respondent. Application under s.103 dismissed. Applicant to pay respondent $7,703.44 (being $7,085.12 per tax invoice dated 29 April 2008 plus interest $618.32 from 31 May 2008 to 23 September 2009). Legal...
Key principles
Where a legal practitioner gives an accurate and extensive explanation of a costs agreement in a language the client understands before the client signs, and contemporaneous file...
Separate retainer agreements relating to distinct claims are to be treated as separate engagements; a later costs agreement relating to a new claim (s.99 claim) is not subsumed...
Where independent expert evidence (legal costs consultant) supports that professional costs calculated on the applicable scale would exceed a cap or are reasonable, the Tribunal...
When a client has paid nothing toward professional costs and the Tribunal finds the claimed amount is not excessive, the Tribunal may order the client to pay the amount claimed...
Issues before the court
Whether the second costs agreement could be cancelled under s.103 of the Legal Practice Act 1996 on grounds of misrepresentation, fraud or...
Plain English Summary
VCAT dismissed the client's application to cancel a 2005 costs agreement. The Tribunal accepted the solicitor's evidence that he explained the agreement to the client in Greek, found the agreement valid and intact when signed, and rejected the client's contrary account. The Tribunal also found the solicitor's professional costs for two separate engagements were not excessive, ordered the client to pay the invoiced amount plus interest, and directed the Legal Services Commissioner to release the deposit accordingly. A separate hearing on the solicitor's costs of the VCAT applications was adjourned.
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Deep Dive
2,032 words · generated 15/07/2026
What happened
Mrs Stratoula Patsialaridis was injured at work in 2000. She retained Mr Bill Velos, a solicitor, to pursue two statutory claims under the Accident Compensation Act 1985. In 2002 she signed a costs agreement for a s.98C lump sum claim; that costs agreement included a cap of $3,300 if recovered. In November 2005 she entered a second costs agreement related to a s.99 application seeking restoration of medical and like expenses and payment for shoulder surgery, matters which required commencement of proceedings in the Magistrates' Court.
Whether the professional costs charged by the respondent for both claims were excessive or unsupported by the costs agreements, and whether the cap...
Whether the two retainer agreements should be treated as one integrated costs arrangement for the purpose of applying a cap from the first agreement.
Cited legislation
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
The dispute came before VCAT in two parts. First, the applicant sought cancellation of the second costs agreement under s.103 of the Legal Practice Act 1996 alleging that the agreement had not been explained to her and that required information was absent when she signed. Second, a costs dispute under s.4.3.15 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 arose after the respondent rendered a tax invoice dated 29 April 2008 for $7,085.12 (and originally a further disbursement invoice that the respondent later wrote off). The Legal Services Commissioner was unable to resolve the dispute, so it was referred to VCAT.
At hearing, the solicitor produced contemporaneous file notes, a covering letter dated 11 November 2005 and an unsigned copy of the costs agreement that had been posted to the client. The solicitor gave evidence that he explained the agreement to the client in Greek on 17 November 2005, that the conference lasted about 35 minutes, and that the client signed the agreement after that explanation. The client gave contrary evidence: she said she cannot read English, that she signed without explanation, and that the part of the agreement headed "Information" (which included numerical cost estimates of $6,000 to $8,000) was missing from the version she signed.
VCAT accepted the solicitor's evidence and contemporaneous records, concluded that the "Information" material was part of the costs agreement when signed (observing aligned margins and a common footer across pages), found the client's evidence lacking credibility, and dismissed the cancellation application. On the costs dispute, the Tribunal accepted expert evidence from a legal costs consultant (Mr Gavin Wood) that costs assessed on Magistrates' Court scale would exceed the cap applicable to the first agreement and that the professional costs attributable to the post-17 November 2005 work would be assessed at $5,600.50 including GST. The Tribunal treated the s.98C and s.99 engagements as separate retainer matters, found the total professional costs of $8,529.84 including GST were not excessive, and ordered the applicant to pay $7,085.12 plus interest from 31 May 2008. The final order (reflecting interest) required the Legal Services Commissioner to pay the respondent $7,703.44 from the money on deposit and to return $137.27 plus interest to the applicant. The respondent's application for costs of the VCAT proceedings was adjourned.
Key document and hearing dates: hearings 3 and 23 September 2009; written reasons published 23 September 2009. The decision delivered by Senior Member Malcolm Howell.
Why the court decided this way
VCAT's conclusions rest on credibility findings grounded in contemporaneous documentary records and expert evidence. The Tribunal accepted the solicitor's account because:
Documentary corroboration: the solicitor produced a covering letter dated 11 November 2005 and an unsigned file copy of the costs agreement that had been posted to the applicant (Application to cancel costs agreement, para 5). The signed original filed with VCAT contained the "Information" clause; the Tribunal observed that margins aligned and all pages included the same footer text, indicia that the post-signature inclusion allegation was false (para 12).
Contemporaneous file notes: the solicitor had made a handwritten file note recording the applicant's telephone call and the in-person conference; the file note concluded that the applicant "agreed with the Costs Agreement signed it and gave instructions to proceed with the claim and all necessary work to institute Court Proceedings in the M.C." The Tribunal treated this contemporaneous note as strong evidence of what occurred (paras 5 and following).
Oral evidence and plausibility: the solicitor gave evidence that he explained the agreement in Greek during a 35 minute conference and that the applicant did not indicate any lack of understanding; the applicant’s account that she could read figures but did not notice the estimate of $6,000–$8,000 was treated with scepticism (paras 6, 8, 11, 14).
On the costs issue, the Tribunal accepted independent expert evidence from a legal costs consultant that the work performed after the second agreement, almost entirely relating to the s.99 Magistrates' Court matter, would be assessed at $5,600.50 including GST by a Taxing Master (para 8). The Tribunal also found that the first and second agreements corresponded to different matters: the first (2002) for the s.98C lump sum, the second (2005) for restoration and shoulder surgery. Accordingly, the cap in the first agreement did not apply to the second engagement (paras 4-7). Taken together, these findings supported the ruling that the professional costs charged were not excessive and that the applicant was liable to pay them, plus interest (Dispute about amount of the costs, paras 9-10; Order).
The Tribunal emphasised credibility and documentary evidence. Where contemporaneous documents, an expert assessment and consistent practitioner notes aligned, the Tribunal preferred those over the applicant’s later discrepant recollection.
Before and after state of the law
Before this decision: VCAT and courts apply statutory frameworks governing costs agreements and cost disputes. The Legal Practice Act 1996 s.103 sets out grounds for cancellation of a costs agreement, including inducement by fraud, misrepresentation, and questions of fairness and reasonableness. Under the Legal Profession Act 2004 s.4.3.15 (and related provisions), disputes unresolved by the Legal Services Commissioner may be determined by VCAT.
After this decision: Patsialaridis v Velos reinforces a number of settled principles within the Victorian administrative and costs framework:
The evidential weight of contemporaneous file notes, covering letters and the physical features of documents when assessing claims about the omission or later addition of clauses in costs agreements. The decision shows the Tribunal will look to such tangible indicia when resolving credibility conflicts about the content of a signed agreement (see Application to cancel costs agreement, paras 11-14).
The treatment of separate retainers: where distinct matters are engaged at different times, a later costs agreement governs the later matter and a cap in an earlier agreement does not automatically limit fees for the later matter. This is particularly pertinent where the later engagement involves ongoing or indeterminate benefits (restoration of medical expenses) or new litigation (Magistrates' Court proceedings), making cost estimation difficult (Dispute about amount, paras 5-7).
Acceptance of well-founded expert opinion on taxation/assessment of costs as relevant evidence of reasonableness (paras 4, 8-9).
The decision therefore affirms practical evidentiary and retainer principles rather than changing substantive law; its utility lies in reinforcing how tribunals assess documentary and expert proof in costs disputes.
Key passages with plain-English translation
"I accept the evidence of Mr. Velos, and find that Mr. Velos gave an accurate and extensive explanation of the second costs agreement to Mrs. Patsialaridis, in Greek, before she signed the agreement." [Application to cancel costs agreement, para 5]
Plain English: The Tribunal believes the solicitor. He explained the agreement to the client in her language before she signed it, so she was not misled or uninformed.
"The original costs agreement, signed by Mrs. Patsialaridis, is in evidence. The information that appears after the signature of Mrs. Patsialaridis does not appear to me to have been added. The margins are aligned, and all three pages of the costs agreement bear the same footer 'JS-100859-1-20-V1:JS'." [Application to cancel costs agreement, para 12]
Plain English: The Tribunal examined the signed document and saw no signs someone added material after signing; the pages look consistent and genuine.
"I accept the evidence of Mr. Wood, and find that the professional costs of $8,529.84, including GST, charged by Mr. Velos for handling both claims was not excessive." [Dispute about amount of the costs, para 9]
Plain English: An independent costs expert's opinion was accepted: the fees the solicitor charged were reasonable for the work done.
"There is no ground upon which the second costs agreement could be cancelled, so the application to cancel the costs agreement is dismissed." [Application to cancel costs agreement, para 15]
Plain English: The client did not show a legal basis to cancel the second costs agreement, so that part of her application fails.
"I will order that Mrs. Patsialaridis pay $7,085.12 to Mr. Velos for costs and disbursements, calculated in accordance with the tax invoice dated 29 April 2008... I will order that Mrs. Patsialaridis pay interest... calculated from 31 May 2008." [Dispute about amount, para 10]
Plain English: The Tribunal ordered the client to pay the solicitor the invoiced amount and interest from the specified date.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
This decision is directly on point where:
A client claims non-explanation of a costs agreement and seeks cancellation under s.103, but the solicitor can produce contemporaneous evidence (posted agreement and covering letter, handwritten file notes, a contemporaneous unsigned copy) and give credible oral evidence of explanation in a language the client understands.
There are two separate retainers for different statutory claims (one a lump sum capped retainer, the other for restoration/ongoing benefits or litigation), and the client contends a cap in the first agreement limits fees for the second.
A costs dispute requires assessment of whether the charged amount is excessive and an independent legal costs consultant gives evidence estimating likely taxed amounts.
Key factual triggers:
Disputed language/translation of explanation and contemporaneous records that can rebut a later claim.
Separate dates of engagement and distinct scope of work (no written merging of matters).
Expert evidence available on what taxation would produce.
If a practitioner can supply contemporaneous documents and expert costing evidence, Patsialaridis v Velos is a strong precedent to resist cancellation and to support quantum of fees.
How later courts have treated it
This decision is a VCAT determination and the deep dive must be limited to this judgment's text. The judgment itself does not cite later treatment. The holding is a tribunal-level factual and legal application; future tribunals and courts will treat it as persuasive on issues of evidential weight for contemporaneous records and treatment of separate retainers, but it does not establish binding appellate precedent. Practitioners should treat the decision as a useful guide to how VCAT may evaluate competing accounts about explanation and document authenticity, and how it values expert cost assessments.
Still-open questions
Threshold for acceptable contemporaneous evidence: While this case accepted the solicitor's file notes and posted documents, it does not articulate a precise threshold for when a file note will be insufficient. Cases with less clear contemporaneous records may result differently.
Role of cultural/linguistic assistance: The client testified she relied on daughters to explain English correspondence. The Tribunal accepted the solicitor’s direct explanation in Greek. It remains open how the Tribunal would approach cases where explanation occurred through a third party rather than the practitioner.
Interaction with consumer-protection fairness inquiries under s.103: The decision was driven by credibility. A broader question is how tribunals will apply the 'fair and reasonable' limb of s.103 where there is no direct evidence of misrepresentation but where power disparities, vulnerability, or language issues are present. Patsialaridis emphasises documentary corroboration; it is less instructive where such documents are lacking.
Quantification methodology: The decision accepted a legal costs consultant's estimate of what a Taxing Master would assess. Questions remain about the standard and admissibility of costs expert evidence in different factual matrices, and the weight to be given where expert opinions diverge.
Consequences for procedural fairness in costs applications: The Tribunal adjourned the respondent's application for costs until written reasons were provided to the applicant, reflecting sensitivity to fairness where the applicant may struggle to respond. How tribunals will structure such adjournments and what interim protections will be standard remain to be seen.
Practitioners should note that credibility, corroboration, and expert costing evidence were decisive here. Where such evidence is absent for a solicitor, or where a client can produce contemporaneous contradictory documentation, outcomes could materially differ.
Judgment (11 paragraphs)
[1]
The applicant is to pay $7,703.44 to the respondent, being $7,085.12 calculated in accordance with the tax invoice dated 29 April 2008 rendered by the respondent to the applicant, plus interest thereon of $618.32 calculated from 31 May 2008 to 23 September 2009.
The applicant having deposited $7,840.71 with the Legal Services Commissioner pending resolution of the dispute which is the subject matter of the application, the Legal Services Commissioner:
(a) is to pay $7,703.44 to the respondent in satisfaction of the previous order;
(b) is to pay $137.27 and interest earned upon the full amount deposited to the applicant.
[2]
After the respondent has received the sum of $7,703.44, the applicant by appointment may collect those parts of the file compiled by the respondent that belong to the applicant.
The application by the respondent that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of both applications is adjourned to a date to be fixed.
[3]
Mrs Patsialaridis attended n person, assisted by her daughter Ms Kathy Patsialaridis.
[4]
In 2000 Mrs. Patsialaridis was injured in an accident at her place of employment.
In 2002 Mrs. Patsialaridis engaged Mr. Velos, a solicitor, to make claims under the Accident Compensation Act1985. She entered into two costs agreements with Mr. Velos.
The present application is in reality two applications. It is an application to cancel one of the costs agreements; and it is an application to determine a dispute as to the amount of the costs charged by Mr. Velos, a dispute that could not be resolved by the Legal Services Commissioner.
[5]
Mrs. Patsialaridis entered into two costs agreements with Mr. Velos.
The first costs agreement was dated 3 December 2002. It related to an application made by Mrs. Patsialaridis pursuant to s.98C of the Accident Compensation Act1985. The application sought lump sum compensation for permanent impairment. Mrs. Patsialaridis did not seek to have the first costs agreement cancelled.
The second costs agreement was dated 17 November 2005. It related to an application made by Mrs. Patsialaridis pursuant to s.99 of the Accident Compensation Act1985. The application sought re-instatement of compensation for medical and like expenses (which had been terminated by the insurer as from 5 October 2005), and payment of the cost of surgery to Mrs. Patsialaridis' right shoulder (which the insurer had refused to pay on 5 September 2005). Mrs. Patsialaridis sought cancellation of the second costs agreement.
The application for cancellation was made pursuant to s.103 of the Legal Practice Act 1996. That section sets out the grounds upon which a costs agreement may be cancelled. The ground or grounds upon which the application was based was not set out in the application, or in further particulars of the application. However, if the allegations made in the application were proved, the allegations probably would establish that Mrs. Patsialaridis was induced to enter into the costs agreement by fraud or misrepresentation, or that the agreement was not fair and reasonable, two of the grounds set out in s.103.
[6]
- MRS P called and said she had received the letter and costs agreement I sent to her on Friday but that she would like to come in so that I could explain it to her
[7]
- I made an appointment for her to come in & see me on Thursday.
[8]
- She has shown her daughter but it is best she come in for me to explain to her.
[9]
Mrs. Patsialaridis gave evidence to the effect that she came to see Mr. Velos, that he did not provide an explanation of the letter or the costs agreement, and that she simply signed the costs agreement.
Mr. Velos gave evidence that Mrs. Patsialaridis came to see him on 17 November 2005. He said that she came with the letter and the costs agreement. He said that he explained the costs agreement to her in Greek. He said that he explained the need for the second costs agreement, namely that she wanted to make a new claim that would require the commencement of proceedings in the Magistrates' Court. He said that he told her that the new claim would involve the payment of fees to doctors to attend to give evidence, payment of an interpreter, payment of fees to counsel, and payment of court fees. He said that he told her that the second costs agreement would apply from that time onwards. He said that he estimated the cost of the proceedings to be $6,000 to $8,000. He said that he informed Mrs. Patsialaridis that she would have to pay a loading of 25% if she won, because she would not have to pay anything if she lost. Mr. Velos also gave evidence that his conference with Mrs. Patsialaridis occupied 35 minutes, and that Mrs. Patsialaridis did not say at any stage that she could not understand his explanation.
Mr. Velos said that Mrs. Patsialaridis then signed the agreement, that he made a photocopy of the signed agreement, and that he gave the photocopy to Mrs. Patsialaridis.
The evidence of Mr. Velos was confirmed by a contemporaneous file note in his own handwriting. It is a lengthy file note, and it concludes with the words "She agreed with the Costs Agreement signed it and gave instructions to proceed with the claim and all necessary work to institute Court Proceedings in the M.C."
I accept the evidence of Mr. Velos, and find that Mr. Velos gave an accurate and extensive explanation of the second costs agreement to Mrs. Patsialaridis, in Greek, before she signed the agreement.
Mrs. Patsialaridis made another allegation about the second costs agreement. She gave evidence that the second costs agreement, when she signed it, did not contain that part of the agreement which appears after her signature.
The part that was missing, according to Mrs. Patsialaridis, is headed "Information". It sets out the information that a legal practitioner was required at that time to provide to a client, at the commencement of a matter, pursuant to s.86 of the 1996.
[10]
On 29 April 2008 Mr. Velos rendered a tax invoice to Mrs. Patsialaridis for $7,085.12. The invoice related to both claims. If disbursements are disregarded, Mr. Velos seeks professional costs of $5,847.89 including GST. Mr. Velos acknowledged that he received professional costs of $2,681.95 from the insurer in respect of the claim under s.99. Consequently, the total amount charged by Mr. Velos for professional costs was $8,529.84 including GST. Mrs. Patsialaridis contended, in substance, that the costs agreements did not support a charge of $8,529.84 including GST.
It is common ground that on 29 April 2008 Mr. Velos rendered another tax invoice to Mrs. Patsialaridis for $755.59, solely for disbursements. During the course of this hearing, Mr. Velos stated that he had written off the invoice and did not seek payment of it.
Both costs agreements were no win no fee agreements. Both provided for payment of a loading of 25% if the respective claims made by Mrs. Patsialaridis were successful. Both claims were successful. However, Mr. Velos does not seek payment of a loading so I will ignore the loadings.
The first costs agreement provided that costs would be charged on Magistrates' Court scale "D". However, it also provided that costs would be capped. The lump sum eventually paid to Mrs. Patsialaridis in respect of her claim under s.98C was $14,420. Legal costs were capped at $3,300 if that amount was recovered. The claim had a long and tortuous history, and I readily accept that a large amount of work was performed by Mr. Velos. A legal costs consultant, Mr. Gavin Wood, gave evidence on behalf of Mr. Velos. His evidence was to the effect that legal costs, if calculated on the Magistrates' Court scale, would have exceeded the cap of $3,300. I accept the evidence of Mr. Wood. Indeed, I would have reached the same conclusion if Mr. Wood had not given evidence. Consequently, Mr. Velos is entitled to be paid $3,300 for the claim under s.98C.
The second costs agreement also provided that costs would be charged on Magistrates' Court scale "D". The costs were not capped. Mr. Velos explained why the costs were not capped. He said that the s.99 application was an application for restoration of medical and like expenses, an ongoing benefit, the amount of which cannot be known in advance. He said that the s.99 application also sought payment of the cost of shoulder surgery, a cost that is difficult to determine. He also said that the insurer had refused to pay for shoulder surgery on the basis that it was not satisfied that the injury was a result of the workplace accident, thus forcing Mrs. Patsialaridis to commence court proceedings, the cost of which was difficult to estimate.
[11]
At the conclusion of this hearing I gave this decision orally, albeit it abbreviated form. Counsel for Mr. Velos then sought an order that Mrs. Patsialaridis pay the costs incurred by Mr. Velos in respect of the hearing.
I stated that I was not prepared to hear the costs application until Mrs. Patsialaridis received the reasons for my decision in written form. I was concerned that Mrs. Patsialaridis might find it difficult to respond to the costs application in the absence of written reasons.
After written reasons have been provided to Mrs. Patsialaridis, I will arrange a date for the hearing of the costs application.
Parties
Applicant/Plaintiff:
Patsialaridis
Respondent/Defendant:
Velos
Legislation Cited (2)
Legal Practice Act 1996
Profession Act 2004
Cases Cited (1)
Patsialaridis v Velos (Legal Practice) [2009] VCAT 1978 (23 September 2009)
AI Analysis
Outcomerespondent
Disposition:
Application under s.103 dismissed. Applicant to pay respondent $7,703.44 (being $7,085.12 per tax invoice dated 29 April 2008 plus interest $618.32 from 31 May 2008 to 23 September 2009). Legal Services Commissioner to pay $7,703.44 to respondent and return $137.27 plus interest to applicant from monies deposited. Applicant may collect parts of file after payment. Respondent's costs for the applications adjourned for later hearing.
It was alleged by Mrs. Patsialaridis that the second costs agreement was not explained to her by Mr. Velos. I am satisfied by the evidence of Mr. Velos that he sent the agreement to Mrs. Patsialaridis in the post on 11 November 2005. His evidence was supported by a file copy of the covering letter, and an unsigned file copy of the agreement.
The letter and the agreement are written in English. Mrs. Patsialaridis gave evidence that she cannot read English. However, she said that when she received letters written in English she had them explained in Greek by one of her two daughters, if one was available. She also said that when she received a letter from Mr. Velos written in English she usually telephoned Mr. Velos, or went to see Mr. Velos, so that Mr. Velos could explain the contents of the letter to her in Greek.
Mr. Velos gave evidence that Mrs. Patsialaridis telephoned him on 14 November 2005 and made an appointment so that he could explain the letter and the agreement. This was confirmed by his file note of the telephone discussion, which I will set out in full:
Legal Practice Act
Mrs. Patsialaridis said that, although she cannot read English, she can read figures. The information included an estimate of $6,000 to $8,000 for legal costs. She said that she would have noticed the figures, and made enquiry about them, if the figures had been in the costs agreement when she signed it.
As I have mentioned, Mr. Velos gave evidence that he sent the costs agreement, subsequently signed by Mrs. Patsialaridis, to Mrs. Patsialaridis under cover of a letter dated 11 November 2005. The file copy of the costs agreement sent to Mrs. Patsialaridis is in evidence, and it contains the information that Mrs. Patsialaridis claims to have been missing from the original.
It is common ground that Mrs. Patsialaridis brought the original costs agreement to her conference with Mr. Velos on 17 November 2005. It also is common ground that the purpose of the conference was for Mr. Velos to explain the agreement to Mrs. Patsialaridis in Greek. Mr. Velos gave evidence that the costs agreement, when signed by Mrs. Patsialaridis, contained the information that Mrs. Patsialaridis claims to have been missing.
I have already found that Mr. Velos gave an accurate and extensive explanation of the costs agreement to Mrs. Patsialaridis before she signed it. I am well satisfied that his explanation included an explanation of the estimate of $6,000 to $8,000.
The original costs agreement, signed by Mrs. Patsialaridis, is in evidence. The information that appears after the signature of Mrs. Patsialaridis does not appear to me to have been added. The margins are aligned, and all three pages of the costs agreement bear the same footer "JS-100859-1-20-V1:JS".
The application to VCAT lodged by Mrs. Patsialaridis included a signed copy of the second costs agreement. That copy includes the information that Mrs. Patsialaridis claims to have been missing when she signed the original. Mrs. Patsialaridis denied in cross examination that Mr. Velos gave her a photocopy of the agreement immediately after it was signed. She said that Mr. Velos gave her a copy of the agreement at a later stage, which included the information, and that copy formed part of her application.
I accept the evidence of Mr. Velos. I find that the information formed part of the costs agreement when it was posted to Mrs. Patsialaridis, and that it remained part of the costs agreement when it was signed by Mrs. Patsialaridis. I totally reject the evidence of Mrs. Patsialaridis, which appeared to be designed to explain away the fact that costs were estimated in writing to be $6,000 to $8,000.
There is no ground upon which the second costs agreement could be cancelled, so the application to cancel the costs agreement is dismissed.
The Magistrates' Court proceedings were settled on the day of hearing, on the basis that medical and like expenses would be restored, that the shoulder injury was accepted as being work related, that the insurer would pay for shoulder surgery and 12 physiotherapy treatments following the surgery, and that the insurer would pay party/party costs on Magistrates' Court scale "C".
Mrs. Patsialaridis contended that the claim under s.98C for lump sum compensation and the claim under s.99 for restoration of medical and like expenses and shoulder surgery was one claim, with the result that the cap under the first costs agreement was all that could be charged by Mr. Velos. The contention had no merit whatsoever. Mr. Velos was engaged in 2002 to make a claim under s.98C, which was the subject matter of the first costs agreement. It was not until 2005 that Mrs. Patsialaridis mentioned to Mr. Velos the she was in need of shoulder surgery. That led to the second costs agreement and the claim under s.99. There were two claims. The first costs agreement related only to the first claim.
Mr. Wood gave expert evidence that professional costs for the work performed by Mr. Velos after 17 November 2005, very largely concerning the second claim in the Magistrates' Court, would in his opinion be assessed by the Taxing Master of the Supreme Court at $5,600.50 including GST.
I accept the evidence of Mr. Wood, and find that the professional costs of $8,529.84, including GST, charged by Mr. Velos for handling both claims was not excessive.
Mrs. Patsialaridis has not paid any money to Mr. Velos for professional costs. I will order that Mrs. Patsialaridis pay $7,085.12 to Mr. Velos for costs and disbursements, calculated in accordance with the tax invoice dated 29 April 2008. Mr. Velos gave evidence that he has paid all of the disbursements. Consequently, I will order that Mrs. Patsialaridis pay interest to Mr. Velos on the full amount of $7,085.12, calculated from 31 May 2008.