Park v R

Park v R - [2020] NSWCCA 90 - NSWCCA 2019 case summary — Zoe

[6]

Offence 11: Sexual intercourse without consent

As at April 2017, another person (a woman), also with the surname Kang, resided in a three-bedroom unit in Concord, together with a male flatmate. In early April 2017, Ms Kang's flatmate advised her that he intended to find a person to sublet his room for a month.
At about 10.30am on 16 April 2017, Mr Kang's flatmate told her that someone would come to the unit to inspect the room and asked that she let the person inside. Ms Kang was in bed, home alone. She met the applicant at the front door. She confirmed that he was there to inspect the room and permitted him to come inside.
The applicant asked to see all three bedrooms. Ms Kang was standing outside the master bedroom when the applicant called out. She walked into the master bedroom but did not see the applicant before he put his right arm around her neck. He pulled her tightly against his body. She was struggling to breathe. She thought that she had blacked out momentarily, but quickly regained consciousness. The applicant forcefully dragged her into a corner of the room between the bed and an en suite bathroom. As he did this, she bit his fingers in an attempt to get him to release her. The applicant said, "Do you want to die?". She asked, "Are you going to kill me?". He said, "No, I'm not going to kill you. Let's do it quickly and then I'll leave".
The applicant pushed Ms Kang up against the wall and used one of his hands to cover her mouth and nose. He began to forcibly remove her clothing by pulling her top over her head, undoing her bra and trying to pull her pants down. The applicant grabbed her breasts and put his hand all over her stomach and body, saying, "I want to touch it".
The applicant then slid his hand down inside the front of her pants and grabbed her genitalia so that his hand was pressed up against her vagina for a short time.
He removed his hand and removed all clothing from the lower half of his body and lifted up his shirt to his armpits, exposing his chest. He said, "Touch my penis". At this stage his penis was flaccid. He repeatedly said, "Massage it. If you don't do it properly, you will die". He said, "I want to ejaculate quickly and I want to leave". She did as he demanded, and sucked on his chest and massaged his penis with her hand for about five minutes.
The applicant said, "Do it in your mouth" and pushed Ms Kang down with one hand on each shoulder. She put the applicant's penis in her mouth and performed fellatio for about 15 minutes.
The applicant then sat on the bed and said, "Suck my chest and do penis massaging with your hands, do it simultaneously". She did as instructed. He then pushed her on both shoulders and told her to continue performing oral sex. When on the floor on her knees, Ms Kang put the applicant's penis in her mouth again and used both hands to perform oral sex on him as instructed. He ejaculated into her mouth and then said, "Get into the bathroom". She did as instructed.
Ms Kang stayed in the bathroom for about two minutes, before climbing over the divide on the balcony and alerting her neighbour to what had happened to her. The neighbour called the police.
Police arrived about 20 to 30 minutes later. Ms Kang was taken to Royal Prince Alfred Hospital and examined. An oral swab revealed a DNA profile matching the applicant.
Photographs of Ms Kang showed abrasions and marks on her face, chin, shoulder, upper back and lower back.
Police found tissues in the en suite bathroom which tested positive for semen. The semen matched the applicant's DNA profile.

[9]

The reports relied upon by the applicant

The applicant tendered a psychiatric report from Dr Chew dated 4 October 2018 and a psychological report from Mr Fordyce dated 13 August 2018.
Mr Fordyce undertook a risk assessment which confirmed the result of the earlier risk assessment by the psychologist from Corrective Services NSW of static risk factors which, in combination with the applicant's dynamic risk factors, attracted an assessment of him being at an above average risk of sexual recidivism. Mr Fordyce also reported that the applicant displayed limited insight into his sexual offending behaviour "making it difficult to provide a comprehensive account of his criminal antecedents or potential risk situations".
He went on to say: In my opinion, Mr Park's primary risk factors revolve around problems with self-awareness, insight into his offending behaviour, alcohol use, sexual preoccupation and beliefs about sexual boundaries. Furthermore, I am of the opinion, based on the limited available evidence, that his poorly managed mania-related symptoms are likely a key risk factor and antecedent to his offending behaviour. I suggest that Mr Park would be most likely to reoffend in an opportunistic manner, similar to his index offence, when he is sexually dysregulated and responds impulsively to have his needs met.
He went on further to say: Mr Park described a significant history of mania-related symptoms, which are complicated by his alcohol use. However, I was not able to form a diagnosis based on the available information. He may develop greater insight into these symptoms through treatment and monitoring of his mood. Mr Park denied other mental health issues.
Dr Chew was provided with Mr Fordyce's report. The applicant told Dr Chew that he had been diagnosed and treated for Bipolar Affective Disorder in Korea and that he had a number of psychiatric hospitalisations where he was treated with mood stabilising medications. He also described prolonged periods of elevated moods and periods of depressed mood. Dr Chew considered that, on the basis of the applicant's self-report of a Bipolar Affective Disorder and previous hospitalisations for mania, it was "possible" that at the time of the offending behaviour the applicant was in the manic phase. No psychiatric diagnosis was offered. Dr Chew reported that the applicant was in "a depressive phase".

[10]

The findings of the sentencing judge

In the course of his sentencing remarks, the sentencing judge noted that the applicant was 28 years of age at the time of sentence. He also noted that the applicant had no criminal antecedents in this jurisdiction, having arrived in Australia a period of weeks prior to committing the first of what proved to be a succession of offences over subsequent weeks.
The applicant was apparently living with his parents in the USA before travelling to Australia. He is the eldest of two children and was raised in a positive family environment. He believes that his parents are intending to relocate back to South Korea and it is his wish, after his release and deportation, to join his family there. His Honour also noted the applicant had three years' education at high school and then two years in a vocational college where he studied automotive technology. He was employed in the construction industry before undertaking compulsory military service for 21 months.
His Honour noted that enquiries made of the National Police Agency in South Korea revealed that the applicant had a record of criminal antecedents which he found difficult to interpret. He did, however, note the following: For an offence described as "special law on sexually violent crimes (shooting with camera), infringement in construction or structure, fraud, embezzlement and property damage" the order was of imprisonment for one year, suspended for a period of two years. Another incident of "special law on sexually violent crimes (shooting with camera), infringement in construction or structure, fraud, embezzlement, property damage", was disposed in combination with the earlier similarly described entry, and so too with another entry in similar terms, and a fourth entry in similar terms. It is difficult to decipher when these incidents occurred, but they extend from, it appears, 9 May 2012 to 29 June 2016. There are no institutional misconduct offences.
He also noted that desertion from military duty and violation of an accident compensation security law resulted in non-custodial sentences.
The sentencing judge undertook a detailed review of the reports of Dr Chew and Mr Fordyce relied upon by the applicant but rejected the submission advanced by his counsel that they established that he had mental health issues which operated in mitigation of sentence. In particular, his Honour was not satisfied of a causal connection between any mental health condition or underlying mental illness and the applicant's offending.
There is no challenge on the appeal to his Honour's approach to the assessment of this evidence or the findings he made based upon that assessment.
His Honour noted that the applicant had a drug and alcohol and gambling history which he described as "of little moment". In regard to the applicant's attitude to his offending, the sentencing judge noted: He engaged in a degree of justification for the offence against the first victim, responding to an accusation that he had stolen the knife. He could not explain his sexual assault on the third victim but said he was intoxicated at the time. He said that he had more passion or desire than usual. It is said that his offences are impulsive, reactive and opportunistic in nature.
His Honour went further to find the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation were poor.

[12]

Ground 1

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the finding of special circumstances was not meaningfully translated into a reduction of the non-parole period, where the adjustment to the statutory ratio was by a period of three months or approximately thirteen weeks. Counsel maintained that submission despite acknowledging that the finding of special circumstances was expressly limited to the hardship the applicant would likely suffer as a prisoner because of a language barrier and where his time in custody will be more onerous because he is a foreign national isolated from family support. The sentencing judge rejected the submission advanced by the applicant's counsel in the sentencing hearing that the finding of special circumstances should also encompass the evidence of the applicant's compromised mental health which will render his time in custody more difficult. That finding was not challenged on the appeal.
Counsel also submitted that in appointing the non-parole period of 8 years, the sentencing judge was influenced by the applicant's status as a foreign national in finding that any rehabilitation that might result from a conditional release from custody would necessarily occur outside the jurisdiction. Counsel submitted this approach was contrary to law citing R v Mirzaee [2004] NSWCCA 315 at [21] and Kristensen v R [2018] NSWCCA 189 where Mirzaee was applied in circumstances where the cancellation of the offenders visa was mandatory under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
That submission begs the question whether the sentencing reasons, as distinct from an exchange between counsel in the course of sentencing submissions, revealed that the sentencing judge has taken the applicant's migration status into consideration in the appointment of the non-parole period. The applicant relies upon the following exchange: HIS HONOUR: Do you want to say something to me about special circumstances? MIKHAIEL: Again it's a fairly funny - we've been discussing this, the Crown and I, this morning. In the ordinary course, somebody like him would receive the benefit of an order for special circumstances but-- HIS HONOUR: I put aside the fact that he's going to be sent back to Korea. MIKHAIEL: I think your Honour needs to do that. HIS HONOUR: The law requires I do that so that's okay but the recent pronouncements in the Court of Criminal Appeal tell us to focus upon the extent to which rehabilitation will be achieved by a longer period on parole. That doesn't arise in this case, does it? MIKHAIEL: It doesn't arise and it's a funny one. We've been grappling with it a little bit I think. HIS HONOUR: By reason of his status as a non-citizen he doesn't get the benefit of special circumstances because -- MIKHAIEL: Yes. HIS HONOUR: -- his rehabilitation, if it's going to be achieved, will be back home. MIKHAIEL: Whatever we can achieve with him in custody here, the benefits will be achieved elsewhere. That's -- HIS HONOUR: Yes.
Although on the appeal the applicant's counsel accepted that in the exchange with defence counsel his Honour acknowledged that the deportation of the applicant upon serving the non-parole period was not a matter he could take into account on the question of special circumstances, she submitted that, when, in his sentencing remarks, his Honour said, "I am satisfied that the parole period will be sufficient to meet the prospects of rehabilitation, such as they are", he had implicitly done just that. I do not read into the sentencing remarks the implication contended for by the applicant.
The Crown submitted that the limited basis upon which the finding of special circumstances was based, coupled with the expressed concern of the sentencing judge to provide for a lengthy period in custody to reflect the totality of the applicant's criminality, together with his assessed poor prospects of rehabilitation, was such as to warrant only a moderate alteration to the statutory ratio in the exercise of the sentencing discretion.
In circumstances where the sentencing judge expressly stated that the parole period would not be "significantly greater" than what would apply upon the strict application of s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, and where it was not submitted by the applicant that the non-parole period which was imposed was due to miscalculation or other arithmetic error, I am not satisfied that the first ground of appeal is made out.

[13]

Ground 2

It is well established that to make out a ground of manifest excess when aggregate sentences are imposed, the applicant must satisfy the court that the aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive, in the sense that it is unreasonable or plainly unjust (see Hughes v R [2018] NSWCCA 2).
The applicant submitted that the aggregate sentence of 11 years with a non-parole period of 8 years was "unreasonable and plainly unjust", in large part because the degree of notional accumulation of the seven indicative sentences reflected what was said to be a misapplication of the principles of totality.
Accepting that the indicative sentences are not themselves appealable, counsel for the applicant submitted that the severity of at least some of them, in particular the sentence of 5 years and 6 months with a non-parole period of 4 years indicated for offence 10 (aggravated sexual intercourse without consent and the reckless infliction of actual bodily harm) and the sentence of 5 years with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months indicated for offence 11 (sexual intercourse without consent), both offences having been committed against the same person in the same episode in her home, has led to error in the appointment of an unjustifiably high aggregate sentence.
Although at the hearing of the appeal the applicant's counsel expressly abandoned the submission made in writing that the sentence of 2 years indicated for offence 6 amounted to a sentencing error if, in order to arrive at that sentence, the 25 per cent discount the sentencing judge expressly allowed for the applicant's plea of guilty was applied to a head sentence of 2 years and 8 months, a starting point which exceeded the jurisdictional maximum of 2 years for that offence, R A Hulme J raised with counsel whether the operation of s 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act had any bearing on the issue.
In the course of addressing that question, it became clear that further written submissions from both the applicant and the Crown should be filed. Directions were made accordingly. The supplementary submissions focused upon the construction of s 22(1) and its legislative history, together with secondary materials which might aid the construction of that section. The supplementary submissions also addressed a number of provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act, implicated in the sentence indicated for offence 6, including ss 267 and 268 and ss 166-168. A number of decisions in this Court where the Court has had occasion to consider the impact of a jurisdictional maximum of 2 years for offences the subject of sentence proceedings in the District Court were also cited.
For the reasons which follow, I do not regard those decisions as dictating the outcome in this case, although they are of assistance in the analysis of what is comprehended by the concept of a jurisdictional maximum penalty.
Before turning to consider the supplementary submissions of the parties in greater detail, it is necessary to consider the context in which the sentencing judge indicated a sentence of 2 years for offence 6.

[15]

The offence on the Form 1 (offence 5)

The offence of stealing property from a dwelling house contrary to s 148 of the Crimes Act (offence 5 on the schedule) (in this case car keys that were used by the applicant to take and drive the conveyance) was the subject of a Form 1 attaching to offence 6. In the course of the sentencing remarks, his Honour expressed the intention of taking that offence into account in the appointment of an indicative sentence for offence 6.
When addressing the impact of the Form 1 offences generally (there were four Form 1s to be accounted for in the aggregate sentencing exercise) the sentencing judge said, "There will be an increase in the sentence that would have otherwise been imposed were the principal offences before me standing alone". This was clearly a reference to s 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. That section provides as follows: 33 Outstanding charges may be taken into account (1) When dealing with the offender for the principal offence, the court is to ask the offender whether the offender wants the court to take any further offences into account in dealing with the offender for the principal offence. (2) The court may take a further offence into account in dealing with the offender for the principal offence - (a) if the offender - (i) admits guilt to the further offence, and (ii) indicates that the offender wants the court to take the further offence into account in dealing with the offender for the principal offence, and (b) if, in all of the circumstances, the court considers it appropriate to do so. (3) If the court takes a further offence into account, the penalty imposed on the offender for the principal offence must not exceed the maximum penalty that the court could have imposed for the principal offence had the further offence not been taken into account. (4) A court may not take a further offence into account - (a) if the offence is of a kind for which the court has no jurisdiction to impose a penalty, or (b) if the offence is an indictable offence that is punishable with imprisonment for life. (5) For the purposes of subsection (4)(a), a court is taken to have jurisdiction to impose a penalty for an offence even if that jurisdiction may only be exercised with the consent of the offender. (6) Despite subsection (4)(a), the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeal and the District Court may take a summary offence into account.
Earlier in the course of his sentencing remarks, when referring generally to the Form 1 offences, his Honour noted his familiarity with the statements of principle in Attorney General's Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 No 1 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518; (2002) 56 NSWLR 146 where, at [42]-[44], Spigelman CJ said: [42] The position, in my opinion, is that, although a court is sentencing for a particular offence, it takes into account the matters for which guilt has been admitted, with a view to increasing the penalty that would otherwise be appropriate for the particular offence. The Court does so by giving greater weight to two elements which are always material in the sentencing process. The first is the need for personal deterrence, which the commission of the other offences will frequently indicate, ought to be given greater weight by reason of the course of conduct in which the accused has engaged. The second is the community's entitlement to extract retribution for serious offences which there are offences for which no punishment has in fact been imposed. These elements are entitled to greater weight than they may otherwise be given when sentencing for the primary offence. There are matters which limit the extent to which this is so. The express provision in s33(3) referring to the maximum penalty for the primary offence is one. The principle of totality is another. [43] I did not intend these observations to be exhaustive of the elements upon which the fact of other offences may impinge. However, no additional elements for which that could be so have been identified in submissions to this Court. The important point is that the focus throughout must be on sentencing for the primary offence. [44] The manner and degree to which the Form 1 offences can impinge upon elements relevant to sentencing for the principal offence will depend on a range of other factors pertinent to those elements and the weight to be given to them in the overall sentencing task. For that reason it will rarely be appropriate for a sentencing judge to attempt to quantify the effect on the sentence of taking into account Form 1 offences. (See R v Kay at [69].)
That approach was expressly adopted by Hoeben CJ at CL in the following passages in Abbas, Bodiotis, Taleb and Amoun v R [2013] NSWCCA 115; (2013) 231 A Crim R 413 at [95]-[96]: [95] As indicated, nothing in the express text of the statute purports to limit, in the manner contended for by the applicants, the way in which the sentencing judge was able to "take into account" the Form 1 offences. That is not the end of the analysis as consideration also needs to be given to established principles concerning the imposition of sentences. It is in that context that the guideline judgment becomes important. The guideline judgment did not purport to, nor did it exhaustively analyse the phrase "to take into account", as used in the Act. It did, however, by reference to sentencing principles, establish a number of propositions which are helpful when seeking to apply that phrase. [96] In general terms, it approved an approach which focused on the principal offence (the one on the indictment) and sentenced for that offence on the basis of an "instinctive synthesis" of factors, including the amount of increase in penalty due because a Form 1 was involved. In other words, it held that sentencing for matters involving a Form 1 called for a principal offence based approach in which the penalty is increased because of the use of the Form 1 procedure.

[16]

The plea of guilty and s 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act

Finally, the sentencing judge also acknowledged that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of the utility of his early pleas of guilty and that he intended to apply a 25 per cent discount to what he described as: … the sentence that would have otherwise been imposed to reflect that utility. This has been applied to each of the individual offences upon which sentence is to be determined, prior to the aggregation of the overall sentence, adopting an appropriate level of concurrence and accumulation to reflect the totality of [the applicant's] misconduct. (Emphasis added.)
Although the sentencing judge did not refer expressly to s 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, it would appear that by acknowledging that the 25 per cent discount would be applied to the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed for offence 6, he was deploying the language of s 22(1) when indicating the sentence for that offence.
As it applied at the time of sentence, s 22 provided as follows: 22 Guilty plea to be taken into account for offences (1) In passing sentence for an offence on an offender who has pleaded guilty to the offence, a court must take into account - (a) the fact that the offender has pleaded guilty, and (b) when the offender pleaded guilty or indicated an intention to plead guilty, and (c) the circumstances in which the offender indicated an intention to plead guilty, and may accordingly impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise have imposed. (1A) A lesser penalty imposed under this section must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence. (2) When passing sentence on such an offender, a court that does not impose a lesser penalty under this section must indicate to the offender, and make a record of, its reasons for not doing so. (3) Subsection (2) does not limit any other requirement that a court has, apart from that subsection, to record the reasons for its decisions. (4) The failure of a court to comply with this section does not invalidate any sentence imposed by the court.
Following the passage of the Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals and Guilty Pleas) Act 2017 (NSW) ("the 2017 Act"), s 22 was amended to read as follows (amendments italicised): 22 Guilty plea to be taken into account for offences not dealt with on indictment (1) In passing sentence for an offence on an offender who has pleaded guilty to the offence, a court must take into account - (a) the fact that the offender has pleaded guilty, and (b) when the offender pleaded guilty or indicated an intention to plead guilty, and (c) the circumstances in which the offender indicated an intention to plead guilty, and may accordingly impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise have imposed. (1A) A lesser penalty imposed under this section must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence. (2) When passing sentence on such an offender, a court that does not impose a lesser penalty under this section must indicate to the offender, and make a record of, its reasons for not doing so. (3) Subsection (2) does not limit any other requirement that a court has, apart from that subsection, to record the reasons for its decisions. (4) The failure of a court to comply with this section does not invalidate any sentence imposed by the court. (5) This section applies only to a sentence for an offence that is dealt with summarily or to a sentence for an offence dealt with on indictment to which Division 1A does not apply.
As amended, s 22 now applies only to a sentence for an offence which is dealt with summarily (including, it must be assumed, summary offences the subject of a referral to this Court or the District Court under ss 166-168 of the Criminal Procedure Act) or an offence dealt with on indictment to which ss 25A-25F in Pt 3 Div 1A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act do not apply. Part 3 Div 1A now provides for offences dealt with on indictment to have fixed sentencing discounts for the utilitarian value of the plea referable to the timing of the plea. These provisions are part of the Early Appropriate Guilty Plea reforms implemented by the 2017 Act.
It is not necessary to refer further to those reforms and the fixed sentencing discount scheme which has replaced the approach to the calculation of a sentencing discount for the utilitarian value of a plea of guilty addressed in R v Borkowski [2009] NSWCCA 102; 195 A Crim R 1 and endorsed by Bathurst CJ in R v AB [2011] NSWCCA 229. Suffice to note, however, and not unimportantly for present purposes, that express provision is also made in ss 25D(2) and (4) for the discount for a plea of guilty to be applied to "any sentence that would otherwise have been imposed" - language that both mirrors the language in s 22(1) which continues in force following the 2017 amending Act, and language which has been used in criminal and criminal procedure statutes in NSW where statutory force has been given to a sentencing discount for a plea of guilty.
For emphasis, I note that s 22(1) was incorporated in the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) which commenced on 3 April 2000. Section 439 of the Crimes Act (the relevant wording of s 439(1) being not materially different to the wording of s 22(1)) was repealed at that time.
At its commencement on 1 February 1992, s 439 of the Crimes Act read as follows: 439 Guilty plea to be taken into account (1) In passing sentence for an offence on a person who pleaded guilty to the offence, a Court must take into account: (a) the fact that the person pleaded guilty, and (b) when the person pleaded guilty or indicated an intention to plead guilty, and may accordingly reduce the sentence that it would otherwise have passed. (Emphasis added.) (2) A Court which does not, as a result of this section, reduce the sentence that it passes on a person who pleaded guilty to an offence must state that fact and its reasons for not reducing the sentence when passing sentence. (3) The failure of a Court to comply with this section does not invalidate any sentence imposed by the Court. (4) In this section, a reference to a Court includes a reference to a Judge and a Magistrate (whether exercising jurisdiction in respect of an indictable offence or a summary offence) but does not include a reference to the Children's Court or a court exercising the jurisdiction of the Children's Court. (5) This section applies to proceedings for an offence whether commenced before or after the commencement of this section.
As I have noted above, s 22(1) in the form in which it appeared prior to the passage of the 2017 Act applied to the applicant's sentence proceedings as those proceedings were commenced in the Local Court prior to 30 April 2018 (Sch 2 30 of the Act). That fact has no relevant bearing in the resolution of the question raised by the sentencing judge's approach to offence 6, since s 22(1) is expressed in the same terms before and after passage of the 2017 Act. However, because the operation of s 22, and s 22(1) in particular, after the 2017 Act is now confined to pleas of guilty where sentences are imposed in the exercise of the summary jurisdiction of the Local Court (including where the District Court or this Court is invited to deal with "backup" or "related offences" in the way provided for in ss 165-168 of the Criminal Procedure Act, including where a sentencing court imposes an aggregate sentence) and to matters on indictment to which Div 1A does not apply (see s 22(5)), the construction of s 22(1) which is central to the issue addressed in the supplementary submissions of the parties is of continuing significance.

[19]

Consideration

The Crown's submission and the Crown's interpretation of the sentencing judge's reasoning must be rejected if for no other reason than it is contrary to the express requirement in s 53A(2)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act to indicate a sentence for offence 6 after taking into account "such matters as are relevant under Part 3 of the Act". Part 3 of the Act includes Division 3 which is devoted to "taking further offences into account": Division 3 includes s 33 which, as Hoeben CJ at CL said in Abbas in the passage extracted above, calls for: … an "instinctive synthesis" of factors, including the amount of increase in penalty due because a Form 1 ...
Although the offence on the Form 1 was also a Table 2 offence, that fact had no relevant bearing on the sentencing exercise since the applicant was neither being sentenced for the Form 1 offence nor was his Honour required to indicate a sentence for that offence. Additionally, there is no additional statutory or common law requirement to take into account the fact that an offender acknowledges his guilt when taking the Form 1 offence into account on sentence (see Gordon v R [2018] NSWCCA 54 at [95]).
Contrary to the Crown's submission, the sentencing judge was required to focus on the offending comprehended by the take and drive offence and indicate a sentence for that offence, taking into account the offence on the Form 1 as part of an "instinctive synthesis" of "such matters as are relevant under Part 3 or any other provision of this Act" including, necessarily, the extent to which the sentence for offence 6 would be increased because of the offending the subject of the Form 1. In that exercise, s 33(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act operated so that the indicative sentence for offence 6 could not exceed 2 years.
The Crown's submission is also contrary to a settled line of authority in this Court decided before the 2017 Act in which s 53A(2)(b) has been interpreted as obliging a sentencing court, when indicating the separate sentences that would otherwise have been imposed on an offender who has entered a plea of guilty, to indicate that sentence (or those sentences) after application of the sentencing discount in s 22(1) of the Act (see PG v R [2017] NSWCCA 179 at [71]; Elsaj v R [2017] NSWCCA 124 at [56]).
In TL v R [2017] NSWCCA 308, Davies J (Hoeben CJ at CL agreeing, Adamson J in dissent but not on this issue) regarded the reasoning of Button and N Adams JJ in PG as justifying application of the discount for assistance in s 23 of the Act to the indicative sentence. Section 23(1), which utilises language to similar effect to s 22(1), provides: A court may impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise impose on an offender, having regard to the degree to which the offender has assisted, or undertaken to assist, law enforcement authorities in the prevention, detection or investigation of, or in proceedings relating to, the offence concerned or any other offence. (Emphasis added.)
As Davies J said at [103]: Two other matters suggest that a s 23 discount should be applied to the indicative sentence or sentences. First, s 23 refers to imposing a "lesser penalty for the offence". That points to consideration of each of the offences for which an aggregate sentence might be imposed under s 53A. Secondly, it would be inimical to the simplified sentencing process brought about by s 53A if there was not consistency in the approach to discounting sentences for whatever reason. Authority now points strongly to a s 22 discount being applied to indicative sentences. The same approach should be adopted in relation to a discount under s 23.

[20]

Further submissions of the parties and the authorities

On the assumption that the sentencing judge complied with s 53A(2)(b) in his treatment of the Form 1 offence, the applicant argued that by applying a discount of 25 per cent for the plea of guilty to the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed as required by s 22(1) to arrive at an indicated sentence of 2 years, it follows that his Honour must have used as a "starting point" a sentence of 2 years and 8 months, that is 8 months longer than the jurisdictional maximum penalty for that offence. The applicant submitted that an undiscounted sentence of 2 years and 8 months was not a sentence the court would otherwise have imposed for offence 6 were there no plea of guilty to that offence, as it would have amounted to a sentencing error were a sentence that exceeded the jurisdictional maximum of 2 years to have been imposed. In the applicant's submission, it follows that because the sentence his Honour would otherwise have imposed "but for" the plea of guilty could not have exceeded 2 years' imprisonment, it was a sentencing error to apply the 25 per cent sentencing discount to a sentence in excess of 2 years' imprisonment, in this case to a sentence of 2 years and 8 months.
The Crown further submitted that, were the Court to find that the sentencing judge did apply the 25 per cent discount to a sentence of 2 years and 8 months, that was an approach in conformity with a settled line of authority in this Court which should be followed.
In R v Doan [2000] NSWCCA 317; 50 NSWLR 115 at [35] Grove J was dealing with a complaint about the disparity between the sentence imposed on the applicant and the sentence imposed on a co-offender including, but not limited to the failure of the sentencing judge to take into account that the sentence imposed on the co-offender had been dealt with in the Local Court where a jurisdictional maximum of 2 years applied. The applicant argued that the jurisdictional maximum was a de facto substitute for the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for offences dealt with in the Local Court under s 20(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act as it applied at that time (a section which is similar although not identical to the current s 268 of that Act).
In the course of considering that submission his Honour made the following observation at [35]: The result of true construction of the statutory provisions in New South Wales is that, what has been prescribed is a jurisdictional maximum and not a maximum penalty for any offence triable within that jurisdiction. In other words, where the maximum applicable penalty is lower because the charge has been prosecuted within the limited summary jurisdiction of the Local Court, that court should impose a penalty reflecting the objective seriousness of the offence, tempered if appropriate by subjective circumstances, taking care only not to exceed the maximum jurisdictional limit. The implication of the argument of the appellant that, in lieu of prescribed maximum penalties exceeding two years imprisonment, a maximum of two years imprisonment for all offences triable summarily in the Local Court has been substituted, must be rejected. As must also be rejected, the corollary that a sentence of two years imprisonment should be reserved for a "worst case".
In Lapa v R [2008] NSWCCA 331; 192 A Crim R 305, Hidden J (with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Hulme J agreed) treated the reasoning by Grove J in Doan at [35] as validating the approach of a sentencing judge who, when sentencing an offender for an indictable offence which attracted a jurisdictional maximum of 2 years' imprisonment, applied a 25 per cent discount (described by Hidden J as the full utilitarian value of the plea of guilty envisaged in R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; 49 NSWLR 383) to what Hidden J described as a "starting point of sentence above the two year jurisdictional limit", thereby arriving at a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment at the jurisdictional limit. His Honour appears to have reasoned that because the "starting point" was above the 2 year jurisdictional limit and not above the statutory maximum for that offence, it was not an error to apply the sentencing discount to an undiscounted sentence despite it being above the jurisdictional limit. Section 22 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act was the statutory expression for the treatment of guilty pleas at the time of the sentence and the hearing of the sentence appeal. His Honour was not referred to it, nor did he give any consideration to it, when concluding there was no error of the very kind agitated by the applicant on this appeal.
In Mundine v R [2017] NSWCCA 97, the sentencing court engaged in an aggregate sentencing exercise which included two summary offences the subject of a s 166 certificate, being an assault occasioning actual bodily harm and contravention of an apprehended violence order, both offences committed on the same day as the commission of the offence of reckless wounding charged on indictment. One of the grounds advanced by the applicant in seeking to make good his complaint that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive, was that a sentence of 2 years and 3 months was indicated for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm which amounted to a sentencing error because it exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court and was in breach of s 168(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act for that reason. The Crown conceded that sentencing error but submitted that it had no relevant impact on the aggregate sentence which was ultimately imposed.
Although Adamson J accepted the Crown's concession that it was a sentencing error for the sentencing judge not to reduce the sentence assessed at 2 years and 3 months to an indicated sentence of 2 years to comply with the jurisdictional maximum, her Honour did not identify error in the process by which the discounted sentence of 2 years and 3 months was arrived at. Her Honour reasoned as follows at [92]: The error was in not reducing this figure to 2 years, being the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court, which was applicable by reason of ss 168(3) and 268 of the Criminal Procedure Act. As this Court has explained in R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115 ; [2000] NSWCCA 317 at [27]-[35] (Grove J, Spigelman CJ and Kirby J agreeing), a provision such as s 268 of the Criminal Procedure Act is to be treated as a jurisdictional maximum and not a maximum penalty for any offence triable within that jurisdiction. Accordingly, a sentence of two years' imprisonment need not be reserved for a worst case and might be appropriate notwithstanding that a plea of guilty was entered at the earliest opportunity and that, accordingly, a discount of 25% was called for.
Although her Honour noted that the sentencing judge had allowed a discount of 25 per cent for each of the pleas of guilty to the offences on the s 166 certificate in the process of fixing indicative sentences, she also did not engage with the question raised on this appeal, namely whether the exercise of the sentencing discretion to reduce a sentence for a plea of guilty, directly referable under s 22(1) to a sentence the court would otherwise have imposed, must be to a sentence no higher than the jurisdictional limit of 2 years.
In the Crown's submission, Lapa and Mundine resolve the question raised on the appeal adverse to the applicant, and that this Court should follow those decisions despite the fact that s 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act or its predecessor in s 439 of the Crimes Act was not expressly considered in either case. In the Crown's submission, the analysis applied by both Hidden J in Lapa and Adamson J in Mundine (both cases citing Grove J's analysis in Doan) remain sound authority for the proposition that it is not a sentencing error for a sentencing court exercising the jurisdiction under s 22(1) to use a term of imprisonment above the jurisdictional limit for the offence as a starting point in the appointment of a discounted sentence, whether it is a summary offence in the Local Court or an offence dealt with in the District Court or the Supreme Court on a s 166 certificate. In the Crown's submission, the only constraint on a sentencing court in those circumstances is to ensure that the sentence actually passed (or in this case the sentence indicated in an aggregate sentencing exercise) does not exceed the jurisdictional limit. Here, as the sentence of 2 years' imprisonment indicated for offence 6 was at the jurisdictional limit but did not exceed it, in the Crown's submission, no sentencing error is disclosed.
The applicant submitted, and I agree, that Lapa and Mundine are distinguishable because in neither was the discretion in s 439 of the Crimes Act or s 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act to impose a lesser penalty than the court would have otherwise imposed but for the plea of guilty considered, and it is the construction of those words that provides the context for the resolution of the question that arises on this appeal.

[21]

Has error in the sentence indicated for offence 6 been made out?

It cannot be doubted that s 22 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act expressly provides that after taking into consideration the mandatory considerations in ss 22(1)(a)-(c) it is open to the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise have imposed for the offence subject of the sentence proceedings.
Applying the settled principles of statutory construction most recently considered and restated in The Queen v A2; The Queen v Magennis; The Queen v Vaziri [2019] HCA 35 (see Kiefel CJ and Keane J at [32]-[37]), an ordinary reading of s 22 allows for the following to be stated: 1. A sentencing court is required to take into account the fact that an offender has pleaded guilty to an offence together with the timing of that plea and the circumstances in which the plea was entered; 2. There is no obligation on a sentencing court to impose a lesser sentence as a consequence of a plea of guilty; 3. Where a discount is applied for a plea of guilty, it is to be applied to the sentence that the court would have imposed but for the plea of guilty; 4. The discount allowed for a plea of guilty must not result in a sentence that is unreasonably disproportionate to the offending; 5. A court which does not afford an offender a discount is required to give reasons for that decision.
In my view, the proper construction of s 22(1) obliges a sentencing court to apply the discount allowed for the plea of guilty to a sentence that the court would in fact have imposed but for an offender's plea of guilty and, where there is a jurisdictional limit for a particular offence, the Court is to have regard to that limit when applying the discount.
The same applies when a court is imposing an aggregate sentence where s 53A(2)(b) obliges the court to indicate the sentence that would have been imposed for each offence.
It follows that it was a sentencing error for the sentencing judge to apply the discount of 25 per cent for the applicant's plea of guilty to offence 6 to an undiscounted sentence (or a starting point) of 2 years and 8 months and that the sentencing discretion will be need to be exercised afresh by this Court for that reason.

[22]

Further consideration of Ground 2

I turn now to consider the applicant's submission that the sentencing discretion also miscarried in the appointment of indicated sentences for offences 10 and 11 which, together with misapplication of totality principles, has resulted in an aggregate sentence that is "unreasonable or plainly unjust".
Although the applicant's counsel accepted that offences 7, 10 and 11 on the table are "extremely serious", with offence 10 having Form 1 offences of indecent assault taken into account for the purposes of indicating a sentence for that offence, she emphasised that since all three offences were committed in a single episode of offending involving a single victim, a substantial degree of notional concurrence in the imposition of an aggregate sentence was warranted. Counsel further submitted that the offending incorporating offences 7, 10 and 11, and offences 8 and 9 on the Form 1, occurred only hours after the offending the subject of offences 5 and 6 and while some accumulation was called for between both groups of offences given the distinct offending comprehended by each, that should not have been substantial.
Finally, counsel for the applicant submitted that offence 1, the first offence committed in time, attracted an unjustifiably excessive indicated sentence of 18 months against the jurisdictional maximum of 2 years' imprisonment after application of the 25 per cent discount for the plea of guilty. While counsel acknowledged that as a matter of sentencing principle the jurisdictional limit, where it is less than the maximum statutory penalty otherwise applicable to the offence, is not reserved for the worst case, in this case, the vehicle the subject of the "take and drive conveyance" was stolen from a public place and thereafter the applicant made no attempt to conceal that fact, publishing the car registration number against his name at his temporary residence.
The Crown submitted the aggregate sentence of 11 years with a non-parole period of 8 years has not been shown to be "unreasonable or plainly unjust" having regard to the maximum penalties provided for the multiple instances of serious sexual offending against Ms Kang (being offences 7, 10 and 11) and with two of those offences attracting standard non-parole periods of 7 and 10 years, and where his Honour indicated non-parole periods significantly less than the standard non-parole periods, being 4 years and 3 years 6 months respectively. The Crown also submitted that the attack on Ms Kang was not an isolated incident of an attack against a woman in her home, although offence 4, another physical attack on a woman in her home, was charged as a common assault. The Crown submitted that the other offences of physical violence, being offences 2 and 3, were not trivial and the property offences also involved property of considerable value.
In the Crown's submission, the circumstances of the offending, and the repetition of increasingly more serious offending over a period of weeks, required substantial weight to be given to both general and specific deterrence. The Crown submitted that where the applicant's subjective case disentitled him to any leniency, even were the Court to find error in the sentence indicated for offence 6 and a slightly reduced sentence should have been indicated for that offence, no lesser aggregate sentence was warranted.

[23]

Resentence

On resentence, the applicant relied upon an affidavit sworn by his solicitor Mr Etkind in which he deposes to having reviewed the applicant's "gaol file". From my review of the various annexures to his affidavit, the applicant continues to have difficulties communicating with Justice Health and, it would seem, with correctional officers, with the consequence that it has not always been easy for correctional officers to determine whether he is fully comprehending what is expected of him as a serving prisoner. It also seems that the applicant has attracted some verbal warnings but has not committed any custodial offences. Unsurprisingly, he has had no visits from family since his incarceration. Mr Etkind also draws attention to the fact that at the applicant's request he is being detained on protection.
The applicant also affirmed an affidavit dated 4 October 2019 where he says he has been threatened with assault whilst on protection but that the situation has improved since he has been moved to the Hunter Correctional Centre where he is working and studying a Japanese language course and a Bible studies course. In the affidavit, he expresses guilt and sorrow for his offending and the harm that he has caused others which he says he regrets. He says he is willing to participate in sex offender courses. He says he is not taking any medication. He says he is in regular contact with his family by telephone.
The applicant's expression of remorse, which is some indication of a gathering insight into his offending and its impact on others, is worthy of some weight on resentence. Although on the available material his prospects of rehabilitation are difficult to assess, having regard to his current work and study ethic they seem to have improved to some extent from the finding of the sentencing judge that his prospects of rehabilitation were poor.
The following table reflects the approach I propose on resentence. Date of offence How dealt with Section Offence Max. Pen. & SNPP Indicative Sentence Crimes Act 1900 1 20 March 2017 s 166 s 154(1)(a) Take & drive conveyance Summary: 6 months 2 years and/or 50 PU 2 25 March 2017 Form 1 s 61 Common assault 2 years Taken into account for offence 3 3 25 March 2017 s 13(1) Intimidation 5 years and/or 50 PU 1 year 4 2 April 2017 s 61 Common assault 2 years 9 months 5 16 April 2017 Form 1 s 148 Steal property in dwelling house Taken into account for offence 5 6 16 April 2017 s 166 s 154(1)(a) Take & drive conveyance Summary: 10 months 2 years and/or 50 PU 7 16 April 2017 s 37(2) Choking 25 years 4 years 8 Form 1 s 61L Indecent Assault 5 years Taken into account for offence 10 9 Form 1 s 61L Indecent assault 5 years - Taken into account for offence 11 10 s 61J (1) Aggravated sexual intercourse without consent - recklessly inflict ABH 20 years, 5 years and 6 months, NPP 4 years SNPP 10 years 11 s 61I Sexual intercourse without consent 14 years, 5 years, NPP 3 years and 6 months SNPP 7 years

[26]

Offence 6 - take and drive conveyance ("sequence 7" in the court below)

I respectfully disagree with Fullerton J on the issue raised by the applicant about the sentence imposed for the take and drive conveyance offence identified in the court below as "sequence 7". (For consistency, I will refer to this as "offence 6" as her Honour has.)
This issue in relation to this offence raises a matter of considerable importance in relation to sentencing for indictable offences that are dealt with summarily. This is encountered daily in the Local Court and the District Court.
Offence 6 was before the District Court as a "related offence" pursuant to the provisions of Ch 3 Pt 3 Div 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). [3] The offence of take and drive conveyance is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment for 5 years but it may be dealt with summarily pursuant to s 260 of that Act. It is an offence in Table 2 of Sch 1 of the Act. The maximum penalty that may be imposed in respect of Table 2 offences when dealt with summarily, according to s 268(1A), is 2 years. This is commonly referred to as the "jurisdictional limit".
After consideration of all relevant factors, and taking into account an additional offence on a Form 1, the primary judge determined that a sentence of 2 years and 8 months was appropriate. He reduced that sentence by 25% because of the applicant's plea of guilty and arrived at a sentence of 2 years. That sentence coincided with the jurisdictional limit that applied.
Imposing a lesser sentence where an offender has pleaded guilty is authorised by s 22 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). Sub-section (1) is pertinent: 22 Guilty plea to be taken into account for offences not dealt with on indictment (1) In passing sentence for an offence on an offender who has pleaded guilty to the offence, a court must take into account - (a) the fact that the offender has pleaded guilty, and (b) when the offender pleaded guilty or indicated an intention to plead guilty, and (c) the circumstances in which the offender indicated an intention to plead guilty, and may accordingly impose a lesser penalty than it would otherwise have imposed. (Emphasis added)
The applicant contends that the sentencing judge erred by applying the discount for the plea of guilty to the sentence the judge regarded as otherwise appropriate in all the circumstances. That sentence, 2 years and 8 months, was not one that the judge "would otherwise have imposed". The applicant says that the discount should have been applied to a sentence within the jurisdictional limit.
Fullerton J has accepted the applicant's contention of error and has concluded as follows: "[T]he proper construction of s 22(1) obliges a sentencing court to apply the discount allowed for the plea of guilty to a sentence that the court would in fact have imposed but for an offender's plea of guilty and, where there is a jurisdictional limit for a particular offence, the court is to have regard to that limit when applying the discount." [Emphasis in original]
There appear to be two alternative ways in which a court could assess a sentence in accordance with that construction. One approach would involve the court making an assessment upon a consideration of all relevant factors aside from the plea of guilty but in the context of the prescribed maximum penalty for the offence. If the sentence at that point exceeded the jurisdictional limit, the court would revert to that limit. It would then take into account the plea of guilty and apply a discount (assuming a discount was considered appropriate). The other approach would be for the court to assess the sentence by synthesising all relevant factors including the plea of guilty but in the context of the jurisdictional limit rather than the prescribed maximum penalty for the offence. This would entail treating the jurisdictional limit as the maximum penalty.
In my view, the term "would otherwise have imposed" in s 22(1) is a reference to the sentence a court considers appropriate having regard to the maximum penalty and all of the facts and circumstances of the case. That sentence may then be discounted for the offender's plea of guilty. Once that assessment has been made and any discount applied, there remains the question of whether any jurisdictional limit applies. A sentence will need to be reduced to the limit if it would otherwise be exceeded.
This construction is supported by long-standing authority concerning the correct approach to the assessment of sentence when a court is sentencing for an indictable offence but exercising summary jurisdiction. Such authority is not open to be overturned by a narrow literal construction being given to words used in s 22(1), or words to the same effect, that have been used by the legislature for the past 28 years.

[28]

Longstanding authority

It was held in R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; [2000] NSWCCA 317, and followed in many cases since, that the jurisdictional limit does not represent the maximum penalty for an indictable offence dealt with summarily. Grove J (Spigelman CJ and Kirby J agreeing), said (at [35]-[36]): "The result of true construction of the statutory provisions in New South Wales is that, what has been prescribed is a jurisdictional maximum and not a maximum penalty for any offence triable within that jurisdiction. In other words, where the maximum applicable penalty is lower because the charge has been prosecuted within the limited summary jurisdiction of the Local Court, that court should impose a penalty reflecting the objective seriousness of the offence, tempered if appropriate by subjective circumstances, taking care only not to exceed the maximum jurisdictional limit. The implication of the argument of the appellant that, in lieu of prescribed maximum penalties exceeding two years imprisonment, a maximum of two years imprisonment for all offences triable summarily in the Local Court has been substituted, must be rejected. As must also be rejected, the corollary that a sentence of two years imprisonment should be reserved for a 'worst case'. That conclusion is compatible with the observation of Allen J (Smart J and Dunford J agreeing) in R v Young (Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 October 1993, unreported) at 5: 'It is not the function of Local Courts to give less than appropriate sentences because the matters are being dealt with in a Local Court rather than in the District Court of the Supreme Court.'"
Earlier (at [23]), Grove J referred to the then ss 20 and 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act which provided for the summary disposition of indictable offences: 20 Offences to be dealt with summarily unless election made to proceed on indictment (1) An indictable offence listed in Table 1 to Schedule 1 is to be dealt with summarily by a Local Court unless the prosecuting authority or the person charged with the offence elects in accordance with this Division to have the offence dealt with on indictment. … 27 Maximum penalties for Table 1 offences (1) This section prescribes the maximum penalty that may be imposed for an indictable offence listed in Table 1 to Schedule 1 dealt with summarily under this Division in any case where the maximum penalty (when the offence is dealt with summarily) is not provided by law. (2) The maximum term of imprisonment that a Local Court may impose for an offence is, subject to this section, 2 years or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the offence, whichever is the shorter term.
These provisions are the basis for current ss 260(1) and 267(1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act: 260 Offences to be dealt with summarily unless election made to proceed on indictment (1) An indictable offence listed in Table 1 to Schedule 1 is to be dealt with summarily by the Local Court unless the prosecutor or the person charged with the offence elects in accordance with this Chapter to have the offence dealt with on indictment. … 267 Maximum penalties for Table 1 offences (1) This section prescribes the maximum penalty that may be imposed for an indictable offence listed in Table 1 to Schedule 1 dealt with summarily under this Chapter in any case where the maximum penalty (when the offence is dealt with summarily) is not provided by law. (2) The maximum term of imprisonment that the Local Court may impose for an offence is, subject to this section, 2 years or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the offence, whichever is the shorter term. …
The former and the current provisions are, relevantly, verbatim. Accordingly, Grove J's "true construction" must apply to the provisions of ss 260(1) and 267(1) and (2). They must apply as well to the provisions relevant to offences in Table 2 of Sch 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act which are also, relevantly, verbatim: ss 260(1) and 268 (1) and (1A).
The effect of that "true construction" is that a court sentencing for an indictable offence in the exercise of summary jurisdiction should assess the appropriate penalty in accordance with whatever the facts and circumstances of the case require, within the context of the prescribed maximum penalty for the offence, but not impose a sentence that exceeds the jurisdictional limit. Thus, a sentence, whether or not reduced on account of a plea of guilty, may be assessed at a level higher than 2 years, in which case only 2 years should be imposed.
This analysis reflects what has in fact occurred over the past 20 years in Local Courts and on appeal in the District Court. It also has effect when "back up" or "related" offences are before the District and Supreme Courts pursuant to Ch 3 Pt 3 Div 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
The following cases demonstrate the continued adherence to this sentencing practice.

[32]

Court of Criminal Appeal examples

Cases in this Court also indicate the approach that has been applied in courts sentencing for indictable offences but in the exercise of summary jurisdiction. There are the following examples.
In Lapa v R [2008] NSWCCA 331; (2008) 192 A Crim R 305, the Court was concerned with sentences imposed in the Drug Court. One offence was indictable with a maximum penalty of 14 years but it was dealt with in summary jurisdiction whereby there was the limit of 2 years. In the analysis of Hidden J, the effective sentence was one of 2 years (but reduced by a month to allow credit for pre-sentence custody). With 25% having been allowed for the plea of guilty, the starting point must have been 2 years and 8 months. It was contended that this exceeded the judge's jurisdiction in that the starting point was greater than the maximum sentence available to him.
Hidden J referred to Doan (Grove J at [35]) and said (at [17]): "By parity of reasoning, it was open to Judge Dive in the present case to determine a starting point of sentence above the two-year jurisdictional limit. The only constraint imposed upon him by the relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Act was that the sentence actually passed could not exceed 2 years. Accordingly, his Honour's approach was not in error."
In Mundine v R [2017] NSWCCA 97, the Court considered an aggregate sentence that had been imposed in the District Court for four offences. One of the offences was indictable but had been subject to sentencing in summary jurisdiction as it was before the District Court on a certificate pursuant to s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The primary judge had allowed for a 25% reduction for the offender's pleas of guilty and indicated a sentence for this particular offence of 2 years and 3 months. It was accepted that the judge erred by exceeding the jurisdictional limit. Adamson J said (at [92]): "I discern no error in the sentencing judge's exercise of the sentencing discretion to arrive at a figure of 2 years and 3 months. The error was in not reducing this figure to 2 years, being the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court, which was applicable by reason of ss 168(3) and 268 of the Criminal Procedure Act. As this Court has explained in R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; [2000] NSWCCA 317 at [27]-[35] (Grove J, Spigelman CJ and Kirby J agreeing), a provision such as s 268 of the Criminal Procedure Act is to be treated as a jurisdictional maximum and not a maximum penalty for any offence triable within that jurisdiction. Accordingly, a sentence of two years' imprisonment need not be reserved for a worst case and might be appropriate notwithstanding that a plea of guilty was entered at the earliest opportunity and that, accordingly, a discount of 25% was called for."
Her Honour held (at [93]) that the sentencing discretion miscarried by the judge's failure to have regard to the jurisdictional limit. In resentencing, her Honour applied a 25% discount for the pleas of guilty. In relation to the offence dealt with in summary jurisdiction, she said (at [109]): "For the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, I consider the appropriate sentence to be 2 years and 6 months, commencing on 28 June 2015. However, this term must be reduced to 2 years as the offence was the subject of a certificate under s 166(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court applies."

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Park

Respondent/Defendant:

Legislation Cited (12)

Crimes and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1974(NSW)

Crimes Legislation (Amendment) Act 1990(NSW)

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment Act 2010(NSW)

Criminal Procedure Amendment (Indictable Offences) Act 1995(NSW)

Justice Legislation Amendment (Committals and Guilty Pleas) Act 2017(NSW)

Justice Legislation Amendment (Committal and Guilty Pleas) Act 2017(NSW)

Crimes Act 1900(NSW)

Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007(NSW)

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999(NSW)

Criminal Procedure Act 1986(NSW)

Migration Act 1958(Cth)

Cases Cited (54)

Kristensen v R [2018] NSWCCA 189 Lapa v R [2008] NSWCCA 331; (2008) 192 A Crim R 305 Ly v Jenkins (2001) 114 FCR 237; [2001] FCA 1640 Mundine v R [2017] NSWCCA 97 PG v R [2017] NSWCCA 179 R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 93 ALJR 1106 R v AB [2011] NSWCCA 229 R v Borkowski [2009] NSWCCA 102; (2009) 195 A Crim R 1 R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; [2000] NSWCCA 317 R v Doyle [1988] 2 Qd R 434; (1987) 30 A Crim R 379 R v Johnson [2014] NSWDC 91 R v Mirzaee [2004] NSWCCA 315 R v Price [2016] NSWCCA 50 R v Rampling [2018] NSWLC 7 R v Ravasong [2018] NSWLC 5 R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; [2000] NSWCCA 309 R v Young (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 27 October 1993, unrep) SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34 TL v R [2017] NSWCCA 308 The Queen v A2; The Queen v Magennis; The Queen v Vaziri [2019] HCA 35 Wamir v R [2011] NSWDC 152 Wiltshire v Mafi [2010] WASCA 111; (2010) 211 A Crim R 326 Texts Cited: Sentencing Council (NSW), Reduction in Penalties at Sentence, August 2009 Category: Principal judgment Parties: Jong Han Park (Applicant) The Crown (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: J Paingakulam (Applicant) E Wilkins SC (Crown)

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment] Jong Han Park (the applicant) sought leave to appeal an aggregate sentence of 11 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 8 years. The applicant entered pleas of guilty in the Local Court to the following five offences which were committed to the District Court for sentence: (1) intimidation intending to cause fear of physical harm contrary to s 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW); (2) common assault contrary to s 61 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW); (3) aggravated sexual assault with infliction of actual bodily harm contrary to s 61J(1) of the Crimes Act; (4) choking with intent to commit an indictable offence contrary to s 37(2) of the Crimes Act; and (5) sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 61l of the Crimes Act. When indicating the sentences for the offence of intimidation in (1), a further offence of common assault was taken into account on a Form 1, and for the offence of aggravated sexual assault in (3), a further two offences of indecent assault were taken into account on a Form 1. A further two offences were referred to the Court as related offences under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), namely taking and driving a vehicle without the consent of the owner, contrary to s 154A(1)(a) of the Crimes Act. A charge of stealing property from a dwelling house, contrary to s 148 of the Crimes Act, was taken into account on a Form 1 in respect of one of the offences of take and drive conveyance. In respect of each offence, the sentencing judge applied a discount of 25 per cent for an early plea of guilty. The sentence imposed on the applicant for the second offence of "take and drive conveyance" (referred to as 'offence 6' in the judgment) was of particular significance on the appeal against sentence. Offence 6 was before the District Court as a "related offence" on a on a certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The offence of take and drive conveyance is an indictable offence punishable by imprisonment for 5 years but may be dealt with summarily pursuant to s 260 of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is an offence in Table 2 of Schedule 1 of the Act. The maximum penalty that may be imposed in respect of Table 2 offences when dealt with summarily, otherwise known as the "jurisdictional limit", according to s 268(1A) of the Act is 2 years. In indicating a sentence for offence 6, the sentencing judge stated that he intended to apply a 25 per cent discount to "the sentence that would have otherwise been imposed", deploying the language of s 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. The sentencing judge indicated a sentence of 2 years imprisonment which coincided with the applicable jurisdictional limit. The indicative sentence necessarily implied a pre-discount sentence of 2 years and 8 months. The sentencing judge noted that the applicant committed the offences for which he was sentenced shortly after he arrived in Australia on a holiday visa. The sentencing judge accepted that, because the applicant has no family in this country, his time in custody will be difficult and that should attract a finding of special circumstances. However, the sentencing judge also stated that "there must be a period of custody to reflect these crimes upon which he engaged". In the result, the sentencing judge adjusted the statutory ratio by a period of three months or approximately thirteen weeks. The applicant relied upon two grounds of appeal. First, that the sentencing judge erred in failing to give appropriate weight to the finding of special circumstances; and second, that the aggregate sentence was manifestly excessive. In considering whether the sentence was manifestly excessive, an issue arose as whether the sentencing judge erred when applying the discount of 25 per cent for the plea of guilty to offence 6 to an undiscounted sentence (or starting point) that exceeded the jurisdictional maximum penalty for that offence. Bathurst CJ and R A Hulme J dismissed the appeal. Fullerton J, in dissent, allowed the appeal. Whether the sentencing judge erred in failing to give appropriate weight to the finding of special circumstances? (i) The sentencing judge did not err in failing to give appropriate weight to the finding of special circumstances. The adjustment of the statutory ratio was "modest", however, this was what the judge intended. The sentencing judge expressly stated that the parole period would not be "significantly greater" than what would apply upon the strict application of s 44 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act and it was not submitted by the applicant that the non-parole period which was imposed was due to miscalculation or other arithmetic error: [36] (Bathurst CJ); [89]-[94] (Fullerton J); [161]-[166] (R A Hulme J). R v El-Hayek [2004] NSWCCA 25; (2004) 144 A Crim R 90; R v Cramp [2004] NSWCCA 264; Clarke v R [2009] NSWCCA 49; Quayle v R [2010] NSWCCA 16; Caristo v R [2011] NSWCCA 7 referred to. Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive? (ii) The sentencing judge did not err in assessing 2 years and 8 months imprisonment as an appropriate sentence for offence 6 that was then reduced to 2 years because of the plea of guilty. The expression in section 22 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure Act) that the Court is to impose a lesser sentence "than it would otherwise have imposed" should be construed as referring to the penalty which would have been imposed but for the constraint resulting from the jurisdictional limit. A court sentencing for an indictable offence in the exercise of summary jurisdiction should assess the appropriate sentence for an offence within the context of the prescribed maximum penalty. The assessment involves a synthesis of all relevant facts and circumstances with any discount for a plea of guilty then applied. The result is the sentence that the court would impose. If that sentence exceeds a jurisdictional limit, it must be reduced so that it is within the limit: [22]-[35] (Bathurst CJ); [166]-[202] (R A Hulme J). R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; [2000] NSWCCA 317 considered. R v Young (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 27 October 1993, unrep); R v Doyle [1988] 2 Qd R 434; (1987) 30 A Crim R 379; Canino v Venning (1993) 113 FLR 327; Hansford v His Honour Judge Neesham; [1995] 2 VR 233; Ly v Jenkins (2001) 114 FCR 237; [2001] FCA 1640; Lapa v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 331; (2008) 192 A Crim R 305; Wiltshire v Mafi [2010] WASCA 111; (2010) 211 A Crim R 326; Mundine v R [2017] NSWCCA 97; Hampton v R [2014] NSWCCA 131; (2014) 243 A Crim R 193; Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49; John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 169 CLR 417; [1989] HCA 5; Gett v Tabet [2009] NSWCA 76; (2009) 254 ALR 504; R v Ravasong [2018] NSWLC 5; R v Rampling [2018] NSWLC 7; Wamir v R [2011] NSWDC 152; R v Johnson [2014] NSWDC 91; Bimson, Roads & Maritime Services v Damorange Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 734 referred to. (iii) The aggregate sentence imposed on the applicant was not manifestly excessive. The gravity of the offences, with little available in mitigation, called for a substantial sentence: [36] (Bathurst CJ); [204]-[215] (R A Hulme J). Cahyadi v R [2007] NSWCCA 1; 168 A Crim R 41 referred to. (iv) In dissent, Fullerton J held that the sentencing judge erred in applying the discount of 25 per cent for the applicant's plea of guilty to offence 6 to an undiscounted sentence (or starting point) of 2 years and 8 months. The proper construction of s 22(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act obliges a sentencing court to apply the discount allowed for the plea of guilty to a sentence that the court would in fact have imposed but for an offender's plea of guilty and, where there is a jurisdictional limit for a particular offence, the Court is to have regard to that limit when applying the discount. The sentencing discretion should be exercised afresh by this Court for that reason: [124]-[129]; [132]-[144] (Fullerton J) Lapa v R [2008] NSWCCA 331; (2008) 192 A Crim R 305; Mundine v R [2017] NSWCCA 97 distinguished. Abbas, Bodiotis, Taleb and Amoun v R [2013] NSWCCA 115; (2013) 231 A Crim R 413; Gordon v R [2018] NSWCCA 54; PG v R [2017] NSWCCA 179; Elsaj v R [2017] NSWCCA 124; TL v R [2017] NSWCCA 308; R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; [2000] NSWCCA 317; The Queen v A2; The Queen v Magennis; The Queen v Vaziri [2019] HCA 35 referred to. (v) Finding error on Ground 2, and proceeding to resentence, Fullerton J proposed to quash the aggregate sentence imposed and sentence the applicant to an aggregate sentence of 9 years with a non-parole period of 6 years and 7 months: [146]-[159] (Fullerton J).

Cited By (8)

Principles of construction

As has been stated on a number of occasions, the task of statutory construction must begin and end with a consideration of the text. The statutory text must be considered in context, including the legislative history and extrinsic material. Understanding context has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text: Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41 at [47]; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503; [2012] HCA 55 at [39]. In SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 262 CLR 362; [2017] HCA 34, the plurality (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ) stated the principle in the following terms (citations omitted): "[14] The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected." (citations omitted) Whilst Gageler J made the following remarks (citations omitted): "[39] Integral to making such a choice is discernment of statutory purpose. The unqualified statutory instruction that, in interpreting a provision of a Commonwealth Act, 'the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to each other interpretation' ... 'is in that respect a particular statutory reflection of a general systemic principle'. [40] Exactly the same process of contextual construction is involved when the question is one of what content is to be given to a statutorily invoked concept which is expressed in words the ordinary or grammatical meaning of which is well-enough understood but insufficiently precise to provide definitive guidance as to how the concept is to be understood and applied in the particular statutory setting. An example is the varying senses in which the concept of causation might be invoked in statutory provisions which attribute responsibility for loss caused 'by' or 'because of' or 'as a result of' contravention of different statutory norms. Because 'one cannot give a common sense answer to a question of causation for the purpose of attributing responsibility under some rule without knowing the purpose and scope of the rule', … '[t]he application of a causal term in a statutory provision is always to be determined by reference to the statutory text construed and applied in its statutory context in a manner which best effects its statutory purpose'." See also R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 93 ALJR 1106 at [32]-[37] where Kiefel CJ and Keane J adopted what might be called a broad purposive approach to construction: cf. Bell and Gageler JJ in dissent at [124]; Edelman J (also in dissent) at [163].
In the present case, the purpose of s 22 of the Sentencing Procedure Act may shortly be stated as providing an incentive to a person to plead guilty, whilst not resulting in a sentence which is unreasonably disproportionate to the offence.

The relevant authorities

In R v Young (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 27 October 1993, unrep), Allen J, with whom Smart and Dunford JJ agreed, in dealing with what his Honour considered to be a series of lenient sentences imposed in the Local Court, remarked that "[i]t is not the function of Local Courts to give less than appropriate sentences because the matters are being dealt with in the Local Court rather than in the District Court or the Supreme Court". Although the decision was cited by Grove J in R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; [2000] NSWCCA 317 ('Doan') at [36] in considering the appropriate course to take in sentencing in cases where the jurisdictional limit applied, it is difficult, with respect to his Honour, to see its relevance in dealing with that issue.
Doan was not a case involving a plea. Rather, as I pointed out, it involved, in the context of a parity argument, the approach to be taken in sentencing in circumstances where the jurisdictional limit imposed on the Local Court applied. In that case, Grove J in considering the then ss 20 and 27 of the Criminal Procedure Act (the predecessors to ss 260 and 267) stated at [35] (Spigelman CJ and Kirby J agreeing): "[35] The result of true construction of the statutory provisions in New South Wales is that, what has been prescribed is a jurisdictional maximum and not a maximum penalty for any offence triable within that jurisdiction. In other words, where the maximum applicable penalty is lower because the charge has been prosecuted within the limited summary jurisdiction of the Local Court, that court should impose a penalty reflecting the objective seriousness of the offence, tempered if appropriate by subjective circumstances, taking care only not to exceed the maximum jurisdictional limit. The implication of the argument of the appellant that, in lieu of prescribed maximum penalties exceeding two years imprisonment, a maximum of two years imprisonment for all offences triable summarily in the Local Court has been substituted, must be rejected. As must also be rejected, the corollary that a sentence of two years imprisonment should be reserved for a 'worst case'."
It is apparent from his Honour's remarks and the authorities he cited in support, R v Doyle [1988] 2 Qd R 434; (1987) 30 A Crim R 379; Canino v Venning (1993) 113 FLR 327 at 330; (1933) 66 A Crim R 92 and Hansford v His Honour Judge Neesham [1995] 2 VR 233, that he was rejecting an approach to sentencing for Table offences which treated the jurisdictional limit of 2 years as the maximum penalty for the offence in question and the corollary that in sentencing for those offences, the penalty of 2 years is reserved for the worst class of case. The alternative approach which his Honour found to be correct involves consideration of the appropriate penalty having regard to among other things the statutory maximum penalty for the offence in question and adjusting the sentence to take account of the jurisdictional limit. This necessarily involves consideration of whether if permitted a sentence above the jurisdictional limit was otherwise appropriate. If so, the Court is to impose a sentence not exceeding the actual jurisdictional limit.
Doan was considered briefly in Ly v Jenkins (2001) 114 FCR 237; [2001] FCA 1640 which involved the question of whether the Federal Parliament had power to confer jurisdiction on the Local Court to deal summarily with offences under the Copyright Act 1986 (Cth). In the course of his judgment, Sackville J with whom Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) agreed at [118], described the effect of Doan as imposing a "jurisdictional maximum and not a maximum penalty for any offence triable within the jurisdiction".
Lapa v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 331; (2008) 192 A Crim R 305 did concern a plea. Similarly to the indicative sentence in the present case, an indicative sentence of 2 years after a discount of 25 per cent for an early plea was determined. The starting point was therefore a sentence of 2 years and 8 months. The Court rejected the submission that the approach resulted in the jurisdictional limit of the Drug Court being exceeded. Hidden J, with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Hulme J agreed, stated at [17] that by parity of reasoning to Doan, it was open to determine a starting point of the sentence above the 2 year jurisdictional limit. It should be noted that both Doan and Lapa have been followed by the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, Wiltshire v Mafi [2010] WASCA 111; (2010) 211 A Crim R 326 at [29].
A similar conclusion was reached in Mundine v R [2017] NSWCCA 97. That case like the present involved an indicative sentence for an offence being dealt with on a s 166 certificate. In that case, the sentencing judge had determined the appropriate sentence was 2 years and 3 months after a discount of 25 per cent for a plea of guilty. He was held to be in error not because of the starting point from which he assessed the discount but rather that having reached the indicative sentence of 2 years and 3 months, he erred in not reducing the sentence to 2 years to bring it in within the jurisdictional limit. Basten JA at [19] stated that the jurisdictional limit applied "only to the sentence actually imposed, not to the starting point prior to the discount for the plea". Adamson J explained the position as follows at [92]: "[92] The other indicative sentence which was the subject of criticism was the one imposed for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm on the certificate given under s 166(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. I discern no error in the sentencing judge's exercise of the sentencing discretion to arrive at a figure of 2 years and 3 months. The error was in not reducing this figure to 2 years, being the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court, which was applicable by reason of ss 168(3) and 268 of the Criminal Procedure Act. As this Court has explained in R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115; [2000] NSWCCA 317 at [27]-[35] (Grove J, Spigelman CJ and Kirby J agreeing), a provision such as s 268 of the Criminal Procedure Act is to be treated as a jurisdictional maximum and not a maximum penalty for any offence triable within that jurisdiction. Accordingly, a sentence of two years' imprisonment need not be reserved for a worst case and might be appropriate notwithstanding that a plea of guilty was entered at the earliest opportunity and that, accordingly, a discount of 25% was called for."
In resentencing, Adamson J with whom the other members of the Court agreed, imposed individual sentences for each offence rather than an aggregate sentence. For the offence the subject of the s 166 certificate, she stated that after a discount of 25 per cent, the appropriate sentence was 2 years and 6 months which she reduced to 2 years to take account of the jurisdictional limit.

Consideration

In the present case, it does not appear to be suggested that the sentencing approach adopted in relation to Table offences is incorrect as distinct from suggesting that it cannot be used in circumstances where the appropriate discount for a plea of guilty was required to be taken into account. The sentencing approach is consistent with the distinction drawn in ss 267(2) and 268(1A) of the Criminal Procedure Act between the sentence the Local Court can impose and the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for the offence.
It would be anomalous and lead to incoherence if a different approach was to be taken to sentencing for Table offences in circumstances where a discount for a plea of guilty falls to be considered. Section 22 of the Sentencing Procedure Act should be read in the context of the appropriate manner of sentencing for Table offences and the expression "than it otherwise would have imposed" should be construed as referring to the penalty which would have been imposed but for the constraint resulting from the jurisdictional limit. That approach seems to me to be consistent with the purpose of the provisions to provide discounts for the pleas whilst ensuring that a sentence disproportionate to the gravity of the offence is not imposed. In many cases, Table offences if dealt with on an indictment would attract a significantly greater penalty than the jurisdictional limit. It would, in my opinion, be contrary to the requirement that the discount not result in a sentence disproportionate to the gravity of the offence, to discount from the jurisdictional limit as distinct from what the judge would otherwise consider to be the appropriate starting point.
Further, even if the expression in s 22, "a lesser penalty than it would otherwise have imposed" should be read as referring to the penalty imposed as a consequence of the exercise of the jurisdictional limit, the approach taken by the sentencing judge in the present case did not infringe the provision. If, as in the present case, the discount for the plea reduced the sentence from its notional starting point to the jurisdictional limit it would simply follow that no lesser penalty was imposed. The information required by subsection (2) was simply that the effect of the discount did not bring the sentence below the jurisdictional limit. Similarly, if a starting point was such that after discount the sentence was below the jurisdictional limit, a lesser penalty has been imposed although the sentence would be greater than if the discount had been applied to the jurisdictional limit as a starting point.
For these reasons, I agree with the conclusion of R A Hulme J on this issue.
I accept that the contrary conclusion reached by Fullerton J is arguable. However, even if I had considered that view correct, I would not overturn the two previous decisions of this Court which have reached a contrary conclusion. It would not be possible, in my view, to reach the requisite degree of satisfaction to warrant overruling them: see Hampton v R [2014] NSWCCA 131; (2014) 243 A Crim R 193 at [32]; Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49 at [84]-[85]. Further, it is important to bear in mind the approach set out in those cases has been accepted as correct by judges and magistrates in a large number of cases and the legislature has not sought to intervene, notwithstanding the fact that it has added a considerable number of offences to the Tables and at least partly revised s 22 for the purpose of limiting its operation to summary proceedings: c/f John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 169 CLR 417 at 438-439; [1989] HCA 5; Gett v Tabet [2009] NSWCA 76; (2009) 254 ALR 504 at [297]-[298]. In these circumstances, I do not think these cases should be overruled unless the Court concluded they were plainly wrong. As I indicated, I am not of that view.
It must be emphasised that the conclusion I have reached is based on the assumption that what was said in Doan, that the jurisdictional limit was not to be treated as the maximum penalty for any particular offence, is correct. In the context of legislation which imposed both maximum and minimum penalties, this approach has not been followed but rather that the maximum and minimum penalties have been treated as providing the range within which the seriousness of the offence is to be assessed. Thus, in Bahar v R (2011) 45 WAR 100; [2011] WASCA 249, McLure P, with whom the other members of the Court, agreed made the following comments: "[54] Otherwise, there is no positive inconsistency in terms between s 233C and the general sentencing principles in the Crimes Act as supplemented by common law principles. In particular, the sentencing principles are intentionally framed at a level of generality for application within the boundaries of power established not only by the maximum statutory penalty but also the minimum statutory penalty. The statutory maximum and minimum also dictate the seriousness of the offence for the purpose of s 16A(1). It would be positively inconsistent with the statutory scheme for a sentencing judge to make his or her own assessment as to the 'just and appropriate' sentence ignoring the mandatory minimum or mandatory maximum penalty and then to impose something other than a 'just and appropriate' sentence (whether as to type or length) in order to bring it up to the statutory minimum or down to the statutory maximum, as the case may be. The statutory minimum and statutory maximum penalties are the floor and ceiling respectively within which the sentencing judge has a sentencing discretion to which the general sentencing principles are to be applied." See also Karim v The Queen; Magaming v The Queen; Bin Lahaiya v The Queen; Bayu v The Queen; Alomalu v The Queen (2013) 83 NSWLR 268; [2013] NSWCCA 23 at [42]-[45]; c/f Dui Kol v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 150 at [12]-[16], [27]-[30].
However, the matter was not raised in the appeal.

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