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[2002] AATA 137
respondent. The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. It found that the late veteran did not meet the impairment threshold and also stated that the lifestyle rating would be 4, below the required 6...
The Tribunal considered whether the late Mr Parsons qualified for an additional pension amount called extreme disablement adjustment. The law required both an impairment score of at least 70 and a lifestyle score of at least 6. The main disagreement was how severely his accepted anxiety disorder affected him. The Tribunal preferred a lower psychiatric impairment assessment, which brought the combined impairment score to 65. It also assessed his lifestyle score at 4. Because neither required threshold was met, the Tribunal affirmed the decision refusing the claimed adjustment.
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2,206 words · generated 30/09/2026
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), constituted by Senior Member B.H. Pascoe and Dr P. Fricker, reviewed a Veterans’ Review Board decision concerning the late Sydney Albert Parsons. The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. The application had been made while Mr Parsons was alive, but he died on 21 July 2001, before the Tribunal hearing. His widow, Mrs Sylvia Parsons, appeared for him at the hearing (paragraphs 1–2).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
The underlying pension decision was made by the Repatriation Commission on 1 October 1998. It set Mr Parsons’ disability pension at 100 per cent of the general rate, with effect from 6 April 1998. The Veterans’ Review Board affirmed that determination on 15 February 2000 (paragraph 1). At the Tribunal hearing, the applicant accepted that Mr Parsons did not qualify for the special rate. The remaining claim was for extreme disablement adjustment, or EDA (paragraph 3).
The Tribunal quoted section 22(4) of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986. The provision included several conditions for EDA, but the parties agreed that only paragraph (c) was in dispute. It required an impairment rating of at least 70 points and a lifestyle rating of at least 6 points, with both ratings determined under the approved Guide to the Assessment of Rates of Veterans’ Pensions (GARP) (paragraph 3).
Mr Parsons had several conditions accepted as war-caused, including bladder neoplasm, bilateral sensorineural hearing loss, ischaemic heart disease, diabetes mellitus, generalised anxiety disorder and atrial fibrillation (paragraph 4). The parties disagreed about several impairment scores. The largest point of difference concerned anxiety disorder: the applicant’s proposed score was 24, while the respondent’s was zero. Their overall combined impairment scores were shown as 71 for the applicant and 53 for the respondent, before rounding (paragraph 5).
The Tribunal preferred neither party’s overall figure wholesale. Its central finding was that the anxiety disorder should receive a 9-point assessment under GARP Tables 4.1 to 4.8. On the applicant’s proposed ratings for the other conditions, this reduced the combined impairment score to 65, below the required 70 (paragraph 10). The Tribunal also gave its view that the lifestyle score would be 4, below the required 6 (paragraph 12). It therefore affirmed the decision under review (paragraph 13).
The decision’s practical scope was limited to the EDA claim for the period 19 June 2000 to 21 July 2001. The Tribunal noted that Mrs Parsons had been granted a widow’s pension from 23 July 2001, and clarified that her widow’s pension was not the issue it had to decide (paragraph 13).
The Tribunal’s decisive reasoning concerned how to score the accepted anxiety disorder. It noted that the GARP tables in question assessed the effects of the accepted psychiatric condition, rather than the combined effects of that condition and Mr Parsons’ other physical disabilities (paragraph 10). The dispute was therefore not simply which psychiatrist’s overall impression was more persuasive. The Tribunal focused on whether the evidence supported the particular table ratings for the psychiatric condition itself.
Dr Cole examined Mr Parsons in July 2000 and described a chronic generalised anxiety disorder of moderate degree. He gave a combined impairment assessment of 24 points. His scores were higher than Dr Parkin’s particularly for subjective distress, manifest distress, social interaction and leisure activities (paragraph 9). For example, Dr Cole assessed substantial reduction in social interaction and loss of interest in most recreational pursuits, whereas Dr Parkin assigned lower scores for occasional friction and some loss of interest in previously enjoyed activities (paragraph 9).
Dr Parkin had earlier assessed Mr Parsons as having a generalised anxiety disorder and gave a combined assessment of 9 points. Dr Kenny, who examined Mr Parsons in January 2001, considered that he had no psychiatric disturbance, impairment under GARP, or psychiatric effect on lifestyle (paragraph 8). The Tribunal did not adopt Dr Kenny’s no-impairment view. Instead, after considering the evidence, it preferred Dr Parkin’s 9-point assessment (paragraph 10).
The Tribunal explained why it did not accept Dr Cole’s higher score. It considered that the higher ratings appeared to be affected by the veteran’s many physical disabilities, even though the relevant tables assessed the effects of the psychiatric condition. The Tribunal also referred to Mrs Parsons’ evidence, the Veterans’ Review Board’s findings and a GARP report by Dr Jeffery, whom it described as knowing Mr Parsons well and being liked by him. It acknowledged the difficulty of making the assessment without hearing directly from Mr Parsons, but nevertheless reached its finding on the available evidence (paragraph 10).
Once the anxiety score was set at 9, the applicant’s proposed combined impairment assessment fell from 71 to 65 points. That fell short of section 22(4)(c)’s minimum of 70. The Tribunal said it was unnecessary to resolve other differences, including the bladder neoplasm rating, because the impairment requirement was already not met (paragraphs 10–11).
The Tribunal also addressed lifestyle, although it was unnecessary to do so after its impairment finding. Using the lifestyle questionnaire completed by Mr Parsons, it set out maximum ratings for Tables 22.1 to 22.5. Those ratings produced a lifestyle score of 4.25, rounded down to 4, rather than the required 6 (paragraph 12). This was an additional reason the claim did not meet the criteria, though the impairment shortfall was independently decisive.
The decision quoted the applicable statutory requirement rather than announcing a change to it. Under section 22(4)(c), as set out in paragraph 3, the EDA criteria relevant to the dispute were cumulative: an impairment rating of at least 70 and a lifestyle rating of at least 6, determined in accordance with GARP. A failure to meet either threshold meant that paragraph (c) was not satisfied.
The decision also described the assessment framework. The method involved calculating a combined impairment rating and determining a lifestyle rating under GARP, approved under section 29 of the Act (paragraph 4). The Tribunal said it had to decide matters to its reasonable satisfaction under section 120(4), and stated that the correct pension rate was to be decided on the balance of probabilities (paragraph 4).
The decision’s interpretive contribution, on its face, is case-specific: when applying Tables 4.1 to 4.8 to an accepted psychiatric condition, the Tribunal treated the relevant task as assessing the effects of that condition, rather than allowing physical disabilities to inflate the psychiatric ratings (paragraph 10). It did not set out a new statutory test or claim to amend the operation of GARP generally. The judgment text supplied here does not establish what the law was before Parsons beyond the provisions and approach it quotes, and it does not provide later legal developments. Accordingly, it would not be grounded in this source to describe a broader “before and after” change in the law.
For practitioners reading the decision as an assessment example, its reasoning distinguishes the existence of an accepted diagnosis from the separate question of the degree of impairment attributable to it under the relevant tables. The Tribunal accepted that generalised anxiety disorder was an accepted condition, but still assessed what the evidence showed about its effects for GARP purposes (paragraphs 4, 9–10).
At paragraph 3, the Tribunal quoted the requirement for “an impairment rating of at least 70 points and a lifestyle rating of at least 6 points”. In plain English, both minimum scores had to be reached. The Tribunal treated the impairment and lifestyle criteria as separate requirements, not alternatives.
At paragraph 10, it said that “assessment under Tables 4.1 to 4.8 is for the effects of the accepted psychiatric condition”. In plain English, when rating the anxiety disorder, the relevant question was what effects were attributable to that condition under the tables, not the overall limitations caused by all the veteran’s health conditions combined.
At paragraph 10, the Tribunal found a combined anxiety impairment rating of 9 points. That figure reflected its preference for Dr Parkin’s assessment over Dr Cole’s higher assessment. The Tribunal considered the clinical evidence and the possibility that the higher scores included effects of the veteran’s physical conditions.
At paragraph 11, the Tribunal said it was “unnecessary to consider” the other significant disagreement about the bladder neoplasm assessment, while adding that a rating of 20 would be excessive in the circumstances. This means the bladder rating was not essential to the result. The Tribunal’s observation should therefore be read in context: it did not need to determine the parties’ full disagreement on that condition to decide the EDA claim.
At paragraph 12, the Tribunal’s maximum table assessments produced a lifestyle rating of 4.25, “rounded down to 4”. In plain English, its calculations did not reach the statutory minimum of 6. It had already found the impairment score too low, so the lifestyle assessment was not necessary to its primary reasoning, but it provided a further finding.
Finally, paragraph 13 explains that the live question concerned EDA for the period from 19 June 2000 to 21 July 2001. It did not concern Mrs Parsons’ separate widow’s pension, which had been granted from 23 July 2001.
The decision is most directly relevant to a fact pattern involving a claim for EDA under section 22(4)(c), where the dispute concerns whether the GARP impairment score reaches 70, whether the lifestyle score reaches 6, or both. It is particularly relevant where an accepted psychiatric condition is assessed alongside substantial physical disabilities, and the parties disagree about which effects should be attributed to the psychiatric condition in the relevant tables.
The reasoning may be relevant where medical assessors give materially different table scores for symptoms such as distress, social interaction or leisure activities. In Parsons, the Tribunal compared the specific table assessments and supporting evidence rather than treating the diagnostic label alone as fixing the score (paragraphs 9–10).
The case also illustrates why an assessment dispute may turn on a relatively small set of ratings. The applicant’s proposed total was 71, but replacing the 24-point anxiety assessment with 9 points reduced the proposed combined score to 65, below the threshold (paragraphs 5, 10). A dispute over the attribution of symptoms or the choice of GARP table may therefore be material when a claimed total is close to the statutory minimum.
The decision should not be read as establishing that a particular anxiety diagnosis must receive 9 points, or that Dr Parkin’s assessment should be preferred in other cases. The Tribunal’s conclusion relied on the evidence before it, including witness evidence, other assessments and the difficulty created by Mr Parsons’ death before the hearing (paragraph 10). The judgment does not state that its numerical outcome applies generally.
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later cases, and the supplied material does not identify any later judicial or tribunal treatment of Parsons. Its “precedentRelationships” are therefore not determinable from this source. No claim can be made here that a later court followed, distinguished, approved or overruled it.
The source identifies Parsons as an AAT decision made on 5 March 2002. It records the Tribunal’s application of section 22(4)(c) and GARP to the evidence in this particular matter. It does not report a subsequent appeal, judicial review, or later decision applying its reasoning. A separate search of relevant subsequent decisions would be needed to establish any later treatment, but that history is outside the material supplied for this analysis.
Several matters were expressly left unresolved. First, the Tribunal did not finally determine the bladder neoplasm rating because its impairment finding already put the total below 70. It said that a rating of 20 was excessive in the circumstances, but did not need to decide between the parties’ proposed approaches (paragraph 11).
Second, the Tribunal did not need the lifestyle finding to reach its outcome after finding the impairment score insufficient. It nevertheless calculated a lifestyle score of 4. The judgment does not address how lifestyle ratings should be approached in other factual circumstances, or what evidence would support a score of 6 or more (paragraph 12).
Third, the decision gives limited detail about the method by which the Tribunal translated the evidence into each anxiety-table score. It describes the differences between Dr Cole and Dr Parkin and explains the concern about physical disabilities affecting the psychiatric assessment, but it does not set out a general method for resolving all competing psychiatric assessments (paragraphs 9–10).
Fourth, the Tribunal noted the evidentiary difficulty arising because it could not hear directly from Mr Parsons. It relied on Mrs Parsons’ evidence, the VRB findings and Dr Jeffery’s report in reaching its view (paragraph 10). The decision does not explain how the assessment might have differed had Mr Parsons been available to give evidence, and it makes no general statement about the weight to be given to that circumstance.
Finally, the judgment provides no information about later treatment of its reasoning. Its significance beyond the facts decided should therefore be described cautiously and confined to the statutory and evidentiary reasoning actually expressed in paragraphs 3–13.
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VETERANS' AFFAIRS -- whether veteran entitled to extreme disablement adjustment - whether impairment rating of at least 70 points - whether lifestyle rating of at least 6 points - impairment assessment for generalised anxiety disorder
1. This is an application to review a decision of the Veterans' Review Board ("VRB") of 15 February 2000 which affirmed a determination of the respondent dated 1 October 1998 that disability pension be paid to the late veteran at 100 per cent of the general rate with effect from 6 April 1998. At the VRB hearing, the late veteran sought entitlement at the intermediate rate, special rate or extreme disablement adjustment. The veteran died on 21 July 2001, after the application for review was lodged with the Tribunal and before a hearing of the application.
2. At the hearing Mrs Sylvia Parsons, the widow of the veteran, Sydney Parsons, was represented by Mr D. De Marchi, a solicitor, and the respondent by Ms T. Chant, an advocate with the Department of Veterans' Affairs. Evidence was given by Mrs Parsons, Dr E. Cole, consultant psychiatrist, and Dr F. Morgan, senior medical officer with the Department of Veterans' Affairs. In addition to the documents provided by the respondent pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the T documents), the following documents were tendered by the parties:
Lifestyle Questionnaire completed by the late veteran dated 19 June 2000 -- Exhibit A1
Report of Dr W. Stone, rehabilitation physician, dated 29 September 2000 -- Exhibit A3
Report of Dr C. Webster, chiropractor, dated 7 February 2001 -- Exhibit A4
Respiratory Function Test, Royal Melbourne Hospital dated 9 June 2001 -- Exhibit R1
GARP Report, Dr R. Jeffery, general practitioner, dated 21 June 2000 -- Exhibit R2
Audio Report, Prescription Hearing, dated 16 June 2000 -- Exhibit R3
Report of Dr B. Kenny, consultant psychiatrist, dated 7 February 2001 -- Exhibit R4
Combined Impairment Assessment, Dr Morgan, dated 22 February 2001 -- Exhibit R6
Admission notes, John Faulkner - Moreland Hospital, 10 July 2001 -- Exhibit R7
3. At the hearing Mr De Marchi accepted that the late veteran was not entitled to disability pension at the special rate and that the question for consideration was whether there was an entitlement to the extreme disablement adjustment ("EDA") under section 22(4) of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 ("the Act"). This section provides:
(i) the degree of incapacity of a veteran from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, is determined under section 21A to be 100% or has been so determined by a determination that is in force; or
(ii) a veteran is, because he or she has suffered or is suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, receiving or entitled to receive a pension at the maximum rate per fortnight specified in subsection (3);
(c) the veteran has an impairment rating of at least 70 points and a lifestyle rating of at least 6 points, each determined in accordance with the approved Guide to the Assessment of Rates of Veterans' Pensions; and
(d) the veteran is not receiving a pension at a rate provided for by section 23, 24 or 25;
the rate at which pension is payable to the veteran is increased by 50% of the maximum rate set out in subsection (3).
It was accepted by both parties that the sole matter in dispute was whether paragraph (c) was satisfied.
4. The veteran served with the Australian Army from 5 November 1941 to 11 June 1946, which constituted eligible war service under the Act. He did not have operational service. Under section 120(4) of the Act, the Tribunal is required to decide all matters to its reasonable satisfaction. Consequently, the assessment of the correct rate of pension is to be decided on the balance of probabilities. The method of assessing incapacity is set out in the "Guide to the Assessment of Rates of Veterans' Pensions" ("GARP") which is approved under section 29 of the Act. It involves the calculation of a combined impairment rating and the determination of a lifestyle rating. The late veteran had the following conditions accepted as being war-caused:
5. The dispute between the parties can be demonstrated by the impairment ratings submitted by each as follows:
It can be readily seen that the major area of difference in the impairment rating is the rating for anxiety disorder and, if the applicant's submission for a rating of 24 points is not accepted or reduced to 15 or below, then the claim for EDA must fail. Similarly if the lifestyle rating of 6 is not accepted the claim must fail.
6. The late Mr Parsons retired from being a linesman with Telecom at age 60 in 1981. In 1989 he commenced work again as a glasscutter. He ceased work in December 1998 on advice of his general practitioner, Dr Jeffery, because of chest pains and shortness of breath. The VRB decision after hearing evidence from Mr Parsons noted that:
. . . He remains active, with shopping, cleaning, washing and cooking as well as gardening and odd jobs. He drives an EJ Holden, his first and only car, which he purchased in 1963, but which he finds difficult to steer and only drives short distances.
7. Mrs Parsons said that her late husband could not walk far and had stopped driving his car after an ulcer problem in April 2001. She said that he enjoyed television, did not go out much and had little social interaction. She felt that he "got on well enough" with people but had never had many friends at all during his life. She described him as a "nervous person" although was unable to elaborate on that description. She said that, after an examination by a psychiatrist, he told her that he was "O.K." with no psychiatric problem.
8. Dr Kenny examined the late Mr Parsons on 31 January 2001 and provided the report of 2 February 2001. He did not see Mr Parsons as having any psychiatric disturbance nor any impairment according to GARP nor any psychiatric effect on lifestyle. Dr Parkin, consultant psychiatrist, had examined Mr Parsons and provided a report dated 31 August 1998 (T11). He believed that Mr Parsons suffered from a generalised anxiety disorder and provided a combined impairment assessment under Tables 4.1 to 4.8 of 9 points.
9. Dr Cole examined Mr Parsons on 5 July 2000 and provided the report dated 24 July 2000. He was of the view that Mr Parsons was "suffering from a chronic generalised anxiety disorder of moderate degree". Dr Cole noted that there had been no psychiatric treatment but doubted whether any treatment "would have done more than control the worst of his anxiety and depression without having a great deal of influence upon the overall course of his condition". The doctor provided the combined impairment assessment of 24 points. In his oral evidence, Dr Cole accepted that he had not gone into detail in his report of the basis for his diagnosis but had considered it unnecessary with generalised anxiety disorder being an accepted condition. The major differences in the assessments of Dr Parkin and Dr Cole were under Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.6 and 4.7. Under Table 4.1, subjective distress, Dr Cole assessed 6 points being "frequent symptoms causing moderate distress. The veteran will sometimes be unable to distract himself or herself from the distress". Dr Parkin assessed 3 points as being "recurring symptoms causing mild distress" and "the veteran can distract himself on most occasions". Under Table 4.2, manifest distress, Dr Cole assessed 6 points being "distress is apparent, and/or the veteran's preoccupation with the symptoms is noticeable to astute observers or persons familiar with the veteran". His assessment noted that "his wife knew when he was upset and told him to take it easy". Dr Parkin assessed 3 points being distress "sometimes apparent" and symptoms "sometimes noticeable" to astute observers or persons familiar with him. Under Table 4.6, social interaction, Dr Cole assessed 5 points as "substantial reduction in social interaction" whereas Dr Parkin gave 1 point, "occasional friction with colleagues and friends". Under Table 4.7, leisure activities, Dr Cole assessed 5 points as "loss of interest in most recreational pursuits" compared with Dr Parkin's 1 point for "some loss of interest in activities previously enjoyed".
10. It should be noted that assessment under Tables 4.1 to 4.8 is for the effects of the accepted psychiatric condition. In our view, much of the difference between Dr Cole and Dr Parkin and the higher ratings given by Dr Cole is accounted for by Dr Cole allowing his judgement to be affected by not excluding the effects of the many physical disabilities of Mr Parsons. It should be noted, perhaps, that Dr Cole appears regularly before this Tribunal on behalf of applicants and, on occasions, is recognised as being somewhat generous in his diagnoses and assessments. That is not to say that some psychiatrists who appear for the respondent are not sometimes considered somewhat ungenerous. On this occasion it has been difficult without being able to hear evidence directly from the veteran. Nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence of Mrs Parsons, the findings of the VRB and a GARP report by Dr Jeffery, who knew Mr Parsons well and was liked by him, we prefer the assessment of Dr Parkin, which, if anything, may well have produced a higher rating compared with that of Dr Jeffery. As a result, the Tribunal finds that Mr Parsons had a combined impairment rating under Tables 4.1 to 4.8 of GARP of 9 points. Without considering other differences between the parties, this rating would reduce the combined impairment rating, as submitted for the applicant, to 65 points, thus not satisfying section 22(4)(c).
11. Given the foregoing, it is unnecessary to consider the other significant difference between the parties in relation to the impairment rating for neoplasm of the bladder. Dr Stone assessed a rating of "15 or 20, perhaps nearer 15" under Table 9.2.1 although he felt that the table was "not really appropriate in his circumstances". Dr Morgan assessed under Table 14.2 based on life expectancy. We would be of the view that a rating of 20 is excessive in the circumstances of this case.
12. It is also unnecessary to consider the lifestyle rating given that the veteran did not have an impairment rating of at least 70 points. However, on the basis of the lifestyle questionnaire completed by the late veteran his rating would be no more than 5. Our maximum assessment would be:
These ratings under Chapter 22 of GARP would produce a lifestyle rating of 4.25, rounded down to 4. Consequently, we find that the veteran would not have a lifestyle rating to satisfy section 22(4)(c).
13. It follows from the foregoing that the decision under review should be affirmed. It is, perhaps, relevant to note that Mrs Parsons was somewhat unsure of the necessity for the hearing as she had been under the impression that the issue of concern was her right to a widow's pension. This had been granted on 17 October 2001 with effect from 23 July 2001. Consequently the sole issue was whether the late veteran was entitled to EDA for the period 19 June 2000 to 21 July 2001.
I certify that the thirteen [13] preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr D. De Marchi, De Marchi & Associates
Solicitor for the Respondent: Nil - Ms T. Chant, departmental advocate
The Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. It found that the late veteran did not meet the impairment threshold and also stated that the lifestyle rating would be 4, below the required 6 points.