Given the mother's vulnerabilities and the difficulties, which she has experienced facilitating time between the child and the father, I am inclined to make an order in the terms sought by the Independent Children's Lawyer restraining the father from giving gifts to the child during supervised time. Such an order will also ensure that the child's focus is on a quality interaction with her father as opposed to, for example, a toy. I am, however, prepared to make an order that the father be permitted to send letters, cards and gifts to the child on special occasions.
2. The Independent Children's Lawyer promotes an order that the mother be at liberty to open any letter, card or gift sent by the father to ensure that it is age appropriate. Given my reservations about the father's conduct as set out above, I consider that it is in the child's best interests to make such an order.
3. The Independent Children's Lawyer also promotes an order that on receipt of letters, cards and gifts from the father, the mother do send a photograph of the child to the father. Neither the Independent Children's Lawyer or the mother made any submission about the proposed order. I decline to make such an order in circumstances where the father will be spending time with the child on four occasions per annum in any event.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer promotes an order that the parties keep each other advised of his/her mobile telephone number and email address. The mother did not oppose the making of such an order.
2. I accept that the parties may need to communicate from time to time in relation to time spending arrangements between the child and the father and accordingly, I will make an order in the terms promoted.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer promotes orders that:

(a) The father be restrained from attending at the child's school;

(b) Being within 500 metres of the mother's residential address; and/or

(c) Attending at the mother's place of employment.

1. The order is supported by the mother. The father's counsel made no submission with respect to the appropriateness of such an order.
2. I am concerned about the distress, which the father will likely suffer as a consequence of the orders to be made by me. Further, and as will be obvious from my reasons:

(a) I do not have any confidence that the father will act in a manner, which will shield the child from his distress;

(b) I do not have any confidence that the father will act in a manner, which is respectful of the mother and her family members;

(c) I do not have any confidence that the father will act in a manner, which will not undermine the stability, which I anticipate the child will continue to enjoy in the mother's household.

1. The orders promoted by the Independent Children's Lawyer are orders, which can be made pursuant to s 68B of the Act.
2. An injunction is not, by definition, a "parenting order".[156] The Act provides separate powers for making injunctions, parentings orders, or other orders in relation to the welfare of a child.[157] Section 68B of the Act is not, therefore, technically subject to the paramountcy principle - the words of the section lack any express reference thereto. This issue has been addressed in many authorities and, as summarised in Attwood & Attwood [2022] FedCFamC1F 6, has to some extent been reconciled:
   1. ... Section 68B(1) of the Act states that the Court may make such order or grant such injunction as it considers appropriate for the welfare of the child. Section 68B(2) also states that the making of the order may occur in any case in which it appears to the Court to be just or convenient to do so.
   2. The Full Court in Bennett v Bennett (2001) FLC 93-088 determined that the power in s 68B was not subject to the express legislative requirement that the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration; and even if s 68B were subject to the "best interests" principle, it is doubtful that this would displace the established common law principles contained in the authorities such as In re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21; Commonwealth Trading Bank v Inglis [1974] HCA 17; (1974) 131 CLR 311; Re Attorney-General (Cth); Ex parte Skyring [1996] HCA 4; (1996) 135 ALR 29 and Coco v R [1994] HCA 15; (1994) 179 CLR 427. However, the Full Court in Flanagan and Handcock (2001) FLC 93-074 considered this and referred to CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172 which decided that orders that are not a parenting order do not directly invoke the application of the paramountcy principle. Nevertheless the Court agreed with the Full Court that the consideration of what is in the best interests of the child are "powerful matters to be weighed up against a competing principle such as finality". The Full Court therefore held that in respect of the issue of an injunction under s 68B, it is incorrect to state that the "paramountcy principle" applies. However, the best interests principle needs to be given careful consideration, especially where the orders sought to be made intimately concern the welfare of the children.
   3. Thus, whilst the best interests of the child is not stated explicitly as the governing principle when making an injunction under s 68B, for all practical purposes the concept provides a useful framework within which to explore whether ... the injunction is appropriate for the welfare of the child, and is otherwise just or convenient.[158]

1. Given my concerns with respect to the father's behaviour, I find that it is appropriate for me to make an order restraining the father from coming within 500 metres of any place where the child resides, attending at the child's school or at the mother's place of employment.
2. The Independent Children's Lawyer also promoted an order that each party be restrained from denigrating the other parent to or in the presence of the child, denigrating the other parent on any form of social media and/or discussing these proceedings with the child. For reasons, which will be obvious to a reader of this judgment, I consider it to be in the child's best interests to make such an order.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer and the mother seek orders, which would permit the mother to remove the child from the Commonwealth of Australia for the purposes of travel absent the consent of the father. The mother also seeks orders with respect to the issue of passports to the children. It was not a topic addressed by the mother's affidavits.
2. Nevertheless, and in circumstances where I have made an order allocating sole parental responsibility to the mother, it is not necessary by operation of section 11(1)(a) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) to make the order sought by the mother.

Application by the Independent Children's Lawyer for costs

1. At the conclusion of proceedings, counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer made an application seeking an order that the father pay half of the costs of the Independent Children's Lawyer fixed in a sum of $9,714.45 including GST. An application was not made for the mother to pay costs in circumstances where the mother is in receipt of a grant of aid from Legal Aid New South Wales.[159] The father opposes the application.
2. Section 117(1) of the Act abolishes for the purposes of family law proceedings, the general rule that, in civil proceedings, costs follow the event. Section 117(2) of the Act provides that if, in proceedings under the Act, the Court is of the opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so, the Court may subject to subsections (3A), (4), (4A), (5) and (6) and the applicable rules of court, make such order as to costs as the Court considers just.
3. Section 117(2A) is expressed in mandatory terms to require a Court when considering what order (if any) should be made under s 117(2) to have regard to seven matters. None of those seven matters is determinative. As was held in PBF & TRF (2004) 33 FamLR 123[160], it is not necessary for more than one factor to exist under s 117(2A) before it is competent for a judge to enliven s 117(2A) so as to make a costs order departing from the general principle set out in s 117(1) of each party bearing his or her own costs.
4. The father opposed the application on the following grounds:

(a) The father has borrowed in excess of $80,000 to assist him with his legal fees;

(b) That the mother "should have to pay too" in circumstances where she was meeting her own legal fees at the time the proceedings commenced.

1. There is no merit to the submission referred to at sub-paragraph (b) above given the operation of s 117(4) of the Act. With respect to the first submission, whether a party is rich or poor has, generally speaking, no relevant connection with the litigation[161]. It may be said, by way of qualification to that general proposition, that a party's financial position may be relevant to the extent that it may inform the structure of a costs order. For example, impecuniosity may justify providing for the payment of costs over time in order to avoid inflicting unnecessary hardship while at the same time improving the likelihood of compliance with the order[162].
2. As the Full Court pointed out in Lenova & Lenova (Costs):-

[A] limited financial capacity to meet an order cannot be determinative; if it were, a party would always be able to plead impecuniosity as a means of avoiding a cost order in circumstances where the pursuit of litigation has continued in the face of a reasonable offer to cease that litigation and the incurring of its attendant costs.[163]

1. In the matter of Nardini & Legal Aid NSW [2019] FamCA 340, the Deputy Chief Justice considered issues relevant to the payment of costs of the ICL:
   1. In terms of s 117(2A)(g), it is relevant that the role played by the ICL in parenting proceedings, including in this matter, is invaluable. The role of the ICL was summarised in the context of an application for costs in proceedings before the High Court of Australia in CDJ v VAJ (No 2) (1998) 197 CLR 172. Specifically, at [11], Kirby J said:

The children's representative has a duty to "act in an independent and unfettered way in the best interests of the child". This duty carries over to an appeal. The interests of the children and their welfare is of concern to the public. Those interests extend beyond, and are separate from, the interests of the parents. The children are the children of both parties. They should share equally the costs of their children being separately represented in this court. [References omitted].

1. I accept that it is in the public interest for the best interests of children to be represented in proceedings before this Court and that the Court invariably receives substantial assistance, in that regard, from ICLs appointed in parenting proceedings. Such assistance was undoubtedly provided by the ICL in this case.

2. Also relevant to these proceedings is s 117(5) of the Act, which provides:

(5) In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (2) in proceedings in which an independent children's lawyer has been appointed, the court must disregard the fact that the independent children's lawyer is funded under a legal aid scheme or service established under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law or approved by the Attorney-General.

1. Accordingly, it is my view that the ICL should be presumed to be unfunded and, having regard to authority, in those circumstances, the Court is generally inclined to order litigants to contribute to the ICL's costs: Gahen & Gahen (No 2) [2013] FamCA 936 and De Roma & De Roma [2013] FamCA 566.
2. Further, I note that the ICL has sought an order for costs to be paid by the mother in a lump sum amount. Those costs have been itemised in a schedule provided by the ICL to the Court and the mother at the hearing on 20 May 2019.
3. Pursuant to rule 19.18(1)(a) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), the Court may make an order for costs of a specific amount. Having regard to the principles adumbrated by Kent J in Stoian & Flemming (Costs) [2014] FamCA 944 at [91], I am satisfied that the costs figure sought by the ICL is logical, fair and reasonable. I will, therefore, make an order for costs in favour of the ICL in the sum of $14,903.70, being 50 per cent of the total costs incurred by the ICL in this matter.

1. At paragraph 22, the Deputy Chief Justice referred to a decision of Kirby J in the matter of CDJ v VAJ (No 2) (1998) 197 CLR 172 ("CDJ v VAJ"), where his Honour said at [11]:

The children's representative has a duty to "act in an independent and unfettered way in the best interests of the child". This duty carries over to an appeal. The interests of the children and their welfare is of concern to the public. Those interests extend beyond, and are separate from, the interests of the parents. The children are the children of both parties. They should share equally the costs of their children being separately represented in this court.

(References omitted)

1. Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer played a pivotal role in these proceedings. Her calm manner of cross-examination and her sensible submissions have assisted me to arrive at my determination.
2. When considering whether the overall circumstances justify the making of a costs order, I also note the following:

(a) The litigation has been a financial burden to the father. Although I was not provided with any details as to his precise financial circumstances, his Costs Notice reveals that he has paid $67,940 to his solicitors to date[164] and by the time the trial concluded, he owed his solicitors a further sum of $69,856.[165] Nevertheless, the father must have some confidence in his financial circumstances given he has relied on savings and loans to fund the litigation;

(b) Both parties have been afforded a significant benefit in these proceedings from the assistance of the ICL. Particularly, it was cross-examination of the mother by counsel for the ICL and the proposed minute of order promoted by counsel for ICL, which led the mother to alter her application for final orders such that she supported an order for supervised time. This is an additional factor that I bring to account under s 117(2A)(g) of the Act, by reference to the decision of Kirby J in CDJ v VAJ.

1. Pursuant to Rule 12.17(1)(a) of the Rules, I am permitted to make an order for costs in a specific amount. The amount sought by the ICL is modest particularly in circumstances where by the time I deliver this judgment, the ICL would have been engaged in the proceedings for in excess of 24 months. The costs claimed are against this background fair and reasonable. I will, therefore, make an order for costs in favour of the ICL in the sum of $9,714.45 including GST being 50 per cent of the total costs incurred by the ICL in this matter.

1. The Orders set out at the commencement of these reasons are those that most capably meet the child's best interests.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and ninety-eight (198) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anderson.

[1] Father's affidavit filed 23 February 2023, paragraph 2.

[2] Father's affidavit filed 23 February 2023, paragraph 3; Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 36.

[3] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 2.

[4] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2024, paragraph 11.

[5] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 10.

[6] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 15.

[7] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 12.

[8] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 39.

[9] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 45.

[10] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 25; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 54.

[11] Mother's affidavit filed 12 May 2023, paragraph 23; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 55.

[12] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 35.

[13] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 57.

[14] Mother's affidavit filed 12 May 2023, paragraph 25.

[15] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 27; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 72.

[16] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 28.

[17] Father's affidavit filed 23 February 2023, paragraph 12.

[18] Father's affidavit filed 23 February 2023, paragraphs 12 and 13.

[19] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2023, paragraph 48.

[20] Two affidavits were filed in the name of the father on 16 May 2023. The father relied on the affidavit filed at 4.50pm.

[24] Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336.

[25] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 268.

[26] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 11.

[27] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 10.

[28] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 46.

[29] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 20; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 44.

[30] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 28.

[31] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 12.

[32] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraphs 18 to 20.

[33] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 21.

[34] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 18.

[35] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 22.

[36] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 11.

[37] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 25.

[38] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 11; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024.

[39] Father's affidavit filed 16 May 2023, paragraph 2; Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 19.

[40] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 20.

[41] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 13.

[42] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 30.

[43] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 14.

[44] Father's affidavit filed 16 May 2023, paragraph 2; Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 22.

[45] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 32.

[46] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 32.

[47] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2023, paragraph 11.

[48] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 266.

[49] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 266.

[50] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 267.

[51] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 268.

[52] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2023, paragraph 45.

[54] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 39.

[55] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 24.

[56] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 25.

[57] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 40.

[58] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 42.

[59] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 45.

[60] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 21.

[61] Father's affidavit filed 16 May 2023, paragraph 266.

[62] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 23.

[63] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 24.

[64] Father's Affidavit filed 16 May 2023 at 12.29 pm, paragraph 4.

[65] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 25; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 54.

[66] Mother's affidavit filed 12 May 2023, paragraph 23; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 55.

[67] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 35.

[68] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 57.

[69] Mother's affidavit filed 12 May 2023, paragraph 25.

[70] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 73.

[71] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 68.

[72] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 27; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 72.

[73] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 42.

[74] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 28.

[75] Father's affidavit filed 23 February 2023, paragraph 12.

[76] Father's affidavit filed 23 February 2023, paragraphs 12 and 13.

[77] Father's affidavit filed 23 February 2023, paragraph 13.

[78] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 12.

[79] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2024, paragraph 48.

[80] Mother's affidavit filed 12 May 2023, paragraph 28.

[81] Father's affidavit filed 16 May 2023, paragraph 3.

[82] Mother's affidavit filed 12 May 2023, paragraph 29; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 76.

[83] Father's affidavit filed 16 May 2023, paragraph 3.

[84] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 36.

[85] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 37.

[86] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 36.

[87] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 43.

[88] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 269.

[90] Father's Affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 45.

[91] Father's affidavit filed 23 February 2023, paragraph 23.

[92] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 21.

[93] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 73(a).

[94] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 51.

[95] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 45.

[96] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 291.

[97] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 289.

[99] Father's Affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 51.

[105] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 287.

[108] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 248.

[109] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 290.

[110] Mother's affidavit filed 7 April 2025, paragraph 19.

[112] Mother's affidavit filed 7 April 2025, paragraph 28.

[113] Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 90.

[114] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 53.

[115] Mother's affidavit filed 7 April 2025, paragraph 5.

[116] Father's affidavit filed 4 April 2025, paragraph 36.

[118] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 17, Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 15.

[119] Mother's affidavit filed 12 May 2023, paragraph 15; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 15.

[120] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 12.

[121] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 12.

[122] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 16.

[123] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 19; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 17.

[124] Father's affidavit filed 28 June 2024, paragraph 17.

[125] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 30.

[126] Father's affidavit filed 16 May 2023, paragraph 11; Mother's affidavit filed 31 January 2024, paragraph 97.

[127] Mother's affidavit filed 27 March 2023, paragraph 48.

[128] Mother's affidavit filed 7 April 2025, paragraph 26.

[129] Mother's affidavit filed 7 April 2025, paragraph 18.

[130] Mother's affidavit filed 7 April 2025, paragraph 42.

[131] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 292.

[132] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 296.

[133] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 294.

[134] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2023, paragraph 46.

[135] Slater & Light [2013] FamCAFC 4; [2013] 48 Fam LR 573.

[136] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 237.

[137] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 189.

[138] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 295.

[139] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 261.

[140] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 237.

[141] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2023, paragraph 48.

[142] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 244.

[143] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2023, paragraph 45.

[144] Report of Dr E dated 15 February 2023, paragraph 48.

[145] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 188.

[146] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 190.

[147] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 253.

[148] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 253.

[149] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 253.

[150] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 251.

[151] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 277.

[152] Family Report dated 9 April 2026, paragraph 280.

[153] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 308/

[154] Family Report dated 9 April 2025, paragraph 301.

[155] Mother's affidavit filed 7 April 2025, paragraph 26.

[156] Hedlund v Hedlund [2021] FedCFamC1A 84 [118].

[157] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65D(1), s 67ZC.

[158] Attwood & Attwood [2022] FedCFamC2F 6, [31]-[33].

[159] Section 117(4).

[160] PBF & TRF [2005] FamCA 158; (2004) 33 FamLR 123.

[161] Hollier v Australian Maritime Safety Authority [No 2] [1998] FCA 975 at 3; Scott v Secretary, Department of Social Security [No 2] [2000] FCA 1450 at [4]; Board of Examiners v XY [2006] VSCA 190; (2006) 25 VAR 193 at 207-208, paragraph 35, 209, paragraph 41; Dal Pont, Law of Costs, 4th ed (2018) at [8.30].

[162] For example, see Berman J in Jacob v Lawrence (No 2) [2013] FamCA 544

[163] Lenova & Lenova (Costs) [2011] FamCAFC 141 at paragraph 12 (Bryant CJ, Coleman and Murphy JJ).

[164] Costs Notice filed on 14 April 2025.

[165] Costs Notice filed on 14 April 2025.