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[2026] ACTSC 346
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-09-10
Muller J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd v The Barrow-Yu Trading Pty Ltd Citation: [2026] ACTSC 346 Hearing Date: 28 August 2026 Decision Date: 10 September 2026 Before: Muller J Decision: (1) The application in proceeding lodged on 5 August 2026 is dismissed. (2) I make no order as to the costs of the application. (3) The plaintiff is directed to file and serve an application for possession of land complying with rr 1118, 1119 and 1124 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) within 14 days. (4) The matter is listed for directions before the Registrar on Friday 25 September 2026 at 9.30 am. Catchwords: CIVIL LAW – CONFLICT OF LAWS – Cross-vested jurisdiction – geographic limits of State Supreme Courts – order of possession for land in the Territory made in Victoria – parties in different states – unclear whether parties submitted to jurisdiction in Victoria – unclear whether State Supreme Court exercised cross-vested jurisdiction CIVIL LAW – CONFLICT OF LAWS – Enforcement – orders capable of registration under Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) – judgment for debt of sum capable of registration – whether property orders capable of being registered – whether order is unenforceable Legislation Cited: Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), s 85 Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), rr 1118, 1119, 1124, 2010A Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1993 (ACT), s 4 Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), ss 3, 105 Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2018 (Vic), r 13.10 Case Cited: Atanaskovic t/as Hartnell v Robey [2014] NSWSC 150 Parties: Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd (Plaintiff) The Barrow-Yu Trading Pty Ltd (Defendant) Representation: Counsel A Gugasayan (Plaintiff) No appearance (Defendant) Solicitors Gadens Lawyers (Plaintiff) Self-represented (Defendant) File Number: ES 2 of 2026 MULLER J:
Pepper Finance seeks an order for delivery of possession of land at State Circle, Forrest in the Australian Capital Territory. At that address is an apartment complex and possession is sought of two apartments within the complex. Each of the two apartments is owned by The Barrow-Yu Trading Pty Ltd (Barrow-Yu).
On 7 November 2025, default judgment was entered in favour of Pepper Finance against Barrow-Yu in the Supreme Court of Victoria in the following terms: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS THAT: 1. The Plaintiff recover from the Defendant possession of all that piece of land in the Statement of Claim on the Writ being the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume 3002 Folio 267 Edition 9 Forrest Section 13 Block 13 on Deposited Plan 11399 with 87 units on Unit Plan 12776 situated at and known as 33/7 State Circle, Forrest, Australian Capital Territory. 2. The Plaintiff recover from the Defendant possession of all that piece of land in the Statement of Claim on the Writ being the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume 3002 Folio 253 Edition 10 Forrest Section 13 Block 13 on Deposited Plan 11399 with 87 units on Unit Plan 12776 situated at a[n]d known as 29/7 State Circle, Forrest, Australian Capital Territory. 3. The Defendant pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $2,679,776.08 for the outstanding claim, $100,194.82 for interest and $8,174.40 for costs.
On 18 February 2026, the order for judgment in Victoria was registered in this court pursuant to r 2010A of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT). That rule provides relevantly: 2010A Enforcement—certificate of registration of enforceable order under Service and Execution of Process Act (1) This rule applies in relation to an application for the registration in a court of an enforceable order of another court or tribunal under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cwlth), section 105. (2) An application under subrule (1) is made by filing in the court— (a) a copy, sealed by the court or tribunal that made the order, of the enforceable order, or a fax of the copy so sealed; and (b) a draft certificate with a copy of the sealed copy of the order attached. (3) Part 6.2 (Applications in proceedings) does not apply to the application. (4) A copy of the enforceable order and draft certificate need not be served on anyone unless the court otherwise orders on its own initiative. … (8) In this rule: certificate of registration, of an order, means the certificate given under subrule (5), signed by the registrar, certifying that the enforceable order is registered. enforceable order means— (a) an enforceable money order; or (b) an enforceable non-money order. working day means a day that is not— (a) a Saturday or Sunday; or (b) a public holiday or bank holiday.
At hearing of the application before me on 28 August 2026, an issue arose as to the power of the court in Victoria to make orders in rem beyond its geographical limits. A secondary issue arose as to the enforceability of any order made by the Victorian court under s 105 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) (the SEPA).
As a consequence, I directed Pepper Finance to file written submissions within seven days addressing the following questions: a. Whether under s 105 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), the Plaintiff accepts the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria (the VSC) which is registerable in the ACT is limited to Order 3 and if not, why this Court should conclude otherwise. b. If this Court should conclude otherwise, the power of the VSC to make an order for possession for land in the ACT. c. If the Plaintiff accepts the judgment of the VSC registrable in the ACT is limited to Order 3, whether the Plaintiff is content to proceed to apply for an order for possession of land in the ACT.
The submissions have been received and my reasons for decision are set out below.
What is the scope of s 105 of the SEPA?
Section 105 is in the following terms: 105 Enforcement of judgments (1) Upon lodg[e]ment of a sealed copy of a judgment, or a fax of such a sealed copy, the prothonotary, registrar or other proper officer of the appropriate court in a State other than the place of rendition must register the judgment in the court. (2) Subject to subsection (4), a registered judgment: (a) has the same force and effect; and (b) subject to sections 106 and 108, may give rise to the same proceedings by way of enforcement; as if the judgment had been given, entered or made by the court in which it is registered. (3) If the copy lodged is a fax, a sealed copy of the judgment is to be lodged with the prothonotary, registrar or other proper officer of the court within 7 days (not including any day that is a Saturday, a Sunday or a public holiday or bank holiday in the place at which the fax was lodged) after the fax was lodged. (4) If the sealed copy of the judgment is not so lodged within the 7 day period, until the sealed copy is lodged with the prothonotary, registrar or other proper officer of the court, a proceeding to enforce the judgment is not to be commenced or continued without the leave of the court. (5) A judgment is capable of being enforced in or by a court of a State in which it is registered only if, and to the extent that, at the time when the proceeding for enforcement is or is to be taken, the judgment is capable of being enforced in or by: (a) the court of rendition; or (b) a court in the place of rendition. (6) In this section: appropriate court, in relation to a State other than the place of rendition of a judgment, means: (a) if the court of rendition is the Supreme Court of the place of rendition—the Supreme Court of the first-mentioned State; or (b) in any other case: (i) the court of the first-mentioned State (including, if applicable, the Supreme Court of that State) in or by which relief as given by the judgment could have been given; or (ii) if there is more than one such court—the court of more limited jurisdiction; or (iii) if there is no such court—the Supreme Court of the first-mentioned State.
A matter of interest arises from sub-s 5. That section limits the capacity to enforce a judgment entered in one state and registered in another to the extent the judgement is capable of being enforced in or by the court of rendition or a court in the place of rendition. In other words, s 105(5) limits the capacity of this court to enforce a judgment registered under this rule to a judgment capable of being enforced by either the Victorian Supreme Court that made the order or another court of that state. To the extent the judgment registered is not enforceable by a court of the jurisdiction of inception, it is not enforceable pursuant to s 105(5).
Pepper Finance argues order (3) of the Victorian judgment is a sum of money order. To that extent at least, the judgment is enforceable by the court of rendition and in turn by the ACT Supreme Court by virtue of the operation of s 105(5). They do not address the fundamental issue of the enforceability of the order for possession in or by the Supreme Court of Victoria or any other Victorian court.
Pepper Finance submits s 105(5) should not be construed as requiring the court of rendition to possess “the practical ability to execute directly against interstate property”. They submit such an interpretation would diminish the operation of s 105(2). I disagree.
Judgment is defined in the Dictionary appearing in s 3 of the SEPA. The definition of judgment appearing in s 3 does not extend to a non-money judgment for possession of land.
The power of the Victorian Supreme Court to make an order for possession of land in the ACT
Pepper Finance elected not to address this issue in their written submissions other than to observe that an order for judgment in the Victorian Supreme Court is, by virtue of the SEPA, enforceable in the ACT. That argument appears to miss entirely the difficulty in the form of the limitations the SEPA itself places on the types of judgments so registrable.
Section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) invests the Supreme Court of Victoria with “jurisdiction in relation to Victoria its dependencies and the areas adjacent thereto in all cases whatsoever”. There is nothing in the terms of that section which could be read as extending the jurisdiction of the Victorian Supreme Court to make orders in rem beyond its geographical limits.
There is however the prospect of an alternative pathway pursuant to the cross-vested jurisdiction in each of the superior state based courts. Section 4(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1993 (ACT) confers upon other Supreme Courts “original and appellate jurisdiction in respect of ACT matters”. The Dictionary defines “ACT matter” as a matter in which the ACT Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
There is authority elsewhere for the use of that jurisdiction to decide matters relating to property located in another state or territory where the “home” Supreme Court could have exercised the jurisdiction: see, eg, Atanaskovic t/as Hartnell v Robey [2014] NSWSC 150 at [12]-[13]. In Atanaskovic, Kunc J had cause to consider an application for possession of land in the ACT. In making orders for possession, he referred expressly to those orders as an exercise of ACT jurisdiction conferred on the New South Wales Supreme Court by the relevant cross-vesting legislation. His Honour noted in the course of his reasons that each party had expressly submitted to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of New South Wales.
Unhelpfully in this instance it is unclear whether the parties expressly submitted to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the Victorian Supreme Court. It is also unclear whether, in making the orders, the prothonotary sought to exercise ACT jurisdiction conferred by relevant cross-vesting legislation. It may also be doubted whether the prothonotary had the ability to exercise cross-vesting jurisdiction: r 13.10(1) of the Supreme Court (Miscellaneous Civil Proceedings) Rules 2018 (Vic). As a consequence, whilst I accept the existence of an alternative pathway in appropriate circumstances, I cannot be satisfied on the material before me that it applies in this case.
What are the consequences of registration of the enforceable order?
For the reasons given above, order (3) comprising default judgment for a money sum together with interest and costs is registered in the ACT and enforceable as a debt.
In relation to orders (1) and (2) made on 7 November 2025, it will be necessary for Pepper Finance to now make separate application in this court for delivery of possession of land. The evidence before me, limited as it is to the background for and the circumstances in which the Victorian judgment was registered in this court, is insufficient to support such an application. I will therefore require Pepper Finance to file a further application for an order for possession of land together with a supporting affidavit satisfying the requirements of rr 1118, 1119 and 1124 of the Rules.
Orders
I certify that the preceding nineteen [19] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Muller.
Associate: Date:
Pepper Finance Corporation Ltd
The Barrow-Yu Trading Pty Ltd