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[2026] ACTCA 19
procedural. The appellants are to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal, except that each party is to pay its own costs of the stay application and the costs of the expedition application are to be paid...
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The appeal had already been dismissed, and the appellants had been ordered to pay the respondents’ costs. The Court then reconsidered the costs of two applications. For the stay application, the appellants had obtained the stay, but the appeal was later dismissed. Balancing those points, the Court ordered each side to pay its own costs of that application. The respondents’ costs of the appeal remained payable by the appellants, except that all parties’ costs of the expedition application were to come from the estate.
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2,115 words · generated 07/10/2026
This is a short costs judgment delivered by the ACT Court of Appeal in Pastrello v Saeedi (No 3) [2026] ACTCA 19. It does not reconsider the underlying succession appeal. Instead, it addresses how the costs of two applications made during the appeal should be treated after the appeal itself was dismissed.
The Court records that it delivered its appeal decision on 31 March 2026 in Pastrello v Saeedi (No 2) [2026] ACTCA 10. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondents’ costs. The parties were given leave to seek an alternative costs order ([1]). The present judgment resolves that further costs question.
The appellants asked the Court to make exceptions to the usual appeal costs order. They proposed that they pay the respondents’ appeal costs, except for the costs relating to applications filed on 18 February 2025 and 7 May 2025. They also proposed that the costs of both applications be paid from the estate ([2]). The judgment clarifies that references by the parties to 12 February 2025 were understood as references to 18 February 2025, the date the appellants filed the stay application ([3]).
The first application was for a stay of orders made by Mossop J on 12 February 2025. The appellants filed it on 18 February 2025, and it was opposed ([4]). On 31 March 2025, McWilliam J stayed the principal order until further order and reserved the costs of that application ([5]).
The second application was for expedition, filed on 7 May 2025. The respondents opposed the appellants’ proposed costs treatment of the stay application, but consented to the proposed order that the expedition application costs be paid from the estate ([3]).
The final order kept the appellants liable for the respondents’ appeal costs, subject to two exceptions. Each party was to bear its own costs of the stay application. All parties’ costs of the expedition application were to be paid from the estate of the late Mr Lorenzo Antonio Pastrello ([9]).
The Court’s stated starting point is that costs involve “a very wide discretion”, exercised with the aim of achieving a “fair and just result” ([6]). The judgment does not set out a detailed test or cite earlier authorities for that proposition. Its reasoning is confined to applying that broad discretion to the stay application.
The Court identifies two opposing considerations. First, the appellants sought a stay because they considered Mossop J’s decision to be wrong. The Court of Appeal later dismissed their appeal. The Court described this as rendering the basis for the stay “unfounded” ([7]). That was a consideration against treating the appellants as having succeeded in a broader sense.
Second, the appellants did obtain the stay on the application itself. The Court acknowledged that they “might be viewed as having succeeded on that confined application” ([7]). The stay had operated from McWilliam J’s order on 31 March 2025 until further order, but the present judgment does not describe its practical effects beyond that procedural fact ([5]).
The Court did not treat either consideration as decisive in isolation. Rather, it expressly described them as “two opposing considerations” and concluded that each party should bear its own costs of the stay application ([8]). That result avoids making the appellants pay the respondents’ costs of an application on which the appellants obtained the order they sought, while also avoiding an order requiring the respondents to pay the appellants’ costs after the appeal failed.
The treatment of the expedition application is different in the reasons. The judgment records that the respondents consented to the proposed order that its costs be paid from the estate ([3]). It gives no further explanation for that allocation. The operative order directs that all parties’ costs of that application be paid from the estate ([9]). The source does not state whether the estate allocation rested on a particular legal principle or on the parties’ consent, so the explanation should not be extended beyond the reasons given.
The appellants’ liability for the respondents’ costs of the appeal otherwise remained in place. That flowed from the earlier appeal costs order, which the Court varied only to insert the exceptions stated at paragraph 9 ([1], [9]).
The judgment does not purport to change or develop the general law of costs. Its express statement is that the Court has a very wide discretion in respect of costs, with the qualification that a costs order should aim for a fair and just result ([6]). It does not cite a case as authority for that statement or analyse competing costs doctrines.
Before this costs decision, the appeal had been dismissed and the appellants had been ordered to pay the respondents’ costs. The parties then had leave to seek an alternative order ([1]). The stay application costs had been reserved by McWilliam J, rather than finally allocated, when the stay was granted ([5]). The costs of the expedition application were also part of the later request addressed by the Court.
After this decision, the general appeal costs order continued, but with defined exceptions. The appellants remained responsible for the respondents’ appeal costs. Each party bore its own stay application costs. The estate was responsible for all parties’ expedition application costs ([9]).
Accordingly, the practical development in this proceeding was an adjustment to the allocation of costs between the parties and the estate, not a new rule governing costs generally. The decision illustrates the Court’s willingness to distinguish between the appeal as a whole and discrete applications within it. For the stay application, the Court considered the result of that application alongside the ultimate appeal outcome. For the expedition application, the judgment records the parties’ consent and makes the estate-payment order.
The decision should be read within those limits. The reasons do not state a general formula for allocating costs whenever a party obtains an interim stay but later loses an appeal. Nor do they explain when costs of an expedition application may be paid from an estate. Those broader propositions cannot be drawn from this judgment alone.
At paragraph 6, the Court says: “There is always a very wide discretion in respect of costs, the proviso being that the intent of any costs order should be to achieve a fair and just result.”
In plain English, the Court says it has substantial flexibility when deciding who should pay costs, but that flexibility is directed towards a fair outcome. The passage supplies the general framework used in the reasons. It does not identify a checklist of factors or define what “fair and just” means in every case.
At paragraph 7, the Court explains that the appellants sought the stay because they believed Mossop J’s decision was wrong. It then notes that the appeal was dismissed, making the basis for the stay “unfounded”. But it also recognises that the appellants succeeded in obtaining the stay and could therefore be regarded as successful on that limited application.
In plain English, the appellants had won the immediate procedural order they sought, but lost the appeal that had prompted it. The Court treated both outcomes as relevant to the stay costs. It did not equate success on the stay application with success in the appeal overall.
At paragraph 8, the Court says: “Taking into account the two opposing considerations, the Court is of the view that each party should pay its own costs of the stay application.”
In plain English, neither side was made to reimburse the other for the costs of that application. This was the Court’s resolution of the competing considerations, rather than a general rule that each party pays its own costs whenever an interim application has a mixed outcome.
Paragraph 9 is the operative order. It states that the appellants must pay the respondents’ appeal costs, “except that” each party pays its own stay application costs and the estate pays all parties’ expedition application costs. In plain English, the original appeal costs consequence remained the default, but the Court carved out those two specified categories.
The decision is most directly relevant to the specific procedural pattern described in its reasons: an appeal is dismissed after the appellants obtained an interim stay, and the Court must later decide how to allocate the costs of that stay application. The features the Court expressly relied on were that the appellants obtained the stay, the appeal was dismissed, and the asserted basis for the stay was therefore unfounded in the Court’s view ([7]).
The case may also be a useful comparison where costs of an interlocutory or related application have been reserved and the later outcome of the main proceeding changes the context in which those costs are considered. Here, McWilliam J had reserved the stay application costs when granting the stay ([5]), and the Court of Appeal later considered those costs after dismissing the appeal ([1], [7]).
Its relevance is narrower where an interim application was not successful, where the appeal succeeded, or where the costs question concerns a different kind of application. The judgment does not decide those situations. It also does not establish a general principle for paying litigation costs from an estate. For the expedition application, the reasons record the respondents’ consent to that proposed treatment and state the resulting order, but do not explain a wider rule ([3], [9]).
The case is therefore best understood as an example of a discretionary, fact-specific costs decision. It shows that a court may separate the costs of an appeal from the costs of applications made during it, and may assess the latter by reference to both the result of the application and the eventual appeal outcome. The precise order in another matter would depend on its own facts and the relevant sources.
The judgment supplied here contains no discussion of later judicial treatment of Pastrello v Saeedi (No 3) [2026] ACTCA 19. It was decided on 3 July 2026, and the text identifies no later cases applying, distinguishing, or otherwise considering it. No conclusion about subsequent treatment can be drawn from this source.
The judgment itself refers to two earlier decisions in the same dispute. It identifies Pastrello v Saeedi (No 2) [2026] ACTCA 10 as the appeal decision delivered on 31 March 2026, which dismissed the appeal and made the initial appeal costs order ([1]). It also identifies Saeedi v Pastrello [2025] ACTSC 26 as the decision of Mossop J from which the appeal arose ([4]). This costs judgment does not set out the substantive reasoning in either earlier decision.
For research purposes, the source supports describing No 3 as a later costs ruling in the same litigation, following the appeal outcome in No 2. It does not support claims about how courts beyond this proceeding have treated the ruling or whether its costs reasoning has been adopted as a general approach.
Several matters are left open by the short reasons. The Court does not explain whether the stay had practical consequences beyond the fact that the principal order was stayed until further order ([5]). It does not give details of the orders made by Mossop J, the grounds of appeal, or the reasoning by which the appeal was dismissed. The present judgment refers to those matters only to explain the costs context.
The reasons also do not identify a detailed set of factors for deciding whether an unsuccessful appeal should affect the costs of an earlier successful stay application. The Court names the two considerations relevant here and gives the result, but does not say how the same considerations would be weighed in a different factual setting ([7]–[8]).
The estate’s responsibility for the expedition application costs is stated in the final order, but the reasons do not explain the basis for that allocation beyond recording the respondents’ consent to it ([3], [9]). The judgment does not address whether the estate allocation reflects any general succession-law principle, the conduct of the parties, or another case-specific consideration.
Finally, the judgment offers no broader discussion of when costs should be paid from an estate, how such an order interacts with the interests of beneficiaries, or how a court should deal with disagreement among parties about that form of order. Those topics are outside the reasons given. Any analysis of them would require additional legal sources and facts not contained in this judgment.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have it checked by a qualified Australian lawyer.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY COURT OF APPEAL
Case Title: Pastrello v Saeedi (No 3) Citation: [2026] ACTCA 19 Hearing Date: 12 November 2025 Decision Date: 3 July 2026 Before: McCallum CJ, Taylor J and Elkaim AJ Decision: (1) The appellants are to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal, except that: (a) Each party is to pay its own costs of the stay application filed on 18 February 2025. (b) The costs of all of the parties of the expedition application filed on 7 May 2025 are to be paid out of the estate of the late Mr Lorenzo Antonio Pastrello who died on 4 August 2021. Catchwords: APPEAL – SUCCESSION – Wills, probate and administration – costs Cases Cited: Pastrello v Saeedi (No 2) [2026] ACTCA 10 Parties: Luisa Sonia Pastrello (First Appellant) Eddy Louis Pastrello (Second Appellant) Kamyar Saeedi (in his capacity as executor of the estate of the late Lorenzo Pastrello) (First Respondent) Carl Pastrello (Second Respondent) Christian Pastrello (Third Respondent) Massimo Pastrello (Fourth Respondent) Representation: Counsel C Birch SC with G Blank (First and Second Appellants) No appearance (First Respondent) S Chapple SC with D Yazdani (Second, Third and Fourth Respondents) Solicitors Thomson Geer (First and Second Appellants) Kamy Saeedi Law (First Respondent) KJB Law (Second, Third and Fourth Respondents) File Number: ACTCA 3 of 2025 Decision Under Appeal: Court: ACT Supreme Court Before: Mossop J Date of Decision: 12 February 2025 Case Title: Saeedi v Pastrello Citation: [2025] ACTSC 26 Court File Number: SC 286 of 2022 THE COURT: Introduction
The Court delivered its decision on the appeal on 31 March 2026 (Pastrello v Saeedi (No 2) [2026] ACTCA 10). The appeal was dismissed. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondents’ costs. Leave was given to the parties to seek an alternative costs order.
The appellants have taken up this invitation and asked for the following two orders: (a) The appellants are to pay the respondents’ cost of the appeal except for the cost relating to the Applications in Proceeding dated 12 February 2025 and 7 May 2025. (b) The parties’ costs of the Applications in Proceeding dated 12 February 2025 and 7 May 2025 are to be paid from the estate.
The respondents oppose the application in respect of 12 February 2025 but consent to the order for 7 May 2025. Parties’ references to 12 February 2025 are presumed to be 18 February 2025 as this was the date the appellants filed an application in proceeding.
The appeal arose from a decision of Mossop J delivered on 12 February 2025. On 18 February 2025 the appellants filed an application in proceeding requesting a stay of the orders made by Mossop J. The application was opposed.
On 31 March 2025, the application for a stay came before McWilliam J. Her Honour ordered that the principal order made by Mossop J be stayed until further order of the Court. Her Honour reserved the costs of the application.
There is always a very wide discretion in respect of costs, the proviso being that the intent of any costs order should be to achieve a fair and just result.
The appellants asked for a stay because they thought the decision of Mossop J was wrong. The Court of Appeal disagreed and dismissed the appeal, rendering the basis for the stay to to be unfounded. On the other hand, the appellants were successful in obtaining the stay so they might be viewed as having succeeded on that confined application.
Taking into account the two opposing considerations, the Court is of the view that each party should pay its own costs of the stay application.
Orders
I certify that the preceding nine [9] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Court. Associate: Date:
Pastrello
Saeedi (No 3)
The appellants are to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal, except that each party is to pay its own costs of the stay application and the costs of the expedition application are to be paid out of the estate.