Pervez & Ruann [2025] FedCFamC1A 225 (11 December 2025)

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Pervez & Ruann has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These reasons explain the dismissal of an appeal brought from property settlement orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) on 23 July 2025.

1. The appellant ("the husband") and the first respondent ("the wife") married in 1995 and began cohabitation in Australia a few months later.
2. They had four children during their marriage, the eldest three of whom are now adults. The youngest is nearly 12 years old and lives with the wife.
3. The husband travelled overseas alone in November 2021, which opportunity the wife used to flee the former family home with the minor children (at [18]). The spouses effectively separated at or about that time and were later divorced, effective from June 2024.
4. The husband remarried and his current wife lives overseas.
5. The wife commenced financial proceedings under Pt VIII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act") in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) in May 2022. She joined to the proceedings a corporation controlled by the husband ("the second respondent"). Another corporation ("the third respondent") which conducts business with the second respondent was later joined in October 2022 at the wife's instigation.
6. The proceedings were heard over four days in November 2024. The spouses actively contested the trial, but the second and third respondents did not. For all intents and purposes, the second respondent was (and remains) the husband's alter ego, but the husband has no proprietary interest in the third respondent. The third respondent elected not to participate, though one director did attend the trial ephemerally (at [2], [5] and [6]).
7. Judgment was pronounced in July 2025. The wife was effectively conferred with the benefit of all the spouses' known property (at [221]). To achieve that outcome, orders were made for:

(a) the husband to pay the wife $2,442,153 (Order 1) and, subject to his compliance, the second and third respondents would the retain their joint ownership as tenants in common of a parcel of real property at Town D, NSW (Orders 2 and 5), but in default of which the Town D property would have to be sold to ensure the wife's payment (together with any accrued interest) from the second respondent's share of the proceeds (Orders 3-4);

(b) the wife to receive the contents of a bank account (Order 6);

(c) the spouses to keep their own superannuation interests (Order 7) and personal property (Order 8); and

(d) the reservation of the parties' costs (Order 10) and the dismissal of all other applications (Order 11).

1. The husband appealed from Orders 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8.

1. On 7 November 2025, the husband filed an Application in an Appeal to achieve two outcomes: first, to adduce further evidence in the appeal; and second, to convert the second respondent to the second appellant. In support of the application, the husband relied upon the affidavits filed by him and his solicitor on 7 November 2025.
2. The wife filed a Response to an Application in an Appeal on 4 December 2025, by which she opposed the first form of relief, but consented to the second.
3. The further evidence which the husband wanted to adduce was the transcript of another hearing later conducted before the primary judge on 2 October 2025. The husband contended the transcript supports Ground 8, which alleges both judicial bias and procedural unfairness, but the transcript does not accomplish the objective. The further evidence is rejected for the reasons discussed in relation to Ground 8.
4. The second aspect of the application was pointless. It does not matter whether the second respondent remains a respondent to the appeal or becomes a joint appellant because, being already joined to the appeal, the second respondent is entitled to be separately heard. However, as the husband's solicitor correctly deposed, the second respondent's interests are "identical to those of the [husband] and it seeks the same relief [as the husband]". The husband's lawyers also represented the second respondent in the appeal.
5. The Application and the Response are both dismissed.

1. The husband prosecuted a Further Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 4 November 2025, in support of which he was permitted to rely upon an Amended Summary of Argument filed on 10 November 2025.
2. Despite being joined as a party to the appeal, the third respondent chose not to participate.
3. Ground 7 was abandoned so there are seven residual grounds of appeal.

1. This ground alleges an apprehension of judicial bias arose from remarks made by the primary judge about the husband and his lawyers on two occasions: during the trial, conducted across four days in November 2024, and again at the hearing of his stay application in October 2025. It is contended the primary judge's remarks on those two occasions conveyed "pre-judgment" of the husband's "credibility and interests".
2. The ground is rejected for two reasons.
3. First, in respect of any comments made by the primary judge during the trial in November 2024, no disqualification application was made by the husband at the time and so he necessarily waived any apprehension of bias he then held and cannot now belatedly revive his concern when dissatisfied by the judgment which resulted from the trial (Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 at [76] and [79]; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6], [55] and [69]-[71]; Vakauta v Kelly [1989] HCA 44; (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 577-579 and 586-588).
4. Secondly, as to any comments made by the primary judge after the judgment was delivered in July 2025, the contention of apprehended bias is illogical. The husband filed his appeal in August 2025, before his stay application was heard and dismissed in October 2025. Any remarks made by the primary judge when dismissing his stay application could not retrospectively invest the applicant with any reasonable apprehension of judicial "pre-judgment" of the litigious issues at any point in time before the appealed judgment was delivered (Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427 at [67]; Feldman v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 260; (2020) 103 NSWLR 307 at [41] and [45]). An asserted "apprehension" denotes a prospective fear or belief and cannot be acquired retrospectively.
5. The primary judge's tone during exchanges with the husband's counsel at the stay hearing in October 2025 could objectively be regarded as intemperate at times, though that most likely reflected his Honour's frustration with counsel's unreadiness and obfuscation.
6. Initially, the husband's counsel wanted the primary judge to stand the matter down for two reasons: first, so she could attend to another hearing in a different court, apparently not realising her breach of r 104 of the Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015 (NSW); and secondly, to allow her more time to give advice to the husband through an interpreter. Unsurprisingly, his Honour was unimpressed with counsel's unreadiness when the husband's stay application had been listed on short notice at his request. Nevertheless, the primary judge acceded to the request and did stand the application down for about 30 minutes until 12.00 noon.
7. Upon resumption, the husband's counsel made an oral application to disqualify the primary judge from hearing the stay application for "apprehended bias", asserted to have arisen from his Honour's conduct in the short time before the matter was stood down. Counsel additionally sought an adjournment of the disqualification application so she could garner affidavit evidence from unidentified persons in the court gallery who had observed the proceedings that morning. His Honour refused the adjournment and expected the disqualification application to be made orally without delay.
8. When pressed for precision rather than banal generality, counsel articulated the apprehension of judicial bias to arise from these aspects of his Honour's conduct:

(a) expressing regret to the wife's counsel about his illness and saying he looked forward to seeing him in person another time, as he was appearing electronically;

(b) "aggressively shouting" at the husband's counsel, thereby making her feel "[un]safe in [her] workplace", which allegation of shouting his Honour refuted;

(c) observing to counsel that the husband, who was apparently seated some distance away from her, should be correctly seated behind her; and

(d) saying the husband understood English quite well, as his Honour knew to be so from seeing him in court over three days during the trial.

1. Having identified those complaints, but without any further elaboration of how such alleged facts compromised impartiality, the primary judge dismissed the disqualification application.
2. The husband's counsel then applied to adjourn the hearing of the stay application because she felt unwell. His Honour stood the matter down again so counsel could consult her doctor. The matter was not resumed until several hours later at around 4.00 pm, at which time counsel did not re-appear. The husband's solicitor appeared and sought an adjournment of the stay application, which was granted until 15 December 2025, with the wife's application for her costs thrown away being reserved.
3. There was evident tension between the primary judge and the husband's counsel at the hearing in October 2025, but it could have no logical bearing at all upon his Honour's impartiality at the trial conducted nearly a year before in November 2024, when the husband was represented by different counsel, or at any point up until judgment was delivered in July 2025. The further evidence does not advance the appeal and the application to adduce it should be dismissed.

1. These two grounds assert the husband's deprivation of procedural fairness.
2. Ground 8 alleges the reasonable apprehension of the primary judge's bias caused a deprivation of procedural fairness but, since the primary contention of bias fails, so must the consequential complaint about the denial of procedural fairness.
3. Ground 5 alleges the husband's deprivation of procedural fairness for two different reasons: first, the primary judge determined the proceedings adversely to him, based upon findings made concerning "third-party" transactions with the third respondent and its directors, without him having had the opportunity to address those transactions; and secondly, by the husband's impaired ability to understand the trial due to "inadequate interpretation and translation".
4. Both complaints demonstrably lack merit and will be addressed seriatim.
5. The complicity of the husband and the third respondent's directors was narrated in the reasons for judgment (at [2], [5], [6] and [25]). The third respondent voluntarily failed to contest the proceedings, even though joined as a party. On the second day of trial, one director of the third respondent attended the Court and announced her intention to give evidence at the request of the husband, but his counsel disavowed her as a witness. Nor had the third respondent served any evidence upon which it wanted to rely. Therefore, the director did not become a witness and she then departed.
6. The husband's financial association with the third respondent was known to be in issue in the proceedings, as the spouses disagreed over how such financial arrangements affected the establishment of their own existing assets and liabilities (at [3] and [55]). Relevantly for present purposes, his Honour determined:

(a) the husband's payment of $50,000 to the third respondent's directors should be added-back to the parties' existing property interests as the premature distribution of a marital asset (at [94], [117]-[123] and [142]);

(b) a debt allegedly owed by the husband to the third respondent's director was not a genuine liability (at [94], [129] and [142]); and

(c) a debt allegedly owed by the second respondent to the third respondent should be disregarded because it would not likely be repaid (at [94], [130]-[137] and [142]).

1. It is nonsense to suggest the husband was deprived of the opportunity to address those factual issues, either in evidence-in-chief, in cross-examination, or in submissions. The issues were plainly evident before the trial started and were ventilated during the trial. Any asserted failing by the wife's counsel to cross-examine the husband on material factual discrepancies could not manifest as a denial of procedural fairness to the husband.
2. As to the second complaint, the oral evidence given by both parties was interpreted for them by an interpreter. The husband now points to instances of the primary judge dismissively ignoring one or more interjections by the interpreter to inform his Honour of the husband's difficulty understanding "financial terminology". But even assuming that to be true, nothing more could have been done. The husband was already assisted by an interpreter, for which the primary judge made allowance (at [72]). It is not suggested, then or now, the standard of interpretation was inadequate. The husband was legally represented throughout the trial by counsel and instructing solicitors. They said nothing to the primary judge about the husband's impaired capacity to understand the trial proceeding. The alleged problem was beyond the primary judge's capacity to rectify. The trial process was made as fair as it could be by his Honour. Besides, nothing in this appeal turns on the husband's oral evidence in cross-examination about "financial terminology" he alleged not understanding.
3. The husband's Amended Summary of Argument alleges his denial of procedural fairness, but for completely different reasons from those asserted under Ground 5, in these generic terms:
   1. The proceedings miscarried because the [husband] was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case and to respond to adverse findings. The primary judge reached conclusions on the rights of third parties and on the [husband's] credibility without proper notice, without procedural safeguards, and in circumstances that gave rise to practical unfairness.
4. The grounds of appeal are those articulated in the Further Amended Notice of Appeal, which grounds have already been twice revised by the husband. Written arguments advanced in supposed support of, but which do not match, the pleaded grounds of appeal should usually be disregarded because the Summary of Argument cannot be permitted to outflank the Notice of Appeal (r 13.23(2)(a) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)). Nevertheless, the husband's sundry submission can be easily addressed.
5. First, the husband was certainly not denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case. He was represented by counsel throughout the trial, who made no complaint of any such denial.
6. Second, other than by way of an appeal, no litigant ever has the chance to "respond to adverse findings", including findings made about the reliability of witnesses. The factual issues between the parties were defined well in advance of trial by the nature of the relief each spouse sought and the evidence they each adduced. Both spouses were cross-examined. Both spouses made final submissions. Judgment was reserved. When the primary judge later contemplated the final result and the reasons which would be given for it, his Honour was not then obliged to re-list the proceedings to foreshadow the provisional factual findings which were contrary to the husband's interests and then give him another chance to argue against them.
7. The husband also wrongly claims the third respondent's property rights were extinguished "without hearing from [the third respondent]", which is nonsense for several reasons: the third respondent chose not to be present at trial and eschewed the chance to be heard; the husband has no standing to complain of procedural unfairness suffered by an unrelated party like the third respondent; and the third respondent's property rights were not extinguished anyway, which latter point is addressed under Ground 6.

1. This ground contains multiple complaints. Though the ground was not formally abandoned, the husband shied away from the defence of it when the alleged errors were challenged during debate at the hearing.
2. Ground 3(c) asserts the primary judge's "error of principle" by the wrongful failure to comply with s 79(4) and s 79(5)(d) of the Act, but the complaint of legal error is misconceived because those provisions did not apply. The amendments to Pt VIII of the Act enacted by the Family Law Amended Act 2024 (Cth) did not commence operation until 10 June 2025. The trial before the primary judge was conducted in November 2024, so the amendments did not apply.
3. Ground 3(a) alleges the primary judge "erred in law" in two ways: first, by not taking account of the existence and quantum of certain "third-party debts" alleged by the husband; and secondly, by misapprehending the evidence about the value of the second respondent. Neither complaint particularises an error of law but, regardless, both complaints fail.
4. The husband claimed he owed a credit card debt of $4,604 to a bank (at [94]-[95]). The wife admitted he owed the debt but alleged a lesser value. The parties did not address the factual dispute. The husband failed to prove the greater value he alleged, so the wife's value was adopted as an admission (at [124]-[127]). There was no error.
5. The husband claimed he owed $20,000 to a director of the third respondent (at [94]-[95]). The wife refuted it and the husband failed to prove it (at [129]).
6. The husband claimed he owed a debt of $25,000 to Mr E (at [94]-[95]). The wife refuted it and the husband failed to prove it (at [129]).
7. The husband alleged the second respondent owed a debt of $400,000 to the third respondent (at [94]-[95]). The wife refuted it. The document which the husband adduced in evidence to supposedly prove the loan failed to do so. The primary judge accepted the wife's submissions that the terms of the document were too unclear and vague to be enforceable (at [130]-[137]). In any event, the debt supposedly owed by the second respondent to the third respondent was not a liability of the husband (or the wife). If proven, it could only possibly reduce the value of the second respondent as an asset in the hands of the husband, which is the subject of the next complaint made under this ground.
8. The primary judge accepted the opinion evidence given by the appointed single expert about the value of the second respondent, which valuation depended upon the valuation of the Town D property, of which property the second respondent was a joint owner (at [97]-[102]). The single expert witnesses were cross-examined. The husband argued in final submissions for the rejection of the single expert evidence, but its acceptance over his contrary submission is not an error. The parties tendered a joint balance sheet showing they agreed the value of the second respondent (whatever sum it be found to be) had to be brought to account as an asset of the husband (at [94]).
9. Ground 3(b) asserts an error of law by the add-back of the $50,000 paid by the husband to the third respondent's directors as a notional asset of the husband being contrary to s 79(3) of the Act and the decision of the Full Court in Shinohara & Shinohara (2025) FLC 94-266, but the contention is rejected.
10. As already noted, the amendments to the Act, operable from 10 June 2025, did not apply here. In Shinohara & Shinohara (at [95]-[101], [117]-[128] and [135(d)]), the Full Court explained generically that notional add-backs do not now apply after legislative amendments. The decision in Shinohara & Shinohara does not retrospectively convert the decision to add-back the premature distribution into a legal error because, at the time the decision was made, the add-back was consistent with the prevailing law (Trevi & Trevi [2018] FamCAFC 173; (2018) FLC 93-858). While this is an appeal by re-hearing, conducted on the present evidence and the current state of the law (Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 at 124-125), no interference with the appealed judgment is possible until appealable error is demonstrated (Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 179-181 and 187; Coal & Allied Operations Pty Ltd v AIRC (2000) 203 CLR 194 at 204 and 223-225).

1. This ground contends the primary judge gave insufficient reasons for discounting the various liabilities claimed by the husband.
2. It is rejected for the reasons given in respect of Ground 3(a).

1. This ground alleges the primary judge fell into discretionary error by taking account of irrelevant considerations - said to be "speculative assumptions regarding alleged undisclosed assets/funds outside the known pool without sufficient evidentiary foundation".
2. The husband's submissions in support of this ground commenced this way:
   1. Judgment [130]-[138] record His Honour's finding that the husband failed to give frank disclosure of income and business transactions without identifying any evidence of specific transactions or assets to support that conclusion. Those findings were speculative and based on a subjective impression of the [husband's] credibility rather than probative material.
3. The contention of speculation is rejected.
4. The husband's alleged financial non-disclosure was a substantial issue from the outset (at [3] and [55]). He breached orders, frustrated orders, used property for his exclusive benefit, and transferred property to try and put it beyond the wife's reach, which conduct the primary judge explained within the reasons (at [23], [26], [72]-[77], [177], [198]-[211], [217] and [220]). Even allowing for English not being the husband's first language, he was found to be an unreliable witness (at [72]-[78]). The husband failed to produce documents in fulfillment of his financial disclosure obligation so he cannot complain in the appeal of how the absence of such documents undermines the inferences drawn by the primary judge.
5. The primary judge made this factual finding about the husband's financial non-disclosure and active deceit:
   1. In this case, the wife alleges the husband has engaged in widespread and deliberate non-disclosure. The Court is satisfied that the available evidence supports this submission. The husband's non-disclosure in this matter is egregious and flagrant. The husband has gone to extraordinary lengths to dispose of marital assets and conceal property. He has lied to this Court on multiple occasions to avoid revealing the extent of his misconduct. It is not necessary to comment on all material instances of the husband's non-disclosure given that they will be addressed later in these reasons. Nevertheless, the Court is satisfied and finds that the husband's non-disclosure is such that the principles referred to in Weir & Weir should be enlivened. The Court also formally finds the husband to have been a witness of extremely poor credit. The Court therefore will not accept the husband's evidence unless it constitutes an admission against interest, is otherwise aligned with the undisputed facts of the case or is substantiated by legitimate documentary evidence.
6. Such finding was evidently available - expressly and inferentially.
7. Not all facts can be directly proven. Drawing inferences is an ordinary part of the fact-finding process, drawing upon on logical deduction rather than any rule of law (G v H [1994] HCA 48; (1994) 181 CLR 387 at 390). Factual findings, including those reached by inference, are either open on the evidence or not (Thorne v Kennedy [2017] HCA 49; (2017) 263 CLR 85 at [54] and [59]; Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 at 302-304 and 307). Findings which are open cannot be challenged for "discretionary" error, as the husband now wrongly purports to do as this ground complains of the primary judge's alleged error by "taking into account irrelevant considerations".
8. Aside from the husband's undisclosed proprietary interest in a parcel of foreign real property, to which no value was attributed (at [112], [142] and [145]), the primary judge did not construct a balance sheet including any other undisclosed property (at [145]). Instead, as was permissible, the husband's non-disclosure was accounted for under s 75(2) of the Act (at [177] and [198]-[210]), consistently with the wife's submission that it should be (at [168]).
9. In that regard, the primary judge said this:
   1. The Court has made numerous findings as to the husband's inappropriate and problematic conduct during these proceedings. Many of these findings go to his disposal of matrimonial assets in an effort to frustrate the wife's application before this Court for a just and equitable division of the parties' property. This is most evident in the husband's blatant attempt to dispose of his interest in the second respondent which he accomplished with the assistance of the [third respondent's directors], and his successful disposal of [a business]. It is unnecessary for the Court to restate its findings on these issues nor set out the extraordinary breadth of the husband's dishonesty and disregard for this Court and its processes.
   2. The Court is satisfied and finds that the husband's conduct unnecessarily extended the length of these proceedings and undermined the parties' ability to resolve the matter without the need for a final hearing, and judicial determination. This has resulted in the parties incurring further costs through additional legal fees, counsel/solicitor advocate's fees, the costs of further valuation reports, the costs of attending numerous interim hearings, and the wife's costs of issuing numerous subpoenas (together with legal costs associated with reviewing voluminous subpoena material). Most significantly, it has also increased the period which the wife has been denied the benefit of her share of the marital assets. It is undisputed that the wife and the children have resided in sub-optimal conditions post-separation and pending the finalisation of these proceedings. The Court is satisfied this is a relevant consideration under this subsection.
10. There was no error.

1. This ground contends there was an error "in the exercise of discretion" because the judgment was "manifestly unjust and inequitable", which proposition cannot be sustained and is rejected.
2. The second respondent sought to argue this ground on a completely different legal premise of "jurisdictional error", but the second respondent did not separately appeal from the judgment and is therefore bound by the terms of the ground asserted by the husband. The issue of the existence of jurisdiction and power to make the default orders affecting the interests of the second and third respondents is taken up under the rubric of Ground 6.
3. Relevantly for this ground, the primary judge recognised the husband's greater financial and non-financial contributions to the parties' property (at [150]) but gave proper recognition to the wife's primary homemaking contributions (at [152]). The parties agreed their contributions were equal until their separation, save for the wife's contested reliance upon the principles distilled in Kennon v Kennon [1997] FamCA 27; (1997) FLC 92-757 due to her sufferance of family violence committed by the husband (at [165]).
4. Given the findings made about the husband's commission of family violence, which included his convictions for assaulting the wife and his breach of a family violence order made for her protection from him, his Honour accepted the wife feared she would be seriously injured or even killed by the husband (at [153]-[161]).
5. The wife's contributions therefore attracted greater weight on account of her post-separation contributions (at [164]) and her contributions during the relationship being made more arduous by the husband's family violence (at [165]).
6. Consequently, the parties' contribution-based entitlements were assessed at 55 per cent to the wife and 45 per cent to the husband (at [166]). The husband admitted equality (at [52]), so the conclusion was not much different.
7. Upon consideration of the factors prescribed by s 75(2) of the Act, the primary judge assessed an adjustment of 45 per cent should be made in the wife's favour (at [218]), taking her overall entitlement to 100 per cent of the known assets. The adjustment of that magnitude amounted to nearly $1.2 million.
8. An adjustment of that quantum would very often be considered extraordinary, but numerous plausible reasons were given for it here, including: the wife's ongoing sole responsibility for one child, who suffers from disability and for whom the wife bears the principal cost of support (at [176], [179]-[180], [196]-[197], [217] and [219]); the husband's undeclared income and greater earning capacity (at [177], [217] and [220]); the husband lives with family at no cost (at [193]); the husband's unilateral use of assets after separation, about which he failed to give proper disclosure (at [198]-[211]); and the manner in which the husband's deceitful conduct unnecessarily protracted the proceedings (at [212]).
9. His Honour explained the adjustment thus:
   1. The adjustment of 45% to the wife (relative to the known net asset pool) also takes into account the issues raised pursuant to s.75(2)(o) of the Act which need not be restated. The Court has found the husband's evidence to have been utterly unreliable. His non-disclosure was so pervasive and significant that the Court cannot make findings as to the application or whereabouts of funds in the husband's sole control or the value of property in his sole control except to say that, on the available evidence, they are proximate or greater than the amount to be received by the wife pursuant to these orders.
   2. Having considered the available evidence in light of the relevant statutory criteria I am therefore persuaded that an adjustment of 100% of the known net asset pool in the wife's favour is appropriate.
10. The adjustment under s 75(2) of the Act is not so incongruent with those undisturbed findings as to render the final result "manifestly unjust and inequitable".

1. This ground asserts the primary judge's exercise of discretion miscarried by making an order which compelled the sale of real property at Town D, NSW.
2. The first point to make is that the sale of the Town D property is only required if the husband defaults in payment of the cash sum to the wife. Not otherwise.
3. The second point to make is that, while the Town D property is jointly owned by the second and third respondents, the second respondent is controlled exclusively by the husband (at [2]). Aside from the husband's exclusive proprietary interest in the second respondent (and hence his unilateral control of its assets), valued at over $2 million, he has no other assets to easily liquidate to enable his payment of the cash sum to the wife (at [145]).
4. Despite characterising the error as being discretionary, the husband and the second respondent argued the ground as being legal error, but that complaint cannot be maintained either.
5. There is no impediment to the Court making property orders which impinge upon the proprietary interests of a third party if the third party is the alter ego of one spouse (Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper (1981) 148 CLR 337 at 343-344 and 354-356). Here, the second respondent is controlled exclusively by the husband, so coercive orders affecting it and its property are valid and enforceable.
6. The following submissions made by the husband are rejected:
   1. By compelling sale and distribution of proceeds belonging to two separate corporations - neither of which were shown to be mere nominees - the primary judge exceeded the statutory power.

...

1. By failing to distinguish between the husband's personal property and the independent property of [the second respondent] and [the third respondent], the judgment collapses distinct legal personalities into a single "asset pool". That reasoning constitutes legal error, factual misapprehension, and jurisdictional excess warranting that Orders 1-6 be set aside.

1. It is simply false to assert the primary judge improperly merged the husband's property interests with those of the third respondent. While his Honour found the husband and the directors of the third respondent were complicit in their commercial activities, the husband was not found to have any interest in the third respondent or its property.
2. It is also false to submit the second respondent was not shown to be the husband's "nominee". The husband was and remains the sole director and shareholder of the second respondent. His own solicitor deposed the second respondent's interests are "identical to those of the [husband] and it seeks the same relief [as the husband]".
3. The husband expressly proposed the wife receive 50 per cent of the parties' net assets (at [54] and Schedule 1), though he did not directly address how that result would be achieved by operable orders (at [226]). The parties' assets were found to have a net value of $2,607,653.83 (at [145]). Given such assets principally comprised the husband's proprietary interest in the second respondent, which the husband admitted (at [94]), there was no way he could pay the wife a cash sum representing 50 per cent of the value of their net assets, as he proposed, without resorting to the use of the second respondent's assets, which he unilaterally controls. It follows that the husband must have contemplated making the payment to the wife from the second respondent's assets.
4. The third respondent's property rights are not impinged by the appealed orders. The third respondent elected not to contest the trial but, being a party joined to the proceedings, is still bound by the orders. If the Town D property must be sold, the sale orders provide for the third respondent to receive one-half of the net sale proceeds (Order 3(l)(iv)(A)), so its proprietary interest is preserved. The third respondent would extract the same equity from the Town D property if the second respondent sought the sale of the property pursuant to s 66G of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) in separate commercial litigation. The remaining one-half of the net sale proceeds is notionally payable to the second respondent, but the orders appropriate from that share of the proceeds the sum due to the wife (Order 3(l)(iv)(B)), with the remaining balance made payable to the husband (Order 3(l)(iv)(C)).
5. His Honour was conscious of how the sale of the Town D property would crystalise a capital gains tax liability but could do nothing about it. His Honour said:
   1. The Court acknowledges that a capital gains tax liability will likely arise in the event the default order for the [Town D] property to be sold comes into effect. The husband raised this issue during his cross-examination of [the single expert] but otherwise did not propose any specific order be made and, as stated, made no submissions as to this issue. The third respondent, as previously stated, did not participate in the final hearing which proceeded undefended against them. It is not the Court's role to run the parties' cases for them. Despite the obvious fact that a capital gains tax liability will likely arise in the event of default, none of the parties addressed this in their submissions, and the Court will make no orders accounting for this.
6. Neither the husband, the second respondent, nor the third respondent can criticise the primary judge for not making orders to deal with a potential liability they each failed to address. In any event, the potential CGT liability was not the subject of any ground of appeal.

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The husband shall pay the wife's party/party costs of and incidental to the appeal, fixed in the sum of $20,000 pursuant to s 114UB(5)(a) of the Act. The appeal was wholly unsuccessful and the husband conceded costs would then follow. He only argued the quantum. The wife sought $25,000 and the husband conceded $15,000. The sum of $20,000 is a reasonable compromise.

I certify that the preceding eighty-seven (87) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin.