Ground 2: The sentence is manifestly excessive.
19 The first ground is directed to the following remarks by his Honour: (ROS 5/6)
"It has been urged upon me that I should adjust the normal ratio of the non-parole period to head sentence from the usual sixty percent to sixty-six point six percent, so that the ratio is less in your case on account of your age and your state of health. In my view, taking into account all relevant factors, there is no particular need to adjust that ratio, bearing in mind that I must impose, as a non-parole period, a sentence which as a minimum is appropriate in all the circumstances. Taking into account the fact that this is a first offence, and taking into account also your age and your state of health, I am of the view that it is highly unlikely that you will re-offend again. I also bear in mind that it is highly likely that upon release from prison you will be deported and on account of those factors in my view it is both unnecessary and undesirable to provide for a longer than usual period of supervision on parole ."
(emphasis added)
20 The applicant contended, and the Crown acknowledged, that it was erroneous to take account of the prospect of deportation in determining the non parole period. In The Queen v Shrestha (1991) 173 CLR 48, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ said this: (at 71)
"This country has a direct and significant interest in the well-being and rehabilitation of all who are detained within its gaols, whether or not their origins, ties or future prospects lie in this or in some other country. It also has a responsibility, both moral and under international treaty, to treat all who are subjected to criminal proceedings in its courts or imprisonment in its gaols humanely and without discrimination based on national or ethnic origins. To deny foreign offenders of the kind in question the opportunity for the amelioration of their situation and the incentive for reform and rehabilitation which the parole system offers is not to differentiate by reference to degrees of criminality or prospects of rehabilitation. It is to discriminate against prisoners of that class because of their origins, their place of residence and their family ties." (footnotes omitted)
21 Where an offender would otherwise qualify for a finding of special circumstances, because it is recognised that he or she would benefit from a longer than usual period of supervision, then such a finding should be made. The sentencing Judge should not refrain from such a finding because it is believed likely that the offender may be deported at the end of the non parole period, and that supervision therefore would not be provided in Australia.
22 There being error, the focus during the course of argument shifted to the requirement in s6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, namely, whether some other sentence was warranted in law and should have been passed. Attention was drawn to the words of Spigelman CJ in R v Boulghourgian [2001] NSWCCA 460: (at para 34)
"[34] Even though there is error detected in the reasoning process of a trial judge, s6(3) does not enable this court, much less require it, to interfere with the sentence unless it is of the view that a more lenient sentence should have been passed: Regina v Astill (No 2) (1992) 64 A Crim R 289 per Sully J at 303 and Lee AJ at 304."
(see also R v Simpson (2001) 53 NSWLR 704)
23 The argument advanced by the Crown under s6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act raised many of the same issues canvassed by the applicant in respect of ground 2. The Crown asserted that, in the context of this offence, none of the subjective matters warranted a lesser sentence. Reference was made to R v Klein (2001) 121 A Crim R 90, where Wood CJ at CL said this: (at 95)
"Sentencing judges must not lose sight of the following principles when sentencing for such offences:
(a) Prior good character and relative youth are of reduced significance since they are matters which the organisers of the heroin and cocaine trade use to their advantage, in order to avoid attracting suspicion in relation to those who carry those substances across immigration and customs barriers upon their behalf. (See Leroy (1984) 2 NSWLR 441 at 446/7, and Lawson, Wu and Thapa (1997) 98 A Crim R 463.)
(b) The subjective circumstances of an offender standing for sentence need to be kept in context, and not given such an undue weight as result in a sentence that is disproportionate to the objective seriousness of the criminality involved. (See Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354; Stead [1999] NSWCCA 41 and Zayat (NSW CCA, 22 November 1996.)
(c) For foreign offenders, the fact of their separation from their homeland and family is of very little relevance. Those who choose to run the risk of bringing drugs into this country must accept the consequences of being imprisoned here, with all the disadvantages entailed. (See Ferrer-Esis (1991) 55 A Crim R 231 at 239 and Chu (NSW CCA, 16 October 1998.)
(f) There is no reason to extend particular leniency to those who perform the task of personally carrying narcotics into the country, because without them the trade in those substances will collapse. (See Laurentiu and Becheru (1992) 63 A Crim R 402, Budiman (1998) 102 A Crim R 411, and Behar (NSW CCA 14 October 1998.)"
24 Here general deterrence was an important consideration. I am not persuaded that the term imposed, namely, imprisonment for 9 years, was manifestly excessive. However, I am persuaded that the error that has been acknowledged, namely, taking deportation into account, did affect the non parole period which was fixed, such that the Court should intervene on that aspect of the sentence.
25 The applicant's age, his state of health, his isolation and the fact that it was his first time in custody, also indicate that the non parole period should be adjusted by reason of special circumstances.