Petch v R

Petch v R - [2020] NSWCCA 133 - NSWCCA 2020 case summary — Zoe

[This headnote is not part of the judgment] On 12 October 2018, the appellant was found guilty by a jury of making an unwarranted demand with menaces contrary to s 249K of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The offence arose in the context of a conversation that occurred 5 years earlier between Mr Petch, as Mayor of the City of Ryde, and the then Acting General Manager of Ryde City Council, Ms Danielle Dickson. The conversation related to litigation in which Ryde City Council and several councillors, including Mr Petch, were defendants. The appellant allegedly made an implied threat to Ms Dickson in an attempt to influence her to reimburse Mr Petch and the councillors for their costs in the litigation. The appellant advanced the following three grounds of appeal: (1) The learned trial Judge erred by failing to correctly direct the jury with respect to the mental element of the offence. (2) The learned trial Judge erred by admitting evidence of the complainant as to her opinion of the appellant's state of mind when uttering the words relied on by the Crown to establish the offence. (3) The verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. In relation to ground 1, a dispute arose between the parties regarding the mental element of the offence of blackmail under s 249K and the directions that should have been provided to the jury by the trial judge: [33]. In relation to ground 2, the appellant submitted that the oral evidence of the complainant and the final passage of a note written by the complainant shortly after the alleged threat was made, constituted an opinion as to the appellant's intention. It was submitted that the final passage of the note was not relevant, and further was inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence. The complainant's oral opinion evidence was neither relevant nor admissible as lay opinion evidence: [57]. The Court allowed the appeal in part, quashed the conviction and entered a verdict of acquittal holding: In relation to ground 1: By Hamill J (Hoeben CJ at CL agreeing at [1]):

The offence requires proof of an intention to make an unwarranted demand, as well as, proof of an intention to make an unwarranted demand with menaces and this involves the intention to make a threat: [49]. This construction is based on plain words of the statute, the definition of menaces in s 249M, extrinsic material including the Model Criminal Code and the general law concerning the presumption of mens rea: [50]. Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; R v Lambert [2010] 1 Cr App R 299; [2009] EXCA Crim 2860 considered.
The trial judge failed to direct the jury that the prosecution must prove that the accused intended to issue an express or implied threat, being an essential element of the offence: [48], [49].
The omission of the direction that the accused was only guilty if he intended to make an unwarranted demand with menaces resulted in a substantial miscarriage of justice: [53]. Thus, despite the stance taken by the appellant at trial, leave pursuant to r 4 Criminal Appeal Rules 1912 (NSW) ought to be granted: [23], [38], [54], [55]. By Cavanagh J (dissenting as to ground 1 at [110]).
Recourse to extrinsic material under s 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) is unnecessary as the language of s 249M is not ambiguous or obscure: [150]. The proper construction of ss 249K and 249M does not require an "intent to menace" as an element of the offence: [124]. The test is objective rather than subjective and directed towards the effect of the threat rather than the intent of the maker: [133], [135]. Thus, the question is whether there was a threat, rather than whether the accused intended to make a threat: [133]. Gibb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 118 CLR 628 at 635; [1966] HCA 74 (Barwick CJ, McTiernan and Taylor JJ); Cranbrook School v Woollahra Council (2006) 66 NSWLR 379; [2006] NSWCA 155 applied. He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; [1985] HCA 43 distinguished. In relation to ground 2: By Hamill J (Hoeben CJ at CL and Cavanagh J agreeing):
The complainant's perception of the threat was not a material issue at trial: [79], [84]. The material issues were whether an "unwarranted demand with menaces" was made and whether the appellant acted with the requisite intention: [79]. The complainant's oral evidence and final paragraph of the notes taken after the conversation, were not based on what she "saw, heard or otherwise perceived" but was an inference drawn from all the surrounding circumstances. That evidence was not necessary to gain a perception of the matter or event and accordingly was neither relevant nor admissible as lay opinion under s 78 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): [86]-[89]. R v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75 (per Simpson J); Partington v R [2009] NSWCCA 232; McLaren v Chief of Navy [2013] ADFDAT 5; Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 applied. Benasic v R (1987) 77 ALR 340; R v Clear [1968] 1 QB 670; Connolly v Willis [1984] 1 NSWLR 373 distinguished. Patrick v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 651; [2014] VSCA 89; Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; [2011] HCA 36 considered.
All but the final paragraph of the complainant's note of the conversation was hearsay evidence which was admissible under s 66 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The final paragraph was not first-hand hearsay as defined in s 62 and s 66 did not apply to provide an exception to the hearsay rule: [90]-[93]. In relation to ground 3: By Hamill J (Hoeben CJ at CL and Cavanagh J agreeing):
It was open to the jury to find that the appellant intended to issue an implied threat to the complainant and convict the appellant on the admissible evidence if given proper directions: [25]. M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63; SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at 408; [2011] HCA 13; R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35; Pell v The Queen (2020) 94 ALJR 394; [2020] HCA 12; Guo v R [2020] NSWCCA 40 considered. As to whether there should be a re-trial:
The prosecution of those who use their high office to commit criminal offences is within the public interest: [106]. However, due to the appellant's age, the age of the offence and the fact that the appellant has already served most of his sentence, the Court declined to exercise its power under s 8 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) to order a re-trial: [107]. King v R (1986) 161 CLR 423; 67 ALR 379 R v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; [2007] HCA 11; Gerakiteys v R (1984) 153 CLR 317; 51 ALR 417; R v Honeysett (1987) 10 NSWLR 638; Castagna v R; Agius v R [2019] NSWCCA 114 considered.

[6]

Ms Dickson's position and the Supreme Court litigation

Ms Dickson was first employed by Ryde City Council in October 2011. She had qualifications in architecture and was studying a Masters of Business Administration. Her job title was Director, Community Life. In February 2013, after the General Manager (a Mr Neish) left the Council, Mr Petch offered Ms Dickson the temporary position of Acting General Manager until the position was filled. To that point, Mr Petch had been supportive of Ms Dickson and something of a mentor. The position was challenging for Ms Dickson as she was balancing her role as a mother with the extra responsibility of running the Council. Mr Petch asked her if she was enjoying the new role and whether she intended to apply for the permanent position when it was advertised. She agreed in the course of her evidence that she was ambitious and had decided to apply for the permanent position.
At the time Ms Dickson took on the role of Acting General Manager, the Council was involved in litigation in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Some of the councillors, including Mr Petch, were defendants in that litigation. There was an issue concerning whether the legal costs of the individual councillors would be covered, reimbursed or otherwise indemnified by the Council or its insurers. The issue was complex because not all councillors were parties to the litigation and some of the councillors who were parties were not re-elected in Council elections held during the currency of the litigation. The councillors who were parties to the litigation were required to declare their interest and recused themselves when the litigation was considered by Council. This created issues in achieving a quorum.
The matter was raised in an extraordinary meeting on 27 March 2013. The minutes of that meeting became Exhibit A at the trial. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests were declared and a number of councillors recused and/or absented themselves. For reasons of no significance the meeting was adjourned more than once. The following resolutions were made on 9 April 2013: "(a) That Council delegate the Supreme Court Proceedings matter to Council's Acting General Manager, Danielle Dickson. (b) That the Acting General manager provide updates at appropriate milestones of the process that only cover the progress of the matter."
Ms Dickson explained that the second resolution reflected her understanding that it was inappropriate for her to discuss the details of the matter with those councillors, including Mr Petch, who had a pecuniary interest in the outcome.

[9]

The conversation of 2 May 2013

At about 3.00pm on 2 May 2013, there was a meeting in the Mayor's office about an award for Ryde's "Citizen of the Year". The meeting was attended by Mr Petch, Ms Dickson, "probably four staff" and the short listed candidates for the award. After the meeting, Mr Petch asked Ms Dickson to "stay back". Ms Dickson described the layout of the room and said she was seated on a lounge "a metre maybe" from Mr Petch. She said the door was closed but could not recall how it came to be closed. In light of its importance, it is necessary to set out Ms Dickson's version of the critical conversation as provided in her evidence-in-chief: "Q. Doing the best you can, slowly tell us about that conversation. A. So the mayor said that he wanted to speak to me about the email that I had sent out at lunchtime. He said that he'd had a number of councillors contact his office or contact him about the email, and that they were concerned about the contents of the email. I recall saying something like, 'We shouldn't be talking about this because of the complexity,' given, yes, he's the mayor of the council, but he's also a defendant and that it was inappropriate for us to talk about the email or the Supreme Court. The mayor sort of leaned back and said to - said in a sort of gentle tone, 'Look, I think I need to give you some advice. You know, the councillors are very interested in how this matter's resolved, and you - you should take the advice that the parties should pay their' - sorry - 'that the council should pay the defendants' costs in the proceedings.' And again, I - because I was sort of on the edge of the seat, I just went to stand up and said, 'Look. We really shouldn't talk about this.' And it was at that point, really, that his demeanour changed. Q. Tell us how it changed. A. Quite quickly, he's - he leaned forward on the lounge and put his arms on the chair. Sorry. And then, because I had sort of stood up, he leaned forward and - and - and he was really in my space. Q. When you say 'really in your space', how close was he to you? A. Maybe 30 centimetres. And he'd gone very red-faced and seemed quite shocked, and said to me I needed to be very careful how I managed the cost issue. And that it would be very much - it would be very important to settle the issue in a way that was favourable to the defendants, and that I would need his help to be the general manager of the council and that he would need - because he had the casting vote or I - I guess the body of the council, it was very clear to me he-- TURNBULL: Your Honour, is this a speech or not? CROWN PROSECUTOR: Your Honour-- WITNESS: Sorry, I was just explaining-- CROWN PROSECUTOR: Just pause. The witness is being responsive, your Honour. TURNBULL: With respect, it seemed to me and it's not the case, that the witness was moving off into a speculative environment, rather than reciting the terms of the conversation. That's my only objection. HER HONOUR: I don't think she was moving off into anything speculative. I think she was just explaining some of the background to it. So as long as it's clear, Ms Dickson, when you're responding, where you're saying what was said or what you observed, and if you then are pausing to explain some of the background or to explain why you're saying something. Could you just make it clear? Does that deal with your objection, Mr Turnbull? TURNBULL: It does. Because, if at some later stage, there's some relevance in those matters, perhaps they could be corralled and we'll move into it at that stage. HER HONOUR: All right. Q. Ms Dickson, we're corralling. A. No, my apologies. Q. Thank you. That's fine. It's just-- A. So sorry. CROWN PROSECUTOR Q. Perhaps start again from the bit where you say, you went to stand up, you say-- A. Yes. Q. --and what did he do? A. He moved forward and levered off the chair, quite close to my body. Q. And sorry, you're just indicating something and we'll just try and describe it for the record. You've put both of your hands palm down-- A. Yes. Q. --and then moved them down. A. Yes. Q. What are you demonstrating in that? A. So Ivan's chair was like a recliner. And, with no disrespect to him, he's a large man, so he was levering his body out of the chair. Q. Did he get his body out of the chair? A. Yes. Q. And when he got his body out of the chair-- A. Not all the way. Just like - if you like, he's - he was propping himself up. Q. Was he still in his chair? A. He was half-standing, half-sitting. Q. And was that the point in time where you say you were about 30 centimetres-- A. Yes. Q. --apart? Was his tone the same as when he'd started the conversation, or did the tone change? A. Definitely changed. Q. How? A. So, stronger, more strident in his language. Maintained a lot eye contact, like, just zeroed in on my face. Q. Tell us what was said. A. Yes. So Ivan said to me that I needed to be very careful how I managed the cost issue and that he would need the body of the council to favour me to get me appointed as the general manager and he would need their votes. Q. Did you say anything back to him at that time? A. Only that I - we needed to stop talking about this cause he - I can't - it was not appropriate for us to discuss it. Q. And when you said that how was your body positioned? A. I was standing - walking out the door. Q. Did he say anything in response? A. Not that I recall. Q. You mentioned something about councillors meeting councillors. A. Yes. Q. You said something about him having a casting vote. A. Yes. Q. What do you mean? Was there some division within council? A. Yes. So the mayor was the mayor from the - September, and he had a block of councillors - which is not unusual in a council that there's a voting block that consistently vote together, and being a mayor, he lead that block. And it was clear to me in that conversation that he was saying-- TURNBULL: Your Honour, I object to this. What it appears is an opinion. What is required is the facts. CROWN PROSECUTOR: Well your Honour, I press the question, and I can establish the basis upon which the witness says it was clear to her. TURNBULL: It's not an admissible thing. That's my objection. CROWN PROSECUTOR: Well your Honour, s 78. HER HONOUR: You're asking Ms Dickson what she understood? CROWN PROSECUTOR: Yes, your Honour. HER HONOUR: I'll allow it. CROWN PROSECUTOR Q. So you indicated that it was clear to you. What did you understand was happening? A. It was clear to me that Ivan was saying to me that if I resolved the cost issue in a way that was favourable to his-- TURNBULL: I object to this. Again-- CROWN PROSECUTOR: Pressed. TURNBULL: --it's an opinion, it's not the facts. What is being afforded here is an opportunity to recast what the facts might be in light of the post-event opinion, or view, of the witness. HER HONOUR: Madam Crown, you're asking Ms Dickson to indicate what she understood at the time. CROWN PROSECUTOR: Yes, your Honour. HER HONOUR: You're not asking her to recast it from some subsequent knowledge. You're-- CROWN PROSECUTOR: No, your Honour. HER HONOUR: --only asking her understanding at the time. CROWN PROSECUTOR: Yes. HER HONOUR: I'll allow it on that basis. CROWN PROSECUTOR Q. Do you understand what I'm asking you at that time? So we'll start again for the third time. When you said, 'It was clear to me,' what did you understand at that time? A. It was clear to me at that time that Ivan was saying that if I resolved the cost issue so there was no cost to his block of councillors, that he would be able to manoeuvre my - myself into the general manager position. Q. If there was no cost-- A. That's right. Q. You mean no cost to them. They didn't-- A. That's right. Q. --pay any cost. A. That's right. Q. Then he would be able to what? What was the last thing-- A. Manoeuvre me into the general manager's position because he had the vote of the block. Q. Did he actually say to you he had a block? A. No, but that was well known. Is that what-- Q. So what did he say to you on this issue of a vote? A. He said to me that he would need their - I would need their vote to be the acting general manager. Sorry, to be the general manager. Q. And this vote that he told you you would need-- A. Yes. Q. --if you were to be general manager, did he say anything about this group in relation to their attitude to the costs issue? A. That's how he started the conversation. He started the conversation by saying he had phone calls, since my email went out, that they were unhappy with the way the matter was progressing. Q. When you said 'they' were unhappy-- A. That's how he said it, but I was clear. I knew who they - he was referring to. Q. How were you feeling at that stage? A. Devastated. Q. Explain that. A. So I left the room, and I can remember catching the lift back to my office, and I can remember talk - I don't talk to myself very often - but I can remember talking to myself in the lift, just saying to myself, well, I'm now stuck between a rock and a hard place, because if I do what is being suggested, I knew it was the wrong thing to do, and that I would be forever beholden to his opinion and I wouldn't really be the general manager; or if I didn't do it, then he - I fundamentally knew there was no point applying, because the majority of the council would not support my application. So I was - I was devastated. Q. You said earlier, you said to Ivan, 'We shouldn't really be discussing this.' A. Yes. Q. Did you say that once or more than once? A. More than once. Q. Why was it that you were of the view you shouldn't be discussing it? A. Firstly because there was just the two of us in the room, and it could be misconstrued. Secondly-- Q. Misconstrued in what way? A. Well, misconstrued that I was taking advice from Ivan about legal proceedings. It was a topic we shouldn't be discussing. Q. So you say it could be misconstrued as you taking advice from Ivan. A. That's right, as a defendant, not as the - not as the mayor. Q. So-- A. And secondly, because it wouldn't be good for Ivan to be in that position either, because people could make that allegation. Q. As the mayor, was he entitled to direct you as an acting general manager, as to what you should do or not do? A. No. Not when the council had delegated the matter to me. Only one person can have the delegation. Q. And that was with you. A. That was with me. Q. So you left the meeting. A. Mm-hmm. Q. How long, if you can tell us, did you think this meeting lasted? A. It'd be less than five minutes."
Ms Dickson gave evidence that she thought the conversation was "inappropriate and potentially corrupt". Shortly after she left Mr Petch, she typed some notes and telephoned the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).
Ms Dickson's note of the conversation was tendered as Exhibit D. There was no objection to her six paragraph narrative of what occurred. However, objection was taken to the seventh and final paragraph of the note. It is this paragraph that is the subject of the second ground of appeal. The note was as follows (with my italicisation of the final paragraph): "2 May 2013 Notes of conversation with Cr Ivan Petch, Mayor of City of Ryde at 4pm today. I was scheduled to attend a meeting in the Mayoral Chambers today at 3pm for the Volunteer Awards Judging. In attendance was the Mayor (Cr Ivan Petch), Amy Whiting, Persis Koo and Keliie Yelds (CoR staff) along with Jacques Baran (Ryde Citizen of the Year). Following the completion of the judging the Mayor asked me to remain behind and the staff and members of the public left the Mayors chambers. Once the room was clear the Mayor proceeded to close the door. He asked me how I was coping with the pressure, and referred to an email I had issued that day in relation to the matter of the Supreme Court proceedings: City of Ryde v Petch/Supreme Court Proceedings No. 249917 of 2012. I have attached the email to these notes (attachment 1). I indicated that my job was busy at the moment but everything was okay, as I was saying this I stood up, hoping to indicate I did not wish to get into a discussion on the Supreme Court matter. The Mayor proceeded by saying that 'he had had a number of phone calls from Councillors following my email indicating their concerns with the way the matter was being managed and that he would be relying on these same Councillors when it came to the decision to appoint me as the General Manager'. He continued by saying that 'he wanted to give me some fatherly advice and that I should agree to the position that the defendants had presented (that Council should be liable for their costs in the Supreme Court Matter) and ensure that councillors were reimbursed'. At this point I indicated that I would make no comment on the issue of any reimbursement as Council were awaiting advice from our insurers that had only been requested since I was given carriage of the matter on April 9 2013 (refer Councils resolution, attachment 2). I also stated that it was inappropriate for me to discuss the matter with him as he was a defendant in the case. He again stated that I should consider the desires of the majority of the Councillors and he referred to the advice from Brian Belling (K&L Gates) which he confirmed requested be provided to me. Note: this advice indicates that the defendant councillors should be reimbursed their costs by the Council, attachment 3. He reiterated that following this K&L Gates advice would allow him to 'bring these Councillors to a favourable decision on the matter of the GM appointment'. I again restated that it was a matter that was not appropriate for me to discuss with him and that I was not in possession of all of the information given the advice from our insurers was outstanding. At this point I left the room. I was left in no doubt at the end of our conversation that the Mayor was threatening to manipulate the process of the impending GM recruitment to provide me the role if I agreed to settle the Supreme Court matter in a way that was personally financially favourable to him, and that the alternate was to occur if I continue to pursue either a Court hearing or a settlement where each party were liable for their own costs."
There was cross-examination about the precise terms of the conversation, where the pair was seated and Mr Petch's tone, demeanour and physical actions. However, the appeal was effectively conducted on the basis of the evidence I have just set out.

[12]

The trial

A number of pre-trial issues were addressed between 26 September 2018 and 2 October 2018. It is unnecessary to go into very much detail.
The pre-trial issues included a notice of motion demurring to the indictment based on the failure of the original indictment to allege facts capable of establishing "menaces" as defined in s 249M of the Crimes Act, that is an express or implied threat. The substance of the demurrer was upheld because the original indictment alleged that the "unwarranted demand" was made "to improve [Ms Dickson's] prospects of being the successful applicant for the permanent General Manager's position". Judge Noman SC held that this was an "inducement" rather than a threat of any detrimental or unpleasant action. Her Honour held that the indictment in that form was defective. However, her Honour did not accept that the indictment did not charge an offence known to the law. Accordingly, the orders sought in the notice of motion were refused and the Prosecutor was given leave to amend the indictment. The amended indictment cast the menaces or threat in terms whereby it was alleged that Ms Dickson's "prospects of being the successful applicant for the permanent General Manager's position at the Ryde City Council would be adversely affected" if she did not comply with the unwarranted demand.
There were also a number of evidentiary rulings made before the trial commenced. The Judge rejected evidence the prosecution sought to rely on as tendency evidence. An objection to certain portions of a telephone intercept was overruled, as was an objection to evidence of a Ms Carpenter, and an objection to the notes made by Ms Dickson. The question of the admissibility of the final paragraph of Ms Dickson's notes remained outstanding.
A jury was empanelled on 2 October 2018 and the evidence was all but completed 3 days later on 5 October. A number of legal arguments were then addressed in the jury's absence. This included arguments relating to the elements of the offence and an advanced ruling that, if the appellant raised his good character, the prosecution would be permitted to lead particularised evidence to rebut good character. The jury returned on Monday, 8 October 2018, when the last of the evidence was taken, the Prosecution closed its case and Counsel delivered their closing addresses.
The trial Judge summed up the next day and the jury retired to consider its verdict at 2.16pm on Tuesday 9 October 2018. The jury indicated it could not reach a unanimous verdict on the morning of Friday, 12 October 2018 and the Judge exhorted the jury in accordance with the High Court's decision in Black v The Queen (1993) 179 CLR 44; [1993] HCA 71. The jury returned its verdict of guilty at 3.47pm that day.

[17]

The directions provided to the jury

The written direction provided to the jury became MFI 29 and was distributed to the jury towards the beginning of the summing up. It was in the following terms: "The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (1) The accused made a demand; and (2) The demand was unwarranted; and (3) The demand was made with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty; and (4) The demand was made with menaces. Element 1: The accused made a demand • A demand may be explicit or implicit. • The accused must have intentionally made the demand. Element 2: The demand was unwarranted • A demand is unwarranted unless the accused believes that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand and he reasonably believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt either: That the accused did not believe that he had reasonable grounds for making the demand [you consider the accused's belief]; or That the accused did not reasonably believe that the use of the menaces was a proper means of reinforcing the demand [you consider what the accused might reasonably believed in the circumstances]. Element 3: The demand was made with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty • At the time of the demand the accused did so with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty. • Public duty means a power, authority, duty or function that is conferred on a person as the holder of a public office. Element 4: The demand was made with menaces • The demand must be accompanied by a threat or menace. • Menace or threat can be proven by words or conduct; you may consider the accused's demeanour and the circumstances that existed at the time. • Menace is an express or implied threat of any action detrimental or unpleasant to another person. • A threat against an individual does not constitute a menace unless the threat would cause an individual of normal stability and courage to act unwillingly in response to the threat. • You are to consider an individual of normal stability and courage in Ms Dickson's position - that is a person who, as the acting General Manager of the City of Ryde Council, intended to apply for the permanent General Manager position. • If you find a threat was issued: • you must also find that it was sufficiently serious as would cause such an individual or normal stability and courage in Ms Dickson's position to act unwillingly in response. • the accused must have intended that Ms Dickson fear that the threat would be carried out unless she complied. • Ms Dickson does not need to have acted unwillingly in response to the threat or to have complied with the demand. (Emphasis in original.)"
The oral directions essentially took the jury through the document and repeated the written directions: "I now propose to turn to the elements of the charge. I am going to at this stage, provide you with this direction in writing. A copy of MFI 29 will be provided to you. It is on pink paper, so that in amongst all of your documents you can readily locate it. Now that each of you have it, we will work through it together. You will see at the top of the document, there is a box. Within the box there are the elements. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt, four things. They are: one, the accused made a demand; and, two, the demand was unwarranted; and, three, the demand was made with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty; and, four, the demand was made with menaces. You will see each of those elements is numbered. You will also see just to reinforce, that there is an 'and' after each of them and the 'and' is underlined. The reason for that is to remind you that the Crown has to prove each and every one of them. Working down through the document, you will see that there is reference to element one. That is, the accused made a demand. A demand may be explicit or implicit, and the accused must have intentionally made the demand. That is to assist you in relation to element one. Element two: the demand was unwarranted. A demand is unwarranted unless the accused believes that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand and he reasonably believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. You will see under that, that I have put the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt either: One, that the accused did not believe that he had reasonable grounds for making the demand, and there you consider the accused's belief; Or, the second, that the accused did not reasonably believe that the use of the menaces was a proper means of reinforcing the demand. You there consider what the accused might have reasonably believed in the circumstances. Then, element three - the demand was made with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty. At the time the accused made the demand, he did so with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty. Public duty is defined at law. Public duty means a power, authority, duty or function that is conferred on a person as a holder of a public office. On the back of the page is element four, that the demand was made with menaces. The demand must be accompanied by a threat or menace. Menace or threat can be proven by words or conduct, and you may consider the accused's demeanour and the circumstances that existed at the time. Menace is defined as - menace is an express or implied threat of any action detrimental or unpleasant to another person. A threat is also defined as a threat against an individual does not constitute a menace unless the threat would cause an individual of normal stability and courage to act unwillingly in response to the threat. You are to consider an individual of normal stability and courage in Ms Dickson's position - that is a person who, as the Acting General Manager of the City of Ryde Council, intended to apply for the permanent General Manager position. If you find a threat was issued, there are three things listed. You must also find that it was sufficiently serious as would cause such an individual of normal stability and courage in Ms Dickson's position to act unwillingly in response. If you find a threat was issued, the accused must have intended that Ms Dickson fear that the threat would be carried out unless she complied, and if you find a threat was issued, Ms Dickson does not need to have acted unwillingly in response to the threat or to have complied with the demand. You have that document to keep with you to remind you of the legal elements and the matters that inform, as a matter of law, those legal elements. If I can just briefly go to the indictment, having taken you to the elements. I am going to the indictment because contained within the wording of the indictment, are those essential elements as well as the particulars. You will see that the way the charge is pleaded in the indictment, is that on 2 May 2013 at Ryde in the State of New South Wales, did make an unwarranted demand with menaces. You will see that is a reference by going back to the elements document, to what appears as elements one. That is the accused made a demand. Element two, the demand was unwarranted. Element four, the demand was made with menaces. All three of those elements are pleaded in that introductory part of the indictment. You will see that it then appears namely, and thereafter appears the particulars of what the Crown is relying upon. If you go down to line 5, which is the one commencing with the word 'managers'. At the end of that, there is with intent to influence the exercise of a public duty. You will see by going back to the elements document, that is element three on the document, thereafter are the particulars relied upon. If you look at the indictment, the wording of the indictment against the elements, those two will assist you together."
Her Honour then gave uncontroversial directions as to how a person's intention can be inferred from their words and conduct.
There was no application for any re-direction in relation to the elements of the offence or the issue of intention.

[21]

Mental element for offences under s 249K

Section 249K itself provides two alternative intentions that must accompany the "unwarranted demand with menaces". These are (a) an intention of obtaining a gain or causing a loss or (b) an intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty. It was the second of these that was relevant in the present case and the trial Judge provided a clear direction in "Element 3" that the prosecution was required to prove "the demand was made with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty."
However, by use of the ablative "with menaces" attaching to the requirement of an "unwarranted demand" (in s 249K) and the definition of "menaces" (in s 249M), the section also requires proof of an intention to make an "unwarranted demand with menaces". By reference to the definition of "menaces" in s 249M, this requires proof that the accused person intended to make "an express or implied threat" and intended to cause the person subject to that threat to act unwillingly in response to the threat.
The directions provided to the jury under element 4 covered, at least implicitly, the second of those requirements by incorporation of the words "the accused must have intended that Ms Dickson fear that the threat would be carried out unless she complied". However, the directions did not demand proof that the accused intended to issue an express or implied threat (which is the core of the definition of menaces in s 249M). This was an error in the directions going to an essential element of the offence.
To be clear, in cases prosecuted under s 249K, the jury must be directed in some clear form that the offence is only established if it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person intended to make an unwarranted demand with menaces and that requires (amongst other things) proof that he intended to make an express or implied threat. No particular form of words is required but it must be made clear, especially in the case of an implied threat, that the accused intended to make an unwarranted demand, intended the demand to be with menaces and that this involves an intention to make a threat.
I am fortified in this view by the contents of the Final Report on the Model Criminal Code but my conclusion as to the requirements of proof and the elements of the offence created by s 249K is largely based on the plain words of the statute, the definition of menaces in s 249M and the general law concerning the presumption of mens rea: see, for example, Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132 at 149; He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523 at 528-531 (Gibbs CJ), 549-560 (Wilson J), 568, 582-583 (Brennan J) and 591-592 (Dawson J).
This construction also appears to align with the approach taken in the United Kingdom. The blackmail offence contemplated by the Model Criminal Code was said to be based on s 21 of the Theft Act 1968 (UK) which provides: "(1) A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief - (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. (2) The nature of the act or omission demanded is immaterial, and it is also immaterial whether the menaces relate to action to be taken by the person making the demand."
In R v Lambert [2010] 1 Cr App R 299; [2009] EWCA Crim 2860, the Court of Appeal said of this provision at [10]: "It is the essence of the offence that the offender intends and does impose what is described at paragraph 15 of this court's judgment in R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699 as 'menacing pressures'."

[22]

Rule 4 and the proviso

Particularly given the position adopted by the appellant at trial, I have considered whether the omission was one that may have impacted on the outcome of the trial. In other words, I have addressed the question of whether the accused lost a chance of acquittal that was fairly open to him. This is relevant to, although not determinative of, whether leave should be refused under rule 4, and whether it can be said that no substantial miscarriage of justice actually occurred, so as to invoke the proviso to s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW).
The facts of the present case were unusual. It was not a typical case of "blackmail". This was highlighted by the way in which the original indictment was drafted, where the "unwarranted demand with menaces" was identified as an inducement. On the unusual facts of the case, it was possible for the jury to accept that Ms Dickson took the words and conduct as a threat (that is, an unwarranted demand with menaces) and conclude that the behaviour, considered objectively, amounted to a threat, but nevertheless to entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr Petch intended his conduct to constitute such a threat. If the jury were of such a mind, the omission of a direction that he was only guilty if he intended to make an unwarranted demand with menaces may have been crucial.
I can see no forensic or tactical reason for counsel at the trial to have adopted the stance they did. The legislation was relatively new and untested, a matter the trial Judge acknowledged at the conclusion of her judgment on sentence. All participants were doing their best in the absence of direct authority and by reference to analogies with legislation elsewhere and secondary material. While the trial judge accepted the submissions of his then counsel, the appellant lost the chance of acquittal reasonably open to him as a result of the omission of an important direction concerning the elements of the offence. In the circumstances, I would neither invoke rule 4 nor apply the proviso. I am unable to conclude that there was no substantial miscarriage of justice.
For those reasons, I would grant leave under rule 4 and uphold ground 1.

[24]

The evidence and arguments at trial

Before the Prosecutor sought to tender Exhibit D (Ms Dickson's notes of the conversation), Ms Dickson had already been permitted to give evidence of her opinion as to Mr Petch's intentions. The Prosecutor argued, and the trial Judge accepted, that the evidence was admissible under s 78 of the Evidence Act. The evidence is set out above at [13]. To repeat an example, Ms Dickson gave the following evidence over repeated objection: "A. It was clear to me that Ivan was saying to me that if I resolved the cost issue in a way that was favourable to his - … A. It was clear to me at that time that Ivan was saying that if I resolved the cost issue so there was no cost to his block of councillors, that he would be able to manoeuvre my - myself into the general manager position."
The final paragraph of the notes taken by Ms Dickson was in the following terms: "I was left in no doubt at the end of our conversation that the Mayor was threatening to manipulate the process of the impending GM recruitment to provide me the role if I agreed to settle the Supreme Court matter in a way that was personally financially favourable to him, and that the alternate was to occur if I continue to pursue either a Court hearing or a settlement where each party were liable for their own costs."
When objection was taken to the final paragraph of Exhibit D, the Prosecutor again relied on s 78. Senior Counsel for Mr Petch submitted "what really is being provided here in this case, through this witness, is her opinion about this man's criminality and the fact that a crime was being committed." After the trial Judge suggested the witness may be able to give evidence to explain "why she was making notes", Senior Counsel continued: "The problem at the moment is that this [witness's] opinion, as to what she took a conversation which she's deposed to, to actually mean, in order to get her around to ICAC the next day, is not admissible as lay opinion under s 78. There is absolutely no reason why an opinion of this nature about what was being said, in terms which are not redolent of her conclusion, can go into evidence in any way, shape or form."
The Prosecutor referred to the judgment of Spigelman CJ in R v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75. No attention was paid to the contrary view taken by Simpson J in the same case, to the fact that the Chief Justice's view was not adopted by the majority, or to the fact that the judgment of Spigelman CJ has been questioned in subsequent cases. Senior Counsel for Mr Petch referred to Benasic v R (1987) 77 ALR 340, although the argument was not refined or developed to any significant degree and the case appeared to be treated by the Prosecutor and trial Judge as one favouring the admissibility of the evidence. It seems that neither party drew her Honour's attention to the other judgments in R v Whyte, to the decision in McLaren v Chief of Navy [2013] ADFDAT 5 or to the High Court's analysis of s 78 in Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; [2011] HCA 36. Judge Noman determined the evidence was admissible and the trial proceeded.
In cross-examination, further evidence of a similar kind emerged. This was inevitable once the evidence was elicited in chief and in the final paragraph of Exhibit D. Senior Counsel was confronted with the reality that the evidence was before the jury and had to be challenged. That undertaking was something of a forensic minefield. The evidence of the witness included the following opinions as to what was in the appellant's mind: "No. That was not his intent. What his intent was, he wanted the council to reimburse to --" "… it was clear to me the part of the email he wanted to talk to me. He didn't want to talk to me about who the email was sent to or the distribution list." "I knew him well. You form a [collegiate] relationship with someone, you anticipate - I entirely understood what he intended by the conversation."

[25]

The statutory provisions and some authorities

Section 76 of the Evidence Act provides "evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed." Section 78 provides the following exception to this rule: 78 Exception: lay opinions The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if-- (a) the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event, and (b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person's perception of the matter or event.
Benasic v R was a blackmail case where the alleged victim was permitted to give evidence of how he felt when the threat was communicated to him. He said he was shaking and very frightened. The Federal Court held the evidence was admissible. Fox J said at 342, the evidence was relevant because (i) the reaction was "part of the event" or res gestae, (ii) "it tends to show that the threat was serious, and not simply an excusable joke" and (iii) the reaction of the addressee, while by no means conclusive offers some assistance … as to the objective test". Kelly and Pincus JJ held at 344, that the victim's response may provide evidence "as to the menacing character of the approach." Putting aside the fact that Benasic v R was decided under different kidnapping provisions and was not concerned with s 78 of the Evidence Act, the case was concerned with the victim's reaction and its impact on the question of the objective impact of the threat. While those issues may have had indirect relevance to the question of intention, the evidence was not concerned with the victim's opinion of what was in the accused person's mind, or directly concerned with their intention, when the offending words were uttered. The same applies to the cases upon which reliance was placed by the Federal Court: R v Clear [1968] 1 QB 670 at 679 and Connolly v Willis [1984] 1 NSWLR 373 at 384.
As the appellant conceded on appeal, the application of those cases may have permitted evidence of Ms Dickson's reaction. However, they do not authorise the admission of evidence of her perception or opinion of the appellant's intention or state of mind. The question is whether the lay opinion rule in s 78 does so.
R v Whyte was a sexual assault case in which evidence was given that the complainant told her mother the accused "tried to rape me". Spigelman CJ expressed the opinion (at [31]) that "the victim of a sexual assault who has a belief as to what is being done is entitled to express that belief". As to s 78, his Honour said (at [36]): "An opinion of this character is obviously based on what the complainant perceived and, in my opinion, it was, in this case, necessary to obtain an adequate account of that perception. Putting aside the issue of whether it supports the particular of an intent to have penile intercourse, the evidence was necessary to give an 'account of [the] perception' that the assault had a sexual purpose."
Simpson J (as her Honour then was) disagreed. While the evidence was admissible as evidence of "complaint" and pursuant to s 66 of the Evidence Act, it was not admissible to prove the appellant's state of mind. Her Honour explained: "51 … The exceptions to the hearsay rule relax the restrictions on the admissibility of hearsay evidence, but only of hearsay evidence that would otherwise be admissible. They do not permit evidence to be given indirectly that would not be admissible directly. 52 That is why it is important to recognise the character of the fact intended to be asserted by the complainant. In saying that the appellant tried to rape her, she was not asserting that he conducted himself in any particular fashion: she was asserting that he had a particular state of mind - an intention to rape her. 53 The complainant would not have been permitted to give this evidence in court. (Indeed, no attempt was made to have her give such evidence.) Why would she not be permitted to give that evidence in court? There are two reasons. Firstly, what was within the appellant's mind was not within the complainant's knowledge and was not made admissible by any other provision of the Evidence Act. What she said was, properly characterised, her conclusion, drawn from the conduct she observed, of what was in the appellant's mind. Her conclusion as to what was in the appellant's mind was not relevant to any issue in the proceedings. (What in fact was in the appellant's mind was very much relevant to the proceedings - it is the complainant's conclusion or assumption as to what was in his mind that is irrelevant.) The second reason the complainant would not have been permitted to give evidence of what was in the appellant's mind is that that was a critical issue for the jury to determine. It was an element in the Crown case. 54 In my opinion, the complainant's evidence of what she said to her mother was, however, admissible under s60 - it was admissible for a purpose other than proving what was in the appellant's mind. It was, in the traditional way, admissible to establish consistency of conduct on the part of the complainant, and to enhance her credibility. It was not admissible under s66 to prove the truth of the fact asserted by the complainant. 55 The use to be made of the evidence ought to have been limited, under s136, and the jury directed that the complainant's assertion of (what she concluded to be) the appellant's intention could not be used as evidence that that was indeed his intention."
The third member of the Court, Barr J, did not address the s 78 issue. His Honour merely agreed that the evidence was admissible as evidence of complaint.
R v Whyte was not a binding authority on the issue that presented itself to the trial Judge in the present case. There was no majority supporting the application of s 78 to evidence whereby a witness purports to provide an opinion as to an accused person's state of mind or intention. The position taken by Spigelman CJ was not accepted in McLaren v Chief of Navy and does not fit comfortably with the judgments of the High Court in Lithgow City Council v Jackson. In my view, the approach taken by Simpson J in R v Whyte was correct.
Partington v R [2009] NSWCCA 232 was a very different case factually although the Court noted the difference of opinion taken by Spigelman CJ and Simpson J as to the correct approach to s 78 in R v Whyte. Partington was a homicide case and concerned the evidence of a witness who heard banging on a door and was permitted to give evidence of her opinion that a person or a person's head was being pushed against the door. She gave evidence of hearing moans and other noises. McClellan CJ at CL said at [46]: "It is obvious that s 78 allows the admission of an opinion in limited circumstances. Not every opinion which a witness forms after being involved in an event is admissible. It will only be admissible if it is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of what the person perceived of the matter or event..."
His Honour provided some examples, some of which might be considered controversial and need not be considered further here. As to the evidence in Partington, his Honour concluded at [47]: "In the present case LB both saw the door and heard noises outside of it. That is the event, or in fact the sequence of continuous events, which she both saw and heard. There was no difficulty in understanding her account of that event. However, she did not see, although obviously she heard, the sounds of the event which was happening on the other side of the door. Although she may have had an opinion, either speculative or an informed guess, as to what was happening outside the door she did not relevantly perceive that event. Her perception was confined to what she could see and hear on the inside. The door deprived her of any capacity to perceive what was happening on the outside. Evidence as to her opinion as to what may have been happening outside the door was not necessary to understand what she perceived from her position inside the room. She was able to give an account of her perception of the event - what she saw and heard - without proffering her opinion as to what she believed was taking place on the other side of the door. It follows that the portions of LB's evidence identified in the appeal and which I have underlined in the extracts from the transcript should have been objected to and rejected."
In McLaren v Chief of Navy, the Defence Force Disciplinary Tribunal (Tracey J (President), Logan and Brereton JJ (Members)) held at [46] that Partington supported the view taken by Simpson J in Whyte, as "do the plain words of s 78 of the Evidence Act." Their Honours continued: "Likewise, in Whyte, evidence of the complainant's opinion that the accused had tried to rape her was not necessary to obtain or give the jury an adequate account or understanding of the perception of the matters and events in question. With great respect, the approach adopted by Spigelman CJ inverts the test; the question is whether evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the witness's perception of the facts, and that directs attention in the first place to the account of the facts; whereas his Honour appears to have asked first whether the opinion was admissible, and then to permit it on the basis that it was founded on a perception of the facts. Section 78 is not intended to render admissible a witness's inferences derived from observed facts, but to make admissible opinions only where they are necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the observed facts. It is a useful approach, when considering whether to admit opinion evidence under s 78, to ask first what if any deficiency there is in the adequacy of the account or understanding of the witness's perception of the facts that the opinion, if admitted, would serve to illuminate."
The issue in McLaren v Chief of Navy arose from evidence of the complainant that the defendant used a mirror to look at her in a shower cubicle. The Tribunal concluded at [49]: "Turning then to the present case, the evidence of complaint was admissible, pursuant to s 60, to prove consistency of conduct and enhance the credibility of the complainant. It was also admissible, pursuant to s 66, as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted, to the extent that the complainant could have given direct evidence of those facts. Accordingly, the evidence of complaint could be used as evidence that she had seen a mirror under the cubicle. However, the complainant could not and did not give evidence in court to the effect that she believed that the appellant was using the mirror to look at her. The appellant's purpose was not within her knowledge. What she told others in that respect was her inference or conclusion drawn from the conduct she observed. The complainant's description of what she perceived was an adequate and understandable account, which would not be rendered any more adequate or understandable by evidence of her opinion as to the manner in or purpose for which the appellant was using the mirror that she observed. Section 78(b) was not satisfied, and the complainant's inference was not admissible as a lay opinion. It follows that her inference as to the appellant's purpose was not relevant to any issue in the proceedings; it could not be used as evidence of what was in fact the appellant's purpose."
A similar approach was taken by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Patrick v The Queen (2014) 42 VR 651; [2014] VSCA 89. A complainant was permitted to give evidence of her interpretation or "perception" of an apology cast in general terms provided by the alleged perpetrator (her father) of sexual offences against her. The witness said she believed the apology was a reference to sexual misconduct. The Court (Neave and Tate JJA and Sifris AJA) held the evidence was not relevant at [33]: "In this case however, the complainant's statement failed the test of relevance in s 55 of the Act, because it could not 'rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue'. The fact in issue was whether the appellant assaulted the complainant, a matter about which the complainant gave direct evidence. Her subsequent interpretation of his apology provides no greater support for her allegations than her direct evidence."
As to the suggestion that the complainant's evidence might be admissible as a lay opinion, at [50] the Court held: "Moreover the evidence of SW's perception that her father was apologising to her for past sexual misconduct was not 'necessary' to obtain an adequate account of her perception of the matter or event, as required by s 78(b). Her evidence of what the appellant meant was an interpretation of a statement made by the accused, which assumed the truth of that which the jury had to decide. Since s 78(b) did not apply, her lay opinion evidence was excluded by s 76 and the judge should have told the jury to disregard it."
Before turning to the evidence in the present case, I should make fleeting reference to the High Court's consideration of s 78 in Lithgow City Council v Jackson. It is unnecessary to consider the decision closely other than to note that the Court made it clear that the word "perceived" in s 78(a) is a reference to an observation "made by one of the five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch": at [43] (French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ). Their Honour's also considered the meaning of the word "necessary" in s 78(b), noting at [51] that the function of the provision "is to make up for incapacity to perceive the primary aspects of event and conditions, or to remember the perception, or to express the memory of that perception". At [53]-[54], their Honours rejected the suggestion that "necessary" should be construed as "not unreasonable": the provision is not a "best evidence provision", "permitting reception of the evidence if there is no better evidence". Rather, the word "necessary" is directed "to a relationship internal to the evidence of the perceiver - the relationship between the perceiver's perceptions and the perceiver's opinion".

[26]

The respondent's submission in this Court

The respondent's written submissions dealt with this ground in one paragraph. [9] It was submitted that Ms Dickson's perception of the words spoken by the appellant was a "material issue" at the trial. Reliance was placed on the fact that her perception that the words amounted to a threat was challenged in cross-examination. It was submitted that Ms Dickson's opinion "that the appellant intended to threaten her was not led to prove the intention; but to prove her understanding or perception of that intention." The respondent also submitted that the trial Judge directed the jury that it "should ignore the opinion for the purpose of deciding whether the [prosecution] had proved beyond reasonable doubt each of the elements". It was submitted that R v Whyte is the "closest case in factual similarity to the present case" and that "the court held (by majority) the words [were] admissible". None of these submissions can be accepted.
Ms Dickson's perception of the threats was not a material issue at the trial. The material issues were (relevantly) whether an "unwarranted demand with menaces" was made and whether the appellant acted with the requisite intention. The fact that the appellant was driven to cross-examine on Ms Dickson's perception, because evidence was elicited over objection in the evidence in chief, did not make it a material issue. Nor does it justify, retrospectively, the admission of the evidence.
The trial Judge did not direct the jury that it should ignore the evidence of Ms Dickson's opinion when considering the issue of whether there was a threat or in considering Mr Petch's intention. The passage relied on by the respondent was concerned with Ms Dickson's perception that the conduct may have been corrupt. Her Honour said: "Ms Dickson's evidence that the accused implied a threat on 2 May, is a conclusion she drew from the circumstances as she perceived them. Ms Dickson also gave some evidence in the form of an opinion that the accused's conduct in the Mayoral office on 2 May, could potentially amount to corruption. That evidence is a statement of Ms Dickson's understanding. She said it was for others to determine if it was corrupt conduct. Her opinion on potential corruption is a matter that is however irrelevant to your task when you look at the elements. Your task is to determine what was said, the circumstances in which the words were said, and having determined those matters to determine whether the Crown has proved the essential elements. You should ignore Ms Dickson's opinion of potential corruption for the purpose of determining whether the Crown has proved beyond reasonable doubt each of the elements."
The first sentence of that passage followed directions concerning the drawing of an inference "whether or not the accused used menaces or threat". The jury was not directed that it could not use Ms Dickson's perception in drawing such an inference.
The respondent's submission in relation to R v Whyte is simply wrong. While each of the judges held the evidence was admissible as complaint evidence, only one member of the Court (Spigelman CJ) held the evidence was admissible as a lay opinion going to the issue of the accused's intention and whether there was, in fact, a sexual assault. Simpson J disagreed and Barr J did not decide the issue.
The respondent submitted, without any analysis, that both sub-sections of s 78 were satisfied. Ultimately, that is the issue to be determined.

[27]

Was the evidence in the present case admissible under s 78?

Some of the cases have emphasised the importance of identifying the "matter or event" to which the operation of the section is directed. The appellant submitted that the "matter or event for the purpose of s 78(a) was the appellant's state of mind". Alternatively, without making any concession, the appellant submitted if "framed more broadly", the matter or event was "the interaction between the complainant and the appellant".
If it is the former, the complainant's opinion evidence was not relevant. Her opinion could not rationally effect the assessment of the probability of a fact in issue in the trial: cf Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 at [11]-[12]. Smith v The Queen was concerned with evidence of police officers that CCTV photographs of the perpetrator of a robbery depicted the accused. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said: "11 Because the witness's assertion of identity was founded on material no different from the material available to the jury from its own observation, the witness's assertion that he recognised the appellant is not evidence that could rationally affect the assessment by the jury of the question we have identified. The fact that someone else has reached a conclusion about the identity of the accused and the person in the picture does not provide any logical basis for affecting the jury's assessment of the probability of the existence of that fact when the conclusion is based only on material that is not different in any substantial way from what is available to the jury. The process of reasoning from one fact (the depiction of a man in the security photographs) taken with another fact (the observed appearance of the accused) to the conclusion (that one is the depiction of the other) is neither assisted, nor hindered, by knowing that some other person has, or has not, arrived at that conclusion. Indeed, if the assessment of probability is affected by that knowledge, it is not by any process of reasoning, but by the decision maker permitting substitution of the view of another, for the decision-maker's own conclusion. 12 In this case the evidence of the police was irrelevant and should not have been received. No question of admissibility had to be considered."
Contrary to the appellant's submission, I am inclined to the view that the "matter or event" for the purpose of s 78 of the Evidence Act was the conversation and interaction between the protagonists during their five minute meeting in the Mayor's office on 2 May 2013. The "opinion" for the purpose of the section concerned what that interaction meant or established (that is, whether there was an unwarranted demand with menaces), including what was in the appellant's mind and what he intended at the time.
To fall within s 78(a), the evidence of Ms Dickson's opinion had to be based on what she "saw, heard or otherwise perceived" about the matter or event. Insofar as the opinion concerned Mr Petch's intention or state of mind, it was not an opinion based on what Ms Dickson "saw, heard or otherwise perceived"; that is by reference to her five senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch. Rather, it was an inference she drew from the all of the circumstances including the issues then confronting the Council, her knowledge of, and relationship with Mr Petch, and her understanding of his personal and pecuniary interests.
Turning to s 78(b), the evidence of Ms Dickson's opinion was not necessary to obtain an understanding of her "perception of the matter or event". There was no confusion in her evidence about what was said in the conversation, the change in the appellant's demeanour, or the tone in which things were said.
Neither the oral evidence, nor the final paragraph of the notes Ms Dickson made after the conversation, was admissible under s 78 of the Evidence Act.

[30]

Ground 3: The verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence

The appellant submitted that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The approach to be taken to such a ground is well established and need not be repeated here: see for example, M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63, SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at 408; [2011] HCA 13, R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35. The principles were most recently restated by the High Court in Pell v The Queen (2020) 94 ALJR 394; [2020] HCA 12. They were summarised by the this Court in Guo v R [2020] NSWCCA 40 as follows: "The question we must ask ourselves is whether we think 'that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty': M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493; [1994] HCA 63. This is more than a question of the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court is required to 'make its own independent assessment of the evidence': M v The Queen at 492 and SKA v The Queen (2011) 243 CLR 400 at 408; [2011] HCA 13. In doing so, the Court must bear in mind 'that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence': M v The Queen at 493. A reasonable doubt experienced by this Court will, in most cases, be a doubt that the jury ought also to have experienced, unless the jury's advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving that doubt: M v The Queen at 494."
The appellant relied on the unusual nature of the offence which led the prosecution initially to draft an indictment that contained no allegation of any threat to cause a detriment to Ms Dickson. The evidence of the complainant, especially the crucial part of the evidence set out at [13] above, was deconstructed with considerable care and fastidiousness by Senior Counsel on the hearing of the appeal. It was submitted that the evidence did not establish that a threat was made and that the jury ought to have entertained a doubt as to whether there was any unwarranted demand with menaces. It was also submitted that, even if "menaces" were established, the nature of any threat was "not of a quality to cause an individual of normal stability and courage to act unwillingly in response." Reliance was placed on the complainant's evidence that she was somewhat diffident as to whether she wanted the permanent job given her family commitments.
In considering this ground, I have disregarded the inadmissible evidence of the complainant's opinion as to the appellant's intention. I have directed myself as to the intention that must be established in accordance with my resolution of ground 1. I have taken into account that the prosecution's case was circumstantial and that any inference inconsistent with guilt must be excluded beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering all of the evidence, I am not satisfied that the jury ought to (or as some cases put it, "must") have entertained a reasonable doubt about the appellant's guilt. In oral submissions, the appellant approached the crucial part of the complainant's evidence in a piecemeal fashion. The jury was required to consider the evidence taken as a whole. The same applies to an assessment of the evidence undertaken by this Court. Having considered the evidence in that way, I am satisfied that it was open to the jury to find that the appellant intended by his words and conduct on 2 May 2013 to issue an implied threat to act to Ms Dickson's detriment in her application for the permanent General Manager's position.
It is true, as the applicant submitted, that Mr Petch was not empowered to deny Ms Dickson the job and could not have exercised control over the votes cast by the other councillors. However, his position as Mayor, role on the selection committee, and leader of a "block" of councillors who tended to vote together, placed him in a position where he was capable of exercising some influence. At the very least, that was likely to be Ms Dickson's perception - a matter of which the appellant would have been fully aware.
It was also undoubtedly the case that Mr Petch had a financial interest in the issue he raised with Ms Dickson and this provided him with a motive to attempt to influence her. The evidence of Mr Belling was capable of supporting the fact that Mr Petch had an interest in the outcome and had taken steps to achieve a particular result. The question of whether the threat would have caused a person of normal stability and courage to act unwillingly was an issue in relation to which a jury of 12 was in a distinctly advantaged position to evaluate. As the High Court emphasised in Pell v The Queen at [37]-[39], the advantage referred to in cases such as M v The Queen is not confined to the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses give evidence and the atmosphere of the trial. It also involves the interactions of 12 members of the community called upon to reach unanimity.
Ms Dickson's evidence of the appellant's change of mood and demeanour, and his physical actions while uttering the words giving rise to the charge was important in providing the flavour and import of the conversation. Those actions were relevant to the jury's (and this Court's) assessment of his intentions.
I would reject the third ground of appeal.

[31]

Disposition and whether the Court should order a retrial

Having upheld the first and second ground of appeal, the appeal must be upheld and the conviction and sentence be quashed. The question is whether the Court should exercise its power under s 8 of the Criminal Appeal Act to order a retrial. The principles are well established although their application to particular cases can be controversial: see, for example, King v R (1986) 161 CLR 423; 67 ALR 379, R v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; [2007] HCA 11, Gerakiteys v R (1984) 153 CLR 317; 51 ALR 417, R v Honeysett (1987) 10 NSWLR 638 at 646. The appellant relied on what was said in Castagna v R; Agius v R [2019] NSWCCA 114 at [190]-[205].
The respondent was correct in referring to the public interest in the prosecution of criminal offences, particularly those committed by people, like the respondent, who (allegedly) used their high public office to commit the offence.
On the other hand the case has unusual and compelling features. The appellant is now 80 years of age. There was a five year delay in bringing him to trial. By the time this judgment is published he will have served more than three quarters of the custodial sentence (intensive corrections order). By the time of any retrial, eight or nine years will have elapsed since the offence was allegedly committed. Mr Petch was subject to public scrutiny and opprobrium in the course of proceedings before the Independent Commission Against Corruption.
In all of the circumstances of this case, I would not order a retrial.
For those reasons, I would make the following orders: 1. Where necessary, grant leave to appeal. 2. Allow the appeal. 3. Quash the conviction and, in lieu thereof, enter a verdict of acquittal.
CAVANAGH J: I have had the considerable benefit of reviewing the judgment of Hamill J. I agree with the orders that his Honour proposes and, except with respect to ground 1, generally agree with his reasons.
The point on which I disagree with his Honour is in respect of the elements of the offence of blackmail as set out in s 249K of the Crimes Act.
The applicant submits that the elements of the offence include a requirement that the prosecution prove "an intent to menace". This had not been part of the agreed directions to the jury in respect of the offence.
The written direction to the jury included a specific reference to the requirement that the demand was made with menaces but did not include a direction as to the intent to menace.
I accept, as submitted by the applicant, that one of the directions appears to have been taken from the Victorian Bench book for the offence of blackmail as set out in s 87 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and that there are differences in the NSW and Victorian provisions. However, this direction could not have been of any consequence or disadvantage to the applicant in terms of the jury's decision. This is not the point of ground 1.
It is not necessary that I comment further on the background to the directions given to the jury or the issues that arose at the time. These matters have been covered thoroughly by Hamill J.
The applicant's real complaint is that the directions did not include any statement to the effect that it was necessary to prove that the applicant intended: 1. to make a threat "of action detrimental or unpleasant to another person"; and 2. that his threat "would cause an individual of normal stability and courage to act unwillingly in response".
The reason that such a direction was not included was that neither the trial judge nor the parties considered that an intent to menace was an element of the offence. The applicant now advocates a different construction of the offence provision.
The offence provision is set out in s 249K of the Crimes Act as follows: 249K Blackmail Offence (1) A person who makes any unwarranted demand with menaces - (a) with the intention of obtaining a gain or of causing a loss, or (b) with the intention of influencing the exercise of a public duty, is guilty of an offence. (2) A person is guilty of an offence against this subsection if the person commits an offence against subsection (1) by an accusation, or a threatened accusation, that a person has committed a serious indictable offence.
It is clear that the offence requires the prosecutor to establish that the accused intended to obtain a gain or cause a loss or influence the exercise of a public duty. There is thus a necessary mental element to the offence.
The legislative drafting technique adopted was to define the terms used in the offence provision in separate provisions as follows: 249L Unwarranted demands - meaning (1) For the purposes of this Part, a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person believes that he or she has reasonable grounds for making the demand and reasonably believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. (2) The demand need not be a demand for money or other property. 249M Menaces - Meaning (1) For the purposes of this Part, menaces includes - (a) an express or implied threat of any action detrimental or unpleasant to another person, and (b) a general threat of detrimental or unpleasant action that is implied because the person making the unwarranted demand holds a public office. (2) A threat against an individual does not constitute a menace unless - (a) the threat would cause an individual of normal stability and courage to act unwillingly in response to the threat, or (b) the threat would cause the particular individual to act unwillingly in response to the threat and the person who makes the threat is aware of the vulnerability of the particular individual to the threat. (3) A threat against a Government or body corporate does not constitute a menace unless - (a) the threat would ordinarily cause an unwilling response, or (b) the threat would cause an unwilling response because of a particular vulnerability of which the person making the threat is aware. (4) It is immaterial whether the menaces relate to action to be taken by the person making the demand.
As such, when construing s 249K, both "unwarranted demands" and "menaces" must be given the meanings ascribed to them in ss 249L and 249M.
A demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person believes that he or she has reasonable grounds for making the demand and reasonably believes that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. The meaning of unwarranted demand thus requires a finding as to the belief of the offender.
On the construction advanced by the applicant, the prosecution must also prove a third mental element being intent to menace. This is said to be supported by the proper construction of s 249M.
For the reasons set out below, I disagree that s 249M should be construed in such a way as to include an intent to menace as an element of the offence.
Statutory construction involves a consideration of text, context and purpose. The primary object of a statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision consistently with the language and purpose of the provisions of the statute: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28.
As observed by Gleeson CJ in Wilson v Anderson (2002) 213 CLR 401; [2002] HCA 29 at [8]: "Parliament manifests its intention by the use of language, and it is by determining the meaning of that language, in accordance with principles of construction established by the common law and statute, that courts give effect to the legislative will."
It is important to emphasise that s 249M is in the nature of a definition section. It is entitled "Menaces - Meaning", although the drafters have then used the non-exhaustive term "includes". It may be that, despite the use of "includes", s 249M is intended to be exhaustive as it is difficult to anticipate how any other meaning could be given to "menaces" for the purposes of the actual offence provision. This is particularly so when the drafters adopted the technique of specifying that a threat does not constitute a menace unless certain other requirements are satisfied.
Section 249M should be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words used. A qualification should not be introduced unless required by the text or the context in which the provision appears. Section 249M does not operate independently of s 249K.
Such a provision should be interpreted in the context in which it appears: Gibb v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 118 CLR 628 at 635; [1966] HCA 74 (Barwick CJ, McTiernan and Taylor JJ); Cranbrook School v Woollahra Council (2006) 66 NSWLR 379; [2006] NSWCA 155.
This may be particularly relevant when considering the general presumption of mens rea.
The difficulty I have with the applicant's construction is that it has the effect of introducing words into the section that are not there.
A person can only be guilty of the offence if the person makes an "unwarranted demand with menaces".
Whilst "menaces" is defined non-exhaustively, it is defined with reference to either an expressed or implied threat (s 249M(1)(a)) or a general threat (s 249M(1)(b)). The test is objective rather than subjective. The question is whether there was a threat, rather than whether the accused intended to make a threat.
The meaning of "menaces" is then limited in s 249M(2) by the proviso ending with "unless". That is, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish either s 249M(2)(a) or s 249M(2)(b).
Both ss 249M(2)(a) and (b) are directed at the effect of the threat rather than the intent of the maker. That is, it either would cause an individual of normal stability and courage to act in a certain way or would cause the particular individual to act in a certain way (and the person who makes the threat is aware of the vulnerability of the recipient of the threat).
The applicant relies on the second reading speech of the Crimes Amendment Bill 2007 (NSW) for the purposes of establishing that the section was intended to be based on the Model Criminal Code as follows: "- Item [16] of Schedule 1 repeals the existing blackmail provisions and Item [22] replaces it with a provision based on the Model Criminal Code offence of blackmail. The Government believes that the revised drafting will improve the offence in the following ways: - Firstly the offence will no longer be artificially limited to threats intended to cause property gain or loss. It will also cover the situation where the blackmailer intends to influence the exercise of a public duty. - Secondly the offence will now require that the unwarranted demand is made 'with menaces', which is a well-known term at law. It is not confined to threats of harm or violence, and will be defined, non-exhaustively, in the legislation to include express or implied threats of detrimental action. - Finally the offence will no longer be artificially limited to unwarranted threats to publish, abstain from publishing, or preventing the publication of certain material." [11]
Other than supporting the submission that the new provision was intended to be based on the Model Criminal Code (it is in identical terms), the second reading speech does not assist in gleaning the intention of the legislature on this particular point. There is no reference to an intent to menace being an element of the offence.
The reference to the Model Criminal Code is a reference to the 1995 report of the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee established by the standing committee of the Attorneys General ("the MCCOC").
Chapter 3 of the report includes commentary on the offence of blackmail and includes the statement that "the fault elements for blackmail require that the defendant intends to make a demand on another person and intends to reinforce that demand with menace".
The reference to the fault elements is a reference to what became Pt 2.2, Div 5 (fault elements) of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) ("the Code").
It is submitted that Chapter 3 of the report was the foundation for the offences in ss 139.1 and 139.2 of the Code, which are the federal analogues of the offence in s 249K of the Crimes Act.
Whilst they may be the comparable provisions in the Code, a consideration of ss 139.1 and 139.2 of the Code does not shed light on the proper construction of ss 249K or 249M of the Crimes Act.
The Commonwealth legislature adopted a different drafting technique in enacting the Code. As set out in s 3.1 of the Code, an offence under the Code consists of both physical and fault elements. The fault element for an offence under the Code may be intention: s 5.1. Intention is the default fault element when the section creating the offence does not specify a fault element: s 5.6. Intent to menace is incorporated into the offence provisions in the Code through s 5.6.
The Crimes Act does not contain a similar provision. Intention to menace does not become a necessary ingredient of the offence of blackmail through other provisions of the Act.
In my view, caution must be exercised in placing too much weight on extrinsic material of the type relied on by the applicant or construing the Crimes Act with reference to the Commonwealth legislation or even overseas enactments (the applicant also refers to the UK provision).
The often described limitations in discerning the intention of Parliament with reference to what is said in debates in Parliament [12] or commentary in reports, rather than the text of the provision, are evident in this matter.
In the second reading speech, the Attorney-General stated that the new blackmail provisions are based on the Model Criminal Code. However, there is no reference in the second reading speech to a requirement of an intent to menace. That emerges only through an analysis of the commentary in the report of the MCCOC.
Section 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) relevantly provides: 34 Use of extrinsic material in the interpretation of Acts and statutory rules (1) In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, if any material not forming part of the Act or statutory rule is capable of assisting in the ascertainment of the meaning of the provision, consideration may be given to that material-- (a) to confirm that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision … or (b) to determine the meaning of the provision-- (i) if the provision is ambiguous or obscure, or (ii) if the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision … leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable.
In addition to the general limitations to which I have already referred, there are two problems with the use of the commentary and comparable legislation as an aid to construction in this case.
Firstly, I do not consider s 249M of the Crimes Act to be ambiguous or obscure. Further, the importation of the meaning of menaces (as set out in s 249M) into s 249K does not lead to ambiguity or obscurity or produce a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Secondly, I doubt that the commentary falls within the type of material described in s 34(2) of the Interpretation Act being material which may be considered in the interpretation of a provision of an Act.
Similarly, the reference to the Commonwealth legislation does not assist as the element of intent is incorporated into the similar offence in the Code through an express provision. The comparable sections are subject to default fault elements as set out in s 5.6 of the Code. This highlights the limitations of comparing legislation in other jurisdictions as an aid to statutory construction.
Further, I do not consider that the general presumption of mens rea has the effect of requiring an intent to menace as an element of the offence, having regard to the section as a whole. Section 249M must be interpreted in context. It is not the offence provision. It is in the nature of a definition section. It appears as part of Part 4B of the Crimes Act. It provides a meaning to the term "menaces" when used in the section creating the offence.
Unlike in cases such as He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523; [1985] HCA 43 in which the issue was whether Parliament intended that the offence created by the provision should have no mental ingredient, intent is already an element of the offence. It is not necessary to import intent to satisfy any general presumption.
In my view, the proper construction of s 249M does not include the intent to menace as a necessary element of the offence.
In the circumstances, other than the error in making a direction based on the Victorian provision which could not have been disadvantageous to the applicant, the applicant has not established error in the directions given to the jury. I would not allow Ground 1.
I otherwise agree with the reasons and orders proposed by Hamill J.

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