Fair Work Commission|2025-10-15

The applicant relies on his unfamiliarity of court processes as a reason for delay. This is not an acceptable explanation. The overwhelming majority of persons who represent themselves are in the same position. The applicant demonstrated he was capable of contacting the court registry and accessing the relevant forms from the court's website. His difficulty is that he failed to take these simple steps in a timely manner leaving these steps he ought to have taken until the day he was required to initiate these proceedings.

Mr. Gonzalez's failure to seek legal or union assistance is unreasonable "where he had 6 months prior to the date of cessation of employment to seek such assistance and a further three weeks from that date to obtain legal or union assistance to bring his Application". It argues Mr. Gonzalez had not provided an adequate explanation for that substantial lack of diligence; and
Mr. Gonzalez contributed to the delay of 361 days in filing the application by failing to obtain representation in a timely manner.

Consideration of the reasons given for the 361 day delay

[62] Mr. Gonzalez claims his significant physical and psychological injuries "prevented him from facing the process of a Fair Work Submission."

[63] Mr. Gonzalez filed a number of medical reports from his treating neurologist, rheumatologist and cardiologist, together with three reports from Dr Davi Macedo, his treating psychologist.

[64] Dr Macedo, in his report of 6 November 2024, notes "dynamics of bullying and harassment in the work environment have the potential to jeopardise cognitive functions which includes impairments in concentration, decision making, working memory and problem solving". Dr Macedo considers that "these factors" have significantly contributed to [Mr. Gonzalez's] recent difficulties with executive function.

[65] On the basis of these medical reports, I am satisfied he suffers from these conditions. However, the case law establishes that the existence of the conditions per se are not sufficient to establish a reason for delay.

[66] The principals for dealing with mental health as a reason for delay has been helpfully summarised by Deputy President Easton in Bianco Mamo v. ICLED Australia Pty Ltd[29] which deals with an extension of time to make an unfair dismissal application. In that case, the Deputy President, after a considering the decisions in this area, summarised the approach as follows:

Stress, shock, confusion and similar conditions are not exceptional circumstances in and of themselves.
A depressive illness might point towards exceptional circumstance if the illness had a material impact upon the applicant's capacity to lodge the application within the statutory time limit
The evidence should positively demonstrate that the applicant's depressive illness had an impact on their mental capacity so as to prevent the lodging of the application within the 21 day time frame; and
An applicant's self-assessment of their alleged psychological incapacity is unlikely to be sufficient.

[67] According to the medical reports, Mr. Gonzalez suffers from both physical and psychological conditions. The question in this case is whether the evidence demonstrates that various physical and psychological injuries he suffers had such an impact as to prevent Mr. Gonzalez lodging the application within the 21 day time frame. Further, I must be satisfied that the disabilities he suffered as a result of these conditions give a sufficient reason for the 361 delay.

[68] There is evidence to suggest the impairments he suffered by reason of his conditions did not otherwise prevent him from prosecuting his rights. DTP refers to actions he took during the period of the delay which it says "run counter to his suggestion that he had a debilitating illness which affected is memory, concentration and ability to make decisions" to the extent that he could not file a GP application. These include his capacity to:

make two WorkCover applications in the period between 21 December 2023 and 27 May 2024;
initiate two separate WorkCover appeals to the Workplace Injury Commission in respect of rejection of his original WorkCover claims between 29 January 2024 and 10 July 2024;
engage in communications with DTP's Injury Management Team in May 2024 and the DTP's Workplace Relations Team on 12 June 2024 relating to his assertion of bullying; and
seek consultations with and attend multiple doctors' appointments in the period before and following the missed deadline.

[69] Mr. Gonzalez also represented himself at the hearing of his earlier extension of time application before Commissioner Fox on 25 November 2024, and at the hearing of the appeal of that decision before a Full Bench on 6 February 2025 during the period of the delay.

[70] I accept the argument of DTP. The steps Mr. Gonzalez has taken to prosecute his rights in relation to his bullying claim and his workcover claim, together with his earlier self-represented advocacy run counter to an argument that he could not, by reason of his disabilities, do something as simple as lodging general protections claim for a period of over a year.

Reasonable belief in "continued employment and awareness of the dismissal"

[71] The other reason Mr. Gonzalez gives for the delay is his "awareness of the dismissal and his "belief in continued employment". He says he believed this because the "determination of his Worksafe claim had not been made". He argues this "belief was realized when the WIC arbitration decision overturned the original rejection and directed DTP to pay worker's compensation backdated to 24 January 2024". He also submits that he should not be "unfairly treated under the law for actions of DTP during the significant period of legal uncertainty".

[72] This argument boils down to a mistaken belief as to the operation of the WorkCover legislation with respect to his employment. Ignorance of the law by non lawyers is typical rather than exceptional. It would be absurd if an applicant could rely on what they believed to be the operation of law as a sufficient reason for a 361 day delay in filing an application.

[73] Either collectively or separately, the reasons Mr. Gonzalez has given for his 361 day delay are not sufficient to support an extension of time being granted. This factor therefore counts against an extension of time being made.

WHAT ACTION WAS TAKEN BY MR. GONZALES TO DISPUTE THE DISMISSAL?

[74] Mr. Gonzalez argues the following action was taken to dispute his dismissal:

• Engaging in DTP's redundancy process "inclusive of alternative submissions, application for redeployment options and reporting of feeling targeted as part of the redundancy process through the DTP Injury Management Team, SafeT System, Business Partner - Annemarie Ellis, in May 2024 and the Workplace Relations Team".[30] In his evidence he explained his complaints in May were a "workplace bullying claim" with the injury management team, and a "safety complaint on the Safe T reporting system on 21 May 2024 (ten days before his employment ceased).[31]
• Multiple attempts to contact DTP and resolve the matter on 30 May 2025, 3 June 2025 and 16 June 2025. These letters followed the decision of the WorkCover Injury Commission. In that correspondence Mr. Gonzalez says he was "highlighting the initial decision and noting the legislation in support of my on going employment".[32]

The filing of the application on 3 September 2024 (which was the subject of the earlier decisions).

[75] The DTP arguments are that Mr. Gonzalez:[33]

Prepared a detailed response to the proposed abolition of his position during the consultation period prior to the cessation of his employment. In that response, he did not raise any concerns about being selected for redundancy because of race, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability or temporary absence from work because of illness or injury.
Did not take any other steps to contest his redundancy at the time or in the 6 months leading up to the redundancy. "Instead, he elected to by-pass the redeployment process, which would have seen him employed for at least another three months and potentially redeployed within the Victorian Public Service."
Took an enhanced ISP, resulting in the cessation of employment occurring at least three months earlier than may have been the case if redeployment was unsuccessful.
Does not dispute he was consulted about the workplace change and did not seek a Review of Actions (grievance) under the Public Administration (Review of Actions) Regulations 2015, but applied for and accepted an enhanced ISP.
The fact that he believed his employment was still ongoing is incongruent with the notion that he had taken actions to contest the cessation of his employment. These two actions should seemingly be mutually exclusive in nature."

Consideration of action taken to dispute the dismissal

[76] Mr. Gonzalez's engagement with the redundancy process prior to his cessation of employment cannot be regarded as a contest to his "dismissal" because it was yet to occur. The complaints he made on safety and workplace bullying before his employment ceased cannot also be considered action to contest his dismissal.

[77] The letters in May and June 2025 following the determination of the WIC where he requested that DTP "reinstate me to my preinjury role or a suitable alternative" are contesting the fact his employment ceased in May 2024. I consider as a matter of plain English that can be regarded as action taken to dispute the "dismissal".

[78] On the earlier failed application for an extension of time, it does violence to the plain English meaning of s 366(b) that an application for the Commission to deal with a dismissal dispute under s 365 is not "action taken to dispute the dismissal". It therefore must be regarded as action taken to dispute the dismissal.

[79] It follows that in September 2024 and in May, June and July 2025, Mr. Gonzalez took action to dispute his dismissal.

[80] The fact is he did nothing to contest his dismissal:
- For five months between 31 May and 3 September 2024 when he lodged his first general protections application.
- For the three months between the date of the decision on the appeal dismissing his first general protections application in February 2025 until May, June and July 2025 after the WIC decision.

[81] As I understand this factor, it counts towards an extension where, despite the delay, the employer is on notice that the employee contests the dismissal. There were long periods during the delay where DTP may have been uncertain about whether Mr. Gonzalez contested the dismissal. During the lengthy delay, there were periods when Mr. Gonzalez took no action to dispute dismissal, particularly in the five months between the cessation of his employment and the filing of his first general protections application.

[82] In the circumstances where there are gaps between his dismissal in May 2024 and the first contestation of the dismissal by the general protections application in September 2024, and between the initiation of that proceeding and the contestation following the WIC decision in May to July 2025, this factor cannot count in favour of an extension of time being given. As he contested the dismissal sporadically, neither can it count against him.

[83] In those circumstances I regard this factor as a neutral consideration as to whether I should give an extension of time.

WHAT IS THE PREJUDICE TO DTP (INCLUDING PREJUDICE CAUSED BY THE DELAY_)?_

[84] Mr. Gonzalez argues DTP would suffer no prejudice if the extension of time is granted because it has "continuity of staff and the advantage of continuity of legal representation by the Victorian Government Solicitors Office".[34]

[85] DTP claim two kinds of prejudice: a forensic prejudice by reason of the length of the delay and a prejudice arising from Mr. Gonzalez being aware of the arguments made by DTP in the earlier application. In relation to the forensic delay, it argues:

• The long delay in the FWC receiving the application (361 days following the cessation of the Applicant's employment) gives rise to a general presumption of prejudice to the DTP relying on a judgement of Kirby J in the High Court in Brisbane Regional Health Authority v. Taylor where his Honour found: "Besides proved prejudice, the long delay gave rise to a general presumption of prejudice".[35]

Authorised officers of DTP made decisions regarding the abolishment of the Applicant's role at a point in time. The passage of time between the abolishment of the Applicant's role and his general protections application negatively impacts DTP and its authorised officers to clearly demonstrate their state of mind during the change process.

[86] In relation to the prejudice from the earlier proceeding, DTP argues Mr. Gonzalez has been able to prepare this application, with the benefit of its position and counterarguments advanced in the original application and appeal. As a result, Mr. Gonzalez has tailored the application to remove arguments that were previously detrimental to the original application as well as submitting supplementary evidence not provided at first instance, such as:

He has chosen to omit a previous admission that he mistakenly believed that because he had a WorkCover claim underway he did not have to submit his General Protections Claim within any particular time frame.
He has omitted the fact that he became aware of the 21-day limitation period for submitting the original application in August 2024.
He had the benefit of submitting additional medical evidence regarding the subject matter of the original application; and
Despite his claimed medical condition, the fact that the Applicant was able to embark on periods of travel in March 2024 and June 2024.

[87] In a recent Full Bench appeal from a decision of Commissioner Ryan in Shiralee Dollar and RC Group Holding,[36] the Bench did not disturb the observation of Commissioner Ryan that "it is well settled a lengthy delay gives rise to a presumption of prejudice". The Full Bench observed:

"That observation was reasonable in the context of a case where the delay in the Appellant filing her unfair dismissal application is 101 days, The observation is also consistent with the Full Bench in [GHD Pty Ltd v. Kevin Allan Black] where the relevant delay was 168 days.[37]"

[88] The delay in this case is over two times the length of the delay in GHD. Unlike in GHD, DTP made submissions that it suffered prejudice. I accept DTP's submission that "the passage of time between the abolishing of Mr. Gonzalez role and his general protections application negatively impacts the DTP and its authorised officers to clearly demonstrate their state of mind during the change process". It follows the length of the delay will lead to a forensic prejudice.

[89] Further, it is undeniable Mr. Gonzalez received an advantage, to the prejudice of DTP, by having the benefit of arguments and counter arguments made by DTP in the earlier application in the preparation of this second application. As the Full Bench in Grabowsky stated: "It is unfair to their opponents to be entangled in repetitive litigation."[38]

[90] I accept DTP suffered prejudice by reason of the delay. It follows this counts against an extension of time being granted.

[91] The ostensible facts of the cessation of Mr. Gonzalez's employment on 31 May 2024 are set out in the submissions and documents filed by DTP.

• A consultation process commenced for redundancies in DTP on 28 November 2023.[39]
• A new workplace structure was announced on 4 March 2024. Mr. Gonzalez was advised his position at DTP was "abolished" and he was given options including voluntarily applying for an Immediate Separation Package (ISP).[40]
• On 20 May 2024, Mr. Gonzalez was sent a letter from William Little of the Shaping DTP team to "inform [him] of [his eligibility for an ISP] and advising him that in order to apply he had to fill in an online form and submit it by 5PM on Friday 24 May 2024".[41]
• On 27 May 2024, Mr. Gonzalez sent an e-mail to the Shaping DTP team which stated "I am confirming I wish to have my application progressed in the current timeline and will separate employment on Friday 31 May 2024".[42]
• On 29 May 2024, Mr. Gonzalez was sent a letter from Mr. William Little which stated, "This letter is to advise you that the DTP has accepted your application to depart the VPS and receive an ISP. Your final day of work will be 31 May 2023. Your final day of work is also your separation date, at which point your employment contract and employment relationship with DTP will cease on the grounds of genuine redundancy.[43]
• According to the submissions of DTP, Mr. Gonzalez received a gross amount on his cessation of employment of $222,152.12.[44]

[92] Mr. Gonzalez argues his redundancy was a sham. He argues he was targeted for prohibited reasons. In his submissions, he states:[45]

The "dismissal occurred during a protected absence due to illness or injury".
The redundancy was a sham "intended to avoid fulfilling return-to-work obligations and to remove him based on his protected attributes and conduct, including his illness, whistleblowing activities, and participation in diversity networks."
"The restructure was "used in lieu of appropriate performance management or procedural fairness and therefore consultation was not genuine."
In his submissions, he refers to a quote from the Chief Engineer - Rail, who lodged an internal complaint stating: "I fully support his work with I&D [inclusion and diversity]; however, it should not come at the expense of delivering his core function as Principal Engineer, Electrical Systems."
Mr. Gonzalez considers this "adverse statement toward his ...inclusion and diversity work, supports the inference of a retaliatory motive in the dismissal". He notes that Chief Engineer "had direct input into the structure that led to his "dismissal" and was part of the executive decision making group that approved the changes.
In support of his argument the redundancy was a "sham", he refers to the treatment of his position relative to the position of his "direct report' Mr. Plarisan:

"While the restructure ostensibly affected both the Applicant and his direct report, Ed Plarisan, ... it was in fact Mr Plarisan's position that was formally made redundant. However, Mr Plarisan was directly appointed to a newly titled role that retained all of the core and ancillary responsibilities previously held by the Applicant effectively continuing the Applicant's role under a different name and occupant. A contractor was then engaged two days per week to assist Mr Plarisan with the workload."

"A new Senior Rail Engineering Advisor role substantially aligned with the Applicant's skills and prior experience was created and offered to Matt Robson, a power systems engineer with a comparable CV and the Applicant's former counterpart at the Respondent's delivery agency RPV. The Applicant was not offered redeployment to this position as part of the process, nor provided with any opportunity to compete for it."

[93] Mr. Gonzalez argues that these matters support the conclusion that "he, rather than his role, was targeted for removal."

[94] The DTP argues the merits of the application should count "strongly against granting an extension of time". It concedes I am not required to embark on a detailed consideration of the substantive case for the purposes of determining the application of s 366(2)(d). DTP argues the weakness of the application on the merits weighs strongly against granting an extension of time for the following reasons:

Mr Gonzalez's employment ceased with DTP solely on the basis that his role was abolished, and not because the Applicant was exercising a workplace right or because of any protected attribute.
Mr Gonzalez has not advanced any plausible argument as to why the dismissal was in contravention of the general protections provisions or established at even a preliminary level, a causal link between the Applicant exercising a workplace right or having a protected attribute as the operative reason for his dismissal (which DTP denies).
The application does not explain in any detail how DTP took adverse action against the Applicant because of his alleged race, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability or temporary absence from work because of illness or injury in contravention of the general protections provisions.
The termination of the Applicant's employment followed an organisational change within DTP in response to the setting of budget savings targets and reprioritizations announced in the 2023/2024 State Budget.
Mr Gonzalez's employment with DTP ceased on the grounds of his role being abolished and on the basis that the Applicant chose to forgo attempts at redeployment within the Victorian Public Service and instead applied for an enhanced ISP and earlier departure.
Mr Gonzalez was one of 130 employees of DTP whose employment ceased by way of redundancy following extensive consultation from 28 November 2023 to 4 March 2024. Mr Gonzalez was provided with access to independent financial advice.
His employment was not terminated for reasons of race, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability or temporary absence from work because of illness or injury.
Mr Gonzalez's contention that the Senior Rail Engineering Technical Advisor was equivalent to his former role, DTP submits that the advertised role was evidently not equivalent, and the Applicant has conceded, in the original application that the advertised role requires greater cross disciplinary and generic skills.

[95] Mr. Gonzalez argues he was dismissed while he was on sick leave. He also claims that his redundancy was a sham, and he was targeted for dismissal because of protected attributes. On the material before me the factual foundation of these claims are a thin gruel.

[96] In circumstances where Victorian Government policy required a restructure, and he was one of 130 made redundant in the DTP, his claim that he was specifically targeted because of protected attributes seems easily overcome by DTP in discharge of its reverse onus. I assess the prospects of his application to be low. On the limited material before me, I can reach no conclusion as to whether his claim is unarguable. The competing claims rest on contested facts. It is not appropriate to resolve contested issues of fact going to the ultimate merits in an extension of time application.

[97] In circumstances where the claims of Mr. Gonzalez may be arguable and rest on contested facts, the merits of the application are a neutral consideration in an assessment of exceptional circumstances.

FAIRNESS AS BETWEEN MR. GONZALES AND OTHER PERSONS IN A SIMILAR POSITION

[98] The criterion of "fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position" was considered by Deputy President Gostencnik in Morphett v. Pearcedale Egg Farm:[47]

"Cases of this kind will generally turn of their own facts. However, this consideration is concerned with the importance of an application of consistent principles in cases of this kind, thus ensuring fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position, and that consideration may related to matters currently before the Commission or matters which have been previously decided by the Commission."

[99] In his submissions Mr. Gonzalez makes a number of arguments in respect to this factor:[48]

The strict enforcement of the 21-day limitation period would result in unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability, contrary to Australia's obligations under international law and domestic human rights legislation.
He suffers from significant physical and psychological disability. The strict application of the 21 day procedural deadline "would deny him equal access to justice contrary to the Convention on the Rights of people with Disabilities and the Disability Discrimination Act."

• He refers to Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh,[49] and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lam.[50] He argues "the High Court recognised that ratified international treaties can give rise to a legitimate expectation in administrative decision-making. These principles are particularly relevant where the treaty is supported by domestic legislation, such as the DD Act."[51]

He argues s.578 of the Act requires the Commission, in performing its functions, to take into account equity, good conscience, and the need to respect and value the diversity of the workforce including by preventing discrimination on the basis of race, sexuality, and disability.
He notes the Commission has not issued procedural guidelines harmonised with the DD Act, despite being empowered to do so under s.609(1) and s.609(2)(d) of the Act or to seek clarity from the Federal Court under s.608 of the Act.
Lastly, he concluded "In light of these considerations, he contends that the strict application of s.366(1) would be inconsistent with international and domestic anti- discrimination law, and would undermine the principles of access to justice and fairness enshrined in the Act. The discretion to extend time should be exercised in a way that upholds these principles.

[100] The DTP make no submissions in relation to this factor.

[101] As inventive as Mr. Gonzalez's arguments are, they irrelevant to an assessment of fairness as between himself and other persons in a like position. As that phrase has been interpreted by Deputy President Gostencnik in Morphett, it is focused on "matters currently before the Commission or matters which have been previously decided by the Commission".

[102] It follows neither party has made compelling submission on this factor and therefore it can be regarded as a neutral consideration in an assessment of exceptional circumstances.

IS THE COMMISSION SATISFIED THAT THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MATTERS ABOVE?

Two factors against an extension of time being granted

[103] The reasons Mr. Gonzalez gave for the delay are insufficient either separately or together to justify the 361 day delay under s 366(a).

[104] His disabilities during the delay did not prevent him from prosecuting his rights in relation to his WorkCover Claims or in drafting submissions and appearing himself in this Commission and before the Full Bench in his earlier application.

[105] In relation to his belief in his continued employment and awareness of his dismissal, this is a mistaken belief as to the operation of law. Such a belief cannot provide a good reason for a delay in filing an application.
[106] I am also satisfied DTP would suffer prejudice both as a result of the delay and as a result of this proceeding being a second attempt at an extension of time under s 366(2)(c),
[107] These factors count against an extension of time being granted.

[108] There were gaps between Mr. Gonzalez's action to dispute the dismissal by filing the earlier general protections application in September 2024 and his correspondence with DTP after his successful WorkCover arbitration in May, June and July 2025. Given those gaps, I am not satisfied this factor should count in his favour. For that reason, I regard this factor as neutral under s 366(b).

[109] I assess the merits are low but arguable. As a merit assessment turns on contested facts, I regard this factor under s 366(d) as neutral.

[110] No compelling arguments were made as to the fairness as between Mr. Gonzalez and other persons in a like position. This factor under s 366(e) is also neutral.

[111] Two factors count against an extension of time being made and three are neutral considerations. Therefore, on balance, taking into account all the factors in s 366(2), I am not satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of time.

[112] As I have found there are no exceptional circumstances to justify an extension of time on the basis of the factors contained in s 366, I do not need to have regard to the residual discretion which derives from the formulation that I "may" grant an extension of time if I am satisfied that there are exceptional circumstance under s 366(2).

[113] If I was to rely on this residual discretion, I would not have granted the extension. To grant the extension of time is not a "fair and just" exercise of powers as required by s 577(a).

[114] Mr. Gonzalez's claim that an arbitrated decision of the WIC concerning WorkCover payments reanimated his long dead employment relationship is without foundation. As that fact did not give rise to anything new, this application is a rerun of the matter which was before Commissioner Fox and the Full Bench, except the length of time between his dismissal and the application is longer.

[115] I refer to the decision of the Full Bench in Grabowksy v. UPA which stated (with emphasis added):[52]

... The finite resources of the Commonwealth are not to be unreasonably diverted by parties who cannot accept that their claims have been unsuccessful and who seek to resubmit them to the Commission**. It is unfair for their opponents to be entangled in repetitive litigation.** And parties in other matters deserve their turn to be heard.

[116] It follows that even if I had found there where exceptional circumstances, I would not have granted the extension of time.

[117] This application is dismissed.[53]

[1] Digital Court Book (from hereon DCB) at p. 34.

[7] [2012] FWAFB 3206 at [37], [38] and [67].

[15] Singh v BSG Management Services Pty Ltd [2020] FWCFB 553, [10]. See also Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 36(1) as in force on 25 June 2009; Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 40A.

[17] Stogiannidis v Victorian Frozen Foods Distributors Pty Ltd [2018] FWCFB 901, [39].

[22] DCB 115 - in DTP's Outline of Submission.

[23] DCB 103-104: These steps are outlined in the Outline of Submissions at paragraphs 2.4 to 2.10.

[24] DCB 115 - DTP's Outline at paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5.

[25] DCB 14 - Mr. Gonzalez's Outline at paragraphs 57 to 59.

[30] DCB 12 - paragraph 60 of Mr. Gonzalez's Outline.

[31] DCB 34 - paragraph 115 of Mr. Gonzalez's Outline.

[34] DCB 15: Gonzalez Outline paragraph 79.

[35] 186 CLR 541 at p. 556.

[38] Inna Grabovsky v. United Protestant Association NSW Ltd [2019] FWCFB 1964.

[51] There is some doubt whether a "legitimate expectation" of compliance with ratified conventions in Australian domestic law is still part of the common law of Australia. In the High Court decision in Plaintiff S 10/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, [2012] HCA 31 at paragraph 65, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ stated 'the phrase "legitimate expectations" when used in the field of public law either adds nothing or poses more questions than it answers and thus is an unfortunate expression which should be disregarded'.

[52] Inna Grabowsky v. UPA NSW [2019] FWCFB 1964 [26].

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

Injury and Compensation Act 2013

Compensation Act 1985

Administration (Review of Actions) Regulations 2015

Interpretation Act 1901

Paulo Gonzalez v Department of Transport and Planning [2025] FWC 3089 (15 October 2025)

Paulo Gonzalez v Department of Transport and Planning [2025] FWC 3089

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (111 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (6)

Cases Cited (3)

Paulo Gonzalez v Department of Transport and Planning [2025] FWC 3089 (15 October 2025)