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Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: Statement of Claim filed 16 October 2023
Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala (Plaintiff)
Felicite Terrill Perez de la Sala (First Defendant)
James Morgan Copinger-Symes (Third Defendant)
Maria-Teresa Perez de la Sala (Fourth Defendant)
Edward Robert Perez de la Sala (Fifth Defendant)
Maria-Isabel Harry (Sixth Defendant)
Notice of Motion filed 5 May 2026
Maria-Christina Perez de la Sala (Applicant)
Felicite Terrill Perez de la Sala (First Respondent)
James Morgan Copinger-Symes (Second Respondent)
Maria-Teresa Perez de la Sala (Third Respondent)
Edward Robert Perez de la Sala (Fourth Respondent)
Maria-Isabel Harry (Fifth Respondent)

Representation: Counsel:
Statement of Claim filed 16 October 2023
R Wilson SC/S Hill (Plaintiff)
D B Studdy SC/M Taylor (Defendants)
Notice of Motion filed 5 May 2026
R Wilson SC/S Hill (Applicant)
D B Studdy SC/M Taylor (First and Second Respondents)
Solicitors:
Statement of Claim filed 16 October 2023
L Rundle & Co (Plaintiff)
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (First Defendant)
Mills Oakley Lawyers (Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Defendants)
Notice of Motion filed 5 May 2026
L Rundle & Co (Applicant)
HWL Ebsworth Lawyers (First Respondent)
Mills Oakley Lawyers (Second Respondent)

File Number(s): 2023/214349

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. Before the Court is an application by the plaintiff to amend her statement of claim so as to reinstate, in repleaded form, a proprietary estoppel claim which was previously struck out. The application is opposed by the defendants on the ground that the proposed pleading still does not disclose an arguable cause of action.

2. I delivered judgment striking out the previous pleaded version of the relevant claim (as well as dealing with other interlocutory issues) in March this year: Perez de la Sala v Perez de la Sala (No 4) [2026] NSWSC 163 (“J4”). The background and the procedural history to that point are recounted in that judgment. This judgment assumes familiarity with the March judgment and uses the same abbreviations.

3. The proceedings concern the estate of the late Robert Perez de la Sala. The plaintiff (“Christina”) is his daughter. The deceased died in 2022 and left the whole of his estate to his widow (“Terrill”), who is the first defendant. He also appointed her as his executor. She later obtained probate from this Court.

4. Apart from Christina and Terrill, the other parties to the proceedings are Christina’s ex-husband James, who is the third defendant, and her siblings, Teresa (the fourth defendant), Edward (the fifth defendant) and Maria-Isabel (the sixth defendant): see J4 [5]. They have been joined to the proceedings by Christina because, she alleges, they received substantial sums of money out of the deceased’s estate, either by way of gift from the deceased shortly before his death, or, afterwards, from Terrill.

5. Since delivery of the March judgment, Terrill has decided she wishes to retire as executor in favour of Edward. That application is being dealt with in separate proceedings in the Probate List which do not affect the present application.

6. In deciding in my March judgment to strike out the previously pleaded estoppel claim, I did not go so far as to conclude that the claim lacked viability in any form. I indicated that I would give Christina a further opportunity, which I said should be a final one, to plead a properly arguable claim.

7. Christina’s lawyers have produced a proposed new statement of claim (“PSC”) (styled Second Further Amended Statement of Claim). An application has been made on her behalf, by way of notice of motion, for leave to amend the existing statement of claim (“SC3”) accordingly.

8. In September 2020, about two years before he died, the deceased entered into a settlement with his brother Ernest of long-running litigation in Singapore. The settlement resulted in the deceased receiving assets worth over $500 million. These assets make up a substantial share of the deceased’s estate. Christina is seeking to establish, by her estoppel claim, a proprietary entitlement to a one-quarter share of the proceeds of the settlement.

9. In the argument on the previous version of the proprietary estoppel claim, counsel for Christina relied upon the statement of the relevant principles by the High Court in Kramer v Stone (2024) 281 CLR 484, quoted at J4 [262]. Counsel followed the same approach in the present application, and did not dispute my analysis of those principles in the March judgment.

10. I have referred to Christina’s claim as a claim in the nature of “proprietary estoppel”. In the course of the debate about the previous version of the claim, counsel for Christina was at pains to describe it as an “equitable estoppel”. This apparently was because counsel wished to emphasise that the equitable doctrine on which Christina relies can apply beyond the archetypical proprietary estoppel case of a promise concerning an existing interest in real property. In order to distinguish it from another estoppel claim (which I summarily dismissed), the claim in question became known as the “conventionally pleaded estoppel claim”. It is convenient in this judgment to refer to it as a proprietary estoppel claim, noting that the use of that label does not limit the doctrine to the archetypical real property case.

Amendment application

Promises

11. The PSC pleads, as the foundation for Christina’s equitable estoppel claim, four sets of representations, and one promise, allegedly made to her by the deceased about future benefits she might, or would, receive from the family wealth. These statements are alleged to have taken place at various points over a total period of over 25 years. They are as follows:

12. The deceased’s “Early Representations” are alleged to have occurred between “about 1990 and 1995”. This was before and during Christina’s early training in business, which involved studying in London, working in financial institutions in Europe and Canada, and working in the family business under the direction of Ernest in 1994.

13. The deceased’s “2003 Representations” are said to have occurred, as the name suggests, in about 2003. This was before Christina relocated to Singapore and resumed working in the family business under Ernest’s direction.

14. The deceased’s “Litigation Representations” were allegedly made in “2011 and 2012” when the litigation against Ernest began: see J4 [18]-[19].

15. The deceased’s “Hearing Representations” allegedly took place in “about 2014”. This was at the time the litigation came on for hearing at first instance in Singapore.

16. The “2017 Promise” was allegedly made in “about January 2017”, “shortly after” Loh J published his reasons for decision at first instance see J4 [22]-[26].

17. A common feature of nearly all of the alleged Representations is that they were expressed in terms of what Christina could or should do, and of benefits that she would receive as a result. The deceased’s 2003 Representations illustrate this. The alleged Representations are:

A. Given the Plaintiff's skills, the Plaintiff should relocate to Singapore to assist Ernest in managing the said family business and assets;

B. That the Plaintiff should keep in mind Robert Snr's scheme for the management of the family assets for future generations as set out in the Tokyo letter;

C. That Ernest had sent him his emails to the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff should accept Ernest's request to relocate to manage the family legacy; and

D. There would always be a place for the Plaintiff to work within the family business.

13. As counsel for the defendants pointed out in their written submissions, the previous version of the statement of claim had been framed in a similar way. At J4 [278] I commented:

… Kramer at [37] … requires there to have been a “promise”. Counsel’s point about the pleading in this regard is well taken. It is difficult to identify what it is that Christina alleges her father was actually promising to do. This is particularly important because at the time the deceased’s “representations” were allegedly made the family business was under the control of Ernest. It is not immediately obvious how promises, let alone “clear and unequivocal” ones, that Christina would derive benefits from working in the family business could have been made by anyone other than him.

14. Initially, in their oral submissions, counsel for Christina sought to defend the revised pleading by reference to a recently published work, Hon Steven Rares KC and Quintin Rares, The Law of Estoppel in Australia (Lawbook Co, 2026). Counsel relied on [9-290] and [9-320]:

[9-290] It may not be necessary to pinpoint a precise date at which conduct constituting the encouragement became sufficiently definite to satisfy the “clear and unequivocal” element.

[9-320] The representation, promise or assurance can be made progressively over time.

15. It may be accepted that proprietary estoppel cases may arise out of long-standing family relationships which involve the making of representations and the formation of assumptions about future interests in family property which develop over a long period of time. It may also be accepted that the point at which such representations and assumptions harden into a promise capable of founding an estoppel may be contestable. Furthermore, even once that point is reached, the promise may continue to evolve and become more precise as to the interest which is being promised and the conditions associated with conferral of that interest. In this regard, the parties’ mutual representations and assumptions over time may be of great contextual importance in determining the promise or promises which may have been made.

16. But I do not think that this disposes of the need to plead when the relevant promise (and when any later promise in different or more precise terms) was made. There can be no estoppel until there has been detrimental reliance by the promisee on that promise. The making of a series of promises may of course be pleaded in the alternative to each other. But representations prior to the first one are purely contextual. They may well be an important feature of the evidence, but they are not themselves material facts for pleading.

17. In the end, counsel for Christina accepted this analysis. Counsel identified two alleged statements by the deceased which had been pleaded as promises. They accepted that all of the other “representations” were merely contextual.

18. The first of the alleged promises was one of the deceased’s alleged Litigation Representations. PSC [35(J)] pleaded a representation:

That if the Plaintiff and her siblings won the proceedings against Ernest they would be recovering the share of the family business and assets to which they were entitled and he [the deceased] would honour his own father and mother's intentions and give the assets to his children in equal shares.

19. The second was the 2017 promise and was pleaded at [38] as follows:

In about January 2017 shortly after the reasons for decision of Justice Loh were delivered in Suit No 178 and the deceased knew of the finding of the Court that he both directly owned a share of the family assets and/or monies and indirectly through Camila's estate, the deceased made the following promise to the plaintiff - "I will keep my mother and father's wish alive. You and your brother and sisters are going to receive an equal share."

20. Although pleaded as a representation, [35(J)] differs from the representations of the type I describe at J4 [278]. As pleaded, it is a representation that the deceased would himself take some action, namely give property to his children if the litigation against Ernest was successful.

21. Whether such a representation can be sustained in fact is no doubt contestable. At the time the deceased was not even party to the proceedings in question and there may be a question about whether he would even have foreseen that the proceedings would ultimately result in assets flowing to him personally (as opposed to monies being recovered by the Nominee Companies: see J4 ([19]). But for present purposes it is a sufficiently pleaded promise which, if established, could found an estoppel. I will refer to it as the “Litigation Promise”.

22. The position with the alleged “2017 Promise” is not so clear. Although described in the pleading as a promise, it in fact takes the form of a statement that Christina “would” receive benefits. But in the context, it may be possible to contend that the objective meaning of the promise went beyond a statement of benefits Christina would receive, and was properly understood, objectively, as a promise by the deceased to confer that benefit on her. If that is the way in which Christina’s case is to be presented, then it should be so pleaded. Pleaded in that form, however, it too would be a viable allegation for the purposes of founding an estoppel claim.

Detrimental reliance

23. At various places in the PSC, it is pleaded that Christina relied to her detriment on the deceased’s Early Representations, 2003 Representations, Litigation Representations, Hearing Representations and the 2017 Promise. The pleaded reliance went right back to 1990, and included Christina undertaking her studies in London, her subsequent work experience, relocation of her family to Singapore in 2003, her work under Ernest’s direction in the family business, and so forth.

24. As counsel for the defendants pointed out in their written submissions, these acts of reliance all predated the making of any promise to Christina. Once her counsel accepted that the representations which predated the alleged promises were purely contextual, these allegations of detrimental reliance fell away.

25. Relevantly, the pleading of detrimental reliance is (at PSC [57]):

The Plaintiff acted in reliance upon … the deceased's Litigation Representations, [and] the 2017 Promise … in that the making of these representations made a difference to the Plaintiff's decision to act in the manner particularised hereunder and but for these representations, the plaintiff would not have acted in the manner particularised hereunder.

Particulars

…

C. In or about 2011 and 2012, the Plaintiff personally funded advice in relation to commencement of Suit No 178 to recover the family assets Ernest had transferred to himself and in her capacity as a director and shareholder of Paternoster continued to cause the litigation to be funded; and

D. From about 2011 until 2020, the Plaintiff assisted in providing instructions and preparation of various proceedings against Ernest in Singapore and Hong Kong to get back the said family business and assets.

E. Working on a minimum wage as a director of the companies until 2021 and by voting with the Third Defendant and Fourth Defendant ensured majority control of the Plaintiff companies to conduct the litigation to recover the monies.

F. Rejecting Ernest's request to remove the Third Defendant and Fourth Defendants from the boards of the Plaintiff companies.

26. There is a technical failing in this pleading. The paragraph itself only alleges action, in a generalised way, in reliance on the relevant promises. The real substance of the allegation appears in the so-called particulars. That is not appropriate. The alleged actions by way of detrimental reliance are material facts. They should have been pleaded (and if necessary, themselves particularised) accordingly.

27. Counsel for the defendants argued that there was another problematical feature to PSC [57]. PSC [43] pleads that “in about 2017” Christina fell out with her father. Counsel submitted that, even if there had been reliance up to that point, it could hardly have continued after that date as is alleged in particulars D and E. As the period of time in particular F is not specified, it is possible that this point could apply to that particular also.

28. PSC [43] does not specify when in 2017 the falling-out occurred. Clearly it must, on Christina’s case, have been after the delivery of judgment and the making of the alleged 2017 Promise in January. Counsel for Christina told me from the Bar Table that the falling out had actually occurred in the middle of the year.

29. Counsel appeared reluctant to concede that the allegation in PSC [43] was inconsistent with continued reliance on the alleged promises after mid-2017. But Christina’s own affidavit in the proceedings, made in August 2023, makes this difficult to accept.

30. In the affidavit, Christina deposes that she was estranged from her father between “about June 2017 and his death”. The exhibits to the affidavit include an email to Christina from Terrill in July 2017 that expressly stated that her presence was not wanted by her parents in Australia, or in Singapore unless requested by Edward and James. Then, in December 2017, while the appeal was proceeding in Singapore, Christina approached Ernest by email, proposing a settlement between them so that she could obtain funds from him to “defend” herself and get away from the “constant harassment” from her family and James. When her father got wind of this the following March, he sent an email to her describing the approach as the “ultimate betrayal” and denouncing her character in uncompromising terms. It is difficult to see how in these circumstances Christina could possibly maintain that she was continuing to act as a director of the family companies in Singapore because of an expectation that her father would be giving her a share of the litigation proceeds, or indeed giving her anything at all.

31. Counsel for the defendants also pointed out that, to qualify as detrimental reliance sufficient to create an estoppel, the detriment had to be “life-changing” or at least significant. Counsel also drew attention to the requirement that any such detrimental reliance needed to be objectively reasonable, having regard to the terms of any promise made by the promisor.

32. In this regard, there are some further points about the detrimental reliance case which deserve comment.

33. The allegation in particular C is that the plaintiff “funded” the Singapore legal proceedings when they were commenced, both personally and “as a director and shareholder of Paternoster”. It does not say how the “funding” took place. The plaintiffs in the proceedings were the Nominee Companies. If Christina paid legal fees on those Companies’ behalf this would presumably have been by way of loan to them. As J4 [206] records, it appears to be common ground that the assets of the Nominee Companies were enormous. They were ultimately successful in the litigation. It is thus difficult to see how Christina could have been left out of pocket.

34. Similar considerations arise so far as the allegation of funding through “Paternoster” is concerned. According to another passing reference in the pleading, “Paternoster” was the name of a company of which Christina and Edward were shareholders, and through which their father funded the litigation against Ernest. It is hard to see how this would have resulted in detriment to Paternoster, let alone to Christina personally.

35. Next, the allegation in particular D that Christina helped with the conduct of the proceedings against Ernest misses the point. The question is not what benefit she may have conferred on the Nominee Companies (and therefore, perhaps, indirectly upon her father); the question is what opportunities she gave up. At an earlier point in the pleading Christina alleged detriment through giving up other work opportunities so that she could work with Ernest in Singapore in 2003 onwards. That allegation is conspicuously lacking from particular D.

36. Similar comments apply to particulars E and F. Acting as a director of the Nominee Companies, even if at a “minimum wage” (whatever that means in this context) would not necessarily have prevented Christina from undertaking other work or even necessarily obliged her to live in Singapore.

Prayers for relief

33. The prayers for relief in the PSC begin, at [1], with the following declaration:

A declaration there is in existence an equitable estoppel arising from the Deceased's Early Representations, the Deceased's 2003 Representations, the Deceased's Litigation Representations, the Deceased's Hearing Representations, [and] the 2017 Promise and [Christina’s] reliance thereon (in the knowledge of Deceased and [Terrill]) by which [Terrill] holds as executor of the estate of the Deceased on constructive trust for [Christina] one quarter of the monies received by the Deceased as a result of the Deed of Settlement dated 11 September 2020 and one quarter of the shares in [JMM: see J4 [17] and [36]] or such other share or proportion as reflects the intentions of the Deceased.

34. The relief sought against Terrill as executor appears in [2] and [7]:

An order that [Terrill] pay to [Christina] the sum A$125,664,098, being one quarter of the settlement moneys of A$502,656,391, and one quarter of the shares in [JMM] or such other amount or proportion as is found to reflect the intentions of the Deceased.

…

In the alternative to [2], an order that [Terrill] pay [Christina] equitable compensation … in such sum as the Court assesses as just or, in the alternative, such sum as may be necessary to compensate [Christina] for the detriment suffered and to make good the intentions of the Deceased.

35. The relief sought against James and Christina’s siblings is in each case the same. In James’ case, it is:

An order that an account be taken of the receipts and disbursements by the Third Defendant of the monies received by the First Defendant from the settlement monies of A$502,656,391 and of the amount due by the Third Defendant to the plaintiff upon the taking of accounts.

36. Over-use of claims for declaratory relief is a problem in proceedings in this Division. It is not uncommon to see claims for declarations that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff under particular doctrines or causes of action. For example, there could be a claim for a declaration that a transaction was procured by undue influence on the part of the defendant; or alternatively a declaration that the transaction was an unconscionable bargain, or, in the further alternative, a declaration that it is liable to be set aside under the Contracts Review Act 1980. In extreme cases, there can be declarations that specific elements of such causes of action are satisfied.

37. It is hardly necessary to say that this is bad practice. In the example given, the actual substantive relief which the plaintiff, if successful, will receive is an order that the transaction in question be set aside (or, if embodied in a document, that the document be delivered up and cancelled), together with consequential orders, usually of an accounting nature, designed to achieve restitutio in integrum. Claims for declarations as the doctrinal basis for such orders add nothing and at best are a distraction. In substance, they are claims for “interlocutory declarations” of the type criticised by Gummow J in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 at 590.

38. Such is the case for PSC prayer [1]. The substantive relief in a constructive trust claim is usually a declaration specifying the subject property and the plaintiff’s interest in it, followed by an order that the defendant, as trustee, account to the plaintiff for the interest so specified. In the present case it is quite unnecessary to seek a declaration that an equitable estoppel “is in existence” by reason of the deceased’s representations and Christina’s reliance on them. Indeed, as formulated, the declaration introduces an apparently irrelevant element, namely Terrill’s alleged knowledge.

39. The confusion does not end there. An entitlement by way of proprietary estoppel arises when the defendant repudiates the relevant promise. In the present case, the alleged promise fell due for performance when the proceedings came to an end in 2020 as a result of the settlement. It was that point which would have marked the repudiation of the promise. On the face of it, Christina’s case must be that the alleged constructive trust arose at that point. Thereafter she would be entitled to an account of the assets received by the deceased in the settlement, including any assets into which those assets can now be traced. But instead of this, prayer [2] seeks, not an account, but an order for payment of monies which are now (more than five years later) held by Terrill as executor.

40. The temporal gap exposes another difficulty. The constructive trust is pleaded in prayer [1] as a trust over one-quarter of the deceased’s shares in JMM and a large sum of cash, described as money received by the deceased “as a result” of the settlement with Ernest. But what the terms of the settlement actually provided was that the deceased was to receive ownership of the Nominee Companies (one of which was JMM) as well as ownership of JMC, LIL and other companies (see J4 [36]). Accordingly, it is a one-quarter interest in the deceased’s shares in those companies which should have been the subject of the declaration and the account.

41. Counsel for Christina insisted, however, that the subject matter of the claim was a one-quarter share in the cash allegedly held by the Nominee Companies at the time of the settlement. That submission must be erroneous. It involves the same conflation of an interest in a company with an interest in the property owned by the company which I considered was fatal to the now-dismissed “descendants’ trust claim”: see J4 [239]-[246].

42. For all the Court knows, the companies are still in existence and the shares are still in the deceased’s ownership. But if in the intervening years they have been liquidated or their assets distributed, there is no apparent way in which Christina’s alleged proprietary interest could be traced into those distributions. She would simply have to be satisfied with equitable compensation from the deceased’s estate.

43. Such problems in defining and quantifying Christina’s proprietary claim, if any, against the deceased’s estate are not merely theoretical. I was told by counsel for Christina that the Federal Commissioner of Taxation has made a claim against the estate for $480 million. If Christina truly has a proprietary claim to assets of the estate, or sums of money within it, then it may become important to know where tax liabilities which may have been incurred by the deceased, from the settlement or otherwise, fit into that claim.

44. Another practical issue is whether it is tenable for Christina to try to rope James and her siblings into the proprietary estoppel claim by seeking proprietary relief against them. Christina seeks an account against each of them for monies received from the deceased or his estate. That can only work if there was a prior obligation of Terrill to account, and monies or other assets to which Christina was entitled through that account could be traced into the monies allegedly received by them.

45. As already noted, no proper claim has been pleaded to an account against Terrill as executor for the shares received by the deceased in the settlement. But even if that were done, more would be required to sustain a claim for an account against the other defendants.

46. Such a “secondary” account is available if property for which a defendant is obliged to account to the plaintiff can be traced into property transferred from the defendant to a third party who was not a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice. An example is found in the orders with respect to the Kirribilli property in On Sky Enterprises (HK) Ltd v Lanco International Holdings [2025] NSWSC 1599: see at [308]-[316], [810]-[813], [862(1)]. But in that case the plaintiff pleaded and proved that the Kirribilli property was the traceable product of property for which the principal defendant was obliged to account to the plaintiff. Nothing similar appears in the PSC.

Conclusions

47. Counsel for the defendants noted that Christina’s lawyers had ample opportunity to plead a viable case on her behalf. They adopted what I said in J4 [283] about the present application being a last opportunity for that case to be pleaded. Counsel submitted that, if I am satisfied that the PSC is defective, I should dismiss the present application without giving Christina any further opportunity to replead.

48. For their part, counsel for Christina acknowledged that there might be difficulties with the pleading in the PSC of the relevant promises and detrimental reliance. But any such difficulties were only “technical”. They did not justify refusing the amendment completely.

49. I have concluded that the PSC pleads at least one promise which would be capable of founding a claim of proprietary estoppel, namely the Litigation Promise. The 2017 Promise, if formulated in promissory terms, would be a second one. And I am not bound to choose between allowing the PSC in full (with all of its spurious pleadings of “Representations” and the like), on the one hand, and dismissing the application in its entirety, on the other. I could grant leave to amend in limited terms, confining the leave to viable parts of the PSC.

50. The difficulty is, however, that a viable claim cannot be salvaged from the PSC simply by omitting untenable parts of it. I have already noted that the 2017 Promise requires reformulation if it is to be accepted as a promise capable of sustaining an estoppel. There are also difficulties with the pleading of detrimental reliance. For reasons I have given, PSC [57] does not plead the material facts and to the extent that such facts appear in the “particulars” they are too broadly expressed and require further consideration. There are also the problems with the prayers for relief which I have identified.

51. These problems cannot be solved by some sort of partial strike-out. They would require reformulation of what remains. There would need to be a complete reconsideration of Christina’s proprietary estoppel claim, focussing on the small subset of the existing allegations which might support a viable claim.

52. And this would not be merely a technical matter of pleading. It would be necessary to consider whether there is a sufficient basis in provable fact to support such a cut-down claim. Identifying such a factual basis, if possible at all, might require supplementary instructions and affidavit evidence.

53. In these circumstances, I do not think that it would be proper to grant leave for some limited form of the existing PSC to be filed. The application will be refused.

54. Refusal will not close the door completely on a further application which deals with the problems identified in this judgment, if that proves possible. The present application is not, and could not really be, “final” in that sense. But it is final in the sense that the Court will now need to proceed towards trial of Christina’s remaining family provision claim. If the door is to be re-opened on proprietary estoppel, there will need to be very good reasons for doing so.

55. On 14 May, I sent to the parties a draft of my reasons to this point. As well as asking them to identity any errors or omissions in the draft, I invited them to confer on the orders which should be made to give effect to my conclusions. A hearing took place earlier today on these questions.

56. It was common ground that, given my conclusions, Christina’s motion for leave to amend in terms of the PSC should be dismissed with costs.

57. Counsel for Christina announced that no further application to amend would be made at first instance. Instead, Christina would seek leave to appeal against my March judgment and this judgment. This marked the effective end of Christina’s motion for anti-suit relief which was originally brought before Richmond J in July last year, and the costs of which had been reserved: see J4 [294]. The parties agreed that, given my earlier conclusions, Christina should be ordered to pay the costs of that motion, except for any costs solely referable to the service issues, on which she succeeded.

58. Counsel for the defendants submitted that, as the descendants’ trust claim and proprietary estoppel claims had both been disposed of, James and Christina’s siblings were no longer necessary parties to the proceedings. The proceedings against them should be dismissed, and Christina should be ordered to pay their costs.

59. Counsel for Christina resisted that course. Counsel pointed out that Christina’s remaining claim in the proceedings, which seeks a family provision order, includes a claim against to have the monies paid to James and her siblings made available, if necessary, as notional estate to satisfy her claim.

60. Christina has now specified her family provision claim as being for a lump sum of $20 million. Whether, in the context of the estate as a whole, that would justify notional estate claims against James and Christina’s siblings is questionable. But I did not wish to deal with the issue on the run. The proceedings will continue as a claim for family provision, for the moment, in the Expedition List (see J4 [63]). Whether James and Christina’s siblings should remain as defendants can be dealt with as part of that process.

61. The Singapore proceedings were formerly the subject of an anti-suit injunction which prevented the defendants from pursuing the descendants’ trust claim or the proprietary estoppel claim in those proceedings. In my March judgment, I discharged that injunction except as it applied to the proprietary estoppel claim but stayed the order to permit Christina to apply for leave to appeal (J4 [298(9)] and [298(11)]). For practical purposes, the stay continued the anti-suit injunction so far as the descendants’ trust claim was concerned. At the hearing on 6 May, I agreed to extend it until Monday 25 May to allow Christina’s legal representatives to file the application for leave and, if so advised, to seek a further extension of the stay from a Judge of Appeal.

62. My March orders left the injunction in place so far as it applied to the proprietary estoppel claim; that claim was also protected in this Court by an anti-anti-suit undertaking from the defendants (J4 [298(10)]). Both the remaining injunction and the undertaking expire today.

63. At today’s hearing, counsel for Christina asked me to continue the undertaking concerning the proprietary estoppel claim pending the foreshadowed application for leave to appeal. There would have been no difficulty with doing so until next Monday. But counsel sought more time than that. They asked me to extend both the stay concerning the descendants’ trust claim and the proprietary estoppel injunction and undertaking for several weeks.

64. Counsel for the defendants vehemently objected. Counsel protested that nothing whatsoever appeared to have been done towards pursuing the application for leave to appeal, even though over two months have elapsed since I gave my March judgment, and on 6 May the stay was extended only until 25 May. Counsel’s point seems to me to be well taken. But purely as a matter of expediency, I decided to give Christina an additional week. The orders and undertaking will expire at 6pm on 2 June.

Orders

65. The orders of the Court on Christina’s Notice of Motion filed 4 May 2026 are:

66. Order that the Notice of Motion filed by the Plaintiff on 4 May 2026 be dismissed.

67. Order that the Plaintiff pay the First to Third Defendants’ costs of her Notice of Motion filed on 4 May 2026 as agreed or assessed.

68. The further orders of the Court on Christina’s Notice of Motion filed 25 July 2025 are:

69. Order that the Plaintiff pay the First and Third to Sixth Defendants’ costs of her Notice of Motion filed on 25 July 2025 as agreed or assessed, excluding any costs solely referable to the relief sought by the Plaintiff concerning service on the Third to Sixth Defendants.

70. Order that the Third to Sixth Defendants pay the Plaintiff’s costs of the Notice of Motion filed on 25 July 2025 as agreed or assessed solely referable to the relief sought by the Plaintiff concerning service on the Third to Sixth Defendants.

71. Order that Order 11 originally made on 6 March 2026, as varied under the Slip Rule, be extended until 6pm on 2 June 2026.

72. Order that Orders 12 and 13 originally made on 6 March 2026 be extended until 6pm on 2 June 2026.

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