Applicants requiring a larger IBP for any of the requirements (e.g. five single subjects, 80 hours of supervision) are deemed unsuccessful and given the recommendation to complete masters - doctorate level clinical training. This ensures the applicant receives a thoroughly integrated clinical training program that a larger IBP could not provide.

1. We agree that these limitations demonstrate that in making an assessment of the suitability of a candidate, the IBP was a device to assist candidates who were at the margin of qualifying, rather than a general device to be accessed by a person with clearly inadequate qualifications.

1. We accept that the applicant has demonstrated that on at least three occasions a strict application of the Medicare assessment guidelines was not undertaken.
2. We accept further that the additional case summaries provided raise the question as to whether a strict application of those guidelines was not undertaken on other occasions.
3. We recognise that, although it has not been proven to be the case, the material which we have been shown suggests that in some cases candidates were endorsed as clinical psychologists despite not having undertaken any clinical supervision at all.
4. We do not accept that this means that those guidelines have no application. It is simply an illustration of the need to look at each applicant individually. Indeed counsel for the applicant conceded that he was not arguing that those guidelines should be jettisoned. What he was saying was that we should divine from the material a minimum required standard and ask ourselves the question as to whether the applicant met that minimum required standard.
5. We have difficulty in doing so. The problem is that, as the guidelines state, each application is required to be examined on a case-by-case basis. We do not have enough information about any of the cases presented to us to be able to formulate any minimum required standard. Each of these cases was put to the two experts called by the respondent and neither Mr Milton nor Dr Voudaris was prepared to accept that conclusions could be drawn from the material available as to what minimum standard was required.
6. They pointed out that the identity of the person and the supervisors was redacted. They each pointed out that what they were asked to assess was just the notes of an assessor. Mr Milton said these would not necessarily be the final summary of an applicant's qualifications, training or experience. He said that often other documents were received after these notes were made.
7. It is true that when it was put to each of these men that there was a minimum standard applied in assessing applications by the Medicare assessment team, they agreed with that proposition. However they were not able to say what it was, except to emphasise the importance of the guidelines.
8. We do not agree that if the applicant can show a few occasions in which no clinical supervision was demonstrated, then this binds this Tribunal to take the view that she should also not be required to show adequate clinical supervision.
9. There may well have been cases where the requirement for clinical supervision was not imposed because of other factors, such as eminence in the profession, or outstanding experience. There may have been occasions when an applicant fell short of the hours required and was nevertheless approved.
10. However, here the applicant has provided no documented evidence of supervision by a clinical psychologist at all, and there is nothing else in her background or experience which we consider makes up for this glaring shortfall.
11. Mr Milton gave sworn evidence that had the applicant filed the dummy application, it would not have been approved. He said that he knew of no case where an application such as hers had been approved. Dr Voudaris had the same view.
12. However, the asking of theoretical questions of each of these witnesses as to whether an application of a particular description would be approved underscores our difficulty with the use of this comparison material. Milton conceded that if a "doppelganger" application to that submitted by Ms Pereira (that is, an application identical to hers in all respects) had been received and approved, this would provide evidence supporting her application to be approved.
13. But of course it is almost impossible to conceive of an identical application. There are so many variables in the applications, and such broad avenues of enquiry in the guidelines, that the search for an application approved by the Board which is identical to the applicants appears to us to be misconceived. We are not asked to impose identical outcomes on each application. We are asked to provide consistency in approach whilst recognising that each case is to be viewed on a case by case basis.
14. It is not realistic for the applicant to ask us to apply the same standard as in the sample cases when there is insufficient evidence to enable us, or indeed the experts in this case, to determine the reasons the sample cases were dealt with in the way suggested on the incomplete material before us.
15. There was no expert evidence from the applicant to fill this gap.

1. The applicants counsel submitted that because the scheme is protective of the public, the question must be whether she is adequately qualified as at the date of our decision, not as to whether or not she was adequately qualified in the past. He submitted that this could be seen to be so, particularly because the Board gave other applicants the opportunity to do individual bridging plans in order to give them an opportunity to bring their qualifications and experience up-to-date. Many of those bridging plans were not finished until 2013, even though the Board had assessed those candidates in 2010.
2. On the other hand counsel for the respondent suggested that the only way in which we could make a sensible decision was to make it on the basis of the material which would have been available to the Board at the time at which the Board should have granted her application to make for an extension of time.
3. We take the view that in making our decision we should take into account all of the material provided by the applicant up to date on which our decision is made. We note and take up the suggestion from the applicant's counsel that in doing so we should utilise the expertise of the two psychologist members of the Tribunal.
4. Having regard to our conclusions this has not made a significant difference, as there is no further supervised practice put forward after November 2010.

1. Had the applicant shown substantial comparability with the other applications, or appropriately significant training qualifications and experience, we acknowledge that it would be appropriate for this Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the Board, to impose an appropriate bridging plan in order to bring her up to the required standard.
2. However, it is the firm view of this Tribunal that the applicant is so far deficient in supervised clinical experience that there would have been no prospect of her application being successful had it been able to be submitted to the Board in 2010. It is our view that this is so even taking into account all the material provided up to the time of the Tribunal hearing.
3. The applicant appeared to reason that her application should be accepted because she was able to identify a large number of people whose application was accepted with either the same qualifications as her for university study, or a lesser qualification, such as a bachelor degree. She says that her application must be assessed in this light.
4. However we have been satisfied with the explanations given to us that there are good reasons why some applicants were dealt with in a different manner to this applicant. Consistency does not mean equality. We consider it appropriate that a person with a lesser qualification but who is an eminent person within the profession may well be considered favourably for specialist registration despite that lesser qualification.
5. We can also see the wisdom in treating very remote and rural applications in a different way. These are policy issues which show that for candidates fitting into a particular policy area, special allowance was made.
6. We do not believe that this reduces the minimum standard overall or requires us to adopt an identical outcome for this applicant.
7. As we pointed out earlier, our task is not to assess whether Ms Pereira is a competent psychologist. We accept that there are many aspects of her presentation, such as her commendable attendances at professional seminars and presentations, and the references filed on her behalf, which show her to be a skilled and dedicated psychologist. This is not in dispute. The question is whether she has demonstrated that her qualifications, training and experience in clinical psychology are such that she is entitled to be endorsed as a clinical psychologist.
8. We agree with the analysis of counsel for the respondent that in effect the applicant has had no supervision by a clinical psychologist at all. When this lack of supervision is coupled with the deficits in her qualifications, and the fact that her experience has been obtained in principally non-mental health settings, our view is that she has not displayed sufficient skill, training or experience in the field of clinical psychology to justify endorsement in that speciality.
9. When the absence of any supervision by a clinical psychologist is taken into account with the other deficiencies identified, it is our view that any application that she might have made in November 2010 or could now make would be doomed to failure.

1. The second major issue referred back to this Tribunal from the Supreme Court is the issue of whether the Board should have allowed an extension of time for Ms Pereira to lodge her application. The original cut-off point for making this application was extended to 30 September 2010.
2. The applicant is only two months past that deadline. We note that in that calculation we have adopted the direction of the Supreme Court that the date of her application is deemed to be November 2010.
3. The respondent's case is that the application for extension was rightly refused, and that those other applicants who are granted extensions were treated on this favourable basis because of their family or grave personal situations.
4. Our opinion is that given that the applicant was only two months late with her application, considerations of fairness require that the respondent should have extended the deadline. Her circumstances, although not as grave as the other applicants, provide a reasonable explanation as to why she did not appreciate the need to make the application until she did.
5. However given that we have found that there is no merit in the application itself, this finding has no practical impact upon the orders to be imposed in this case.
6. Accordingly the application is dismissed.