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[2026] NSWSC 818
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-07-13
Sirtes J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Perpetual Corporate Trust Ltd v Maneva Pty Ltd [2026] NSWSC 818
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 13 July 2026
Decision date: 13 July 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Sirtes J
Decision: See [76]
Catchwords: EVIDENCE – legal professional privilege – waiver – material contained in affidavit – material communicated to third party – whether documents privileged – whether implied waiver – whether common interest
COSTS – where producing party substantially successful – where material provided on day of hearing – whether costs should follow the event – costs in the cause
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 56, 57, 58, 98
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 117, 118, 119, 122, 131A, 133
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.1
Cases Cited: AWB Limited v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234
Cygnett Pty Ltd v Souris [2020] FCA 1754
Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; [2002] HCA 49
DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc [2003] FCA 1191
Esso Australia Resources Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67
Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; [1976] HCA 63
Hancock v Rinehart (Privilege) [2016] NSWSC 12
In the matter of Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec & mgrs apptd)(in liq) [2006] NSWSC 899
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 66
Marshall v Prescott [2013] NSWCA 152
Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Perpetual Corporate Trust Limited (Plaintiff)
Maneva Pty Ltd (First Defendant / First Respondent)
Mario Evangelo (Second Defendant / Second Respondent)
Janelle Terese Evangelo (Third Defendant / Applicant)
Georgia May Evangelo (Fourth Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
G Stapleton / B Millington (Third Defendant / Applicant)
G Rubagotti (First and Second Respondents / First and Second Defendants)
Solicitors:
Swaab (Third Defendant / Applicant)
Zali Burrows at Law (First and Second Defendants / First and Second Respondents)
File Number(s): 2025/00208125
Before me is an application to maintain privilege over certain documents. This application was referred to me by Faulkner J, before whom questions of privilege arose on 1 June 2026 during an application for these proceedings to be transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the FCFCOA). His Honour is part-heard in the transfer application and will hear it on 20 July 2026. Due to the urgent need to resolve this question, this application has been determined on the papers. Each party has supplied several affidavits and written submissions, for which I am grateful.
It is first necessary to set out the nature of the proceedings out of which this dispute arises.
The Plaintiff, Perpetual Corporate Trust Limited (Perpetual), commenced these proceedings by a Statement of Claim filed on 30 May 2025. It seeks various orders, including judgment for a sum owing under a loan agreement and for possession of an apartment located in Barangaroo (the Property).
On or about 18 October 2023, Perpetual advanced a loan in the amount of approximately $6 million to the First Defendant, Maneva Pty Ltd (Maneva). The Second Defendant, Mario Evangelo, is a director and shareholder of Maneva. The Third and Fourth Defendants, Janelle Terese Evangelo and Georgia May Evangelo respectively, are the registered proprietors of the Property. To avoid confusion, and without disrespect, I will at times throughout this judgment refer to the Second, Third and Fourth Defendants by their first names.
The loan was secured by a general security agreement executed by Maneva as borrower and Mario, Janelle and Georgia as guarantors. Mario seemingly did not provide any security for his guarantee. Janelle and Georgia secured their guarantees by a mortgage they granted to Perpetual over the Property.
On or about 18 January 2025, Maneva defaulted on the loan when it failed to make repayments when they fell due.
On 14 March 2025, Perpetual issued demands to each of the Defendants (the First Demand), demanding payment under the loan, mortgage and guarantee. The First Demand also gave notice of Perpetual’s right to take possession of and to sell the Property.
On 6 May 2025, Perpetual issued another demand (the Second Demand) for $6,260,842.12 plus legal costs of $665.50.
On 30 May 2025, in the absence of repayment, Perpetual commenced these proceedings.
On 17 October 2025, Janelle filed a Cross-Claim seeking orders against Perpetual, Maneva and Mario.
Mario and Janelle were married on 6 October 2018. Georgia is their daughter. Mario and Janelle separated on a final basis on 17 November 2023, some six weeks after the general security agreement was executed.
On 21 February 2024, Mario commenced proceedings in Division 1 of the FCFCOA by which he sought property adjustment between himself and Janelle. The Property is part of the marital asset pool in those proceedings.
On 12 April 2024, Schonell J ordered Mario, from that date, to make all interest and principal payments to the Plaintiff under the loan until further order. It is alleged in the Cross-Claim that, despite Schonell J’s order, Maneva and Mario did not do so.
On 16 May 2025, Campton J made an order that Janelle’s solicitors in those proceedings hold the sum of $1,357,303.69 on trust for Janelle. His Honour made further orders on 24 September 2025 by which Janelle was empowered to use the money in trust to pay arrears owing under the loan as well as monthly principal and interest repayments.
The FCFCOA proceedings are ongoing.
The Cross-Claim seeks various orders and declarations. It alleges, inter alia, undue influence, unconscionable conduct, relief against forfeiture, a resulting trust, co-surety contribution, indemnity by Maneva as principal debtor and also by Mario. Janelle also seeks that the matter be transferred to Division 1 of the FCFCOA to be case managed with the extant FCFCOA proceedings.
The Cross-Claim is pleaded conditionally. It only arises if, contrary to Janelle’s Defence, the Court finds her to be a guarantor and/or principal debtor of any secured monies owed to the Plaintiff. If that finding is made, Janelle seeks to be relieved of liability under the security documents she is alleged to have signed on or about 9 October 2023.
The Cross-Claim focusses on the circumstances in which the Property was acquired on or about 5 November 2021. It was purchased using the proceeds of the sale of another property of which Janelle was the sole registered proprietor. Janelle alleges that when the Property was purchased, Mario caused it to be transferred into Georgia’s name as tenant in common owning an 80% proportion, with Janelle owning the remaining 20%. Janelle says that she was neither aware of nor intended this ownership arrangement.
Janelle further pleads that she signed the security documents under duress and/or Mario’s undue influence, without independent advice, and on the basis of representations made by Mario that any borrowing was for their mutual benefit, would be short-term and that Maneva or Mario would repay the loan without default.
At the commencement of the transfer application before Faulkner J, Ms Zali Burrows, the solicitor acting for Maneva and Mario, served two affidavits. Ms Burrows swore the first affidavit (the Burrows Affidavit) and a new witness, Mr Abdul Osman, swore the second (the Osman Affidavit). Janelle objected to parts of those affidavits on the basis that they contain privileged material.
“I swear this affidavit in respect of
a. paragraphs 5(b) and 20-22 together with Annexure “O” and Annexure “P” of the affidavit of Zali Burrows affirmed 1 June 2026…; and
b. paragraphs 6-12 together with Annexure “A”, Annexure “B”, Annexure “C”, Annexure “D” and Annexure “E” of the affidavit of Abdul Osman affirmed 1 June 2026…,
being pages which I assert contain legally privileged material.”
In resolving this issue, I have regard to the following principles concerning privilege. The party making the claim bears the onus of proving the facts on which the claim for privilege is said to be founded: Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; [1976] HCA 63 at 689*;* In the matter of Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec & mgrs apptd)(in liq) [2006] NSWSC 899 at [14] (Austin J); Hancock v Rinehart (Privilege) [2016] NSWSC 12 (Hancock) at [5] (Brereton J).
To discharge its onus, the party claiming privilege must establish that the disputed documents comprised or contain confidential communications made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice and/or conducting an anticipated or pending litigation: Esso Australia Resources Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 (Esso) at 64–65 [35], 73 [61]–[62] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543; [2002] HCA 49 at 552–553 [9]–[11]; Hancock at [5].
Justice Young in AWB Limited v Cole (No 5) [2006] FCA 1234 said at [44]:
"The purpose for which a document is brought into existence is a question of fact that must be determined objectively. Evidence of the intention of the document's maker, or the person who authorised or procured it, is not necessarily conclusive. It may be necessary to examine the evidence concerning the purpose of other persons involved in the hierarchy of decision-making or consultation that led to the creation of the document and in subsequent communication."
"To sustain the claim of privilege, the claimant must not merely assert it but must prove the facts that establish that it is properly made. Thus a mere assertion that the documents are privileged will not suffice, because it is an inadmissible assertion of law. The claimant must set out the facts from which the court can see that the assertion is rightly made, or in other words 'expose … facts from which the [court] would have been able to make an informed decision as to whether the claim was supportable'. The evidence must reveal the relevant characteristics of each document in respect of which privilege is claimed, and must do so by admissible direct evidence, not hearsay."
As to the necessary requirement of there being a "confidential communication" and a "confidential document", as those terms are defined in s 117 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (the Evidence Act), a communication or document would be "confidential" if either the person who prepared it or the person for whom it was made or prepared "was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law".
The Court has the power to inspect documents over which a claim for privilege has been made in accordance with s 133 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of determining whether such privilege exists. The High Court, in Esso at 52, suggested that a court "should not be hesitant to exercise such a power". This is particularly the case, as it is here, when the judge hearing the application is not the trial judge.
In addition to these principles, there are specific principles concerning email threads and attachments to emails. An email package, which is an email, its attachments and any earlier email embedded in the thread, is not a single indivisible unit. Each component must independently satisfy the dominant purpose test. It is an error to claim, or to refuse, privilege over the whole thread as a block.
A document does not acquire privilege merely because it is attached to, or transmitted under cover of, a privileged email. Similarly, an attachment prepared for the dominant purpose of legal advice or litigation may attract privilege even though the covering email is anodyne and is not privileged. Further, the privileged character of the most recent email in a thread does not invest previous emails in the thread with privilege.
One exception to this, observed by Allsop J in DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc [2003] FCA 1191, is where an embedded earlier email reproduced within a later privileged email is, in substance, a copy of an earlier original email (which is not privileged). Allsop J held that a copy of a non-privileged original may attract privilege where the copy was brought into existence for the dominant purpose of obtaining advice, but that that does not clothe the original with privilege.
I will deal first with the relevant paragraphs and annexures of the Burrows Affidavit before turning to those of the Osman Affidavit.
Paragraph 5(b) of the Burrows Affidavit sworn 1 June 2026 alleges conduct said to have been undertaken by Mr Osman. It seeks to summarise the documentary evidence to which Janelle objects. Accordingly, if I am otherwise satisfied that the documentary evidence is protected by privilege, the contents of paragraph 5(b) should be rejected.
Similarly, paragraphs 20–22 of the Burrows Affidavit, which are referred to in paragraph 5(b), refer to and attach correspondence, being Annexures “O” and “P” to the Burrows Affidavit. If those annexures are protected by privilege, paragraphs 20–22 should likewise be rejected.
Annexure “O” is four pages long. Three of those pages are photographs of an email thread. The most recent email in that thread was sent to Janelle on the evening of 19 January 2026 by her solicitors. The thread includes a detailed email sent to Janelle’s solicitors by Mr Osman, seemingly voluntarily and without warning, that morning. In his email, Mr Osman is seeking information and documents from Janelle’s solicitors. It is not entirely clear how he expected to obtain such material from Janelle’s solicitors. They did not act for Mr Osman, nor is he a solicitor.
In claiming privilege over Annexure “O”, Janelle submits that:
"Each of those communications were sent with the author's dominant purpose being to either provide legal advice or communicate in relation to a litigation" (sic).
This is a broad submission which makes no reference to evidence.
Having examined the email attaching Mr Osman's email, sent later that day to Janelle by her solicitors, I conclude that the email does not actually contain any legal advice. The communication was not prepared for any purpose that satisfies the forms of privilege contained in ss 118 or 119 of the Evidence Act. The email sent by Mr Osman to Janelle’s solicitors on 19 January 2026 was not privileged and is therefore producible.
On that basis, I reject the application for privilege over Annexure “O” and, therefore, over paragraphs 5(b) and 20 to 22 of the Burrows Affidavit. No privilege attaches.
Annexure “P” is seven pages long. It too largely comprises photographs of an email thread. Within that thread are two emails which were part of a thread Janelle forwarded to Mr Osman and a third email Mr Osman sent Janelle’s solicitors. It is unclear whether the third email was attached to either of the first two emails in this annexure. Janelle makes the same submission with respect to Annexure “P” as she did with respect to Annexure “O” at [35] above.
The first two emails in the thread are between Janelle and her solicitors. Both emails were sent on the evening of 20 January 2026. Those emails contain legal advice and instructions and are clearly privileged.
The third email, which is part of Annexure “P” but does not appear to be part of the same thread as the first two emails, was sent by Mr Osman to Janelle’s solicitors. It also forms Annexure “B” to the Osman Affidavit and my conclusion regarding that Annexure at [47] and [48] below applies to the third email.
Subject to the issue of waiver considered below, privilege attaches to the two emails within Annexure “P” between Janelle and her solicitors.
In her affidavit sworn 10 June 2026, Janelle asserts, in relation to paragraphs 6 to 12 of the Osman Affidavit, privilege under ss 118, 119, 122(5)(a)(i) and 122(5)(c) of the Evidence Act.
That assertion is made via a table contained in Janelle’s affidavit. The table in question is more in the nature of a submission than evidence. Although such tables are often helpful in conveying the asserted privilege at a high level, the party bearing the onus of establishing privilege must adduce evidence to support the asserted privilege. In my opinion, that has not occurred here.
I can find no basis to identify any such privilege beyond Janelle’s assertion that she considers the communications between herself and Mr Osman, a non-lawyer, were confidential. That may be so, but it does not create a basis to assert and maintain the substantive right that is a claim for legal professional privilege. As no privilege attaches to paragraphs 6 to 12 of the Osman Affidavit, I need not consider whether privilege was waived.
Janelle claims privilege over Annexures “A” to “D” of the Osman Affidavit.
I am not persuaded that those Annexures are protected by legal professional privilege. First, there is no evidence that any of those documents were prepared for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice, nor for the dominant purpose of litigation within s 119 of the Evidence Act. Secondly, having examined them, nothing in their content suggests they were prepared for those purposes.
No privilege attaches to these Annexures.
Annexure E falls into a different category. It is an email sent by Janelle to her solicitors at 7.50pm on 20 January 2026 responding to an email containing legal advice which Janelle’s solicitors had sent her earlier that evening. Mr Osman deposes that Janelle forwarded that material to him. The document plainly falls within s 118 of the Evidence Act. Maneva and Mario resist the claim for privilege. They submit that any privilege over the annexure has been waived.
Janelle’s explanation for how such documents fell into Mr Osman’s hands is contained in her 10 June 2026 affidavit. On her account, she emailed “the privileged material” to Mr Osman to assist him in his role of managing her “legal and financial affairs”. The question before me is whether Janelle, in providing the material to Mr Osman, waived privilege over it.
It is the disclosure of the privileged documentation to Mr Osman, rather than assertions made as to the contents of such communications, which is in issue. Therefore, any waiver would be implied rather than express.
Implied waiver of privilege occurs where the privilege-holder’s conduct is, objectively, inconsistent with the confidentiality the privilege protects: Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 66; ss 122(2) and 122(3)(a) of the Evidence Act.
Maneva and Mario contend that Janelle forwarded her solicitor’s “substantive advice from 20 January 2026 and her own instructions to her solicitor of the same date” to Mr Osman from her own email account without imposing any obligation of confidence upon Mr Osman.
In response, Janelle submits that she did not act in a way inconsistent with her maintenance of privilege. Janelle further submits that the Court should be satisfied that she provided the documents to Mr Osman on a confidential basis because Janelle and Mr Osman had a common interest in the relevant proceedings pursuant to s 122(5)(c) of the Evidence Act. As part of these submissions, Janelle states that Mr Osman had become her trusted adviser and had provided funds to help pay her legal fees. It was in this context that the privileged communications were shared.
I am required to decide this issue by reference to the Evidence Act: s 131A of the Evidence Act. Janelle’s conduct, in providing advice from her solicitor to Mr Osman, constituted a knowing and voluntary disclosure to “another person”. I am satisfied that Mr Osman was and is “another person” for the purposes of that provision.
Janelle argues that the disclosure should remain privileged under s 122(5)(c) of the Evidence Act because she and Mr Osman had a common interest in the outcome of the FCFCOA proceedings at the time of the disclosure.
The nature of common interest privilege was described by Barrett JA (with whom McColl and Ward JJA agreed) at [65] of Marshall v Prescott [2013] NSWCA 152 in the following terms:
“Where there is, in relation to actual or pending litigation (or its course or outcome), a commonality of interest between, on the one hand, a party to the litigation who is also the holder of the privilege and, on the other, the person to whom disclosure of the privileged content is made by that party for a purpose relevant to that litigation, the commonality of interest supplies a rational basis for inferring an intention that the party's confidentiality should continue and the party's privilege should be maintained, even though the subject matter of the disclosure has passed into the hands of the other person.”
The concept of a “common interest” is not rigidly defined. It is a question of fact in each case: Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 at [23] (Bergin J). Mere common interest in the outcome of litigation will be sufficient to enable a party with that interest to rely upon the privilege: Cygnett Pty Ltd v Souris [2020] FCA 1754 at [19] (O’Callaghan J).
I have read the affidavits in this application closely. There is dissonance between Janelle and Mr Osman’s competing accounts of their relationship. Indeed, their accounts are irreconcilable. They met late in 2024 or in 2025. On 24 December 2025, Mr Osman gave Janelle $66,350 to pay her outstanding legal fees.
Janelle says that Mr Osman became someone she trusted soon after they met. Indeed, her account indicates that there was a blurring of a personal and quasi-professional relationship. Mr Osman advised and assisted Janelle with legal and financial affairs. There is also a suggestion in Janelle’s evidence that Mr Osman had some romantic interest in her. In any event, she regarded him as a trusted advisor who provided funds to help pay her legal fees.
Due to this, Janelle says, when she sent the privileged material to Mr Osman, their interests were aligned. She submits that his conduct, both in providing the loan and generally in assisting her during the FCFCOA proceedings, demonstrates his “advisory role, and the common interest that they shared in the outcome of (at least) the FCFCOA proceedings.” Janelle characterises this as being “somewhat akin” to the common interest that can arise between a litigation funder and the recipient of their funding.
Mr Osman does not agree with Janelle’s characterisation of their relationship. In his affidavit sworn 17 June 2026, Mr Osman says that “Janelle often claimed I was her friend and to offer to be my next of kin, I found her strange.” In his affidavit sworn on 29 June 2026, he says he found her “repulsive, unattractive and extremely unstable.” On his account, he was “hustled” into paying the $66,350 after Janelle and her solicitor promised she would receive $1,000,000 from the FCFCOA proceedings on 23 March 2026.
Although their characterisation of their relationship is irreconcilable, the text messages they sent to each other their during their relationship are of assistance. Those messages are annexed to Janelle and Mr Osman’s various affidavits. I have read them with care. To my mind, a message sent on 21 February 2026 is key. In that message, contained in Annexure “C” to Janelle’s 22 June 2026 affidavit, Mr Osman said:
“… I genuinely thought we had a great friendship. I went out of my way to help you in every way I could. …
I went away and didn’t receive a single text or phone call. Then I get invited to a wine tasting a week before it happened something that was apparently meant to be my Christmas present. That says a lot about how much this friendship means to you.
When you cut ties, I had no choice but to ask for my money back. I can see your case isn’t getting resolved anytime soon, and I wasn’t prepared to keep waiting and risk being made a fool of.”
(Emphasis added.)
To my mind, the message suggests, contrary to Mr Osman’s account, that he knew the $66,350 was to be repaid after the FCFCOA proceedings concluded. This reading is supported by Mr Osman’s own 29 June 2026 affidavit, where he said that he was “hustled” because he was told that Janelle “would get $1,000,000 on 23 March 2026, and unless I paid [Janelle’s solicitor], Janelle ends up with nothing if they stop acting for her.” While this seemingly supports Mr Osman’s account that he was promised money on 23 March, I do not consider it likely, especially on Mr Osman’s own account of their relationship, that he would be concerned about Janelle not receiving money from the FCFCOA proceedings unless his own financial interests coincided with her being successful in the litigation.
I agree with Janelle’s characterisation of Mr Osman’s interest in the outcome of the FCFCOA proceedings as being aligned with her own. Although Janelle, rightly, acknowledges that the litigation funding analogy is imperfect, I do not consider it to be of much import whether Mr Osman was a professional litigation funder or a person who was simply engaged in funding Janelle’s legal proceedings.
Having read and considered the evidence in this application, especially the contents of Mr Osman’s email correspondence to Janelle’s solicitors at Annexure “O” of the Burrows Affidavit, which correspondence I have determined is not privileged, I am satisfied that there was a “common interest” between Janelle and Mr Osman in the outcome of the proceedings.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that Janelle providing her solicitor’s legal advice to Mr Osman attracts legal professional privilege and that such privilege has not been waived. That material must be removed from the Osman Affidavit, along with any references to the contents of that correspondence.
The parties agree that the costs of this application should follow the event. However, there is dispute about which party should pay the costs of the adjournment of the transfer application from 1 June to 20 July 2026.
Maneva and Mario submit that the costs of the adjournment should follow the event in accordance with r 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). They submit that Mr Osman approached Mario on 24 April 2026, after the deadline for evidence had closed. Further, they argue that the material contained in the Burrows and Osman Affidavits only came to light when Mr Osman located and produced the emails on 31 May 2026. He did so after Janelle’s solicitor, responding to a subpoena for correspondence with Mr Osman, stated on 29 May 2026 that she “did not personally hold any documents for production” that answered the subpoena.
Further, Maneva and Mario submit that Janelle’s claims of privilege were unreasonable and that it was those claims, rather than the affidavits themselves, which caused the adjournment.
Janelle submits that Maneva and Mario should pay both her costs of the adjournment and Georgia’s. Janelle points out that the Burrows and Osman Affidavits were served on the day of the hearing, the latter less than an hour before the commencement of the hearing.
It is to my mind significant that Mr Osman only provided the material to Ms Burrows after Janelle’s solicitor said she did not hold such material. That was part of the cause of the late provision of the material. While it is unfortunate that the Burrows and Osman Affidavits were served without notice on the day of the hearing, that seems to have been unavoidable in the circumstances.
I do not agree with Maneva and Mario’s submission that Janelle’s objections to the Burrows and Osman Affidavits caused the adjournment. This is not a situation in which a party, after carefully considering the material, made capricious objections which required further evidence to rebut. The objections on 1 June 2026 were made “on the run” and Counsel for both sides endeavoured to assist the Court in finding a practical method to quell the quarrel.
The costs of the adjournment will be the costs in the cause. For the same reasons, and despite the parties’ agreement, I also consider that the costs of the application should be costs in the cause. In exercising my costs discretion under s 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), I have had regard to the overriding purpose set out in s 56, together with the case management provisions in ss 57 and 58.
I make the following orders:
The Third Defendant is entitled to maintain her claim for privilege over the following material:
(a) the first and second emails, located at pages 36–41, of Annexure P of the Burrows Affidavit; and (b) Annexure “E” of the Osman Affidavit.
(a) paragraphs 5(b) and 20–22 of the Burrows Affidavit; (b) Annexure “O” of the Burrows Affidavit; (c) the third email, located at pages 42–43, of Annexure “P” of the Burrows Affidavit; (d) paragraphs 6–12 of the Osman Affidavit; and (e) Annexures “A”, “B”, “C” and “D” of the Osman Affidavit.
**********
Corrected typographical error in coversheet
Perpetual Corporate Trust Ltd
Maneva Pty Ltd
[2002] HCA 49
(2002) 213 CLR 543
(1999) 201 CLR 49
(1976) 135 CLR 674
(1999) 201 CLR 1