1. The judge refused Dr Peers' application for an interlocutory injunction because she considered that there was no serious question to be tried and because the balance of convenience was against the granting of the injunction sought.
2. In relation to whether there was a serous question to be tried, her Honour said this:

In order for Dr Peers to succeed in obtaining an injunction or indeed prohibition she must first satisfy the court that there is a serious question to be tried. There is nothing before the court that suggests the Medical Board has committed or is proceeding towards committing error of a kind that is reviewable by the Supreme Court. There is nothing before me that demonstrates the Medical Board is acting in a way other than for the purposes of and in accordance with its statutory powers and obligations.

The first ground relied on by Dr Peers is that she asserts the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the production of documents. Dr Peers asserts that the Medical Board has or is headed towards exceeding its jurisdiction in this regard. Insofar as Dr Peers wishes to make a submission of this kind, it must first be made to the Medical Board. At this point in time this proposed ground does not identify any arguable jurisdictional or other error.

Dr Peers further contends that the concerns expressed by the Medical Board are moot or involve historic conduct. Dr Peers' allegations in this regard address the anticipated merits of a decision by the Medical Board which has not yet been made. I also note that the most recent notification to the Medical Board was 10 October 2024. Again no arguable jurisdictional or other error has been identified in respect of these contentions.

Finally Dr Peers submits that s156 of the National Law should be struck down as invalid by reason of the implied freedom of political communication. The law is clear that an interlocutory injunction should not be granted on the basis of a constitutional argument of this kind and, in any event, such an argument was considered and rejected by Quigley J in Fidge v Medical Board of Australia. Accordingly there is no serious question to be tried. As submitted by the Medical Board, the application for judicial review is premature and misconceived. The Board has not yet made any decision to take immediate action and Dr Peers has the right to be heard before it does so.[5]

1. In relation to the balance of convenience, the judge said this:

Further, as submitted by the Medical Board, even if there is a serious question to be tried, the balance of convenience is against the injunction sought. The present application fragments the processes under the National Law, including rights of appeal. The injunction sought would prevent the Board from taking action it may conclude is necessary to protect the public from a serious risk. It would therefore permit Dr Peers to continue to practise as a medical practitioner and to represent herself to the public as a medical practitioner notwithstanding the concerns identified by the Board.[6]

1. After Dr Peers filed her application for leave to appeal, the Board took the following steps in relation to her registration:

(a) On 7 March 2025, the Board issued a new notice of immediate action which proposed imposing conditions on Dr Peers' registration, instead of suspending her (the '7 March notice'). This notice superseded the 28 November notice.[7]

(b) On 17 March 2025 Dr Peers provided submissions to the Board in response to the 7 March notice.[8]

(c) On 21 March 2025, the Board decided to take the immediate action it had proposed in its 7 March notice, namely impose conditions on Dr Peers' registration.[9]

1. In the course of the hearing of her judicial review application before Watson J, and in her written reply submissions dated 11 April 2025, Dr Peers made it clear that she sought judicial review of the Board's decision to impose conditions on her registration. She contended that the conditions were 'tantamount to suspension'.[10] Watson J treated the proceeding as an application for judicial review of the Board's decision to impose conditions on her registration,[11] notwithstanding that there was no formal amendment of Dr Peers' originating motion.
2. As noted above, on 19 May 2025 Watson J dismissed Dr Peers' application for judicial review of the Board's decision to impose conditions on her registration. On 30 June 2025 Dr Peers sought leave to appeal Watson J's decision. That application remains on foot in this Court.
3. I note for completeness that the Board sought leave to adduce further evidence concerning the events that had occurred after the hearing before Judd J, up until 5 March 2025 (being the date on which the affidavit setting out the further evidence was affirmed). Dr Peers opposed that application. As matters have transpired, Watson J delivered his judgment before the resolution of Ms Peers' application for leave to appeal the interlocutory injunction decision. Watson J's judgment sufficiently reveals the relevant facts occurring after the interlocutory injunction decision and up to the date of his Honour's decision. It is thus unnecessary for me to consider the affidavit filed by the Board; its application to adduce further evidence is refused.

1. In her application for leave to appeal, Dr Peers relied upon following proposed grounds of appeal:

Ground 1: Judd J took into account an irrelevant consideration following the decision in Argyrou at [30] as the reason to refuse injunctive relief because it would fragment the process of the statutory authority, the Board in this case. This represents a misconception and misapplication of the nature and remedy of injunctive relief, the very purpose to prevent the process of statutory authority as they have proposed to suspend on grounds which are erroneous in law because it is a question of jurisdiction and not procedure.

Ground 2: Judd J failed to take into account relevant considerations, to perform the necessary inquires that ground injunctive relief and did not address: the serious questions of law to be tried and that there is a prima facie case for success.

Ground 3: The decision by Judd J to refuse to grant injunctive relief was taken on an irrelevant consideration the Boards protective purpose and function of the Board as the basis to refuse injunctive relief. Injunctive relief when properly understood is a challenge to the Boards jurisdictional powers and the lawful exercise of those powers and it is immaterial the protective purpose of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act as all discretionary powers must be exercised according to law. The Board cannot suspend practitioners where there is no legal basis.

Ground 4: Judd J was bound to comply with High Court case law and failed to examine that case law let alone comply with it and merely paid lip service to it. State court judges are not free to make decisions contrary to High Court case law. This fact raises the question as to what do decisions of the High Court mean if the state court judges simply ignore them or fail to comply with them. Had Judd J actually heard the relevant High Court case law she would have ruled correctly. When a party relies on a ruling of the High Court as a defence, the state court is firstly obligated to hear any relevant passages from that case and if the text is explicit in what it directs or what it forbids the state court is bound by that statement and has no authority to hold a view contrary to it.

Ground 5: The Judd J decision seeks to extinguish original jurisdiction and substitute in its place appellate jurisdiction of the court and this is because of misunderstanding of the nature of relief sought. The mere existence of the latter cannot operate as a bar to the exercise of the former.

Ground 6: Judd J has replicated the jurisdictional error in Argyrou and therefore this application has grounds for the collateral attack of Argyrou else the decision will continue to stand and have legal effect as per Bhardwaj at [12].

1. Dr Peers' application for leave to appeal against the judge's decision was brought under s 14A of the Supreme Court Act. Section 14C of the Supreme Court Act provides that this Court may grant leave to appeal under section 14A 'only if it is satisfied that the appeal has a real prospect of success.' As this Court observed in Lanzer v Lombardo, this state of satisfaction is the prerequisite to an exercise of the power to grant the leave sought - but it does not follow that the Court must grant leave whenever the prerequisite is met.[12] That is, even if the Court is satisfied that the proposed appeal has a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success, the Court may still refuse to grant leave in the exercise of the discretion in s 14C. This discretion is frequently referred to as 'the residual discretion'.
2. In Molonglo Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Cahill, this Court said as follows of the residual discretion:

The question of leave may sometimes be approached by considering, first, whether discretionary considerations exist which justify a refusal of leave, regardless of an applicant's prospects of success.[13]

1. The residual discretion is often exercised in the context of applications for leave to appeal against interlocutory decisions, especially those involving matters of practice and procedure.[14]
2. This Court has also said that an appeal will not be entertained unless it has some practical utility, and that the Court will not consider a proposed appeal where the subject matter is moot.[15] As this Court observed in Fidge v Medical Board of Australia,[16] whether leave to appeal should be given in respect of an interlocutory decision will often turn on the ongoing significance of the interlocutory decision and on where the interests of justice lie. Importantly, the interests of justice 'will rarely, if ever, be served by a court making an order that will have no practical effect on the rights, liabilities and duties of the parties'.[17]

1. The subject matter of this application for leave to appeal was an interlocutory decision refusing an injunction to prevent an 'imminent decision by the Medical Board to suspend [Dr Peers'] registration as a health practitioner'. However, the Board did not make a decision to suspend Dr Peers' registration. While it had, in November 2024, indicated that it proposed to take that step, there is nothing in the material before this Court to suggest that the Board is any longer proposing to, or contemplating, suspending Dr Peers' registration.
2. Furthermore, since the interlocutory injunction decision was made, the Board has made a decision to take different immediate action against Dr Peers, by imposing conditions on her registration. That decision was not the subject of Dr Peers' application for an interlocutory injunction.
3. Finally, the underlying proceeding in which the interlocutory injunction was sought has been resolved by Watson J's decision. That decision is the subject of an application for leave to appeal, as noted above. But, unless and until it is set aside on appeal, Watson J's decision stands.[18] As the respondent submitted, the power to grant an interim injunction depends upon the existence of an underlying cause of action.[19] The purpose of an interim injunction is to preserve the status quo until the hearing and determination of the merits of that underlying cause of action.[20] In the present case, the underlying proceeding has been determined by Watson J. There is thus no utility in any appeal from the judge's decision to refuse the interlocutory injunction.
4. Given the above matters, a grant of leave to appeal in relation to the interlocutory injunction decision lacks utility. Rather, the pathway for Dr Peers to pursue her case against the Board is by way of the hearing and determination of her application for leave to appeal against Watson J's decision and, should leave be granted, the appeal.
5. Dr Peers submitted that there is utility in this Court granting leave to appeal in order to 'correct the lower courts incorrect juridical understanding as to the nature and basis for injunctive relief' and to 'reestablish the state courts' compliance with High Court case law'.[21] She also contended that her application 'has general application and is of great public interest because the remedy of injunctive relief is available to any person who seeks it',[22] and therefore is not just limited to her. She submitted that if injunctive relief 'is not correctly understood by the state courts the net result is that the remedy is extinguished and thereby a person is deprived of preventative justice'.
6. Like this Court in Fidge, I do not regard it as appropriate to grant leave to appeal merely for the purpose of enabling this Court to make generalised statements about injunctive relief.[23]
7. Ultimately, it is not in the interests of justice for this Court to grant leave to consider an interlocutory decision that has been overtaken by subsequent events and thus has ceased to have any practical significance. This is a discretionary consideration that justifies the refusal of leave, regardless of Dr Peers' prospects of success.

Dr Peers' application for an interlocutory hearing in this Court

1. In addition to her application for leave to appeal the interlocutory injunction decision, Dr Peers also filed an application seeking an interlocutory hearing in this Court, in which she sought to have this Court make the following orders:
   1. Declare that injunctive relief is an exercise of original jurisdiction and such remedy is ultra vires an appellate court.
   2. Refuse arguments of any party in relation to the appellate jurisdiction which is not a part of original jurisdiction to save the court from jurisdictional error, taking into account an irrelevant consideration in proceedings concerning injunctive relief.
   3. Declare the decision in Argyrou v Victorian Building Authority (2019) VSC invalid in law and cannot be relied upon as a basis to refuse injunctive relief as original jurisdiction is not part of the appellate process and the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction cannot operate as a bar nor substitute for the exercise of original jurisdiction.
2. Given that there is no utility in the grant of leave to appeal, there is equally no utility in having an interlocutory hearing of the kind sought by Dr Peers in her other application. Nor are the declarations she sought in that other application a form of relief that this Court would grant. Thus I will dismiss the other application.

1. For the above reasons, I will order that Dr Peers' application for leave to appeal in relation to the decision to refuse to grant an interlocutory injunction is refused, and her application for an interlocutory hearing is dismissed.

[1] Section 4 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (Victoria) Act 2009 provides that the National Law, as in force from time to time, applies as a law of Victoria. The National Law is set out in the Schedule to the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Act 2009 (Qld).

[2] Peers v Medical Board of Australia, Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 22 January 2025 (K Judd J) ('Reasons').

[3] Peers v Medical Board of Australia [2025] VSC 272 ('Watson J Reasons').

[4] Court of Appeal proceeding S EAPCI 2025 0082.

[7] Watson J Reasons, [9], [18]-[20].

[12] [2025] VSCA 229, [42] (Walker, Orr and Kenny JJA).

[13] [2018] VSCA 147, [96] (Maxwell ACJ, Whelan and Kyrou JJA) (citations omitted), quoted in Fidge v Medical Board of Australia [2023] VSCA 272, [21] (McLeish, Niall and Taylor JJA). See also Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 260, [111]-[113] (Kyrou and McLeish JJA); Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Opal Storm Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 301, [25]-[27] (Priest, Ashley and Weinberg JJA).

[14] See, eg, Molonglo Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Cahill [2018] VSCA 147, [96] (Maxwell ACJ, Whelan and Kyrou JJA); Cargill Australia Ltd v Viterra Malt Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 260, [110] (Kyrou and McLeish JJA); Fei v Hexin Pty Ltd [2024] VSCA 158; (2024) 75 VR 581, 586-7 [67] (Kennedy, Macaulay and Lyons JJA); [2024] VSCA 158.

[15] Re Olrey Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 8, [14]-[15] (Maxwell P, Whelan and Santamaria JJA); Zhong v Attorney-General (Vic) [2025] VSCA 1, [19] (Niall, Boyce and Kenny JJA).

[16] [2023] VSCA 272 ('Fidge').

[17] Fidge [2023] VSCA 272, [25] (McLeish, Niall and Taylor JJA).

[18] New South Wales v Kable (2013) 252 CLR 118, 133-4 [32]-[33] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ); [2013] HCA 26; Queensland v Stradford [2025] HCA 3; (2025) 99 ALJR 396, 413 [53] (Gageler CJ, Gleeson, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ), [179] (Gordon J), [288] (Edelman J); [2025] HCA 3.

[19] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 218 [15]-[16] (Gleeson CJ), 231-232 [60] (Gaudron J), 241 [91] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); [2001] HCA 63; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v MZAPC [2025] HCA 5; (2025) 99 ALJR 486, 494-495 [23] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Gleeson and Jagot JJ), 513 [107] (Beech-Jones J); [2025] HCA 5; Iloski v Victoria [2024] VSCA 32, [26] (J Forrest AJA).

[20] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 199, 216 [9] (Gleeson CJ); [2001] HCA 63; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v MZAPC [2025] HCA 5; (2025) 99 ALJR 486, 494-495 [23] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Gleeson and Jagot JJ); [2025] HCA 5.

[23] See Fidge [2023] VSCA 272, [29] (McLeish, Niall and Taylor JJA).