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[2026] QIRC 70
General information, not legal advice.
Queensland Industrial Relations Commission
2026-03-13
Original judgment source is linked above.
INDUSTRIAL LAW - DISMISSAL - APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT - where the Applicant was employed by Queensland Health - where the Applicant contravened a Public Health Directive - where the Applicant's dismissal followed a disciplinary process - where the dismissal was not harsh - where the dismissal was not unjust - where the dismissal was not unreasonable - where the Applicant failed to follow a Public Health Directive - where the Applicant has not shown contrition - where the Application for reinstatement is dismissed
Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ss 316, 319(b), 320
Public Health Act 2005 (Qld) pt 8, s 362B
Public Sector Act 2022 (Qld) s 91
Augustine v State of Queensland [2022] QIRC 184
Byrne & Frew v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410
Gold Coast District Health Service v Walker [2001] QICV 63
Laegal v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2018] QIRC 136
Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 097
Stark v P&O Resorts (Heron Island) (1993) 144 QGIG 914
Mr E. Shorten of counsel, instructed by MinterEllison on behalf of the Respondent
[1] At the time of dismissal, Ms Perry ('the Applicant') was employed by the State of Queensland (Queensland Health) ('the Respondent') at the Gold Coast University Hospital ('GCUH').
[2] This application and decision relates to the termination of Ms Perry's employment on 17 June 2024, which followed an investigation and disciplinary process substantiating two allegations. The substantiated allegations are:
[3] The allegations arose from an incident which occurred on 12 July 2021 where Ms Perry made a personal visit to a friend, Ms Armstrong, who was hospitalised at the GCUH. At that time, Queensland was experiencing the COVID-19 pandemic. On 7 July 2021, the Chief Health Officer had issued a 'Hospital Entry Direction' ('the Direction').[1] The Direction had been preceded by numerous similar directions.[2]
[4] Clause 16 of the Direction stated that '...a patient of a hospital in a restricted area may not have visitors'. Clause 17 of the Direction provided for a process whereby approval could be sought to visit patients in certain circumstances.[3]
[5] The Respondent was bound by the Direction and contravening the Direction was an offence under the Public Health Act 2005 (Qld), relevantly:
PART 8 - PENALTIES
A person to whom the direction applies commits an offence if the person fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the direction.
Section 362D of the Public Health Act 2005 provides:
A person to whom a public health directive applies must comply with the direction unless the person has a reasonable excuse.
Maximum penalty- 100 penalty units or 6 months imprisonment.
[6] In opening its case, the Respondent made submissions about the situation at the relevant time:[4]
... visitors were, pursuant to these restrictions, banned from hospitals, aged care facilities, corrections facilities, and disability accommodation... When those visitor restrictions were in effect, if one wished to visit their own dying relative, one would need to apply for and obtain an exemption to do so. And in that context, in mid-2021, Ms Perry and Ms Walker abused the power of the access that they had as employees to move around the hospital. They went and visited a friend who was a patient. They didn't seek approval or exemption.
[7] The Respondent submits that on 12 July 2021, Ms Perry knew about the visitor restrictions that were in force and that Ms Perry knew even Ms Armstrong's family were allowed to visit her. The Respondent says that Ms Perry knew that Ms Walker, an administration employee at the GCUH, had 'no business wandering around the cancer ward full of immunocompromised patients when Queensland was in the midst of a public health crisis'. Despite this, the Respondent says that Ms Perry went with Ms Walker to make a personal visit to an old work colleague.[5]
[8] The Respondent says that while Ms Perry refused to admit that she had facilitated Ms Walker's visit, that this is what occurred. The Respondent says that as part of the visit, Ms Perry gave Ms Walker a polo shirt that she was not authorised to have.[6]
[9] The Respondent submits that the conduct in giving Ms Walker the polo shirt 'plays second fiddle to the fact Ms Perry breached the Public Health Direction'.[7]
[10] The Respondent submits that Ms Perry visited a patient at a time when visits were prohibited and she has never advanced a reasonable excuse for that, and this forms the factual basis for her termination.
[11] In its closing submissions, the Respondent has summarised the relevant events regarding the investigation and disciplinary process which followed. This summary reflects the evidence before the Commission and I adopt it here:
(a) obtained a uniformed polo shirt and provided it to Ms Walker (who was not authorised to possess it) knowing that she intended using it to gain unauthorised access to a patient; and
(b) failed to comply with the Direction when she visited the patient.
[12] I note that there was a delay between the Respondent receiving Ms Perry's show cause notice and the decision to terminate her employment. This is because Ms Perry filed a public sector appeal against the disciplinary findings set out in the second show cause notice. The Commission upheld the disciplinary findings. Ms Perry then appealed that decision to the Industrial Court of Queensland. Ms Perry's appeal was later dismissed, which enabled the discipline process to recommence.
Legislative framework, legal principles and approach to the application
[13] Ms Perry says that her dismissal was unfair within the meaning of s 316 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act'). Section 316 provides that a dismissal is unfair if it is 'harsh, unjust or unreasonable'. Ms Perry bears the onus of proving her dismissal was unfair.[16]
[14] Section 320 of the IR Act sets out the matters that must be considered in deciding whether Ms Perry's dismissal was unfair:
(c) whether Ms Perry was given an opportunity to respond to the allegations against her.[19]
(d) any other matters the Commission considers relevant.[20]
[15] With regard to those matters, and on the basis of the evidence before the Commission referred to at paragraph [11] above, I am satisfied that: Ms Perry was notified of the reason for her dismissal; that the dismissal related to Ms Perry's conduct as set out in the substantiated allegations; and that she was given an opportunity to respond to the allegations.
[16] Therefore, what remains are any other matters the Commission considers relevant. Here, there will need to be consideration of whether the matters raised by Ms Perry in her application for reinstatement serve to make the dismissal unfair.
[17] The Respondent submits that in this case, the principle from Stark is relevant and applicable:[21]
Ordinarily where an employer conducts a full and extensive investigation and gives the employee a reasonable opportunity to respond to allegations being made against him, an honest decision of the employer that misconduct warranting dismissal has occurred will, if formed on reasonable grounds, will be held immune from interference by the Commission...
[18] I accept that the findings of Chief Commissioner Hall (as his Honour then was) in Stark are relevant and apply to Ms Perry's case. For the following reasons, I find that Ms Perry's dismissal was not unfair. Her application for reinstatement is dismissed.
Consideration of Ms Perry's key arguments and the Respondent's submissions
[19] At the outset, Ms Perry's representative said, 'the case is not about disputing visitor status'. Ms Perry's position is that the issue of visiting without authorisation has been determined and Ms Perry accepts that.[22] Ms Perry also admits that she was aware of the sign out procedure for uniform shirts and accepts that she did not follow the procedure when she took a shirt and gave it to Ms Walker in circumstances where she knew Ms Walker was not authorised to have that uniform.[23]
[20] In her closing submissions, Ms Perry accepts that on the day of the incident, she was in her designated role and work area. Ms Perry acknowledges that, while on duty, she visited the patient but says this was 'within safe bounds'.[24]
[21] Ms Perry's position is that in undertaking the conduct, she was acting reasonably and within her duties. Ms Perry is of the view that her conduct was not of a serious nature and that the Respondent's actions demonstrate this. Ms Perry believes that her actions did not pose a risk or that any such risk was very low.
[22] Ms Perry was represented by her husband, Mr Perry. Mr Perry is not a lawyer or an industrial advocate. This accounts for Ms Perry's opening submissions and closing written submissions being at times, contradictory or inconsistent, difficult to follow and/or addressing irrelevant matters.
[23] In light of this, I adopt an approach whereby I work through and consider what appear to be the reasons Ms Perry says that her dismissal was harsh, unjust and unreasonable as set out in her Statement of Facts and Contentions; her oral opening submissions; and her written closing submissions. In doing so, I will consider Ms Perry's submissions in respect of each matter, the Respondent's submissions in reply and the relevant evidence before the Commission. I have been assisted by the Respondent's submissions which identify and group Ms Perry's arguments.
[24] I have had regard to Ms Perry's closing submissions in reply to the submissions of the Respondent. I have not addressed submissions which revisit matters addressed in the Statement of Facts and Contentions, at hearing and in the Applicant's closing submissions.
[25] It appears that Ms Perry accepts that the Direction and restrictions applied to her.[25] She accepts that she was visiting without authorisation and that this matter has been settled by way of the decision of the Commission in her public sector appeal and the subsequent decision of the Industrial Court of Queensland. In spite of this matter having been settled, Ms Perry appeared to claim at the hearing that she was not aware of the requirements of the Direction.
[26] The Respondent noted that in cross-examination, Ms Perry argued that the Direction only applied to visitors from outside the hospital.[26] The Respondent also notes that Ms Perry argued that she was in Ms Armstrong's hospital room 'to supervise' Ms Walker during the visit,[27] but also that she admitted she had no special responsibility for supervising patient visits.[28]
[27] Ms Perry argues that the patient requested Ms Walker visit her and that she found herself in a situation where she needed to escort Ms Walker 'to make sure she didn't cross the lines with infection control... because it was in my area of work'.[29]
[29] The Respondent submits that 'it cannot be accepted that Ms Perry reasonably didn't understand that the restrictions applied to her like they applied to everyone else'.[32] While there was some evidence that some 002 Operational Services employees were not fully aware of restrictions in place at the time, the Respondent says that this is not relevant in circumstances where Ms Perry, who was not employed in that position, did get staff alert emails and had intranet access. The Respondent says that whether important information was disseminated lower down the chain is not relevant. Ms Perry was adequately informed and there has been no failure by the Respondent which would make her dismissal unfair.
[30] I have considered Ms Perry's evidence on this point which demonstrates that she had no legitimate reason, requirement or purpose for visiting Ms Armstrong's room with Ms Walker on 12 July 2021. I accept that Ms Perry knew the Direction applied to her and that there was no reason which was not in contravention of the Direction for her to be in Ms Armstrong's room to supervise Ms Walker's visit. It seems Ms Perry continued to argue that she had a legitimate purpose for accompanying Ms Walker on the visit to create a reasonable excuse for her non-compliance with the Direction.
[31] The Direction was made by the Chief Health Officer and the GCHHS was bound by it and required to enforce it. As the Direction applied to Ms Perry, the visit was unauthorised. Ms Perry appears to accept this in her submissions; however, I have dealt with this matter for completeness and in the event there is confusion arising from Ms Perry's evidence which was, at times, contradictory.
Ms Perry knew the Direction applied to her and was not confused about this
[32] Ms Perry's evidence was that she understood that the Direction applied to her.[33]
[33] Ms Perry accepted that during the show cause process, she had made submissions to the effect that she was confused about whether the Direction applied to her. However, she now accepts that she is not confused about that matter.[34]
[34] Ms Perry's evidence at the hearing, under cross-examination, was that she was aware of the restrictions, had received the staff alerts and emails and knew about the directions and that they applied to her. Ms Perry accepted that there was no confusion on her part.
[35] I do not accept any version of events which Ms Perry put forward at hearing that she was confused or did not know about whether the visitor restrictions applied to employees of the hospital.
[36] There was extensive evidence before the Commission regarding communications to staff and the public regarding visitor restrictions.[35]
[37] Specifically, I note that a staff alert was distributed on 2 July 2021 stating:[36]
Statewide restrictions on hospitals, aged care, disability care and correctional facilities will continue to apply with no personal visitors allowed for the next two weeks. This means that visitors are not permitted in our facilities, with the exception of the end of life care, care of a minor, support person in the birth suite or a disability carer.
[38] Ms Perry has abandoned any suggestion that the Direction did not apply to her, however I have addressed it here for completeness. The Direction applied to Ms Perry and Ms Perry knew that. I accept the Respondent's submission that it is 'simply implausible' that Ms Perry was unaware, given the volume of communication, that the restrictions applied to her.[37]
There is no evidence that there was an accepted culture of staff visiting patients
[39] Ms Perry says that witnesses on the second day of hearing confirmed that following the incident, Environmental Services staff received no management communication, instruction or briefing regarding COVID-19 safety, visiting restrictions, or patient contact. This submission appears to be in support of an argument that the Respondent must not have been too concerned about the visit as it did not prompt any communication reminding people about visitor restrictions. I have dealt with the actions taken by the Respondent following it becoming aware of the conduct elsewhere in these reasons for decision.
[40] Ms Perry said that witnesses described 'a culture of accepted visiting during COVID-19, with staff and managers routinely visiting patients'.[38]
[41] The Respondent notes that 'several months into her disciplinary process', Ms Perry made a complaint that certain staff had breached visitor restrictions.[39] The Respondent says that notwithstanding the delay, the lack of detail and the loss of the CCTV footage in the interim, it undertook preliminary investigations, but there was not enough evidence to substantiate them.[40]
[42] The Respondent submits that Ms Perry called several witnesses[41] anticipating they would provide evidence that they themselves had breached the visitor restrictions or that they witnessed other staff doing so. The Respondent says that none of those witnesses gave reliable evidence to that effect. I accept the Respondent's submissions that the witnesses were unable to: specify names or dates; or whether visitor restrictions were in force at the relevant time; or that visits were personal as opposed to work-related.
[43] To the extent that those witnesses said that they received little communication about visitor restrictions, I accept the Respondent's submission that most, if not all, of those witnesses were employed below the Team Leader level which Ms Perry was employed in. On that basis, these witnesses did not have access to work emails or the intranet. As discussed above, Ms Perry knew about the visitor restrictions and that they applied to her and, in any event, she had that information by virtue of her position of Team Leader.
[44] Having considered the evidence of Ms Pitman, Mr Brown and Mr Calvert alongside that of Ms Perry's work colleagues, I am unable to establish as a fact that there was a culture of employees making personal visits to patients when the COVID-19 visitor restrictions were in place.
That there was no RiskMan or WHS report made regarding Ms Perry's conduct does not make her dismissal unfair
[45] Ms Perry says this is not a case about whether she was a visitor, but rather, whether the Respondent lawfully, reasonably and completely or competently discharged its obligations. Ms Perry says that under Queensland Health's critical incident framework, mandated through the Hospital and Health Boards Regulation 2023 Queensland, all patient safety issues must be reported.[42]
[46] Ms Perry's opening submissions appear to address this matter. It was said that 'Mandatory Queensland Health systems, RiskMan, patient safety, Queensland Health HSD-032 and the incident management process, Queensland Health IMP-401-7 were bypassed'. Ms Perry says, 'no clinical review was undertaken; no qualified assessment of risk was made and the statutory duties under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld) were ignored'.[43]
[47] Ms Perry says the reporting gateway exists to ensure that blameworthy conduct is distinguished from system failure, so individuals are not unfairly scapegoated contrary to principles of natural justice. Ms Perry says a 'root cause analysis' or RCA is undertaken so that risks are identified, lessons are drawn and protections are put in place for the patient concerned and future patients.[44]
[48] Ms Perry says these safeguards did not occur in this case. Ms Perry says that because no RCA was conducted, no qualified assessment of risk was ever made. Ms Perry says this omission denied her procedural fairness and left 'the systems without the protections required through the Hospital and Health Boards Act 2023'.[45]
[49] Ms Perry says that while Mr Brown says her conduct posed a significant risk, he conceded that no immediate or preventative risk-management actions were needed or immediately taken to ensure patient or staff safety. In Ms Perry's submission, the Respondent cannot cite a significant safety risk without evidence of corrective measures and that this is contradictory to work health and safety duties.[46]
[50] In her closing submissions, Ms Perry says that under the QH-HSD-032 Patient Safety Directive, the incident must be managed in accordance with the Clinical Incident Management Guideline, and mandatory reporting requirements must be undertaken.[47]
[51] At hearing, Ms Perry emphasised her view that a RiskMan report should have been made in circumstances where her visit was a "SAC-1" incident.[48]
[52] I note that neither Mr Brown nor Mr Calvert accepted that the visit was a SAC-1 incident.[49]
[53] The Respondent says that upon becoming aware of the matters, Ms Pitman 'did report it up the chain and the allegation was investigated'.[50] The Respondent specifically points to Ms Pitman's evidence as to why she reported it in the way she did on 17 July 2021 instead of through the RiskMan system[51] and Mr Calvert's evidence as to why the lack of a RiskMan report is not relevant to the matter.[52]
[54] The Respondent submits that whatever work health and safety process failures Ms Perry perceives as having occurred, it did not affect the fairness of her dismissal.[53]
[55] The Respondent submits that it is important to remember that this is not a work health and safety prosecution and that Ms Pitman is not on trial. The Respondent says, 'this isn't a roving inquiry into Queensland Health's response to the pandemic and how effectively everybody discharged their work health and safety duties'.[54]
[56] Ms Perry breached the Direction. Employees of GCUH later reported this matter. Ms Pitman escalated it as soon as she became aware of it. An investigation was undertaken. A show cause process followed. I am satisfied that the Respondent considered the matter to be very serious and that its actions demonstrated this.
[57] Even if it were found that some individual or manager should have undertaken other reporting or action in relation to Ms Perry's unauthorised visit to a restricted area in breach of the Direction, that would be a separate matter.
[58] I am satisfied that the matter of whether a RiskMan or other escalation as a WHS issue occurred has no bearing on whether the dismissal of Ms Perry was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
That Ms Perry was not suspended from duty or immediately retrained does not make her dismissal unfair
[59] Ms Perry says that despite the Respondent describing her as a significant risk, she was never suspended, or retrained and she continued in her role, including leading COVID-19 teams for nearly three-years post-incident. Ms Perry says that management repeatedly relied on her expertise during the pandemic, including in high-risk settings. Ms Perry says that this is 'wholly inconsistent with the claim that she was unsafe'[55] and that this demonstrates that her conduct 'was not treated as serious'.[56] Ms Perry says that there is no basis to contend that the employment relationship has irreparably broken down.[57]
[60] Ms Perry says that this makes the Respondent's 'narrative of risk' retrospective and opportunistic rather than 'evidence-based'.[58]
[61] Ms Perry says the Respondent 'cannot establish a sufficiently serious breach under cls 4.7 and 5.3 of the Directive 05/23: Discipline'.[59]
[62] Ms Perry says while Mr Brown holds significant concerns that Ms Perry thinks the CHO Directions do not apply to her, she remained in her role for nearly three-years without 'correction'.[60]
[63] Ms Pitman gave evidence as to why there was no immediate correction or retraining of Ms Perry following the reporting of her conduct. Ms Pitman said that she 'would not speculate on something as serious as corrupt conduct to drive different treatment of two staff deserving of natural justice'.[61] Ms Pitman's evidence was that mitigations around training would not be considered until after the Matters Assessment Committee had made their determination.[62]
[64] Further, the Respondent says that Ms Perry was aware no later than October 2021 that her visit was being investigated and so was on notice that her conduct was in question.[63]
[65] Mr Brown gave cogent evidence as to why Ms Perry was not suspended. He said that when the early information came through, he didn't have the full picture as an investigation hadn't proceeded. Mr Brown said that at that point, it was 'far too early' to decide to suspend Ms Perry. Relevantly, he said:[64]
Her role was team leading operational services and I needed to understand why Ms Perry... was in that room... with Ms Armstrong, and hence that's why we undertook an... external investigation process.
I didn't want to make a summarily (sic) decision or an early decision around her guilt without providing her an opportunity to respond to the show causes. And if I had taken the decision to suspend her or remove her from the workplace, the argument would have been that I'd already made my decision that she'd breached the chief health officer's directive and that she had breached the code of conduct. So it's not an easy position to be in making those decisions, Mr Perry, but that was my rationale at that stage.
[66] The Respondent submits that even if Mr Brown's hesitation to suspend might tend to suggest that the later decision to dismiss was disproportionate (which it does not accept), in the present case, it is outweighed by other matters which show the dismissal was proportionate. In particular, the Respondent points to the seriousness of Ms Perry's conduct and her lack of insight or contrition.[65]
[67] It was unnecessary to provide Ms Perry with specific training to reiterate the requirements of the Direction. Ms Perry was aware that it applied to her, and that the Respondent was taking the matter seriously. She knew that her conduct was being investigated which prompted a disciplinary process. Those matters alone were such that Ms Perry should have been aware that her conduct was under scrutiny and she should pay heed to reasonable or lawful directions that applied to her.
[68] It is not unusual for an employee to continue with their duties while a disciplinary process continues. I accept Mr Brown's explanation for why Ms Perry was not suspended. I note that the extended period of time between making the disciplinary findings and terminating Ms Perry's employment was out of the Respondent's control as it awaited the outcomes of her public sector appeal and appeal of that decision to the ICQ.
[69] If Ms Perry had shown contrition and continued to work without incident while the disciplinary process and appeals continued, it may support an argument that the dismissal was unfair. However, Ms Perry has not done so and she maintains that she did the right thing by breaching the Direction. In those circumstances, and considering the seriousness of her conduct, I do not accept that the failure to suspend Ms Perry makes her dismissal unfair.
That the conduct relates to one incident where Ms Perry says she acted with compassion and the intent was to assist a visitor to connect with a cancer patient[66] does not make the dismissal unfair
[70] Ms Perry says that she was placed in a problematic position, balancing GCHHS values with her immediate role responsibilities. Ms Perry says that 'her measured response embodied a balanced judgment under the circumstances'. Ms Perry says that she 'exercised her duty reasonably by closely supervising Ms Walker and ensured that time in the patient's room was kept to a minimum and controlled'.[67]
[71] Ms Perry refers to the GCHHS Strategic Plan 2024-2028 Values and says that her conduct on 12 July 2021 exemplifies those values as she was responding to a distressed, immunocompromised known patient with empathy, maintained infection-control measures and acted within her allocated area and ward, within her duties. Ms Perry says that her brief, safe response reflected the GCHHS commitment to 'safe, compassionate and connected care'.[68]
[72] Ms Perry says that Ms Armstrong's statement makes it clear that the patient initiated the action. Ms Perry says that she could see Ms Armstrong was distressed and that she organised the phone call to Ms Walker.[69] Ms Perry says that Ms Walker arranged her own visit and that the decision to visit Ms Armstrong was made by Ms Walker.[70]
[73] Ms Perry submits that there are cases which confirm that an 'employee's duty of obedience is not absolute but bounded by what is safe, scope of contract service and within the scope of obligation'.[71]
[74] Ms Perry's argument is that she acted with reasonable cause and within her duties by assisting a patient who requested help. Ms Perry submits that the Respondent's rigidly legalistic stance suggests Ms Perry ought to have withheld assistance. Ms Perry says that 'such inflexibility disregards compassion, resulting in the denial of support to a distressed patient, an outcome no reasonable person could endorse, particularly where safe and controlled assistance was plainly achievable'.[72]
[76] The Respondent submits that 'in a parallel universe, if Ms Perry put her hand up and said, 'Yes, I did the wrong thing, I'm sorry' there may have been a different outcome'.[75] However, the Respondent notes that Ms Perry has never admitted that she did the wrong thing and says this has significant ramifications for trust and confidence going forward.
I think - the factor in this case was the - the - the visit against all of those restrictions at the time to an immunocompromised area of the ward, which - which was just a fundamental breach of the rules. The hospital has to have rules in place to protect staff and patients and I thought this was just too much.
[78] The aspect of Ms Perry's submissions I find most concerning is that she believes that it was open to her to break a law which had been made to ensure the safety of vulnerable patients and the community during a pandemic. Instead of being sorry that she breached a Direction and placed the safety of vulnerable patients at risk, Ms Perry is critical of her employer for enforcing the Direction made by the Chief Health Officer.
[79] There were processes in place to allow visitation on compassionate grounds in certain circumstances, and it was open to Ms Perry, like any member of the community who wished to visit a patient, to make such a request. That Ms Perry chose to circumvent that process, by exploiting her position to undertake the visit is of great concern. It cannot be suggested that where one makes their own assessment as to what is compassionate and reasonable, they are discharged from their obligations to comply with Public Health Directions, workplace policies or procedures or the Public Service Code of Conduct. If that approach were condoned, GCHHS could not trust that the rules, procedures and codes put in place for the safe operation of the hospital would be followed by all employees.
[80] I do not accept any proposition that the dismissal was disproportionate to Ms Perry's conduct on the grounds that she was acting out of compassion.
That Ms Perry was vaccinated and has self-assessed that her actions did not create a risk to the patient or the Respondent does not make her dismissal unfair[78]
[81] Ms Perry submits that the Respondent 'relied on unqualified self-inference of risk, shifting the matter into a visitor... narrative under the Public Health Act, thereby avoiding scrutiny and transparency that the Queensland Health's own systems demand'.
[82] Ms Perry says that the facts do not bear out 'the Respondent's reliance on catastrophic risk'. Ms Perry refers to 'vaccination evidence' in a case called 'Fletcher versus State, Queensland, Queensland Industrial Relations' where she says Mr Waters, Executive Direction, HR of Queensland Health testified that vaccination reduced transmission and hospitalisation risk by over 90 per cent. Ms Perry says she was fully vaccinated at the relevant time. With reference to some other cases and studies, Ms Perry reiterates that 'the real-world risk was negligible when layered with infection controls'.[79]
[83] In reply, the Respondent says that the Direction did not say anything about vaccination and that it 'just prohibited visitation, vaccinated or not'.[80] The Respondent says that whether vaccinated or not, Ms Perry's visit contravened the Direction and the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service.[81]
[84] The Respondent says that the fact Ms Perry still maintains that it was appropriate for her to undertake her own risk assessment even though there was a Directive in place demonstrates she has shown no insight.[82]
[85] In her closing submissions, Ms Perry again notes that the Respondent has failed to undertake any verified policy or procedural assessment of risk or harm and that it has failed to follow Queensland Health procedures. Ms Perry says that this makes the decision-making unfair.[83]
[86] Ms Perry says that while Mr Brown gave evidence that Ms Perry's conduct was dangerous for the patient, staff and hospital and said it could have caused multiple deaths, damaged the hospital's reputation and deterred urgent care, it is paradoxical that he took no action in response to the identified patient safety risk. Ms Perry says that if Mr Brown's assessment of the threat to immunocompromised patients is to be accepted, his inaction reflects indifference to QH policy and legislation.[84] I have dealt with the steps taken by the Respondent after it became aware of Ms Perry's conduct elsewhere in these reasons for decision.
[87] Ms Perry says that the disciplinary process proceeded without establishing a verified patient-safety risk. She says that Mr Brown dismissed her full vaccination status which had already reduced the COVID-19 risk to negligible levels.
[88] Ms Perry says that she 'understood her duty to risk profile'. Ms Perry refers to a Californian research paper which confirms that layered infection controls keep cross-infections extremely low.[85]
[89] The Respondent submits that whether Ms Perry thinks what she did was safe misses the point. As Mr Calvert said in his evidence:[86]
[t]he point is there was a public health directive. That had the force of law at the time and she just flatly disobeyed it. So it - it was - it was the disobeying the rules, not whether she had, you know, a - she had been fit tested for a mask or anything. I mean, it was just the breaking of the rules.
[90] The Respondent points to Ms Perry's own evidence and says that in continuing to advance this argument, she demonstrates a profound lack of insight:[87]
After all you've been through with the show-cause and the investigation and the public service appeal, sitting there today, you - your position is, you didn't pose any risk by doing what you did?‑‑‑It was done safely.
It was done safely. No risk at all?‑‑‑I didn't put the - did the patient get hurt? Was that established?
[91] Ms Perry's submissions on this point demonstrate not only a lack of insight, but a lack of understanding of basis of her dismissal. The Direction did not state that visitors who were vaccinated should or could have unfettered access to patients. The Direction was aimed at reducing all contact. Ms Perry would have been liable to discipline because of her breach of the Direction whether she was vaccinated or not.
[92] That Ms Perry believes she posed a negligible risk is irrelevant. The research papers Ms Perry points to which indicate that vaccination along with other controls reduce the risk of transmission of COVID-19 are also irrelevant. In any case, Ms Perry's evidence was that she did not know if Ms Walker was vaccinated or not.[88] So, there is no way to accept her submission that she had properly undertaken some kind of self-assessment of risk and determined the risk to be low. If anything, the conduct is made more serious by the fact that Ms Perry facilitated the visit of Ms Walker in circumstances where her vaccination status was unknown. That also undermines the credibility of Ms Perry's claim that her role in attending Ms Armstrong's room with Ms Walker was to ensure that the visit was undertaken safely.
[93] Ms Perry continues to claim that it was open to her to undertake her own risk assessment and that it is unfair to dismiss her as the visit did not result in what could have been catastrophic consequences. In my view, this provides further grounds for the Respondent to believe that it cannot have trust and confidence in Ms Perry.
[94] Ms Perry's vaccination status and self-assessment of any risk she posed has no bearing on whether her dismissal was unfair.
There has been no 'confusion of allegations' or inconsistent characterisation of the conduct
[95] Ms Perry submits that the Respondent's case is 'marked by confusion and inconsistency'.[89] Ms Perry says that the original allegations include patient risk, harm and reputational damage and that the reframed allegations deliberately removed these elements, 'reducing the matter into a uniform issue and a breach of the hospital entry direction. Ms Perry says that the original themes of risk and harm were reintroduced to justify her dismissal. Ms Perry says that this inconsistency left her unable to respond appropriately. Ms Perry says that she was dismissed on grounds that were not the subject of the allegations and this was 'a clear breach of natural justice'.[90]
[96] This submission is repeated in Ms Perry's closing submissions. It is said that references to risk and harm in the first show cause notice were omitted in the second show cause notice. Ms Perry says that the termination letter, the wording of Allegations One and Two did not include risk but in the termination letter, the Respondent cited significant risk to patients, staff, reputation, and public trust as grounds for dismissal.[91]
[97] With reference to the evidence led at the hearing, Ms Perry says that Mr Brown's evidence is 'internally inconsistent' with Mr Calvert's evidence which 'classifies the matter as a low-level SAC 4 event'. Ms Perry says Mr Brown's 'shifting characterisations' are 'confusing and unreliable'.[92]
[98] I had trouble following this line of argument from Ms Perry. I have looked at the show cause letters and the termination letter. There is nothing inconsistent regarding the allegations, the reasons for substantiating the allegations and the reasons that Ms Perry's conduct gave rise to grounds for discipline. The termination letter provides detailed reasons why the Respondent finally determined to dismiss Ms Perry from her employment.
[99] I understand that the first show cause letter initially set out the two allegations which were investigated for the purposes of the investigation report. The letter goes on to set out two reframed allegations and particulars and to request Ms Perry to respond. The wording of the allegations put to Ms Perry does differ to those which were investigated. That the allegations were reframed does not create an unfairness.[93]
[100] Ms Perry's argument that she was not provided a proper opportunity to respond to the allegations cannot be accepted. Ms Perry, with the support of her union, provided responses during the show cause process.
Any 'failure' to interview the nurse present in the room does not reveal unfairness
[101] Ms Perry says that the failure to interview the nurse present in the room when Ms Perry was there 'meant the investigation proceeded without critical evidence, undermining the substantiation of the allegations'.[94]
[102] In her closing submissions, Ms Perry again notes the absence of a witness statement from the nurse who was in the room and says that Mr Brown has provided no explanation for not seeking a statement from her.[95]
[103] I do not understand the purpose of Ms Perry's submissions in respect of this issue. Ms Perry admits that she was in the room without authorisation. Any evidence Ms Perry thinks the nurse could have given as to whether infection control protocols were followed, is irrelevant. The Direction prohibited Ms Perry from being in Ms Armstrong's room at all.
[104] The 'failure' to interview the nurse who was present in the room when Ms Perry was there does not uncover any unfairness.
[105] The Respondent submits that Ms Perry's long service counts against her as she should have known better.[99] During her evidence, Ms Perry stressed the significance of her special knowledge and the important role she played during the COVID-19 pandemic. Ms Perry was a Team Leader. I am satisfied that she knew and understood the Direction. Ms Perry held a position of trust and responsibility. I agree that she should have known better and on that basis, her length of unblemished service does not support an argument that the dismissal was harsh.
[106] The Respondent further submits that any harshness having regard to Ms Perry's personal circumstances is insufficient to countervail the matters weighing in favour of dismissal.
[107] The Respondent cites the evidence given by Mr Brown as to why any disciplinary action less than dismissal would be insufficient:[100]
[I]f the transmission of COVID had occurred... to Ms Armstrong... and - or others in the cancer ward... there would be no doubt it would have caused deaths... across the board... to those immunocompromised... patients... [I]t would have had a significant impact on the reputation of Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service. At that juncture... many patients were trepidatious and concerned of visiting... the Hospital and Health Service. And we know evidence has... now come out that there were... a lot more deaths in the community because people who were suffering life-threatening... conditions chose not to come to the hospital because they were concerned that... they may be infected with COVID... [T]hese actions... not only placed the patients at significant risk, but also placed the Hospital and Health Service... at a significant reputational... risk and damage. But would have also... increased... people in the community or members in the community not coming to hospital... and seeking healthcare that they may require or urgently... require... [A]nother point that I... gave consideration to is Ms Perry is a team leader... who is responsible for, I suppose - and I'm guessing - 30 to 40 staff members who report to her... Ms Perry... is of the view that the chief health officer's directive does not apply to her - um - and other policies clearly don't apply to her... I had significant concerns around her remaining in the workplace... as to what direction she would continue to give the staff who reported to her.
[108] I found Mr Brown's evidence in this regard to be compelling and to provide a good summary of the context at the time and the reason Ms Perry's conduct was of such grave concern.
[109] I accept that the seriousness of the conduct, particularly as it related to vulnerable patients and the community during the COVID-19 pandemic is such that dismissal was a proportionate disciplinary action. If there was any doubt about that, Ms Perry's own refusal to accept that her actions posed any risk, and her apparent view that it was acceptable for her to breach both the Direction and her employer's policies and procedures mean that dismissal was not disproportionate.
[110] Ms Perry was asked if she had learned anything from the process and her answer was 'to stand up for my rights'.[101]
[111] When given an opportunity to finally show remorse for her actions before the Commission, Ms Perry said, 'Why would I have remorse when I'm actually attending to a patient request that is in distress?'.[102]
[112] In circumstances where Ms Perry accepts that her conduct was unauthorised and in breach of the Direction, but she does not accept that it was wrong, the Respondent can have little confidence that Ms Perry will follow other Directions. As Mr Calvert said:[103]
[T]he whole hospital system relies upon rules being followed for infection control or for work health and safety or... any one of a number of reasons. So anyone who can just recklessly disregard those rules and put immunocompromised patients at risk I think, you know, who knows what else that - what other rules they'll break[?]
[113] I understand that Ms Perry is a sole income earner for her family and that it may be difficult for her to find other employment, however those matters do not outweigh the seriousness of her conduct.
[114] The dismissal was not harsh or disproportionate.
Rainbow v Queensland Rail can be distinguished in these circumstances[104]
[115] Ms Perry raises this case and says that the FWC held that termination is unfair where conduct, though technically a breach, lacks a verification to safety standards to risk or gravity to justify dismissal.[105]
[116] The Respondent says that Rainbow is properly distinguished in these circumstances. The Respondent says, 'there, unlike here, the risk of harm was 'negligible', and the worker expressed genuine 'regret and remorse'.
[117] Here, the risk of harm is reflected in the existence of the Direction and the nature of the ward Ms Perry visited. Further, she has not expressed genuine 'regret and remorse' and, in fact, appears to stand by her actions and defend them.
[118] I am satisfied that Rainbow v Queensland Rail can be distinguished from Ms Perry's matter.
Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd does not assist Ms Perry[106]
[119] In her reply closing submissions Ms Perry refers to Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd and says it 'confirms the Commission assesses whether the alleged conduct can constitute a valid ground and whether the asserted basis is supported by evidence'.
[120] For the reasons set out in this decision, I am satisfied that Ms Perry's substantiated conduct, which she admits to, has been properly considered by the Respondent and gives rise to grounds for discipline under the PS Act in that she contravened a standard of conduct sufficiently serious to warrant disciplinary action.[107]
[121] Ms Perry goes on to say that the Respondent has relied on 'non-enforceable ethical values'. It is unclear what those 'unenforceable ethical values' are, however if that is a reference to the Public Sector Code of Conduct, I confirm that it is an enforceable set of principles and that Queensland Government employees must adhere to them. I also note that Ms Perry's evidence was that she understood that.[108]
There has been no conflict of interest and/or lack of procedural fairness
[122] Ms Perry says that Mr Grant Brown was the Executive Director for the incident under investigation and was also the decision-maker. Ms Perry says the Senior Director, Ms Pitman, authorised the original report. Ms Perry says that both Ms Pitman and Mr Brown 'were directly implicated in the non-reporting of the incident to the Department of Health and mandatory obligation requirements'.[109] I have dealt with this with matter elsewhere. Whether the conduct was reported through other avenues is not relevant to Ms Perry's dismissal which occurred because of her conduct in breaching the Direction.
[123] Ms Perry says that under Directive 01/24: Workplace Investigations, the arrangements described above 'create a real perception of bias and conflict of interest'. Ms Perry submits that in '[b]ypassing qualified systems and retaining control of the investigation process, the Respondent denied Ms Perry the safeguards of impartial policy-compliant investigation'.[110] I am unclear as to what this means. The investigation was outsourced and undertaken according to comprehensive and standard Terms of Reference.
[124] Ms Perry again addresses this matter in closing submissions. Ms Perry says that Mr Brown and Ms Pitman were both involved in the events, shaped the investigation scope and approved the Brief for Approval. Ms Perry says that the dual involvement of the two 'has likely contravened Directive 17/20: Workplace investigations s 4.6(a) which requires workplace investigations to be free from conflict of interest or bias to maintain a clear separation between investigator and decision-maker. Ms Perry says no conflict of interest was declared on the Briefs for Approval.[111] Again, this submission is difficult to understand. A decision was made to undertake an investigation, the investigation was undertaken by an external investigator. Neither Mr Brown nor Ms Pitman undertook the investigation.
[125] Ms Perry says that the external investigation report addressed only uniform policy, omitting QH risk management, incident reporting, and patient safety frameworks central to the allegations. Ms Perry says without a qualified examination of those procedures or their risk context, the report lacked a factual and procedural foundation. Ms Perry says that findings of such gravity 'required more cogent evidence'.[112]
[126] Ms Perry says that the Respondent did not adopt the pathways the external investigator identified for the Allegation.[113]
[127] Ms Perry says that the investigation report reiterated that neither officer engaged in corrupt conduct and identified only procedural deficiencies in the uniform sign-out process, recommending administrative improvements.[114]
[128] Ms Perry also says that she had a strained relationship with Ms Pitman arising from 'Ms Perry's objections to procedural issues and proposed changes to industrial instruments'.[115]
[129] Ms Perry points out that Ms Pitman's name was listed on the brief for approval and that Ms Pitman said this would have been about a cost centre listing. Ms Perry says that Mr Calvert's evidence was that he 'relied on the advisors listed' on the brief.[116]
[130] Ms Perry cites Malcolm v State of Queensland[117] and says in that case 'the same decision-maker 'failed to obtain and consider relevant evidence he knew existed, resulting in procedural unfairness'.[118] Ms Perry says that likewise in this case, the Respondent relied on incomplete and selective evidence before 'drawing unqualified and unreasonable inferences about her risk conduct.[119]
[131] The Respondent submits that there is no issue of procedural fairness. With reference to the evidence of Mr Brown and Mr Calvert, the Respondent says that the investigation and discipline process was 'careful and orthodox'.[120]
[132] The Respondent submits that Ms Perry attended the investigation with a support person and was unconstrained in putting her version of events.[121] The Respondent says that it gave Ms Perry an opportunity to show cause why a disciplinary finding should not be made against her, and a further opportunity to show cause on the proposed disciplinary action of termination. The Respondent notes that Ms Perry provided responses and had the assistance of her union after seeking extensions to respond and being granted extensions of time to do so.[122]
[133] The Respondent says that Ms Perry's complaints about the investigation process are vague and unsustainable and, in this case, the relevance of these complaints is difficult to discern given Ms Perry accepts the conduct occurred.[123]
[134] While Ms Perry may be of the view that the investigation should have looked at things such as risk management, patient safety reporting and so on, there was no requirement for this to occur. The investigation was focussed on Ms Perry's conduct, not the conduct of others resulting from her breach of the Direction and actions in accessing the polo shirt and giving it to Ms Walker.
[135] The Respondent engaged an external independent investigator. Mr Calvert approved the Terms of Reference. The investigation found the initial allegation capable of being substantiated and identified a further allegation arising from Ms Perry's written submissions to the investigation. At that point, the process returned to Mr Brown to consider and progress.
[136] Ms Perry was provided with a copy of the investigation report as an attachment to the first show cause notice. I understand Ms Perry submits that the Respondent did not 'adopt the pathways' the investigator suggested for the allegations. It is unclear what this specifically refers to. However, I would firstly note that the Respondent is not bound to follow suggestions made by an investigator. I would also note that on page 22 of the report, the investigator wrote:[124]
In this Report, the Investigator has focused on the conduct of the Subject Member on 12 July 2021. The Investigator is of the view that her actions had the potential to cause serious and imminent risk to the health and safety of a patient of GCUH as well as the reputation of GCHHS.
The investigation did not deviate from the TOR issued by the Chief Executive, GCHHS in order to come to the findings.
The Investigator does not believe that the actions of the Subject Member should be considered corrupt conduct defined in section 15(1) of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld). However, the conduct is likely to be seen to be in clear breach of her employment arrangements. GCHHS policies and procedures, the Queensland Public Service Act and the Code of Conduct for the Queensland Public Service.
[137] It must also be said that it is unclear why Ms Perry continued to prosecute arguments or submissions about the lack of fairness in either the investigation or the disciplinary process in circumstances where she has admitted the conduct and accepts that the visit was not authorised.
[138] I am unable to identify any conflict of interest pertaining to either Mr Brown or Ms Pitman with regard to either the investigation or the disciplinary process.
[139] I have reviewed all the material and evidence pertaining to the investigation and discipline process. It appears to me that Ms Perry was afforded procedural fairness and the opportunity to participate in a comprehensive disciplinary process, including appealing the disciplinary findings to both the QIRC and ICQ. Ms Perry has not demonstrated anything about investigation or disciplinary process which would serve to make her dismissal unfair.
Any assessment or otherwise of 'corrupt conduct' has no bearing on whether the dismissal was unfair.
[140] Ms Perry says that the CCC found no corrupt conduct or disciplinary breach warranting termination and referred the matter back to GCHHS. Ms Perry says that the Respondent's senior staff misapplied information in the 23 August 2021 Brief for Approval by asserting that corrupt conduct had been 'confirmed' when the CCC found no corrupt conduct. Ms Perry says that the false claim regarding corrupt conduct was carried into the Terms of Reference for the investigation and has anchored the investigation in an 'adverse and misleading context'.
[141] I have reviewed the Matters Assessed document.[125] With regard to the first two allegations considered, the 'endorser comment' said: 'The allegation, if proved, meets the definition of corrupt conduct...'. With regard to the second allegation, specifically the Ms Perry had not signed 'the book' when taking the shirt, the endorser comment said, in part: '...Accordingly, the matter could not constitute corrupt conduct and the CCC is unable to take any further action...It is a matter for the GCHHS to deal with any alleged disciplinary breach or code of conduct issue'.
[142] The relevance of Ms Perry's submissions about whether the conduct was assessed as corrupt conduct is unclear. It is open to the Respondent to commence an investigation and/or disciplinary process regardless of whether the conduct is corrupt conduct or suspected corrupt conduct or is determined not to be corrupt conduct at all.
[143] Having considered the matters initially reported to Ms Pitman, the escalation of the matter, the referral to the MAC, the response from the MAC, and the Terms of Reference for the Investigation. I do not accept that the investigation was anchored in an 'adverse and misleading context'.
[144] In any case, Ms Perry admits the conduct. The conduct breached the Direction and the Code of Conduct, and it was open to the Respondent to commence the disciplinary process which resulted in her dismissal.
[145] Ms Perry refers to what she says is adverse action taken against her by the Respondent. That allegation is not relevant to the matter before me.[126]
[146] I note that Ms Perry says she has been made a scapegoat for GCUH's failure to appropriately respond to the 'identified unacceptable risk' following her visit which breached the Direction.[127] The Respondent submits that 'there is no safe basis to embrace any argument' that Ms Perry was 'singled out'. The Respondent points to the 'near perfect comparator' of Ms Walker and notes the Mr Brown was also 'at the helm' of her disciplinary process and that Ms Walker, like Ms Perry, was dismissed.[128]
[147] Ms Perry has made extensive submissions that she was 'low-risk' and that there is no evidence to support the suggestion that her conduct could have led to catastrophic or extreme consequences. As I have stated above, the serious conduct was the breaching of the Direction. It was not open to Ms Perry, or anyone else, to determine that she could breach that direction because of her vaccination status or self-assessment as to whether she posed a risk. It was open to Mr Brown and Mr Calvert to consider the serious outcomes which could have resulted from Ms Perry's breach in determining the appropriate response to her conduct.
[148] In her closing submissions and in her evidence, Ms Perry continued to maintain that she had done nothing wrong.[129] It is difficult to understand how Ms Perry can maintain that position given that she has had the benefit of: a detailed show cause process including provision of all relevant policies, procedures, directions and the investigation report; an appeal decision from the QIRC upholding the disciplinary findings; a further decision of the ICQ upholding the disciplinary findings; a detailed second show cause notice; a detailed termination decision letter; an opportunity to attend a conciliation conference to discuss the matter which would have included a written response to the application from the Respondent; and the benefit of the Respondent's statement of facts and contentions and written submissions.
[149] Ms Perry's closing submissions state that the conduct was not found to be misconduct.[130] On that basis Ms Perry argues that the matter should not have been dealt with by way of a disciplinary process.[131] This submission is misconceived. Ms Perry's conduct was deemed to give rise to grounds for discipline pursuant to s 91 of the PS Act. On that basis, it was open to the Respondent to commence disciplinary proceedings.
[150] I have considered all of the reasons Ms Perry says her dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Ms Perry has not discharged the onus of demonstrating that the dismissal was unfair.
[151] The dismissal was proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and Ms Perry's lack of remorse. A proper and procedurally fair investigation and show cause process was undertaken with due consideration given to Ms Perry's responses. Consideration was given to Ms Perry's personal circumstances, and it was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable for the Respondent to find that those personal circumstances did not outweigh the seriousness of the conduct.
[152] I have found that the dismissal was not unfair. I will not interfere with the decision of the Respondent that Ms Perry's conduct warranted dismissal.
[2] See for example the Respondent's closing submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 19 December 2025 [2.2].
[16] Gold Coast District Health Service v Walker [2001] QICV 63; [2001] QIC 63; (2001) 168 QGIG 258, 259.
[21] (1993) 144 QGIG 914, 916 ('Stark') cited in Laegal v Scenic Rim Regional Council [2018] QIRC 136 [66].
[24] Ms Perry's closing submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 28 November 2026 [3].
[35] T3-12 L20-T3-15 L38; T4-6 L7-T4-7 L25; T5-3 L43 - T5-4 L39.
[37] Respondent's closing submissions (n 2) [3.15].
[38] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [16].
[40] Respondent's closing submissions (n 2) [3.22].
[41] T2-5-T2-21; T2-23-T2-37; T2-39-T2-46; T2-47-T2-49; T2-52-T2-61; T2-63-T2-73; and T2-74-T2-81.
[42] T1-13. The matter of the Respondent's actions after it became aware of Ms Perry's conduct is also addressed in Ms Perry's reply closing submissions filed in the Industrial Registry on 23 January 2026 at [4], [6], [7], [16], [19], [20], [21].
[46] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [14].
[55] T1-13; this matter is repeated in Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) at [8], [22].
[56] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [10].
[57] Ms Perry's Statement of Facts and Contentions filed in the Industrial Registry on 30 May 2026 [17(h)].
[59] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [10].
[65] Respondent's closing submissions (n 2) [3.35].
[66] Ms Perry's Statement of Facts and Contentions (n 57) [17(d)].
[67] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [51].
[68] Ibid [49]; Ms Perry's reply closing submissions (n 44) repeat this submission [14].
[70] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [50].
[71] Ibid [53]; Ms Perry cites R v Darling Island Stevedoring [1938] HCA 44; (1938) 60 CLR 601; One Key Workforce Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2018] FCAFC 77 [187].
[72] Ms Perry submits further that '[t]he Respondent's rigidly legalistic stance suggests that Ms Perry ought to have withheld assistance. Such inflexibility disregards compassion, resulting in the denial of support to a distressed patient - an outcome no reasonable person could endorse, particularly where safe and controlled assistance was plainly achievable'.
[74] Exhibit 1 (n 1), Tab 8 [17](e), T3-14 T4-8
[76] Ms Perry's Statement of Facts and Contentions (n 57) [17(c)] and [17(d)]
[81] Respondent closing submissions (n 2) [3.40].
[83] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [12].
[89] See, for example, Ms Perry's reply closing submissions (n 42) [13].
[91] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [11].
[93]T1-136-T1-137. Exhibit 1 (n 1) Tab 45. The wording of the allegations can be compared by looking at the investigation allegations on page one of the letter and the particularised allegations put to Ms Perry on pages 2 and 3.
[95] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [22].
[96] Ms Perry's Statement of Facts and Contentions (n 57) [17(e)].
[99] Augustine v State of Queensland [2022] QIRC 184, [132]; T4-18.
[104] Rainbow v Queensland Rail [2022] FWCFB ('Rainbow v Queensland Rail')
[105] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [23]; Ms Perry's reply closing submissions (n 42) [15].
[106] Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410.
[111] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [34].
[117] Malcolm v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2024] QIRC 097.
[118] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24)[24]; see also Ms Perry's reply closing submissions (n 42) [15].
[119] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [24].
[120] Respondent's closing submissions (n 2) [3.43]; T4-11-T4-23; T5-5-T5-6.
[122] Respondent's closing submissions (n 2) [3.43]; T1-120-T1-121, T1-127-T1-129.
[123] Respondent's closing submissions (n 2) [3.44]; T1-103.
[126] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [44]-[45].
[128] T4-24 and Exhibit 1 (n 1) Tab 3.
[129] Ms Perry's closing submissions (n 24) [56].
[131] See for example Ms Perry's reply closing submissions (n 42) [12].
Perry
State of Queensland
(1995) 185 CLR 410
(1938) 60 CLR 601