//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2025] ACTCA 18
procedural. The application lodged on 7 May 2025 was dismissed. Costs of the application were reserved ([30]).
The parties who won at trial asked the Court to hear the appeal about the deceased’s will about three months earlier than it otherwise could be heard. They said delay was costly and made it harder to manage a large estate and related matters. The Court accepted that the estate was complex and costs were continuing, but the evidence did not show that the interim administrator was mismanaging it, that important decisions could not be made, or that the related cases would be significantly harmed by the delay. It was also unlikely that an earlier appeal hearing would enable action on the quarry before the relevant consent expired. Because an earlier hearing would require removing another appeal already allocated a place in the list, and the claimed prejudice was not sufficient on the evidence, the Court dismissed the application.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
2,645 words · generated 05/10/2026
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
Pastrello v Saeedi [2025] ACTCA 18 concerned the timing of an appeal, not the merits of the dispute about the deceased’s will. The appeal followed a trial decision delivered on 12 February 2025, with a notice of appeal filed on 11 March 2025 ([2]). The underlying dispute was whether probate should be granted for a will made on 18 December 2020, or instead for an earlier will made in 1988 ([3]). The deceased, Lorenzo Pastrello, died on 4 August 2021 ([3]).
The applicants for expedition were the second, third and fourth respondents to the appeal, who had succeeded at trial ([5]). They sought to have the appeal heard in the week commencing 4 August 2025. The appeal had not yet been assigned a hearing date. It was listed for an appeal callover on 10 September 2025, and the earliest ordinary hearing date identified by the Court was 3 November 2025 ([7]). Expedition would therefore bring the hearing forward by about three months.
The scheduling constraint mattered. The August appeal sittings were already allocated to existing matters, with no unallocated capacity. To hear this appeal in August, the Court would have to remove another matter that already had a hearing date ([9]). The Court emphasised that the resulting inconvenience to the parties in that matter was not a step to take lightly.
The applicants relied on asserted prejudice from delay. Their grounds included the size and complexity of the estate, property interests in the ACT and NSW, related proceedings, limits on the interim administrator’s role, the need for decisions concerning the Sutton quarry, possible deterioration of property, and substantial ongoing legal costs ([11]–[13]). They also relied on the executor’s knowledge of the deceased’s financial affairs ([12]).
The opposing parties accepted that the estate was large and complex but disputed that the evidence showed sufficient urgency. They pointed to the interim administrator’s steps concerning the quarry and the fact that the available cash was limited in relation to property repairs ([15], [19], [21]–[22]). Both sides acknowledged that an expedited appeal was unlikely to allow the executor to take particular steps concerning the quarry before the existing development consent expired in September ([20]).
Muller AJ dismissed the application. The Court reserved costs ([30]). The decision did not determine the appeal about which will should govern the estate.
The Court treated expedition as a discretionary decision and focused on the particular evidence and practical consequences in this case. Because a date had not yet been set, the Court proceeded on the basis that the application relied on the general power in r 1401(4)(c) of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) to make directions, including setting a timetable ([8]). The judgment distinguished that situation from the rules it mentioned for other procedural settings: r 5437 provides a mechanism to change a hearing date that has already been set, while r 1311 concerns expedition of a trial and specifies evidentiary requirements in that context ([8]). The judgment does not set out the full text of those rules.
A central practical consideration was that granting the application would displace an appeal already allocated a hearing date. The Court described that consequence as part of the discretionary assessment, rather than treating expedition as a scheduling decision affecting only these parties ([9], [25]). The decision therefore considered both the applicants’ asserted prejudice and the cost to other litigants of changing an existing allocation.
The Court assessed the evidence under several headings. First, it accepted that the estate was large, complex, and required significant ongoing management. But there was no suggestion that the interim administrator was mismanaging it. The evidence suggested that administration might be facilitated by transfer to the executor, not that necessary administration was presently failing ([26]).
Second, the administration was incurring substantial and continuing legal costs. The Court noted there was no dispute about the costs identified in the evidence ([23]). But the material did not establish what the executor would charge, if anything, or how those charges would compare with the interim administrator’s costs. The executor was a legal practitioner and the will permitted him to charge for executor services, according to the judgment ([24]). That absence of comparative evidence limited what could be concluded from the costs argument.
Third, the applicants’ concern about the Sutton quarry did not demonstrate that an earlier appeal hearing would resolve the immediate timing problem. Although the development consent was due to expire in September unless physical work was undertaken, the applicants acknowledged that the interim administrator could take steps, even if the process might be more efficient under the executor ([19]). Both sides considered it most unlikely that the executor could take particular steps before the consent expired even if the appeal were expedited ([20]).
Fourth, the related proceedings did not establish sufficient urgency. The Court described three proceedings connected with the estate or beneficiaries. On the material, none was shown to be significantly negatively affected by a three-month delay in the appeal hearing ([16]–[18], [26]). The Court’s conclusion was confined to the evidence before it on this application.
Finally, there was a possible risk that property values could be affected by insufficient maintenance. But available cash was unlikely to allow work to begin promptly regardless of whether the appeal was expedited ([21]–[22], [26]). This weakened the connection between the proposed earlier hearing and the claimed practical benefit.
The Court referred to Hird v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority [2014] FCA 1090 at [19]. As quoted in Pastrello, Kenny J identified possible factors including significant practical disadvantage from delay, irreparable loss, especially significant hardship such as loss of livelihood, business or home, serious detriment to public administration, and effects on people who were not parties ([27]). Muller AJ then applied a case-specific assessment of the evidence. The judgment does not suggest that those examples are an exhaustive checklist.
The Court accepted that the applicants would find it frustrating to be unable to continue the administration after succeeding at trial ([28]). But that frustration did not resolve the separate question of whether the case justified moving another appeal out of the August list. The Court was not satisfied that expedition was in the interests of justice ([29]).
The judgment describes the procedural framework relevant to this particular application. It does not announce a new general test for all applications to expedite appeals, nor does it purport to change the text or operation of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT).
The distinction drawn at [8] is procedural. Rule 5437 was described as dealing with changing an appeal hearing date where a date has already been set. Rule 1311 was described as providing for expedition of a trial and setting out evidentiary requirements in that context. Here, no appeal hearing date had been set. The Court therefore proceeded on the footing that the applicants relied on the general directions power in r 1401(4)(c), including power to set a timetable for the hearing or procedural steps.
The judgment’s practical contribution is its illustration of how the Court assessed expedition where an earlier hearing would displace an already allocated matter. It considered the requested acceleration, the evidence of prejudice, the likely practical benefit of an earlier hearing, and the effect on other litigants ([9], [25]–[27]). It also distinguished between evidence that administration could be more efficient under an executor and evidence that the current administrator could not perform necessary functions. On the material, the latter was not established ([19], [26]).
The judgment applies the discretionary considerations quoted from Hird, rather than recasting them. It quotes possible examples of significant disadvantage and hardship, including irreparable loss or serious detriment to public administration or others ([27]). The decision does not state that applicants must prove one particular category of prejudice, nor does it hold that costs or administrative inconvenience can never support expedition. It finds that the collection of circumstances shown here did not justify expedition, particularly when the costs could not be compared and the proposed earlier hearing was unlikely to address the quarry timing or maintenance constraints ([20], [24], [26], [29]).
The decision should therefore be read as a fact-specific application of discretion, not as a rule that estate appeals, complex matters, or appeals involving continuing costs cannot be expedited. The judgment says the factors depend at least partly on the particular case, adopting the passage from Hird ([27]).
At [8], Muller AJ explains why the application was approached under r 1401(4)(c): “As this is an application for expedition of an appeal hearing in circumstances where the appeal hearing date is yet to be set, I have proceeded on the basis that the applicants rely upon the general power of the court...” In plain English, the Court was not dealing with a request to move an already fixed date. It treated the request as one for case-management directions before a hearing date had been set.
At [9], the Court says that an order for expedition would require another allocated matter to be removed from the August list. The observation that this “is not an action to be taken lightly” makes the effects on other litigants part of the assessment. In plain English, an applicant’s urgency is not considered in isolation where the requested hearing slot is already being used.
At [19], the Court records that the interim administrator was taking steps concerning the Sutton quarry. The applicants’ position was not that nothing could be done, but that the executor could manage the process more efficiently. This distinction mattered: a possible improvement in efficiency was not the same as proof that the current administration was unable to act.
At [20], both sides accepted that an expedited hearing was unlikely to put the executor in a position to take particular steps before the development consent expired in September. In plain English, the proposed timing did not appear likely to solve the most time-sensitive problem relied on in support of expedition.
At [26], the Court gathers its assessment of the evidence. It notes the estate’s scale and complexity, but no suggestion of mismanagement; substantial legal costs, but no evidence of the executor’s prospective fees; no demonstrated significant decision beyond the administrator’s power; no demonstrated serious impact on related proceedings from a three-month delay; and limited funds for maintenance work. This paragraph is the most concise statement of why the evidence did not establish sufficient practical prejudice.
At [27], the Court quotes Hird as identifying factors that may matter, including significant practical disadvantage, irreparable loss, especially significant hardship, serious detriment to public administration, and effects on non-parties. In plain English, expedition can be relevant where waiting would produce a serious practical consequence, but the precise factors depend on the case.
At [29], Muller AJ states the conclusion: the applicants’ position did not make expedition consistent with the interests of justice. The result followed from the assessment of the evidence and the competing listing consequence, not from a finding that the applicants’ concerns were unreal.
The decision is most directly relevant to applications to bring forward an appeal where no hearing date has yet been fixed, the applicant relies on practical prejudice from delay, and the requested listing would displace a matter already allocated a hearing date. In that setting, the judgment illustrates that the Court may examine not only the seriousness of the asserted prejudice, but also whether an earlier hearing is likely to alleviate it and what consequences the rearrangement has for other litigants ([8]–[9], [25]–[27]).
It is also relevant where the claimed urgency involves administration of a deceased estate. Pastrello shows the importance of distinguishing between a complex estate and an estate shown to be mismanaged, and between an administrator’s comparative lack of familiarity and a demonstrated inability to take necessary steps ([12], [15], [19], [26]). The Court did not treat the existence of an executor who might be better placed to manage assets as conclusive proof that expedition was required.
The reasoning may also be pertinent where applicants rely on ongoing professional costs, related proceedings, asset deterioration, or an approaching consent deadline. The judgment shows that the evidential connection between those concerns and the requested acceleration mattered. The costs were substantial, but the executor’s prospective charges were not in evidence. The related proceedings were not shown to be materially harmed by three months’ delay. Property works faced funding constraints, and the quarry issue was unlikely to be resolved in time by an earlier appeal hearing ([16]–[24], [26]).
The case does not determine how an application would be resolved if there were evidence of mismanagement, a decision the administrator could not make, a time-critical loss that an earlier hearing could prevent, or serious harm to a related proceeding. Those circumstances were not established on the material described in this judgment.
The judgment supplied here reports no later judicial treatment of Pastrello v Saeedi [2025] ACTCA 18. It was decided on 6 June 2025, and its reasons refer to Hird v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority [2014] FCA 1090 at [19] ([27]). The available judgment text does not identify any later case that applied, followed, distinguished, or criticised Pastrello.
The relationship with Hird should be stated narrowly. Muller AJ quoted Kenny J’s discussion of factors that may bear on expedition and then assessed the evidence in this application ([27]–[29]). On the face of the reasons, Hird was cited as a source of relevant discretionary considerations. Pastrello does not say that it adopted a closed list of factors or that Hird required any particular result.
Accordingly, any account of subsequent treatment would require sources beyond the judgment provided here. This section cannot establish whether courts later relied on Pastrello or how they characterised it.
The reasons leave several matters open because they were unnecessary to decide on the evidence before the Court.
First, the judgment does not set out the full text of rr 1311, 1401(4)(c), or 5437. It explains how Muller AJ understood those rules for the purposes of this application, particularly the distinction between an unset appeal date, changing an existing date, and expedition of a trial ([8]). It does not provide a comprehensive interpretation of those provisions.
Second, the reasons do not establish what level or kind of prejudice will generally justify expedition. The Court quotes examples from Hird but stresses the case-specific nature of the inquiry ([27]). It does not decide whether particular evidence of financial cost, asset deterioration, or administrative limitation would be sufficient in a different case.
Third, the reasons do not resolve how a court should weigh prejudice to an applicant against the prejudice caused by displacing another listed matter in different circumstances. Here, the August list had no residual availability and there was no sufficient showing that the proposed earlier date would avert the principal practical concerns ([9], [20], [26]). The judgment does not state a general priority rule for competing listing demands.
Fourth, it remains open what evidence would establish that an interim administrator’s powers or practical capacity are materially inadequate compared with an executor’s. In this case, the evidence did not demonstrate a significant decision beyond the administrator’s power, and the administrator was already taking steps concerning the quarry ([19], [26]). The Court did not decide the boundaries of the administrator’s powers.
Finally, the application concerned the timing of the appeal, not the validity of either will, the merits of the appeal grounds, the administration of the estate more generally, or the related proceedings. The decision should not be read as determining those matters.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: Pastrello v Saeedi Citation: [2025] ACTCA 18 Hearing Date: 4 June 2025 Decision Date: 6 June 2025 Before: Muller AJ Decision: (1) The application lodged on 7 May 2025 is dismissed. (2) Costs of the application are reserved.
Catchwords: APPEAL – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to expedite hearing of appeal – interests of justice – where expediting appeal would displace hearing of already allocated appeal – application dismissed Legislation Cited: Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), rr 1311, 1401(4), 5437 Cases Cited: Hird v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti- Doping Authority [2014] FCA 1090 Parties: Luisa Sonia Pastrello (First Appellant) Eddy Louis Pastrello (Second Appellant) Kamyar Saeedi (in his capacity as executor of the estate of the late Lorenzo Pastrello (First Respondent) Carl Lorenzo Pastrello (Second Respondent) Christian Ivan Pastrello (Third Respondent) Massimo Max Eddy Pastrello (Fourth Respondent) Representation: Counsel G Blank (First and Second Appellant) M Mascitti (First Respondent) W Sharwood (Second, Third and Fourth Respondent) Solicitors Thomson Geer (First and Second Appellant) Kamy Saeedi Law (First Respondent) KJB Law (Second, Third and Fourth Respondent) File Number: AC 3 of 2025 Decision Under Appeal: Court/Tribunal: ACT Supreme Court Before: Mossop J Date of Decision: 12 February 2025 Case Title: Saeedi v Pastrello Citation: [2025] ACTSC 26 MULLER AJ: EDITED EX TEMPORE REMARKS Introduction
This is an application for expedition of the hearing of an appeal.
The trial judge gave his decision on 12 February 2025 and a Notice of Appeal was filed on 11 March 2025.
The primary proceedings concerned the validity of a will executed by the late Lorenzo Pastrello (Mr Pastrello) on 18 December 2020. Mr Pastrello died on 4 August 2021. There is a contest as to whether a grant of probate should be made in accordance with the disputed will, which divided Mr Pastrello’s assets amongst his children and grandchildren (the respondents’ position), or alternatively whether probate ought be granted in accordance with an earlier will executed in 1988 which made provision for Mr Pastrello’s children only (the appellants’ position).
The appeal raises 4 primary grounds, but in effect there are 24 separate grounds of appeal.
This application for expedition is made by the second, third and fourth respondents to the appeal, that is, the parties who were successful at trial. The application identifies prejudice to the parties as the primary ground upon which the application for expedition is based. To avoid confusion I shall hereafter refer to the applicants/respondents as “the applicants” and the respondents/appellants as “the respondents”.
An affidavit of Massimo Pastrello, affirmed on 7 May 2025, is read in support of this application, with the applicants also relying upon earlier affidavits of Massimo Pastrello, Kamyar Saeedi and Tamara Goodwin filed in these appeal proceedings in the context of the respondent’s application for a stay. The effect of the stay proceedings was that a stay of the decision of the trial judge was granted until further order.
The appeal proceedings are currently listed in the appeal callover on 10 September 2025 for consideration for inclusion in the Court of Appeal sittings in November 2025. The applicants seek the inclusion of the appeal in the appeal sittings scheduled to take place in the week commencing 4 August 2025. As the matter presently stands the earliest date upon which the appeal could be listed is 3 November 2025 with the appeal sittings scheduled to continue over a two-week period from that date. The effect of an order for expedition would thus be to bring forward the hearing of the appeal by some three months.
The present position is that a date for the hearing of the appeal has not been set. Rule 5437 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) (the CPR) provides a mechanism for changing the date for the hearing of an appeal but in circumstances where a date has already been set. Rule 1311 of the CPR provides for the expedition of a trial and sets out the evidentiary requirements in support of an application for expedition in that context. As this is an application for expedition of an appeal hearing in circumstances where the appeal hearing date is yet to be set, I have proceeded on the basis that the applicants rely upon the general power of the court under r 1401(4)(c) of the CPR to make directions, including the setting of a timetable for the conduct of the hearing or any steps in the proceeding.
It is a matter of relevance that the dates for appeal hearings in August 2025 have been allocated to existing matters and there is no residual availability in that court list. As such, an order for expedition in this case would necessarily require the removal from the list of a matter already allocated a hearing date. Whilst the court has a broad discretion, a decision to remove a matter already set down for hearing, with the inevitable inconvenience to the parties in that matter, is not an action to be taken lightly.
The application is opposed by the respondents and I have the benefit of a written outline of their submissions. I am also assisted by the chronology prepared by the applicants, identifying critical dates pertaining to the history of the matter.
The applicants’ argument for expedition
The grounds for expedition identified in the application are: (a) significant prejudice to the parties as a consequence of delay; (b) consistency with the practice direction as to the timing of hearings; and (c) interests of justice considerations.
Counsel for the applicants expanded on those grounds in oral submissions. He pointed in particular to the following matters: (a) The size and complexity of the estate with property interests extending across the ACT and NSW (I understood this to be identified as a basis for expedition given the limitations arising from the management of the extensive estate by an interim administrator as opposed to the executor); (b) The existence of three related proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court, each dealing with issues either bearing on the estate, or on some or all of the beneficiaries; (c) The continued management of the estate assets via an interim administrator carried some limitations that would be alleviated by the transfer of those functions to the executor – an event that cannot take place until the appeal is determined (counsel for the applicants emphasised that no criticism was made of the conduct of the administration by the interim administrator, but rather the concern was directed to the limitation on her functions and on her knowledge of the estate relative to the appointed executor); (d) The need to make decisions of significance in respect of estate assets, including pending decisions in respect of the development consent for the quarry located at the Sutton property, and the preference for those decisions to be taken by an executor with an intimate knowledge of the estate assets; (e) The risk of deterioration in a number of the estates’ property assets whereby the lack of ongoing maintenance carries the risk of erosion of property values; (f) The substantial legal costs associated with the prolonged interim administration, estimated to total approximately $280,000.00, without any allowance for counsel’s fees; and (g) The advantages flowing to the estate from Mr Saeedi’s intimate knowledge of the financial affairs of the late Mr Pastrello.
The applicants submitted that these matters taken together supported the argument that it was in the interests of justice for the hearing of the appeal to be expedited.
The respondents’ argument opposing expedition
Complexity and limitations of interim administration
The related proceedings
The first of the related proceedings concerns a claim brought by the administrator of a company, Gratory Pty Ltd, owned by the late Mr Pastrello. The claim is brought against a former business associate of Mr Pastrello who is alleged to have defrauded the company of in excess of $4 million dollars. The claim is also brought against the estate on the basis of allegations of fiduciary breaches by the late Mr Pastrello. The criminal proceedings against the former business associate are yet to be determined and it is submitted that no urgency attaches to those civil proceedings.
The second proceedings are also brought by the same company, Gratory Pty Ltd and involve a range of allegations against, inter alia, the estate, including an allegation of misappropriation of funds. As those proceedings are brought and maintained by the receiver of Gratory Pty Ltd it is submitted that they do not involve the need for any strategic decisions by the estate at this time.
The last of the identified proceedings are dormant pending determination of this appeal.
The need to make significant financial decisions
The primary concern raised by the applicants was that of the Sutton quarry and the impending expiry of a current development consent in the absence of some physical work being undertaken at the property. In the course of submissions counsel for the applicants conceded that it was not the case that no action could be taken by the interim administrator but that the process would be able to be managed more efficiently through the executor. The respondents, with reference to Exhibit 1, highlighted that the administrator was actively taking steps, including steps in relation to the Sutton quarry and the issues to be addressed in association with the development consent were clearly in her contemplation.
In the course of submissions, it was acknowledged by both parties that the time frames were such that it was most unlikely, even with an expedited appeal hearing, that the executor would be in a position to take any particular steps in relation to the Sutton quarry prior to the expiry of the current development consent in September. Risk of deterioration in value of assets
The respondents relied upon the affidavit of Ms Goodwin in support of the contention that whilst there is work to be done at a number of the properties, there were also limited cash funds available to address those works.
It was submitted that the properties were either tenanted and subject to management or they were in need of substantial repairs for which funds were not presently available. As a consequence the respondents contended that there is no particular urgency regarding the management of the property assets.
Substantial and ongoing legal costs
There was no contention raised before me about the quantum of costs to date that are referred to in the affidavit of Ms Goodwin affirmed on 26 March 2025. Those costs are clearly substantial, and continuing.
The respondents noted that the executor is a legal practitioner who is empowered in accordance with the terms of the will to charge for the provision of his services as executor. There is no evidence before me as to the prospective charges to be raised by the executor, if any, and how they might compare with the fees incurred as a result of the provision of services by the interim administrator.
Consideration
The determination of this application for expedition involves an exercise of the Court’s discretion, in circumstances where the effect of allowing expedition necessarily displaces an appeal that has already been set down in the August sittings.
In the exercise of discretion, it is necessary to have regard to the facts of the case and the matters of particular relevance arising from the evidence before me are: (a) Although the estate is large and complex and requires ongoing significant management, there is no suggestion that it is currently being mismanaged; rather, that the management of the assets may well be facilitated by the transfer of responsibilities to the executor; (b) The administration is incurring significant legal costs, but the fees that may be rendered by the executor are not in evidence; (c) There are no pending significant financial or strategic decisions that are beyond the power of the administrator or are otherwise demonstrated to be thwarted where expedition is not granted; (d) Although there are related legal proceedings, none have been demonstrated to be significantly negatively impacted by a delay of 3 months in the hearing of the appeal; and (e) Although a delay of 3 months in the hearing of the appeal may have some negative impact on the value of the assets of the estate as a consequence of issues related to maintenance and upkeep, the cash funds presently available to the estate are unlikely to enable any works to commence in a timely manner regardless of the delay.
In Hird v Chief Executive Officer of the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority [2014] FCA 1090 at [19], Kenny J observed; The factors falling for consideration in the exercise of the Court’s discretion will depend, at least in part, on the particular case. Such factors may include whether, if the hearing did not take place at the earliest convenient time or prior to a particular date, the appellant would suffer some significant practical disadvantage, or a party would suffer some irreparable loss or especially significant hardship, such as the loss of livelihood, business or home. Other factors include a serious detriment to good public administration or to the interests of others not party to the appeal.
I accept that it is frustrating for the applicants that, having succeeded before the trial judge, they are prevented from pursuing the further administration of the estate as a consequence of this appeal.
I am not satisfied that the position of the applicants is such that it is in the interests of justice to allow expedition of the appeal hearing.
Orders
I certify that the preceding thirty [30] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Muller. Associate: Date:
Pastrello
Saeedi [2025] ACTCA 18
The application lodged on 7 May 2025 was dismissed. Costs of the application were reserved ([30]).